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ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 


ON    THE    BASIS    OF    LECTURES 


BY  WILLIAM  BARRON,  F.RS.E. 

PROFESSOR   OF   BELLES-LETTRES   AND    LOGIC    IN    THE   UNIVERSITY    01 
ST.   ANDREWS. 


LARGE  SUPPLEMENTARY  ADDITIONS, 

CliJEFIA    FROM  WATTS,  ABEECEOMBIE,   BEOWN,  WHATELY,   MILl-, 
AND  THOMSON. 


EDITED   AND    COMPILED 
BY 

Pkof.  JAMES  E.  BOYD,  D.D., 

AUTHOR   OF  ELEMENTS   OF  RHETORIC,    EDITOR   OF   KAMEs'  CRITICISE 
AND   OF    ENGLISH    POETS    WITH    NOTES,    ETC. 

°f    THC 

university  ,tcond  (revised)  edition. 

OF 

A.  S.  13AKNES   &  COMPANY, 

NEW  YORK  AND  CHICAGO. 


"A  "Well  of  English  Undented.' 


LITERATURE  AND  BELLES  LETTRES. 

PROFESSOR  CLEVELAND'S  WORKS. 

A  WHOLE  LIBRARY  IN  FOUR  VOLUMES. 

COMPENDiraiiLITERATIE. 

CLEVELAND'S  COMPLETE  MILTON,  WITH  VERBAL  INDEX. 

One  Hundred  and  Twenty  Thousand  of  these  Volumes  have  heen  sold,  and  they  are 
the  acknowledged  Standard  wherever  this  refining  study  is  pursued. 


PROF.  JAMES  R.  BOYD'S  WORKS. 

EMBBACING 

COMPOSITION,  LOGIC,  LITERATURE,  RHETORIC,  CRITICISM, 
BIOGRAPHY  ;— POETRY,  AND  PROSE. 


BOYD'S  COMPOSITION  AND  RHETORIC. 

Remarkable  for  the  space  and  attention  given  to  grammatical  principles,  to  af- 
ford a  substantial  groundwork ;  also  for  the  admirable  treatment  of  synonyms, 
figurative  language,  and  the  sources  of  argument  and  illustration,  with  notable  ex- 
ercises for  preparing  the  way  to  poetic  composition. 

BOYD'S  ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC 

explains,  first,  the  conditions  and  processes  by  which  the  mind  receives  ideas,  and 
then  unfolds  the  art  of  reasoning,  with  clear  directions  for  the  establishment  and 
confirmation  of  sound  judgment.  A  thoroughly  practical  treatise,  being  a  system- 
atic and  philosophical  condensation  of  all  that  is  known  of  the  subject. 

BOYD'S  KAMES'  CRITICISM. 

This  standard  work,  as  is  well  known,  treats  of  the  faculty  of  perception,  and 
the  result  of  its  exercise  upon  the  tastes  and  emotions.  It  may  therefore  be  termed 
a  Compendium  of  Aesthetics  and  Natural  Morals ;  »ad  its  use  in  refining  the  mind 
and  heart  has  made  it  a  standard  text-book. 

BOYD'S  ANNOTATED  ENGLISH  CLASSICS. 

Milton's  Paradise  Lost.  I     Thomson's  Seasons. 

Young's  Night  Thoughts.  Pollok's  Course  of  Time. 

Cowper's  Task,  Table  Talk,  &c.  I  '  Lord  Bacon's  Essays. 

In  six  cheap  volumes.  The  service  done  to  literature,  by  Prof.  Boyd's  Annota- 
tions upon  these  standard  writers,  can  with  difficulty  be  estimated.  Line  by  line 
their  expressions  and  ideas  are  analyzed  and  discussed,  until  the  best  compre- 
hension of  the  powerful  use  of  language  is  obtained  by  the  learner. 

Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress  in  the  year  1856,  by 

A.    S.   BARNES  &   COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District 

of  New  York. 

B'S  E.  OP  L. 


INTRODUCTORY    JBSERVATIONS. 


The  Lectures  which  constitute  the  basis  of  the  present  work 
were  read  by  the  learned  author,  during  twenty-five  sessions,  in 
the  University  of  St.  Andrews,  and  may  consequently  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  elaborated  with  great  care,  and  to  be  wor- 
thy of  the  attentive  study  of  all  who  desire  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  the  science  and  the  art  of  Reasoning. 

As  the  Lectures  are  few  and  concise,  there  seemed  to  be 
occasion,  in  fitting  them  the  better  for  a  text-book  in  schools,  or 
even  for  private  perusal,  to  supplement  them  occasionally,  from 
the  works  of  distinguished  writers  on  Logic,  on  points  where, 
for  practical  utility,  a  more  full  discussion  of  the  subject  is 
needed ;  and  also  to  introduce  various  important  topics  upon 
which  Professor  Barron  had  neglected  to  offer  observations. 
As  stated  in  the  title-page,  the  work*  to  which  the  compiler 
lias  had  recourse  for  this  purpose,  are,  chiefly,  those  of  Dr. 
Isaac  Watts,  Dr.  Abercrombie,  Archbishop  Whately,  Dr.  Thom- 
as Brown,  John  Stuart  Mill,  and  William  Thomson.  The  con- 
tributions gained  from  these  standard  sources  will  be  found  at 
/east  equal  in  value,  and  nearly  also  in  amount,  to  the  Lec- 
tures. It  is  hoped,  therefore,  that  a  work  "has  thus  been  con- 
structed which  will  be  found  to  possess  some  advantages  over 
the  text-books  now  most  generally  used.  One  peculiar  feature 
of  it,  is  the  omission  of  a  great  deal  of  perplexing  and  useless 
matter  relating  to  the  Syllogism ;  and  yet  it  presents  a  full  dis- 
cussion of  the  value  and  functions  of  that  ancient  form  of  rea- 

.     215268 


4  INTRODUCTORY   OBSERVATIONS. 

soning.  The  opinions  and  views  of  distinguished  authors  on 
this  interesting  branch  of  the  subject  are  largely  quoted,  that 
the  student  may  be  led  to  a  discovery  of  the  true  state  of  the 
case.  He  is  not,  moreover,  here  subjected  to  the  irksome  task 
of  learning  a  huge  mass  of  intricate  and  unprofitable  details 
about  syllogistic  Moods  and  Figures,  such  as  are  found  in  most 
treatises  on  the  science  of  Logic. 

The  author  of  "  The  Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,"  Dr.  George 
Campbell,  not  a  mean  reasoner,  nor  an  indifferent  critic  in  mat- 
ters of  this  kind,  in  that  celebrated  work  observes  :  "  It  is  long 
since  I  was  convinced,  by  what  Mr.  Locke  hath  said  on  the 
subject,  that  the  syllogistic  art,  with  its  figures  and  moods, 
serves  more  to  display  the  ingenuity  of  the  inventor,  and  to 
exercise  the  address  and  fluency  of  the  learner,  than  to  assist 
the  diligent  inquirer  in  his  researches  after  truth.  The  method 
of  proving  by  syllogism  appears,  even  on  a  superficial  review, 
both  unnatural  and  prolix.  The  rules  laid  down  for  distin- 
guishing the  conclusive  from  the  inconclusive  forms  of  argu- 
ment, the  true  syllogism  from  the  various  kinds  of  sophism, 
are  at  once  cumbersome  to  the  memory  and  unnecessary  in 
practice.  No  person,  one  may  venture  to  pronounce,  will  ever 
be  made  a  reasoner  who  stands  in  need  of  them.  In  a  word, 
the  whole  bears  the  manifest  indications  of  an  artful  and  osten- 
tatious parade  of  learning,  calculated  for  giving  the  appearance 
of  great  profundity  to  what  in  fact  is  very  shallow.  Such,  I 
acknowledge,  have  been,  of  a  long  time,  my  sentiments  on  the 
subject.  On  a  nearer  inspection,  I  cannot  say  I  have  found 
reason  to  alter  them,  though  I  think  I  have  seen  a  little  further 
into  the  nature  of  the  disputative  science,  and  consequently  into 
the. grounds  of  its  futility." 

After  a  series  of  observations  made  in  vindication  of  these 
criticisms  upon  what  he  calls  the  scholastic  art  of  disputation, 
Dr.  Campbell  concludes  in  the  following  terms :  "  When  all 
erudition  consisted  more  in  an  acquaintance  with  words,  and 


INTRODUCTORY    OBSERVATIONS.  5 

address  in  using  them,  than  in  the  knowledge  of  things,  dex- 
terity in  this  exercitation  conferred  as  much  lustre  on  the 
scholar  as  agility  in  the  tilts  and  tournaments  added  glory  to 
the  knight.  In  proportion  as  the  attention  of  mankind  has 
been  drawn  off  to  the  study  of  Nature,  the  honors  of  this  con- 
tentious art  have  faded,  and  it  is  now  almost  forgotten.  There 
is  no  reason  to  wish  its  revival,  as  eloquence  seems  to  have 
been  very  little  benefited  by  it,  and  philosophy  still  less.  Kay, 
there  is  but  too  good  rea'son  to  affirm  that  there  are  two  evils, 
at  least,  which  it  has  gendered.  These  are,  first,  an  itch  of  dis- 
puting on  every  subject,  however  incontrovertible ;  the  other, 
a  sort  of  philosophic  pride,  which  will  not  permit  us  to  think 
that  we  believe  any  thing,  even  a  self-evident  principle,  without 
a  previous  reason  or  argument.  In  order  to  gratify  this  passion, 
we  invariably  recur  to  words,  and  are  at  immense  pains  to  lose 
ourselves  in  clouds  of  our  own  raising.  We  imagine  we  are 
advancing  and  making  wonderful  progress,  while  the  mist  of 
words  in  which  we  have  involved  our  intellect  hinders  us  from 
discerning  that  we  are  moving  in  a  circle  all  the  time" — 
[Philosophy  of  Rhetoric,  p.  92.) 

Of  the  ancient  Logic  (which  Archbishop  Whately  and  others 
have  endeavored  to  revive),  the  same  views  were  entertained 
substantially  by  Dr.  Thomas  Reid  and  Dr.  Adam  Smith,  Pro- 
fessors of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Glasgow,  and 
by  Professor  Dugald  Stewart,  of  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 
One  of  the  pupils  of  Dr.  Adam  Smith,  and  who  was  ranked 
among  his  most  valued  friends  during  life,  makes  the  following 
significant  statement :  "  In  the  Professorship  of  Logic,  to  which 
Mr.  Smith  was  appointed  on  his  first  introduction  into  the 
University  of  Glasgow,  he  soon  saw  the  necessity  of  departing 
widely  from  the  plan  that  had  been  followed  by  his  predeces- 
sors, and  of  directing  the  attention  of  his  pupils  to  studies  of  a 
more  interesting  and  useful  nature  than  the  logic  and  meta- 
physics of  the  schools.     Accordingly,  after  exhibiting  a  gen- 


0  INTRODUCTORY    OBSERVATIONS. 

eral  view  of  the  powers  of  the  mind,  and  explaining  so  much 
of  the  ancient  logic  as  was  requisite  to  gratify  curiosity  with 
respect  to  an  artificial  method  of  reasoning,  which  had  once 
occupied  the  universal  attention  of  the  learned,  he  dedicated 
all  the  rest  of  his  time  to  the  delivery  of  a  system  of  rhet- 
oric and  belles-lettres."  —  (Dugald  Stewart's  Account  of 
the  Life  and  Writings  of  Adam  Smith,  Works,  vol.  vii. 
pp.  8,  9.) 

The  same  view  of  the  subject  was  expressed  by  Lord  Karnes, 
in  his  "  Progress  of  Reason :" — "  Aristotle,"  he  observes,  "  has 
done  hurt  to  the  reasoning  faculty,  by  drawing  it  out  of  its 
natural  course  into  devious  paths.  His  artificial  mode  of  rea- 
soning is  no  less  superficial  than  intricate.  I  say  superficial ; 
for  in  none  of  his  logical  works  is  a  single  truth  attempted  to  be 
proved  by  syllogism  that  requires  a  proof.  The  propositions  he  un- 
dertakes to  prove  by  syllogism,  are  all  of  them  self-evident.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  following  proposition  :  That  man  has  a  power 
of  self-motion.  To  prove  this,  he  assumes  the  following  axiom, 
upon  which,  indeed,  every  one  of  his  syllogisms  is  founded,  viz. : 
That  whatever  is  true  of  a  number  of  particulars,  holds  true 
of  every  one  separately  ;  which  is  thus  expressed  in  logical 
terms  :  Whatever  is  true  of  the  genus,  holds  true  of  every  spe- 
cies. Founding  upon  that  axiom,  he  reasons  thus  :  '  All  ani- 
mals have  a  power  of  self-motion  :  man  is  an  animal :  ergo, 
man  has  a  power  of  self-motion.'  Now,  if  all  animals  have  a 
power  of  self-motion,  it  requires  no  argument  to  prove  that 
man,  an  animal,  has  that  power  ;  and,  therefore,  what  he  gives 
as  a  conclusion,  or  a  consequence,  is  not  really  so  :  it  is  not 
inferred  from  the  fundamental  pr6position,  but  is  included  in  it. 
At  the  same  time,  the  self-motive  power  of  man  is  more  clearly 
ascertained  by  experience  than  that  of  any  other  animal ;  and, 
in  attempting  to  prove  man  to  be  a  self-motive  animal,  is  it  not 
absurd  to  found  the  argument  on  a  proposition  less  certain  than 
that  undertaken  to  be  demonstrated  ?     What  is  here  observed, 


•       INTRODUCTORY    OBSERVATIONS.  7 

will  be  found  applicable  to  the  bulk,  if  not  the  whole,  of  his 
syllogisms." 

The  views  of  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  of  the  University  of  Edin 
burgh,  correspond  substantially  with  those  above  given,  and 
will  be  found  in  the  latter  part  of  this  volume.  These  are  fol- 
lowed by  a  more  profound  discussion  of  the  subject  by  Mr. 
Mill,  who  in  part  sustains,  and  in  part  dissents  from,  the 
statements  and  reasonings  both  of  the  writers  just  referred  to 
and  of  our  author.  Yet  on  the  whole,  perhaps,  he  has  present- 
ed the  most  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  exact  value  and  lim- 
ited functions  of  the  famous  Syllogistic  Process.  Other  por- 
tions, also,  of  this  work  have  been  greatly  enriched  by  contribu- 
tions derived  from  the  same  author. 

The  method  of  treating  the  general  subject,  which  Professor 
Barron  has  in  the  following  Lectures  pursued,  seems  to  be  phil- 
osophical, and  well  adapted  to  secure  all  the  most  valuable  ends 
of  Logic,  in  a  large  and  'popular  sense  of  that  term.  He  first 
discusses  every  topic  introductory  to  the  art  of  reasoning.  He 
explains  the  manner  in  which  we  receive  Ideas,  the  sources 
from  which  they  are  derived,  and  the  methods  we  must  employ 
to  render  them  clear,  adequate,  and  conclusive.  He  then  ex- 
plains the  nature  of  the  propositions  into  which  they  may  be 
formed,  and  the  judgments  which  we  must  pass  on  these  prop- 
ositions. He  delineates  the  prejudices  which  pervert  our  judg- 
ments, and  lays  down  some  rules  which  we  must  follow,  in 
order  to  form  them  with  accuracy  and  justness.  He  then  treats 
of  Reasoning,  or  the  method  of  ascertaining,  propositions  by 
means  of  intermediate  ideas,  or  proofs,  whether  demonstrative 
or  probable.  He  explains  the  different  -methods,  in  common 
use,  of  distributing  or  arranging  ideas  in  different  processes  of 
reasoning.  The  principal  kinds  of  Sophistry,  or  False  Reason- 
ing, are  subsequently  brought  to  view  (which,  however,  are 
more  fully  considered  in  the  pages  we  have  drawn  from  Dr. 
Abercrombie).    The  author  concludes  with  an  exposition  of  the 


8  INTRODUCTORY    OBSERVATIONS. 

nature  of  the  Syllogistic  Process,  and  of  its  great  want  of  utili- 
ty, for  all  the  legitimate  purposes  of  reasoning  in  common  life. 

From  the  treatise  of  the  learned  Dr.  Watts  have  been  drawn 
some  valuable  observations  ou  Prejudices,  and  on  Fallacies  in 
Reasoning ;  also,  some  important  Principles  and  Rules  of  Judg- 
ment, in  matters  of  Reason  and  Speculation,  of  Morality  and 
Religion,  of  Human  Prudence,  of  Human  Testimony,  and  of 
Divine  Testimony.  He  has  supplied  us,  also,  with  some  ex- 
cellent Rules  of  Method  in  Reasoning. 

The  pages  drawn  from  the  work  of  Dr.  Abercrombie  (on  the 
Intellectual  Powers)  are  regarded  as  possessing  uncommon 
value.  They  instruct  us  how  we  may  examine  and  test  the 
validity  of  a  process  of  reasoning  :  they  expose  the  most  com- 
mon fallacies  that  are  practised  in  reasoning :  they  enable  us 
to  distinguish  the  sound  exercise  of  judgment  from  the  art  of 
ingenious  disputation ;  and  they  contain  some  admirable  re- 
marks upon  the  due  culture  and  regulation  of  the  judgment, 
showing  its  important  applications,  alike  to  the  formation  of 
opinions  and  the  regulation  of  conduct.  While  some  of  these 
topics  do  not  fall  within  the  narrow  limits  of  the  Ancient 
Logic,  they  possess  an  admirable  fitness  to  prepare  the  mind 
for  logical  investigations,  and  deductions,  and  communications, 
as  well  as  for  a  rational  course  of  action. 

To  Archbishop  Whately  this  volume  is  much  indebted,  not 
for  what  has  been  taken  from  his  Logic,  but  from  the  First 
Part  of  his  work  on  Rhetoric,  which,  for  all  the  practical  pur 
poses  of  life,  in  matters  of  reasoning,  is  far  more  valuable  than 
the  other  work.  The  best  thoughts  which  he  has  therein  com- 
municated on  the  subject  of  reasoning  have  been  selected,  and 
introduced  into  the  present  work,  and  will  be  acknowledged  to 
be  worthy  of  diligent  study  and  attention. 

To  the  additions  already  named  has  been  appended,  as  in- 
teresting, and  not  inappropriate,  a  brief  illustration  of  the 
Socratic  method  of  Reasoning. 


INTRODUCTORY   OBSERVATIONS.  9 

These  additions,  which  are  either  distributed  through  the 
Lectures  or  appended,  may  readily  be  distinguished  from  them 
by  being  included  in  brackets,  or  by  a  distinct  announcement 
being  made. 

The  last  three  Lectures  of  the  original  work  of  Professor 
Barron,  embracing  a  general  view  of  human  knowledge,  or  of 
the  sciences  and  arts  which  are  proper  objects  of  investigation, 
have  been  omitted  in  this  volume,  as  not  peculiarly  appro- 
priate  to  a  work  on  Logic.  Some  portions  of  the  other  Lec- 
tures, also,  of  a  local  character,  or  of  not  sufficient  pertinency 
and  importance,  have  been  omitted,  and  occasionally  a  verbal 
correction  has  been  made.  The  Editor  has,  further,  taken  the 
liberty  of  indicating  by  the  Italic  character  the  prominent  top- 
ics— has  prepared  running  titles  at  the  top  of  the  page,  and 
arranged  the  matter  of  the  Lectures  under  two  forms  of  type, 
that  the  illustrative  and  also  the  less  important  parts  might  be 
more  readily  discerned, — thus  adapting  the  Lectures  to  more 
convenient  use  in  the  class-room,  or  for  private  reading. 

What  Mr.  Thomson  has  so  well  said  in  the  conclusion  of  his 
able  wTork  on  the  Laws  of  Thought,  the  compiler  of  the  present 
work  would  here  introduce,  as  conveying  an  important  admoni- 
tion to  those  who  would  derive  from  it  the  greatest  amount  of  ben- 
efit which  it  is  designed  and  suited  to  confer.  He  says  :  "  If  this 
little  work  is  hastily  examined  and  cast  aside,  of  course  the 
reader  will  not  have  become  a  logician ;  he  will  have  learned 
the  unimportant  fact  that  upon  this  or  that  disputed  doctrine 
the  author  held  this  or  that  opinion,  and  his  knowledge  will  go 
no  further.  Instead  of  learning  Logic,  he  will  know  an  insig- 
nificant fact  in  logical  history.  The  mistake  is  not  uncom- 
mon : — we  inquire  what  Aristotle  and  Bishop  Butler  said  on 
morality,  and  think  that  we  have  studied  Moral  Philosophy ; 
we  read  the  Organon,  and  call  ourselves  logicians.  History 
presides  over  these  and  other  facts :  we  are  in  her  domain  when 
we  use  our  books  in  this  narrow  spirit.     Philosophy  does  not   v 

1« 


10  INTRODUCTORY    OBSERVATIONS. 

exist  until  the  mind  of  the  student  begins  to  work  for  itself 
with  the  principles  it  receives  historically ;  to  decompose  and 
to  compose  anew,  to  criticise  the  arguments  employed,  to  essay 
at  least  to  push  the  confines  of  Truth  further  into  the  wilds  of 
error  and  ignorance,  and  to  leave  her  a  wider  territory." 

u  If  Grammar  is  learnt  by  speaking  and  writing ;  if  a  man 
cannot  become  an  orator  without  repeated  efforts  to  speak  v* 
public,  nor  a  poet  without  practising  the  mechanism  of  verse, 
till  he  can  use  it  with  ease,  it  seems  absurd  to  expect  that  a 
course  of  lectures  heard,  with  a  string  of  definitions  learnt, 
will  make  a  logician.  Let  those  who  wish  to  possess  the  intel- 
lect they  have  received  from  above  in  the  depth  and  clearness, 
the  sober  composure,  the  calm  activity  which  a  high  degree  of 
culture  can  alone  bestow,  venture  to  study  Logic  in  a  larger 
spirit  than  the  merely  historical." 

Having  thus  stated  the  general  design,  and  glanced  at  the 
more  prominent  topics  considered  in  this  volume,  and  having 
noticed  some  of  the  various  enlargements  and  improvements, 
which  have  been  attached  to  the  original  Lectures  that  form  the 
basis  of  the  present  work,  the  Editor  sends  it  forth  on  a  mis- 
sion of  usefulness  among  the  Academies,  Female  Seminaries, 
and  Colleges  of  this  Western  Hemisphere,  with  the  earnest  de- 
sire that  it  may  be  found  eminently  serviceable  in  forwarding 
the  cause  of  Truth,  and  in  promoting  a  sound  and  useful  edu- 
cation. 

r  J.  R.  B. 


NOTE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 


The  value  of  the  work  has  been  increased  by  some  verbal  correc- 
tions ;  but  especially  by  adding  a  section  on  Induction  and  Deduction, 
from  Thomson's  Laws  of  Thought. 


CONTENTS. 


fAOK. 

Introduction,  by  Professor  Barron 13 

LECTURE  I. 
Object  of  Logic — Its  utility — Operations  of  the  mind — Ideas — 

simple  and  complex — distinct  and  obscure 15 

LECTURE  II. 

Ideas,  adequate  and  inadequate — particular  and  abstract — Genera 
and  Species — Extension  and  Intension — Rules  for  acquiring 
and  examining  Ideas 23 

LECTURE  III. 
Rules  to  prevent  ambiguity — Division — Description — Definition. .     37 

LECTURE  IV. 
Knowledge  and  truth,  what  ? — The  result  of  Intuition  or  of  Rea- 
soning— Propositions— constituent   parts — Various  kinds   of 
propositions — Propositions,  expressive  of  relations — Sources 
whence  propositions  are  derived. 5 i 

LECTURE  V. 
Propositions  derived  from  Consciousness — from  Intuition — from 
Reasoning — from  Testimony — Inference,  or  Reasoning  in  gen- 
eral— Prejudices 6-2 

LECTURE  VI. 
Prejudices 81 

LECTURE  VII. 

Rules  to  prevent  Prejudices — Principles  and  Rules  of  Judgment, 
in  matters  of  Reason  and  Speculation — in  matters  of  Morality 
and  Religion — of  Human  Prudence — of  Divine  Testimony. . .     90 


1V<  CONTENTS. 

LECTURE  VIII.  ,m 
Reasoning — mathematical — moral — political — prudential — Proba- 
ble Reasoning 113 

LECTURE  IX. 
Different  processes  of  Reasoning — Examination  of  the  validity  of 
a  process  of  Reasoning — Different  kinds  of  Sophistry — The 
various  use  and  order  of  several  kinds  of  Propositions  and  of 
Arguments  in  different  cases — The  exercise  of  a  sound  Judg- 
ment    127 

LECTURE  X. 
Syllogism 187 

LECTURE  XL 
Syllogism — Its  merits  as  a  mode  of  reasoning 202 

CONCLUDING  CHAPTER. 

Dr.  Brown's  Analysis  of  the  Scholastic  Logic — Mr.  Mill  on  Syllo- 
gism— Induction  and  Deduction — The  Socratic  Method  of  Rea- 
soning— Thomson's  Division  of  the  Sciences 218 


INTRODUCTION. 

BY  PROFESSOR  BARRON. 


Some  people  imagine  that  Logic  is  a  frivolous,  an  os- 
tentatious, at  best  an  unnecessary  art,  which  may  serve 
to  puzzle  and  perplex,  hut  can  be  of  little  utility  in 
business  or  philosophy.  Others  are  perhaps  of  opinion, 
though  it  were  more  useful  than  it  is,  yet  it  requires  a 
study  so  dry  and  uninteresting,  so  abstract  and  difficult, 
that  few  inquirers  have  patience  to  make  any  progress 
in  it,  or  to  convert  it  to  any  advantage. 

Were  the  system  I  have  to  lay  before  you  composed 
of  the  idle  syllogism  of  the  schools,  which  till  lately  was 
the  only  system  taught  in  our  colleges,  I  should  not 
have  confidence  to  maintain,  that  there  was  not  a  great 
deal  of  foundation  for  the  first  objection.  In  the  short 
account  of  that  system  which  I  have  to  advance,  I  be- 
lieve it  will  appear,  that  it  is  a  vain  and  unavailing  in 
strument  of  truth  and  knowledge. 

But,  though  the  syllogism  of  the  schools,  and  the  old 
art  of  logic,  be  admitted  to  be  idle  systems,  yet  we 
surely  have  more  candor  than  to  infer,  that  there  is  no 
art  at  all  in  reasoning  ;  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
good  reasoning ;  or  that  it  is  of  little~use  to  be  a  good 
reasoner.  I,  on  the  contrary,  will  take  for  granted,  that 
there  is  no  accomplishment  or  qualification  any  man 
can  acquire  more  important.  Whether,  then,  you  be 
come  in  life  men  of  speculation,  or  men  of  business,  in 
every  step  you  take,  your  rational  faculty  must  be  con- 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

stantly  exerted  ;  and  the  following  lectures  are  calcula- 
ted entirely  to  render  you  expert  and  successful  in  that 
exercise. 

As  to  the  second  objection,  that  the  study  is  uninter- 
esting, dry,  and  difficult,  the  proper  answer  is,  that  it  is 
no  more  so  than  every  exercise  of  the  understanding 
naturally  is,  and  must  be.  There  is  nothing  in  it  either 
so  uninteresting,  so  dry,  or  so  difficult,  which  any  per- 
son possessed  of  ordinary  capacity  may  not  easily  sur- 
mount, and  which  every  person  must  surmount,  who 
expects  to  acquire,  either  in  philosophy,  literature,  or 
business,  as  much  use  of  his  understanding  as  to  attend 
to  any  train  of  thought.  It  is  by  the  proper  use  of  his 
understanding  that  man  attains  his  eminent  character- 
istic of  being  rational.  It  is  by  the  proper  use  of  his 
understanding  that  he  can  make  any  progress  in  knowl- 
edge. It  is  by  the  same  means  only  that  he  can  ob- 
tain the  flattering  distinctions  claimed  by  superior 
judgment,  and  by  which  he  can  avoid  the  disgrace  at- 
tached to  ignorance  and  stupidity.  In  a  word,  to  all 
orders  of  men,  true  logic  pretends  to  lend  the  most 
salutary  aid.  Her  pretensions  are  at  least  commend- 
able, and  her  efforts  are  entitled  to  the  most  patient  re- 
flection and  candid  examination.* 

[*  Whatever  has  at  anytime  been  concluded  justly,  whatever  knowl- 
edge has  been  acquired  otherwise  than  by  immediate  intuition,  depended 
upon  the  observance  of  the  laws  which  it  is  the  province  of  logic  to  in- 
vestigate. If  the  conclusions  are  just,  and  the  knowledge  sound,  those 
laws  have  actually  been  observed.  We  need  not,  therefore,  seek  any  fur- 
ther for  a  solution  of  the  question,  so  often  agitated,  respecting  the  utility 
of  logic.  If  a  science  of  logic  exists,  or  is  capable  of  existing,  it  must  be 
useful.  If  there  be  rules  to  which  every  mind  conforms  in  every  instance 
in  which  it  judges  rightly,  there  seems  little  necessity  for  discussion 
whether  a  person  is  more  likely  to  observe  those  rules,  when  he  knows 
the  ruiot»,  than  when  he  is  unacquainted  with  them. — MiU's  Logic. 


ELEMENTS  OF  LOGIC. 


LECTURE  I. 

OBJECT  OF    LOGIC OPERATIONS    OF    THE    MIND IDEAS SIMPLE 

AND  COMPLEX DISTINCT  AND  OBSCURE. 

The  object  of  education  is  to  increase  knowledge,  to 
refine  imagination,  to  improve  taste,  and  to  prepare  us 
for  acting  a  part  in  life,  respectable  and  useful  in  itself, 
as  well  as  advantageous  and  honorable  to  the  public. 

The  professed  purpose  of  logic  is  to  teach  the  right 
use  of  reason,  both  in  the  investigation  and  in  the  com- 
munication of  truth ;  to  inform  us  how  to  introduce 
clearness  and  good  order  among  our  ideas ;  to  explain 
the  operations  of  the  mind,  which  are  conversant  about 
them  ;  and  to  guard  us,  in  performing  these  operations, 
against  falling  into  error.* 

The  understanding  is  occupied  entirely  about  knowl- 
edge. The  end  of  all  science  is  to  instruct  us  in 
knowledge ;  and  the  same  end  is  pursued  by  all  study, 
whether  prudential,  political,  moral,  or  mechanical. 
In  whatever  way  we  exert  our  understanding,  it  is  to 
obtain  some  information  we  did  not  possess  before; 

[*  Logic,  accurately  defined,  is  the  art  of  thinking  and  reasoning  justly: 
it  traces  the  progress  of  our  knowledge  from  our  first  and  most  simple 
conceptions  through  all  their  different  combinations,  and  all  those  nu- 
merous deductions  that  result  from  variously  comparing  them  with  one 
another. — London  Oyc] 


16  OBJECT   OF   LOGIC. 

and  the  design  of  the  art  of  logic  is  to  hold  forth  the 
manner  of  attaining  that  knowledge  with  most  ease  and 
expedition. 

From  these  views  of  the  nature  and  end  of  logic,  it 
is  apparent  that  it  is  one  of  the  first  arts  to  which  we 
should  apply  our  attention  in  our  progress  towards 
knowledge,  as  affording  the  best  means  of  fortifying 
and  improving  our  understanding.  The  more  acute 
the  understanding  is,  it  will  be  more  successful  in  the 
investigations  of  science.  The  less  it  is  liable  to  err, 
the  more  certain  and  expeditious  will  be  its  progress. 
The  more  we  are  acquainted  with  those  prejudices  and 
partialities  whi-ch  have  misled  other  reasoners,  the  less 
danger  of  mistake  will  there  be.  The  better  we  un- 
derstand the  nature  of  the  instrument  we  employ,  the 
more  expert  and  successful  may  we  reasonably  expect  to 
be  in  the  use  of  it.  Every  thing,  then,  in  logic,  that, 
does  not  contribute  to  improve  the  understanding,  and 
to  promote  our  progress  in  useful  knowledge,  I  shall  not 
hesitate  to  pronounce  unworthy  of  attention ;  but  every 
thing,  on  the  other  hand,  that  promotes  these  ends, 
cannot  obtain  more  attention  than  it  deserves. 

I  am  well  aware  that  no  art  ever  gave  occasion  to  so 
much  idle  research,  and  fanciful  refinement,  as  that  of 
which  I  now  speak.  No  art  has  so  much  bewildered 
and  repressed  every  useful  exertion  of  the  understand 
ing,  as  that  which  pretended  to  enlighten  and  improve 
this  faculty,  and  to  guide  it  in  the  road  to  truth.  All 
the  efforts  of  human  genius,  all  the  learning  which  foi 
many  centuries  prevailed  in  Europe,  were  subtle  dis 
quisitions  and  puzzling  distinctions  about  the  method 
of  investigating  knowledge,  without  applying  that 
method  to  any  important  inquiry.  ( All  the  syllogism 
of  the  schools,  after  the  thousands  of  volumes  that  have 
been  written  upon  it,  and  after  the  employment  of  a 


UTILITY    OF   LOGIC.  17 

aeries  of  ages  to  bring  it  to  perfection,  never  enriched 
science  or  business  with  one  useful  discovery. 

Let  us  not,  however,  rashly  conclude,  that  these  abu- 
ses furnish  a  proof  of  the  general  inutility  or  insignifi- 
cance of  the  art  to  which  I  now  call  your  attention. 
It  is  curious  even  to  survey  the  ingenuity  with  which 
so  many  men  have  gone  wrong,  with  the  endless  per- 
plexities in  which  they  have  involved  themselves.  To 
point  out  these  is  one  of  the  purposes  of  this  work ;  but 
it  is  of  more  substantial  utility  to  learn  the  nature  of 
truth,  and  the  operations  of  the  human  mind,  which 
are  concerned  in  the  discovery  and  extension  of  knowl- 
edge. 

As  the  sophistry,  then,  and  absurdity,  with  which 
logic  has  been  disgraced,  are  no  valid  objections  against 
the  use  of  it,  so  neither  is  the  argument,  that  many 
men  reason  often  very  justly  without  any  acquaintance 
with  its  rules.  There  is  in  all  mankind  some  natural 
logic,  for  it  is  one  of  those  arts  which  may  be  learned 
by  practice,  without  the  knowledge  of  theory.  One  of 
the  best  methods  of  making  progress  in  the  art  of  rea- 
soning, is  actual  practice,  or  the  acquisition  of  the  habit 
of  examining  a  train  of  ideas  that  constitute  an  argu- 
ment; and  of  this  branch  of  the  art  all  men  acquire 
some  share  by  experience ;  many  men  acquire  a  great 
deal.  But,  though  long  experience  in  sound  reasoning 
may  render  us  expert  logicians,  in  the  same  manner  as 
practice,  without  the  knowledge  of  principles,  may 
form  eminent  practitioners  in  any  other  art ;  yet  this 
success  will  not  justify  any  inference  against  the  utility, 
or  even  the  propriety  of  theory.  The  end  of  all  theory 
in  the  arts  is  to  render  us  more  methodical  and  reputa 
ble  performers,  and  it  can  scarcely  fail  to  produce  this 
effect,  when  properly  applied. 

What  is  the  theory  of  an  art  ?     It  is  a  philosophical 


18  UTILITY    OF   LOGIC. 

delineation  of  the  principles  on  which  the  art  is  found* 
ed,  of  the  end  it  has  in  view,  and  of  the  means  by 
which  it  proposes  to  accomplish  that  end.  From  this 
delineation  are  deduced  the  rules  of  the  best  practice, 
which  are  commonly  illustrated  from  the  experience  of 
the  most  successful  practitioners.  A  theory  of  an  art, 
then,  is  a  collection  of  all  the  knowledge  which  can  be 
obtained  concerning  that  art,  from  the  combined  infor- 
mation of  all  preceding  theorists  and  practitioners.  It 
points  out  the  most  patent  and  direct  road  to  success, 
and  it  marks  all  the  corners  and  obstructions,  at  which 
improper  deviations  are  most  likely  to  be  committed  ; 
so  that,  after  having  learned  the  theory,  nothing  re- 
mains but  to  obtain  the  habit  of  ready  and  accurate 
practice,  in  order  to  render  us  able  and  successful  per- 
formers. 

Although,  then,  many  men  are  good  reasoners  who 
never  learned  logic,  yet  the  knowledge  of  that  art  may 
be  neither  superfluous  nor  nugatory;  because  an  ac- 
quaintance with  it  may  either  facilitate  our  progress  in 
becoming  good  reasoners,  or  may  enable  us  to  reach 
greater  eminence  in  that  line,  than  those  wh«  have  not 
enjoyed  the  advantages  we  possess ;  and  if  we  acquire 
by  it  either  of  these  emoluments,  it  is  of  too  much  im- 
portance not  to  attract  our  serious  attention.* 

[*  Logic  has  its  use  in  improving  the  condition  of  men:  it  teaches,  or 
may  be  made  to  teach,  them  to  think.  The  active  intellect  has  two  parts, 
one  of  which  originates  our  thoughts,  and  may  be  called  the  suggestive, 
whilst  the  other  checks  and  judges  thoughts  as  they  arise,  and  may  be 
called  the  critical  power.  Thoughts  are  continually  suggested  without  the 
consent  of  the  will.  The  suggestive' power  may  be  educated  as  certainly 
as,  though  more  gradually  than,  the  critical.  The  discovery  which  we  call 
a  flash  of  genius,  a  happy  thought,  really  depends  as  much  upon  previoua 
acquirements,  as  the  power  of  stating  a  case  or  applying  a  rule  does.  All 
discipline  of /he  suggestive  must  proceed  from  the  critical  power:  it  is  by 
u  long,  careful,  patient  analysis  of  the  reasonings  by  which  others  have  at- 
tained their  results,  that  we  learn  to  think  more  correctly  ourselves.  He 
ivho  reads  over  a  work  on  logic  probably  thinks  no  better  when  he  rwe» 


THEORY    OF    LOGIC.  19 

As  the  object  of  logic  is  to  teach  the  best  use  of  our 
rational  faculty,  both  in  investigating  and  in  communi- 
cating truth,  the  theory  of  it,  and  the  materials  of 
which  that  theory  consists,  are  deduced  from  this  end. 
That  theory,  accordingly,  consists  of  two  parts  /  the  na- 
ture of  ideas,  which  are  the  materials  on  which  we  rea- 
son, and  the  nature  of  the  faculties  or  operations  of  the 
mind  which  are  concerned  in  reasoning.  Before  we 
can  reason,  we  must  have  ideas ;  and  before  we  can 
reason  rightly,  we  must  understand  what  kind  of  opera- 
tion reasoning  is.  The  explication  of  both  compre- 
hends the  whole  of  logic  which  is  of  any  use. 

In  explaining  the  nature  of  ideas,  and  of  the  opera 
tions  employed  about  them,  one  of  two  methods  must 
be  adopted.  We  must  either  treat  them  separately,  or 
in  conjunction.  We  must  either  first  discuss  the  ideas, 
and  then  the  operations,  or  we  must  carry  on  the  ac- 
count of  both  at  the  same  time.  The  latter  is  the  bet- 
ter method,  because  one  of  the  chief  means  of  explain- 
ing the  nature  of  ideas  is,  to  point  out  the  operations  of 
which  they  are  the  objects  ;  and  one  of  the  chief  means 
of  illustrating  the  operations  is,  to  present  the  single 
ideas,  or  the  clusters  of  ideas,  about  which  the  opera- 
tions are  exerted.  This  latter  method  we  cannot  hesi- 
tate to  follow ;  and,  in  adopting  it,  all  we  have  to  do 
is,  to  specify  and  illustrate  the  operations  from  experi 
ence,  and  then  to  explain  the  single  ideas,  or  the  collec- 
tions of  ideas,  about  which  each  operation  is  conversant. 


up  than  when  he  sat  down  ;  but  if  any  of  the  principles  there  unfolded 
cleave  to  his  memory,  and  he  afterwards,  perhaps  unconsciously,  shapes 
and  corrects  his  thoughts  by  them,  no  doubt  his  whole  powers  of  reason- 
ing gradually  receive  benefit.  In  a  word,  every  art,  from  reasoning  dowa 
to  riding  and  rowing,  is  learnt  by  assiduous  practice,  and  if  principles  do 
Huy  good,  it  is  proportioned  to  the  readiness  with  which  they  can  be  con- 
verted into  rules,  and  the  patient  constancy  with  which  they  are  applied 
in  all  our  attempts  to  excel.—  Thomson.} 


20  CLASSIFICATION    OF   IDEAS. 

The  operations  employed  in  the  investigation  of  truth 
are  commonly  reckoned  three — perception,  judgment, 
and  reasoning.  By  perception  is  understood  that  ope- 
ration by  which  the  mind  sees  and  becomes  acquainted 
with  every  single  idea  it  possesses.  By  judgment  is 
understood  that  operation  by  which  the  mind  discovers 
the  agreement  or  the  disagreement  of  any  two  ideas  it 
may  have  occasion  to  compare,  in  order  to  discover 
truth  and  knowledge.  By  reasoning  is  understood  that 
operation  in  which  the  mind  compares  two  ideas  by 
means  of  one  or  more  intermediate  ideas,  in  order  to 
discover  the  amount  of  what  is  commonly  called  a  de- 
monstration or  an  argument.  This  short  account  of 
these  operations  must  at  present  suffice  ;  for,  as  they 
comprehend  the  whole  theory  of  logic,  I  am  afterwards 
to  resume  and  consider  them  separately.* 

Ideas  are  arranged  into  classes,  and  different  names 
assigned,  according  as  they  are  simple  or  complex,  dis- 
tinct or  confused,  adequate  or  inadequate,  particular  or 
abstract. 

A  simple  idea,  as  its  name  insinuates,  can  be  contem- 
plated only  in  one  view.  It  cannot  be  divided  or  taken 
to  pieces,  because  it  does  not  consist  of  parts,  being 
naturally  indivisible. 


Most  of  our  ideas  of  the  qualities  of  bodies  are  of  this  clas 
hard,  soft,  round,  smooth,  white,  black,  cold,  hot;  all  ideas,  per 
haps,  of  tastes,  smells,  sounds — as  bitter,  sweet,  low,  loud;  and  many 
of  our  ideas  of  the  feelings  and  operations  of  the  mind — as  of  desire, 
aversion,  hunger,  pain,  thinking,   willing,   discerning,   reasoning. 


[*  Mr.  Thomson  distributes  the  subject  into  three  parts,  the  first  treat- 
ing of  conception,  or  the  power  of  forming  general  notions ;  the  second  o' 
judgment,  or  the  power  of  deciding  whether  two  notions  agree  or  not, 
and  the  third  of  syllogism,  or  the  power  of  drawing  one  judgment  from 
another.  To  these  a  fourth  part,  in  which  method,  or  the  power  of  using 
the  other  three  functions  in  the  discovery  of  truth,  is  explained,  has  bee»; 
usually  added,  which  answers  to  applied  logic] 


CLASSES    OF   IDEAS.  21 

We  cannot  divide  them,  even  in  imagination ;  they  are  perfectly 
uniform,  and  void  of  parts. 

A  complex  idea  contains  two  or  more  simple  or 
subordinate  ideas,  into  which  it  may  be  divided,  and 
which  subordinate  ideas,  when  divided,  may  be  consid- 
ed  separately.  All  our  ideas  of  substances  are  com- 
plex, as  of  animals,  vegetables,  and  the  inanimate  par's 
of  nature. 

The  idea  of  a  tree,  for  instance,  includes  a  great  variety  of  subor- 
dinate ideas — those  of  wood,  stock,  roots,  branches,  vegetable  life, 
shape,  leaves,  bark,  blossoms,  fruit ;  several  of  which  subordinate 
ideas  may  be  subdivided  into  other  ideas.  All  ideas  of  figures — as 
of  circles,  squares,  triangles,  cubes,  cylinders,  pyramids ;  most  of 
the  ideas  of  virtues  and  vices — as  of  justice,  fortitude,  veracity, 
theft,  ingratitude,  falsehood,  deceit. 

The  second  division  of  ideas  was,  into  distinct  ana 
confused,  or,  which  is  much  the  same  thing,  into  clear 
and  obscure.  Distinct  or  clear  ideas  are  those  of  which 
we  have  full  and  perfect  comprehension,  and  which  we 
can  readily  separate  or  distinguish  from  all  other  ideas. 
Confused  or  obscure  ideas  are  those  of  which  we  have 
not  full  and  perfect  comprehension,  and  which  we  can- 
not easily  separate  or  distinguish  from  all  other  ideas. 
Distinct  and  clear  ideas  are  perceived  with  a  perspicacity 
and  energy  similar  to  that  by  which  the  mind  contem- 
plates figures  in  mathematics,  or  numbers  in  arithmetic  ; 
all  their  boundaries  and  their  differences  are  completely 
discernible.  Confused  or  obscure  ideas  are  like  the 
colors  of  a  rainbow,  they  run  into  one  another,  and 
the  mind  neither  perceives  fully  their  nature  nor  their 
limits. 

The  acquisition  of  clear  and  distinct  ideas  is  of  the 
utmost  consequence  in  the  investigation  of  knowledge ; 
for  the  degree  of  conviction  with  which  it  is  presented 
to  the  mind,  is- always  in  proportion  to  the  degree  of 


22  IMPORTANCE    OF   CLEAR   IDEAS. 

clearness  and  distinctness  which  we  have  introduced 
among  our  ideas.  Were  all  our  ideas  clear,  all  our 
knowledge  would  be  demonstrative,  a  quality  which 
belongs  only  to  our  scientific  knowledge.  Obscurity, 
more  or  less,  adheres  to  all  our  other  ideas,  and  leaves 
us  only  greater  or  less  degrees  of  probable  evidence, 
corresponding  to  the  less  or  greater  obscurity  of  our 
ideas. 

In  the  mathematical  sciences,  and  in  arithmetic,  the  evidence  is 
demonstrative,  because  our  ideas  of  all  the  figures  and  numbers 
about  which  we  reason  are  perfectly  clear  and  distinct,  and  be- 
cause, in  comparing  them,  we  perceive  accurately  whether  they 
agree  or  disagree ;  and  if  they  disagree,  how  great  the  excess  of 
one  is  above  another,  so  that  we  can  affirm,  either  that  they  are 
equal,  or  that  the  one  exceeds  the  other  by  a  certain  quantity. 

In  morals,  in  politics,  in  arts,  and  in  business,  almost  all  our 
ideas  are  more  or  less  obscure ;  hence,  in  comparing  them,  we  can- 
not precisely  pronounce  whether  they  agree  or  disagree;  and 
though  we  were  sure  that  they  disagree,  yet  we  cannot  accurately 
ascertain  the  difference.  The  necessary  consequence  is,  that  in  all 
these  branches  of  knowledge,  we  can  obtain  no  demonstrative  evi- 
dence for  truth.  We  must  be  satisfied  with  probable  evidence, 
and  we  should  be  attentive  to  procure  ideas  as  clear  and  distinct 
as  possible,  that  we  may  reach  the  highest  degree  of  probability. 

I  shall  not  at  present  pursue  farther  the  doctrine  of 
distinct  and  obscure  ideas ;  a  future  opportunity  will 
occur  of  discussing  more  completely  this  important 
subject.  I  shall  then  have  occasion  to  point  out  the 
caution  with  which  we  should  proceed  in  the  examina- 
tion of  our  ideas,  the  prejudices  by  which  they  are 
obscured,  but  particularly  the  attention  we  must  em- 
ploy to  prevent  the  confusion  which  may  be  introduced 
among  them  by  the  improper  use  of  words.  From 
these  views,  the  important  and  extensive  utility  of  logic 
will  appear,  and  how  deeply  its  rules  and  principles 
enter  into  all  our  inquiries  and  knowledge. 


IDEAS — ADEQUATE    AND    INADEQUATE.  23 


LECTURE  II. 

IDEAS ADEQUATE    AND    INADEQUATE PARTICULAR    AND    AB- 
STRACT  RULES  CONCERNING  IDEAS. 

The  third  division  of  ideas  related  to  their  being 
adequate  or  inadequate.  An  adequate  idea  is  a  perfect 
picture  of  its  archetype,  or  contains  a  representation  of 
all  the  parts  of  which  the  archetype  (or  object)  consists. 
It  is  different  from  a  distinct  idea,  because  an  idea  may 
be  distinct  and  not  adequate ;  that  is,  we  may  have  a 
clear  perception  of  all  the  parts  of  an  idea,  as  far  as 
these  parts  extend,  though  these  parts  may  not  consti- 
tute a  complete  collection  of  those  of  the  archetype. 

We  may  have,  for  example,  a  distinct  idea  of  a  triangle,  and  yeu 
not  possess  an  adequate  idea  of  a  right-angled  triangle,  an  isoscelec, 
or  scalenum — which,  besides  the  general  ideas  of  three  sides  and 
three  angles,  require  that  the  sides  and  angles  should  be  of  a  par- 
ticular species.  An  inadequate  idea  is  not  a  perfect  picture  of  its 
archetype,  or  contains  not  a  complete  representation  of  the  parts 
of  which  the  archetype  consists. 

Almost  all  simple  ideas  are  adequate,  as  those  of 
colors,  tastes,  or  qualities ;  all  ideas  of  mathematical 
figures,  and  of  numbers,  as  triangles,  squares,  cubes, 
cylinders,  fifty,  a  hundred,  a  thousand,  ten  thousand 
But  although,  when  we  examine  archetypes  with  atten- 
tion, ideas  will  be  as  adequate  as  we  can  make  them ; 
and  when  knowledge  is  either  demonstrative  or  even 
highly  probable,  ideas  must  really,  or  very  nearly,  be 
adequate ;  yet  if  we  compare  ideas,  not  only  with  what 
we  know  of  their  archetypes,  but  with  what  may  be 
lviown  of  them,  and  perhaps  is  known  of  them  by  supe- 


24  IDEAS PARTICULAR   OR   ABSTRACT. 

rior  beings,  few  of  our  ideas,  except  those  of  mathe- 
matics and  arithmetic,  will  be  found  to  be  adequate. 

There  is  hardly  any  other  thing  in  nature,  of  which 
our  knowledge  is  complete.  We  are  acquainted  with 
a  few  only  of  the  properties  of  animals,  vegetables,  and 
inanimate  matter ;  what  substance  is,  whether  of  matter 
or  spirit,  is  totally  beyond  our  comprehension. 

The  whole  system  of  the  transmutation,  or  the  assimilation  of 
nature,  by  which  the  nutriment  of  animals  is  converted  into  the 
different  parts  of  which  their  bodies  consist,  bones,  flesh,  sinews, 
blood,  hair,  horn,  &c,  and  by  which  inanimate  nature  is  converted 
into  the  numerous  parts  of  vegetables  and  metals,  seemingly  so 
different  from  one  another,  as  trees,  shrubs,  leaves,  bark,  blossoms, 
fruit,  gold,  silver,  mercury,  &c,  is  to  us  altogether  unintelligible. 

In  all  these  cases,  and  in  many  others  which  might 
be  mentioned,  our  ideas  are  unavoidably  inadequate. 
But  fortunate  would  it  be  if  our  ideas  were  always  ade- 
quate, or  as  near  to  adequate  as  possible,  when  it  is  in 
our  power,  by  industry  and  attention,  to  make  them  so. 
They  are  less  adequate  than  they  might  be,  chiefly 
from  two  causes — first,  carelessness  in  the  examination 
of  archetypes,  which  overlooks  some  of  their  properties 
or  parts ;  and,  secondly,  inattention  in  ascertaining  the 
meaning  of  the  words  employed  to  denote  them,  which 
words  often  do  not  express  the  same  parts,  or  all  the 
parts,  in  our  minds,  which  they  do  in  the  minds  of 
others.  In  both  cases,  our  knowledge  cannot  be  so 
complete  as  that  of  a  person  who  has  taken  care  to 
prevent  these  errors  or  defects ;  and  in  every  discourse 
or  controversy  with  that  person,  we  must  misunderstand 
him  when  these  words  occur. 

The  last  distinction  of  ideas  considers  them  as  par- 
ticular or  abstract  This  is  the  most  important  distinc- 
tion, as  it  enters  deep  into  the  constitution  both  of 
language  and  knowledge.     All  things  exist  in  nature 


IDEAS PARTICULAR    OR    ABSTRACT.  25 

as  individuals  or  particulars.  Every  substance  is  that 
of  some  particular  animal,  vegetable,  or  inanimate 
piece  of  matter.  Every  material  quality,  as  bard, 
smooth,  rough,  black,  white,  belongs  to  some  substance 
or  body,  without  which  the  quality  cannot  subsist. 
Every  virtue  or  vice  has  always  relation  to  some  agent; 
and  though  we  may  speak,  speculate,  or  reason  con- 
cerning them  separated  from  this  agent,  yet  we  must 
admit  that,  independent  of  him,  they  have  no  actual 
existence,  nor  any  existence  except  in  idea. 

Particular  ideas  represent  individuals  as  they  exist 
in  nature,  as  a  house,  a  horse,  a  man,  a  tree,  for  which, 
perhaps,  we  have  no  names,  or  to  which  we  give  the 
names  of  St.  James's,  Bucephalus,  Alexander,  or  the 
Royal  Oak.  Ideas,  however,  would  be  in  number  infi- 
nite, and  communication,  of  course,  would  be  impracti- 
cable, if  every  individual  thing  with  which  we  are 
acquainted  were  to  require  an  idea  and  a  name  to  de- 
note it.  To  surmount  this  obstacle,  the  mind  is  very 
fortunately  endowed  with  the  faculty  called  abstraction, 
by  which  it  arranges  into  classes  all  the  individuals 
which  have  any  common  qualities,  or  which  have  any 
thing  similar,  either  in  their  figure,  existence,  or  action. 
It  assigns  a  general  idea  and  name  to  each  class,  and 
takes  the  trouble,  only  when  compelled  so  to  do,  to 
specify  individuals,  to  distinguish  them  in  the  mind  by 
ideas,  and  in  language  by  names.*  Ideas  and  lan- 
guage, by  this  expedient,  are  rendered  exceedingly 
manageable   an  1   convenient;   for  the   individuals  of 


[*  A  general  name  is  one  which  is  capable  of  being  truly  affirmed,  in  the 
lame  sense,  of  each  of  an  indefinite  number  of  things. 

An  individual  or  singular  name  is  a  name  which  is  capable  of  being  truly 
ifiirmed,  in  tbe  same  sense,  only  of  one  thing. 

A  class  is  the  indefinite  multitude  of  individuals  denoted  by  a  general 
aame. — Mill's  Logic,  p.  18.] 


2f)  GENERAL   OR   ABSTRACT   IDEAS. 

which  it  is  necessary  to  form  ideas  and  fabricate  names 
are  not  very  numerous,  being  limited  chiefly  to  the  hu- 
man race.  It  was  much  more  necessary  to  assign  ideas 
and  names  to  the  individuals  of  this  class,  than  to  assign 
ideas  and  names  to  all  the  individuals  of  all  the  classes 
in  nature,  while  the  expedient  of  giving  a  general  name  is 
equally  convenient  for  the  purposes  of  communication.* 
This  power  of  forming  an  idea  of  a  class  of  objects,  is 
called  abstraction,  for  the  following  reason  :  The  idea 
of  a  class  contains  only  those  parts  or  qualities  which 
are  common  to  all  the  individuals  of  the  class ;  while 
the  qualities  peculiar  to  any  individual  are  left  out,  or 
abstracted  from  those  which  constitute  the  general  idea 
of  the  class. 

The  general  or  abstract  idea,  for  example,  of  the  class  of  vegeta- 
bles called  trees,  contains  the  following  parts :  a  plant  of  considera- 
ble height,  which  sets  out  large  branches,  is  clothed  with  bark,  and 
in  summer  bears  leaves  and  seeds.  All  the  plants  that  can  be 
called  trees  have  these  qualities ;  and  in  forming  an  idea  of  these 
qualities,  the  mind  abstracts  its  attention  from  all  the  qualities 
which  are  peculiar  to  any  particular  tree,  such  as  the  size  and  di- 
rection of  the  branches,  the  nature  of  the  wood,  the  color,  surface, 
and  shape  of  the  bark,  and  of  the  leaves,  and  the  nature  and  prop- 
erties of  the  seeds,  such  as  berries,  acorns,  apples,  pears,  &c 
Again,  the  general  idea  of  a  horse  contains  the  idea  of  a  large  and 
beautiful  quadruped,  of  cylindrical  body,  high-set  neck,  taper  limbs, 
swift,  strong,  useful,  docile ;  but  it  includes  not  the  ideas  of  shape, 
color,  size,  pleasure,  or  utility,  which  distinguish -individuals,  the 
race-horse,  the  hunter,  the.  war-horse,  or  the  horse  of  the  plough. 


[*  The  notions  formed  in  the  mind  from  things  offered  to  it,  are  cither 
of  single  objects,  as  of  "  this  pain,  that  man,  Westminster  Abbey;"  or  of 
many  objects  gathered  into  one,  as  "  pain,  man,  abbey."  Notions  of 
single  objects  are  called  intuitions,  as  being  such  as  the  mind  receives 
when  it  simply  attends  to  or  inspects  (intuetur)  the  object.  Notion, 
formed  from  several  objects  are  called,  conceptions,  as  being  produced  by 
the  power  which  the  mind  possesses  of  taking  several  things  togethei 
(concipere,  i.  e.,  capere  hoc  cum  Mo).  They  are  also  called  general  notions 
—  Thomson,'] 


CLASSES    OF    OBJECTS.  Zi 

The  mind  is  not  satisfied  with  forming  one  grade  of 
classes,  which  may  comprehend  individuals.  It  gener- 
alizes much  further,  with  the  same  view  of  simplifying 
and  facilitating  the  means  of  communication  and  knowl- 
edge, and  of  abridging  the  number  of  ideas  and  words. 
It  constitutes  classes  above  classes.  Accordingly,  it 
forms  a  second  class,  containing  the  properties  which 
one  first  class  has  in  common  with  other  first  classes,  so 
that  the  first  class  is  now  considered  as  making  only  one 
of  the  constituent  parts  of  the  second  class. 

The  class  of  creatures  called  men,  for  example,  comprehends 
what  qualities  are  common  to  all  its  individuals,  Romulus,  Alexan- 
der, Julius  Caesar.  But  the  class  of  men  has  many  common  quali- 
ties with  other  classes  of  living  creatures,  horses,  dogs,  sheep,  fishes, 
fowls,  &c,  namely,  life,  motion,  shape,  color ;  and  hence,  of  these 
common  properties  is  framed  a  higher  class,  called  that  of  animal*, 
which  contains  the  qualities  common  to  all  living  creatures.* 

The  mind  sometimes  ascends  higher,  and  forms 
another  class  more  general,  of  all  the  properties  which 
this  second  class  has  in  common  with  other  classes  in 
nature.  For  example,  animals  have  several  properties, 
in  common  with  vegetables,  as  shape,  color,  growth, 
decay,  circulation  of  juices;  of  these  is  formed  a  third 
class,  called  animated  nature.  We  may  proceed  farther 
still  to  form  &  fourth  class,  which  will  contain  all  things, 


[*  By  observing  John,  Thomas,  and  Peter,  and  abstracting  from  their 
accidents  the  essential  marks,  we  get  the  notion  of  man  ;  but  again,  by 
comparing  the  conception  man  with  other  conceptions,  cow,  sheep,  wolf, 
whale,  and  observing  the  mark  common  to  all,  that-they  suckle  their  young, 
we  form  the  wider  conception  mammalia, — wider,  because  it  includes  man 
and  many  other  conceptions.  We  may  carry  the  process  further  still ; 
and,  with  writers  on  Natural  History,  compare  the  mammalia  with  aves, 
amphibia,  pisces,  insectae,  and  vermes,  when  we  shall  discover  that  all 
these,  however  different,  agree  in  having  life  and  sensation,  from  which 
marks  we  gain  the  new  conception  animal,  wider  thar  any  of  the  formei, 
as  including  them  all, — higher,  as  requiring  a  second  step  in  the  abstrac- 
tive process  to  reach  it.— Thomson. 

Of   THf 


28  STEPS   OF    GENERALIZING. 

animate  and  inanimate.  The  properties,  however,  of 
it  are  very  few,  and  scarcely  amount  to  more  than  ex- 
istence and  figure. 

Though  all  these  steps  of  generalizing  are  sometimes 
necessary  or  useful,  yet  knowledge  and  language  sel- 
dom require  attention  to  more  than  three  of  them  ; 
namely,  the  individual,  the  first  class,  and  the  second. 
The  first  class  is  called  the  species,  the  second  the  genus. 
Thus,  Alexander  is  the  individual,  man  is  the  species, 
and  animal  is  the  genus ;  the  royal  oak  is  the  individ- 
ual, tree  is  the  species,  and  vegetable  is  the  genus ;  St. 
James's  is  the  individual,  dwelling-house  is  the  species, 
edifice  is  the  genus.J  The  third  and  fourth  classes  are 
also  denominated  genera.  The  second  class,  or  the  one 
immediately  above  the  species,  is  called  the  proximate 
genus,  the  third  and  fourth  classes  are  called  transcen- 
dent genera.  The  proximate  genus  of  the  species  man 
is  animal ;  existence  is  the  transcendent  genus.  The 
proximate  genus  of  tree  is  vegetable;  the  transcendent 
may  be  animated  nature,  or  existence.* 

It  is  to  be  observed,  though  general  or  abstract  ideas 
are  more  comprehensive,  or  extend  to  more  objects,  than 
particular  ideas,  yet  that  they  are  less  complex,  or  con- 
tain fewer  parts,  and  that  the  more  general  they  are, 
the  less  complex  they  are,  or  contain  fewer  parts  in  pro- 


[*  The  same  class  which  is  a  genus  with  reference  to  the  suh-classes  or 
species  included  in  it,  may  he  itself  a  species  with  reference  to  a  more 
comprehensive,  or  superior,  genus.  Man  is  a  species  with  reference  to  an- 
imal, but  a  genus  with  reference  to  the  species,  mathematician.  Animal  is 
a  genus,  divided  into  two  species,  man  and  brute ;  but  animal  is  also  a 
species,  which,  with  another  species,  vegetable,  makes  up  the  genus,  or- 
ganized being.  Biped  is  a  genus  with  reference  to  man  and  bird,  but  a 
species  with  respect  to  the  superior  genus,  animal.  Taste  is  a  genus,  of 
which,  sweet  taste,  sour  taste,  &c,  are  species ;  but  taste  is  a  species  of 
the  genus,  sensation.  Virtue,  a  genus  with  reference  to  justice,  temper- 
ance, &c,  is  one  of  the  species  of  the  genus,  mental  quality.—  Afill's  Logi\ 
p.  82.1 


EXTENSION    AND    INTENSION.  29 

portion.  The  reason  is  exceedingly  obvious.  A  genns 
contains  only  the  few  properties  which  are  common  to 
the  several  species  which  it  includes,  and  which  are  not 
nearly  so  numerous  as  those  that  belong  to  each  species. 
The  species,  again,  contains  the  properties  which  are 
common  to  all  the  individuals  it  includes,  and  which 
are  not  so  numerous  as  those  that  pertain  to  each  indi 
vidual.  The  genus  animal,  for  instance,  includes  few 
properties,  life,  shape,  color,  motion,  growth,  decay. 
The  species  man  contains  all  these  properties  of  the  ge- 
nus, besides  those  of  the  species,  namely,  power  oi 
speech,  thinking,  acting  with  design,  and  many  others. 
The  individual  contains  all  these  qualities  I  have  enu- 
merated, both  of  the  genus  and  of  the  species,  together 
with  those  peculiar  to  the  individual,  wise  or  prudent, 
knowing  or  ignorant,  rich,  poor,  fortunate,  unfortunate, — 
all  these  qualities,  however  variable,  and  in  a  particu- 
lar degree  corresponding  to  the  nature  or  character  of 
the  individual.* 

[*  Extension  and  Intension.  When  we  compare  a  vague  and  general 
conception  with  a  narrower  and  more  definite  one,  we  find  that  the  former 
contains  far  more  objects  in  it  than  the  latter.  Comparing  plant  with  ge- 
ranium, for  example,  we  see  that  plant  includes  ten  thousand  times  more 
objects,  since  the  oak,  and  fir,  and  lichen,  and  rose,  and  countless  others, 
including  geranium  itself,  are  implied  in  it.  This  capacity  of  a  conception 
we  call  its  extension.  The  extension  oi 'plant  is  greater  than  that  of  gera- 
nium, because  it  includes  more  objects. 

But  conceptions  have  another  capacity.  Whilst  plant  has  more  objects 
under  it  than  geranium,  it  has  fewer  marks  in  it — fewer  properties  by  which 
we  assign  it  a  place  under  some  appropriate  conception.  I  can  describe  the 
leaves  petals,  stamina,  and  pistils  oi  geranium,  but  oi  'plant  no  such  de- 
scription is  possible.  1  cannot  say  that  every  plant  has  a  stem,  for  there 
are  the  lichens  to  contradict  me ;  nor  a  flower,  for  ferns  have  none,  and  so 
on.  I  can  say  little  more  about  plant,  than  that  all  plants  have  growth  and 
vegetable  life.  The  logical  expression  of  this  defect  is,  that  its  intens'on  is 
very  limited. 

The  greater  the  extension,  the  less  the  intension ;  the  more  objects  a 
conception  embraces,  the  more  slender  the  knowledge  which  it  conveys  oi 
any  of  those  objects  ;  and  vice  versa. 

With  the  help  of  the  important  distinction  between  extension  and  inter 


30  UTILITY    OF    ABSTRACT   IDEAS. 

The  power  of  abstraction  is  one  of  the  most  important 
belonging  to  the  understanding,  and  the  practice  of  it  in 
ccience  and  in  business  is  of  the  npst  extensive  use.  £lt 
will  afterwards  be  explained,  thaftr  all  definitions  are 
regulated  by  the  arrangements  ot  abstraction,  and  that 
they  consist  entirely  in  referring  an  individual  to  its 
species,  with  the  addition  of  some  quality  which  distin- 
guishes it  from  the  other  individuals  of  its  species;  or 
in  referring  a  species  to  its  genus,  with  the  addition  of 
some  quality  which  characterizes  it  as  a  species. 

To  evince  the  exceedingly  extensive  utility  of  abstrac- 
tion, I  must  observe,  that  all  science,  almost  all  reason- 
ing, indeed  almost  alLthe  words  of  language,  are  con- 
versant about  abstract  ideas.  You  will  readily  appre- 
hend, that  the  two  sciences  of  quantity,  mathematics  and 
arithmetic,  are  occupied  entirely  about  abstract  ideas. 

No  property  is  demonstrated  of  any  triangle  in  the  elements  of 
geometry,  that  is  not  true  of  all  triangles,  at  least  all  triangles  of  the 
same  kind.  The  figure  delineated  on  the  board  of  the  mathemati- 
cian is  not  particular  or  local ;  it  represents  every  figure  of  the  same 
species,  and  the  demonstration  is  equally  extensive  in  its  applica- 
tion, namely,  to  all  figures  of  the  species.  Were  not  this  the  case,  sci- 
ence would  have  no  existence,  and  the  mind  of  man  could  make  no 
progress  in  knowledge.  "Were  not  this  the  case,  the  mathematician 
would  be  obliged  to  demonstrate  the  properties  of  every  particular 
figure  he  should  employ,  and  all  progress  in  knowledge  would  be 
suspended,  because  the  new  figures  of  the  same  species  which  may 
occur  are  infinite. 

All  the  operations  in  arithmetic,  the  objects  of  which  are  dis- 


sion,  or  as  others  express  it,  the  sphere  and  matter  of  the  conception,  we 
can  understand  the  meaning  of  the  saying,  that  the  subject  of  a  judgment 
is  in  the  predicate,  and  the  predicate  in  the  subject.  "  Man  is  an  animal :" 
this  conveys  two  notions,  that  man  is  contained  in  animal,  as  a  species  in 
a  genus  ;  and  that  whatever  makes  up  our  notion  of  animal — all  the  marks 
of  animal — are  contained  in  man.  So  they  are  mutually  contained.  In- 
stead of  "man  is  an  animal,"  Aristotle  would  say  "animal  inheres  in 
man.1' — Thomson.] 


UTILITY    OF    ABSTRACT    IDEAS.  31 

creted  quantity,  or  quantity  divided  into  parts,  are  of  a  general  na- 
ture, and  all  the  truths  they  establish  are  of  the  same  denomination. 
The  capital  operations  of  addition  and  subtraction,  into  which  all 
others  in  arithmetic  are  resolvable,  however  apparently  removed 
from  them,  respect  not  the  comparison  of  any  two  individual  parts 
of  divisible  quantity;  the  conjunction  of  both  in  one  total,  which 
is  the  object  of  addition,  or  the  disjunction  of  the  quantity  by  which 
the  greater  exceeds  the  lesser,  which  is  the  object  of  subtraction 
They  are  of  a  general  nature,  and  are  applicable  to  all  cases  what- 
ever, in  which  quantity  is  divisible  and  separable. 

In  like  manner,  inquiries  in  morals,  concerning  vir- 
tues and  vices  ;  in  politics,  concerning  legislation,  and 
the  happiness  of  communities;  in  arts,  concerning 
beauty  and  utility ;  in  business,  concerning  propriety, 
decency,  wisdom,  and  interest ;  are  all  of  an  abstract 
nature,  and  are  theories  established  by  argumentation 
and  experience,  which  every  individual  applies  to  his 
particular  case,  according  to  his  best  judgment. 
/We  must  not,  however,  conclude,  that  no  reasoning 
is  competent  about  particular  ideas  or  individuals. 
The  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  in  which 
knowledge  consists,  is  equally  perceptible  in  particular 
ideas  as  in  general  ones ;  and  we  can  reason  as  well 
about  one  man,  one  tree,  or  one  triangle,  as  about  the 
species  or  genus  of  these  individuals.  But  all  particu- 
lar reasonings  are  confined  to  the  cases  to  which  they 
are  applied  ;  and,  of  course,  as  they  are  of  very  limited 
use,  we  avoid  them  as  much  as  possible,  and  rathe* 
seek  for  general  theories,  in  which  particular  cases  may 
be  included.  In  a  word,  all  the  appellative  nouns  of 
language  are  significant  only  of  abstract  ideas,  so  that 
there  is  hardly  a  topic  about  which  we  can  either  speak 
or  write,  that  is  not  the  offspring  of  abstraction. 

As  abstraction  is  the  capital  operation  by  which 
ideas  are  prepared  for  reasoning,  and  by  which  reason- 
ings become  of  extensive  use,  so  it  is  the  operation  by 


32  RULES    FOR   ACQUIRING    IDEAS. 

which  man  is  most  eminently  distinguished  above  the 
inferior  animals. 

"We  cannot  doubt  that  the  inferior  animals  possess  particular 
ideas,  and  that  they  even  deduce  inferences  from  them ;  that  they 
are  endowed  with  a  power  of  recalling  them,  and  of  forming  asso- 
ciations among  them.  The  horse  recollects,  and  discovers  a  mani- 
fest inclination  to  revisit  the  house  where  he  has  formerly  been 
well  used ;  but  he  forms  the  same  opinion  of  no  other  house,  where 
his  opinion  has  not  been  supported  by  experience,  that  is,  he  draws 
no  general  conclusion  concerning  the  probability  of  similar  good 
usage  in  similar  houses.  The  pointer  that  has  frequently  been 
beaten  for  starting  heath-game  or  partridge  before  the  fowler  was 
ready  to  take  aim,  learns  in  time  to  connect  correction  with  such 
rashness,  and  consequently  forbears  the  latter  from  fear  of  the 
former ;  but  his  associations  extend  not  beyond  his  experience,  and 
his  primitive  rashness  remains  with  regard  to  a  hare  or  a  snipe. 

I  have  now  explained  those  classes  of  ideas  which 
appear  to  be  of  consequence  sufficient  to  attract  atten- 
tion ;  but,  as  I  intend  this  course  to  be  an  introduction, 
not  to  the  idle  syllogism  of  the  schools,  but  to  sound 
reasoning  in  the  sciences,  in  arts,  and  in  business,  and 
as  ideas  are  the  materials  of  a|l  reasoning,  before  I  re- 
linquish this  subject  I  shall  point  out  the  most  frequent 
causes  of  their  imperfections,  and  endeavor  to  suggest 
the  best  means  of  preventing  or  removing  these  imper- 
ections.  I  shall  not,  however,  treat  of  these  topics 
separately,  because  they  are  necessarily^  conjoined. 
When  we  know  the  causes  of  errors,  the  road  to  truth 
is  to  avoid  them.  When  the  imperfections  of  ideas  are 
removed,  they  become  clear  and  distinct  of -course.  I 
shall  therefore  comprehend  both  these  views  in  the  fob 
lowing  rules  concerning  the  acquisition  and  examina- 
tion of  ideas. 

1.  Replenish  the  mind  with  as  great  variety  of  im- 
portant ideas  as  possible^ 

The  end  of  all  science,  of  reading,  of  observation,  of 


ACQUISITION    OF    NEW    IDEAS.  33 

the  study  of  nature  and  arts,  of  useful  conversation,  and 
of  education,  is  to  replenish  the  mind  with  ideas,  in  or- 
der to  extend  our  knowledge,  and  to  improve  our  facul- 
ties, to  render  us  happy  in  ourselves,  serviceable  to  so- 
ciety and  our  friends,  and  respectable  in  life.  Human 
knowledge,  it  must  be  confessed,  is  in  many  articles 
extremely  limited.  The  business,  the  avocations,  even 
the  necessary  amusements  and  refreshments  of  life,  em- 
ploy a  great  part  of  our  time.  But,  notwithstanding 
these  disadvantages,  much  might  be  done,  much  im- 
portant information  might  be  obtained,  were  we  to 
spend,  in  searching  for  new  ideas,  what  portion  of  time 
may  still  remain  unoccupied.  Industry,  properly  direct- 
ed, wTould  be  attended  with  signal  acquisitions,  and  in 
this  field  nothing  but  industry  can  avail.  Genius  can- 
not begin  to  operate  with  advantage,  till  the  mind  has 
procured  materials,  numerous,  valuable,  and  various. 
The  end  of  education  is  to  direct  us  in  making  these 
acquisitions  ;  but  it  is  not  to  be  expected,  considering 
the  immensity  of  the  field  we  traverse,  at  a  time  of  life 
when  our  heads  are  giddy,  and  our  faculties  unaccus- 
tomed to  investigation,  that  we  should  make  very  much 
progress  in  appropriating  what  we  learn.  The  acquisi- 
tion of  new  ideas  should  be  the  business  of  the  best 
part  of  life,  and  no  man  ever  accumulated  a  large  trea- 
sure of  them,  who  derived  them  not  from  his  own  ap- 
plication. Obtain,  therefore,  all  the  knowledge  you 
can  of  science,  of  arts,  of  nature,  of  society,  of  manners, 
laws,  and  customs.  Endeavor  to  gain  great  and  com- 
prehensive views  of  men  and  things  -in  all  your  re- 
searches and  inquiries,  and  let  these  views  serve  as 
foundations  of  your  judgments  and  reasonings  in  all 
your  particular  pursuits.* 

[*  "  The  way  of  attaining  such  an  extensive  treasure  of  ideas"  (says  Dr. 
Watts),  "  is,  with  diligence  to  apply  yourself  to  read  the  best  books ;  oou- 

2» 


34        IMPORTANCE  OF  ACCURACY  OF  IDEAS. 

2.  Endeavor  to  attain  accurate  ideas  of  the  informa- 
tion you  receive,  which  requires  two  operations,  first,  to 
compare  ideas  with  their  archetypes ;  second,  to  com- 
pare them  with  the  established  meaning  of  the  words 
by  which  they  are  denoted. 

I  need  not  employ  much  time  to  evince  the  necessity 
and  utility  of  this  rule.  Unless  accuracy  be  obtained, 
all  our  labor  and  search  are  in  a  great  measure  thrown 
away.  If  the  foundation  be  not  properly  prepared  and 
secured,  the  superstructure  can  never  be  finished  with 
beauty  and  strength.  Inaccurate  ideas  are  little  better 
than  no  ideas  ;  they  are  sometimes  worse.  In  respect 
of  every  deduction  resulting  from  them,  they  are  not 
preferable  to  ignorance,  because  such  deduction  cannot 
be  legitimate.  But  this  is  not  their  only  inconvenience  ; 
they  lead  us  to  suppose  ourselves  well-informed  when 


verse  with  the  most  knowing  and  the  wisest  of  men ;  and  endeavor  to  im- 
prove by  every  person  in  whose  company  you  are  :  suffer  no  hour  to  pass 
Rway  in  a  lazy  idleness,  in  impertinent  chattering,  or  useless  trifles  :  visit 
other  cities  and  countries  when  you  have  seen  your  own,  under  the  care 
of  one  who  can  teach  you  to  profit  by  travelling,  and  to  make  wise  obser- 
vations :  indulge  a  just  curiosity  in  seeing  the  wonders  of  art  and  nature  : 
search  into  things  yourselves,  as  well  as  learn  them  from  others :  be  ac- 
quainted with  men  as  well  as  books  :  learn  all  things  as  much  as  you  can 
at  first  hand;  and  let  as  many  of  your  ideas  as  possible  be  the  representa- 
tions of  things,  and  not  merely  the  representations  of  other  men's  ideas  : 
thus  your  soul,  like  some  noble  building,  shall  be  richly  furnished  with 
original  paintings,  and  not  with  mere  copies." 

"  In  order  to  preserve  your  treasure  of  ideas,  pursue  the  following  ad- 
vice : — 

"  (1.)  Recollect  every  day  the  things  you  have  seen,  or  heard,  or  read, 
which  may  have  made  any  addition  to  your  understanding :  read  the  wri- 
tings of  God  and  men  with  diligence  and  perpetual  reviews  :  be  not  fond 
of  hastening  to  a  new  book,  or  a  new  chapter,  till  you  have  well  fixed  in 
your  mind  what  was  useful  in  the  last. 

"  (2.)  Talk  over  the  things  which  you  have  seen,  heard,  or  learned,  with 
some  proper  acquaintance. 

"(3.)  Commit  to  writing  some  of  the  most  considerable  improvements 
which  you  daily  make,  at  least  such  hints  as  may  recall  them  to  youi 
mind,  when  perhaps  they  are  vanished  and  lost."  J 


IMPORTANCE  OF  ACCURACY  OF  IDEAS.        35 

we  are  not  so,  and,  of  course,  expose  us  to  all  the  mor- 
tification which  attends  the  detection  of  error,  ard  to 
all  those  irksome  contentions  which  arise  from  contro- 
versies about  the  meaning  of  words. 

In  comparing  ideas  with  their  archetypes,  nothing 
more  is  requisite  than  patience  and  attention ;  for,  by 
the  exercise  of  these  qualities,  we  shall  render  our  ideas 
as  adequate  and  accurate  as  it  is  in  our  power  to  make 
them.  We  should,  for  this  purpose,  carefully  and  re- 
peatedly make  comparison,  particularly  of  ideas  which 
lead  to  consequences  of  importance,  or  which  relate  to 
topics  of  ambiguity  or  difficulty. 

Of  the  three  kingdoms  of  nature — animals,  vegetables,  and  in- 
animate matter,  the  objects  generally  remain  as  long  as  we  pleasa 
under  our  examination,  and  we  have  sufficient  time  to  attend  to 
every  particular  necessary  to  be  known.  In  the  demonstrative 
sciences,  also,  mathematics  and  arithmetic,  our  ideas  of  princip^s 
at  least  will  be  accurate ;  and  it  is  seldom  that  our  conceptions, 
even  of  proofs  and  conclusions,  are  liable  to  ambiguity.  The  pre- 
cise and  defined  nature  of  the  subjects  of  these  sciences,  the  simple 
and  perspicuous  language  in  which  most  writers  have  agreed  to 
communicate  them,  render  it  almost  impossible  for  a  reader  en- 
dowed with  ordinary  attention  not  to  comprehend  distinctly  the 
sense  intended  to  be  communicated. 

^It  is,  then,  in  the  sciences  susceptible  only  of  proba- 
ble proof,  in  morals,  in  politics,  in  metaphysics,  in 
writings  which  convey  miscellaneous  truth,  as  history, 
criticism,  but  particularly  in  controversial  writings,  and 
in  conversation,  that  the  hazard  of  inaccurate  ideas  is 
very  considerable,  and  the  probability  of  avoiding  them 
altogether  is  exceedingly  small.  One  great  source  of 
ambiguity,  in  all  these  cases,  is  the  indefinite  nature  of 
the  subjects,  and  the  different  aspects  under  which  they 
appear  to  different  inquirers ;  but  the  greatest  source  is 
the  unavoidable  ambiguity  of  language,  and  the  diffi 


36  IMPORT   OF   WORDS    SHOULD   BE    UNDERSTOOD. 

culty  of  ascertaining  exactly  the  meaning  of  words.* 
This  double  indistinctness,  both  of  the  subjects  and  of 
the  means  of  communication,  cannot  fail  to  produce 
important  consequences  in  all  our  opinions  and  reason- 
ings;'and  the  subject  is  of  too  much  moment  not  to 
obtain  a  little  more  of  our  attention. 

[*  Since  reasoning,  or  inference,  the  principal  subject  of  logic,  is  an  oper- 
ation which  usually  takes  place  by  means  of  words,  and  in  all  complicated 
cases  can  take  place  in  no  other  way,  those  who  have  not  a  thorough  in- 
sight into  the  signification  and  purposes  of  words,  will  be  under  almost  a 
necessity  of  reasoning  or  inferring  incorrectly.  And  logicians  have  gener- 
ally felt  that  unless  in  the  very  first  stage  they  removed  this  fertile  source 
of  error,  the  pupil  would  not  be  in  a  condition  to  practise  the  remaining 
part  of  their  discipline  with  any  prospect  of  advantage.  Therefore  it  is 
that  an  inquiry  into  language,  so  far  as  is  needful  to  guard  against  the  er- 
rors to  which  it  gives  rise,  has  at  all  times  been  deemed  a  necessary  pre- 
liminary to  the  science  of  logic. 

But  there  is  another  reason  why  the  import  of  words  should  be  the 
earliest  subject  of  the  logician's  consideration  ;  because  without  it  he  can- 
not examine  into  the  import  of  propositions.  Now  this  is  a  subject  which 
stands  on  the  very  threshold  of  logic. — Mill' 9  Logic,  pp.  11,  12.1 


SIMPLE    IDEAS.  37 


LECTURE  III. 

IDEAS,   SIMPLE    AND    COMPLEX TO    PREVENT    AMBIGUITY  — 

DIVISION RULES DESCRIPTION DEFINITION. 

To  penetrate  to  the  bottom  of  the  doctrine  of  ambi- 
guity, as  it  relates  both  to  thoughts  and  language,  and 
to  provide  every  possible  preservative  against  it,  I 
begin  with  observing,  that,  in  respect  of  simple  ideas, 
all  mankind  are  nearly  agreed,  both  about  the  arche- 
types and  the  expression  of  them,  as  soon  as  they  are 
acquainted  with  the  objects  that  suggest  them,  and 
understand  the  language  of  which  the  expression  makes 
a  part.  Simple  ideas  are  not  very  numerous,  and  they 
are  called  simple,  partly  because  they  admit  no  divis- 
ions into  parts,  but  chiefly  because,  in  receiving  them, 
the  mind  is  perfectly  passive,  and  cannot  acquire  them 
without  an  actual  survey  of  the  external  objects  which 
suggest  them,  or  an  actual  feeling  of  the  mental  opera- 
tions which  produce  them.  The  chief  simple  ideas  are 
those  of  the  qualities  of  external  objects,  shape,  colors, 
tastes,  smells,  sounds ;  those  of  the  operations  of  the 
mind,  perception,  judgment,  reasoning,  willing;  and 
those  of  pleasure  and  pain,  power,  extension,  unity,  ex- 
istence, which  are  derived  partly  from  the  senses,  and 
partly  from  reflection. 

There  is  no  method  of  conveying  any  knowledge  of  these  ideas 
but  by  presenting  their  archetypes  to  the  external  or  internal  per- 
cipients ;  and  if  a  person  be  deprived  of  any  of  the  senses  which 
should  convey  the  knowledge  of  them,  no  words,  no  signs,  no 
known  mode  of  communication  can  supply  that  defect ;  he  must 


38  COMPLEX    IDEAS. 

forever  remain  in  ignorance.  If  a  person  be  deprived  of  sight,  foi 
example,  he  must  be  destitute  of  all  conceptions  of  light  and  colors. 
If  he  require  an  account  of  thinking  or  willing,  of  pleasure  or  pain, 
we  can  only  refer  him  to  experience. 

About  these  ideas,  then,  no  controversy  can  exist ;  because,  as 
all  men  must  receive  them  from  their  archetypes,  and,  of  course, 
all  men  must  receive  either  the  same  impressions,  and  must  have 
these  impressions  constantly  suggested  by  the  words  allotted  to 
denote  them,  or  even  if  they  receive  somewhat  diiferent  impres- 
sions, they  must  speak  and  reason  about  them  as  if  they  were  the 
same — for  every  person  can  speak  and  reason  only  about  the  simple 
ideas  in  his  own  mind.  For  example,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe 
that  the  idea  of  the  color  denoted  by  the  word  green  is  the  same 
in  the  minds  of  all  men;  but  though  there  were  some  difference  of 
idea  in  different  men,  yet  it  could  not  perhaps  be  detected,  for 
every  person  must  speak  and  reason  concerning  that  color  from 
the  idea  of  it  he  possesses. 

The  next  class  of  ideas  about  which,  and  the  words 
that  denote  them,  little  difference  or  ambiguity  can 
take  place,  consists  of  those  complex  ideas,  which  result 
from  collections  of  simple  ideas  of  the  same  hind. 
These  are  the  first  remove  from  simple  ideas;  and  as 
simple  ideas  are  clear  and  intelligible,  the  compositions 
made  out  of  them  partake  of  the  nature  of  their  constit- 
uent parts,  and  are  likewise  clear  and  intelligible.  The 
two  sciences  susceptible  of  demonstration  present  collec- 
tions of  such  ideas,  and  on  this  account,  among  others, 
they  are  capable  of  that  high  species  of  evidence. 

All  the  operations  in  arithmetic,  however  complex,  never  exhibit 
any  collections  of  ideas,  which  result  not  from  different  combina- 
tions or  fractions  of  the  simple  idea  of  unity.  All  the  enunciations 
and  demonstrations  of  mathematics,  however  compounded  and  re- 
fined, contain  no  ideas  which  are  not  formed  from  combinations  of 
the  simple  idea  of  extension.  All  the  triangles,  circles,  squares,  and 
parallelograms,  about  which  the  mathematician  is  conversant,  ex- 
hibit only  different  views  and  combinations  of  the  same  simple  idea 
of  quantity.  About  simple  ideas,  of  course,  and  those  sciences 
which  involve  combinations  of  them,  men  have  differed  very  little, 


COMPLEX    IDEAS.  39 

either  in  the  conceptions  of  them,  or  in  the  language  that  denotes 
them. 

Thus  far  our  path  is  luminous  and  patent;  here, 
however,  the  field  of  perfect  light  terminates,  and  the 
next  step  lands  us  in  some  degree  of  darkness  and  ob- 
scurity. When  we  enter  the  confines  of  the  othei 
sciences,  morals,  politics,  criticism ;  when  we  contem- 
plate the  subjects  of  miscellaneous  knowledge,  oratory, 
poetry,  history,  essays,  or  attend  to  the  business  of  arts 
and  common  life,  we  immediately  encounter  complex 
ideas,  comprehending  large  groups  of  subordinate 
ideas,  and  these  groups  composed  not  of  combinations 
of  the  same  simple  idea,  but  of  combinations  of  differ- 
ent ideas,  partly  simple  and  partly  complex,  and  we 
find  it  almost  impossible  to  avoid  mistakes. 

When  we  examine,  for  example,  the  ideas  denoted  by  the  word 
beauty,  a  word  in  everybody's  mouth,  when  speaking  of  truth, 
arts,  and  animals,  we  are  amazed  at  the  multiplicity  it  includes, 
and  the  combinations  it  exhibits.  When  applied  to  truth,  it  de- 
notes some  important  proposition,  established  by  a  clear  but  a 
refined  train  of  proof — as  when  we  speak  of  a  beautiful  theorem, 
or  a  beautiful  discovery.  When  applied  to  animals,  it  includes  the 
ideas  of  shape,  color,  utility,  sensibility,  acquired  bodily  and  mental 
accomplishments,  youth,  health,  gracefulness.  When  applied  to 
arts,  it  includes  uniformity,  variety,  high  polish,  convenience, 
utility — as  when  we  speak  of  a  beautiful  woman,  or  a  beautiful 
picture. 

Taste  is  another  word  in  frequent  use  among  men  of  genius  and 
lovers  of  the  fine  arts,  and  it  also  will  serve  to  illustrate  to  what 
ambiguity  communication  is  in  many  cases  unavoidably  exposed. 
It  signifies  that  sensibility  to  the  beauties  of  nature,  genius,  and  art, 
which  results  from  a  sound  state  of  the  imagination  and  the  under- 
standing, and  which  leads  us  to  distinguish  and  properly  prize  these 
beauties.  It  is  plain  that  much  ground  of  difference  is  laid  in  the 
nature  of  the  objects  of  this  internal  sense,  because  every  man  must 
judge  from  the  state  of  his  own  faculties,  and  the  cultivation  of  the 
faculties  of  no  two  men,  perhaps,  is,  entirely  equal.  Their  ideas  of 
the  objects  of  taste  must  share  a  similar  difference,  and  must  cor* 


40  RULES    AGAINST   AMBIGUITY. 

respond  to  the  state  of  their  respective  faculties.  It  were  easy  to 
multiply  examples ;  but  it  will  appear  from  those  I  have  adduced, 
that  a  double  source  of  ambiguity  prevails  with  respect  to  the  ideaa 
and  words  I  have  mentioned,  and  many  more  similar  ideas  and 
words,  which  every  day  occur  in  books  and  in  business.  The  ideas 
which  compose  a  complex  idea  may  really  be  different  in  different 
men's  minds,  according  to  the  improvement  of  their  faculties  or 
powers  of  perception ;  but  the  greatest  hazard  of  error  results  from 
the  inattention  with  which  the  complex  idea  may  be  formed. 
Thus,  one  man  may  omit  some  of  the  ideas  which  compose  the 
complex  ones  of  beauty  and  taste ;  others  may  add  to  them  more 
ideas  than  they  naturally  and  justly  contain. 

Another  great  source  of  ambiguity  in  every  inquiry 
where  body  or  spirit  is  concerned,  is  the  nature  of  sub- 
stances, whether  corporeal  or  spiritual.  What  substance 
is,  we  are  utterly  ignorant.  All  we  can  conceive  of  it 
s,  that  it  supports  qualities ;  and,  of  course,  all  our 
.deas  of  substances  are  nothing  more  than  collections 
cf  the  qualities  we  have  found  to  belong  to  them  re- 
spectively. Now,  if  any  person  form  not  the  same 
conception  with  us  of  any  of  these  qualities,  or  if  he 
either  add  to  or  diminish  their  number,  it  is  plain  that 
his  complex  idea  of  the  substance  can  never  agree  with 
ours,  and  that  in  all  communication  concerning  it,  we 
and  he  must  misunderstand  one  another. 

From  these  observations,  the  following  important 
practical  rules  will  be  allowed  to  result,  as  the  best 
preservatives  against  ambiguity. 

1.  In  all  cases  when  complex  ideas  come  under  our 
consideration,  we  should  employ  every  precaution  to 
render  our  collection  of  the  constituent  ideas  as  com- 
plete and  accurate  as  possible;  and  whenever  we  dis- 
cover that  our  reasonings  and  conclusions  disagree  with 
the  reasonings  and  conclusions  of  those  with  whom  we 
converse,  or  whose  books  we  read,  we  should  stop  and 
re-examine  both  the  constituent  ideas  and  the  expres 


ORIGin    OF    DISPUTES.  11 

sion  of  them,  because  it  is  a  thousand  to  one  tha  in 
the  re-examination  we  shall  discover  the  cause  of  Jie 
difference. 

The  propriety  and  utility  of  every  part  of  this  *ule 
appears  so  obvious  as  hardly  to  need  any  illustration. 
Happy  had  it  been  for  the  peace  of  society,  fortunate 
had  it  been  for  the  progress  of  knowledge,  if  it  had  al- 
ways been  punctually  practised.  All  those  irritating 
and  frivolous  disputes  which  pester  conversation,  almost 
all  those  controversies  which  have  disturbed  and  dis- 
tracted the  world,  would  have  been  prevented.  Consult 
the  controversies  which  have  involved,  not  individuals 
only,  but  classes  and  periods  of  learned  men,  and  you 
will  find  that  they  have  originated  chiefly  from  misap- 
prehensions of  the  ideas  and  terms  which  furnish  the 
ground  of  the  difference,  and  that,  if  the  parties  had  ex- 
ercised any  patience  and  pains  to  understand  one 
another,  before  they  began  to  dispute,  they  might  have 
prevented  much  trouble  and  vexation  to  themselves,  and 
much  contention  and  disturbance  to  society. 

The  famous  controversy  concerning  the  superior  merit  of  ancient 
or  modern  learning,  which  interested  and  divided  almost  all  the 
learned  men  of  Europe  in  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  and  the  begin- 
ning of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  which  still  interests,  and  some- 
times divides,  learned  men,  appears  a  pertinent  illustration.  It  is  a 
controversy  about  the  meaning  of  words,  and  affords  very  little 
ground  of  difference  of  opinion  when  the  terms  are  fully  ascer- 
tained. The  parties  have  never  considered,  that  no  comparison  of 
authors  can  exist,  except  in  circumstances  perfectly  similar.  If  the 
state  of  ancient  society  gave  encouragement  to  some  efforts  of  genius 
and  industry,  which  are  not  now  prompted  by  similar  incitements, 
can  we  wonder  that  these  efforts  should  be  more  brilliant  in  the 
former  situation,  than  they  are  found  to  be  in  the  latter  ?  If  ora- 
tory, statuary,  architecture,  and  perhaps  poetry,  received  superior 
countenance  and  patronage  in  Greece,  than  they  found  even  in 
Kome,  and  much  more  than  they  have  found  in  modern  times,  iai 


4:2  ENUMERATION,    OR    DIVISION. 

it  not  natural  to  expect  that  their  exhibitions  should  be  more  de- 
serving of  applause  ? 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  moderns  possess  superior  knowledge  of 
the  system  of  nature,  from  the  advantages  which  the  progress  of 
science  has  thrown  into  their  hands;  if  the  improvements  of  gov- 
ernment, and  the  extension  of  refinement  and  knowledge,  have  led 
them  to  excel  in  politics,  in  moral  researches,  and  in  the  greater 
part  of  the  useful  arts,  can  we  be  surprised  at  their  superiority  8 
It  was  impossible  that  the  moderns  could  rival  the  ancients  in  the 
former  case ;  it  is  equally  impossible  that  they  should  equal  us  in 
the  latter.  The  superiority  in  the  one  case,  or  the  inferiority  in  the 
other,  is  no  compliment  to,  or  impeachment  of,  the  genius  of  either ; 
it  is  the  natural  consequence  of  the  different  situations  of  human 
affairs,  and  could  not,  without  a  miracle,  have  been  otherwise. 
Had  the  keen  combatants  in  this  controversy  attended  to  this  nat- 
ural state  of  the  case,  they  would  have  forborne  their  ill-founded 
and  injurious  recriminations.  The  patrons  of  modern  literary  merit 
unjustly  measure  the  merits  of  ancient  genius  by  a  scale  adopted 
from  modern  ideas  and  manners ;  the  patrons  of  ancient  genius  re- 
taliate the  same  game,  and  pretend  to  determine  the  eminence  of 
modern  genius  by  a  scale  derived  from  the  ideas  and  manners  of 
ancient  times.  Let  these  reasonable  limitations  be  admitted,  and 
the  shadow  of  a  controversy,  I  believe,  would  vanish ;  the  differ- 
ence would  at  least  be  found  to  be  so  frivolous,  as  to  satisfy  every- 
body of  the  absurdity  of  the  contest. 

2.  After  ascertaining  the  amount  of  a  co?nplex  term 
by  enumeration,  by  description,  or  by  definition,  6m- 
ploy  it  ahvays  in  the  same  sense,  without  adding  to, 
diminishing,  or  changing  the  ideas  it  denotes. 

Enumeration,  commonly  called  division  t>y  logicians, 
is  a  recapitulation  of  the  subordinate  ideas  of  which  a 
complex  idea  consists,  and  forms  a  very  satisfactory 
method  of  explaining  or  ascertaining  that  complex 
idea. 

For  example,  the  term  gratitude  includes  the  following  subordi- 
nate ideas :  a  consciousness  of  favor  received,  a  disposition  to  ac- 
knowledge it  on  every  proper  occasion,  and  a  resolution  to  seize 
the  first  opportunity  of  returning  a  similar  favor  to  the  benefactor. 


DIVISION DESCRIPTION.  43 

Honor,  in  like  manner,  includes  an  unalterable  regard  to  truth  in 
words,  humanity  and  generosity  in  actions,  candor  and  forgiveness 
in  thoughts,  and  resentment  of  insult  or  affront, 

[Division  of  a  conception  enumerates  all  the  objects  or  classes 
that  are  included  under  it,  and  so  deals  with  the  extent  of  the  no- 
tion ;  or  it  is  the  enumeration  of  the  various  co-ordinate  species  of 
which  a  proximate  genus  is  composed.  The  rules  for  conducting 
the  process  correctly  are — 

(1.)  The  constituent  species,  called  the  dividing  members,  mast 
exclude  one  another. 

(2.)  The  constituent  species  must  be  equal,  together,  to  the  ge- 
nus divided. 

(3.)  The  division  must  be  made  according  to  one  principle  or 
ground. 

The  first  rule  is  to  secure  that  the  classes  and  sub-classes  shall  be 
distinct  from  each  other.  Exceptions  to  this  rule  are  often  un- 
avoidable, especially  in  subjects  that  do  not  belong  to  strict  sci- 
ence: thus,  in  enumerating  the  species  of  imaginative  writers,  one 
would  probably  mention  poets,  dramatists,  and  writers  of  tales; 
yet  some  poets  are  dramatists,  and  some  tales  are  poems. 

The  second  rule  provides  that  no  class  shall  be  omitted,  and  se- 
cures completeness. 

The  principle  of  division  mentioned  in  the  third  rule,  is  some  new 
conception,  for  the  marks  of  which  we  seek  in  the  conception  to  be 
divided.  Thus  man  may  be  divided  into  European,  African,  Asi- 
atic, American,  and  Australian ;  and  again  into  Christian,  Mobam 
medan,  Jew,  and  Pagan ;  and  again  into  just  and  unjust.  The 
separation  of  the  parts  of  any  individual  object,  as  of  a  sword  into 
blade  and  hilt,  is  termed  partition.  An  individual  is  thai  which 
cannot  be  divided  without  ceasing  to  be  what  it  is :  its  parts  can- 
not have  the  name  of  the  whole.  When  a  genus  is  divided,  every 
part  of  it  remains  unchanged,  and  may  have  the  name  of  the  genus. 
The  trunk  and  limbs  of  a  man  cannot  be  severally  called  a  man ; 
but  a  European  is  a  man,  and  an  Asiatic,  and  an  American.— 
Thomson.'] 

Description,  also,  is  a  sort  of  enumeration,  but  is  ap- 
plicable chiefly  to  objects  of  sight.  It  is  used  often  to 
distinguish  objects  of  sight,  which  have  not  obtained 
names,  or  of  which  the  names  are  unknown.  We  de- 
scribe a  landscape,  a  river,  a  house,  a  town,  a  ship,  a 


44  DEFINITION. 

horse,  a  tree,  a  robber,  in  order  to  communicate  ideas 
of  these  objects  to  those  who  have  not  seen  them,  or  tc 
enable  those  to  distinguish  them  when  they  do  see 
them.  Description  is  a  recapitulation  of  the  parts  or 
properties  of  the  object  described. 

A  landscape,  for  instance,  contains  corn-fields,  plantations,  water 
running  or  stagnating,  hills,  houses,  villages,  animals,  situate  in  such 
a  manner  as  diversify  it  from  all  other  landscapes.  The  color, 
shape,  strength,  gentleness,  fleetness,  and  easy  motion,  which  con- 
stitute the  description  of  my  horse,  discriminate  him  from  all  other 
horses.  A  deserter,  or  a  robber,  is  described  by  his  stature,  figure, 
complexion,  features,  and  dress ;  or,  in  other  words,  by  a  recital  of 
the  particulars  which  form  his  appearance,  and  which  mark  him 
out  among  other  men. 

Definition  is  the  last  method  of  ascertaining  complex 
ideas  or  general  terms,  and  differs  not  essentially  from 
the  preceding  methods.  The  chief  difference  is  the  use 
of  it  on  different  occasions.  It  may  be  employed  in  fix- 
ing complex  ideas  of  all  sorts,  whether  their  archetypes 
are  objects  of  the  external  senses,  or  are  the  creatures 
of  reflection,  that  is,  whether  they  exist  in  matter  or  in 
mind.  It  is  used,  however,  chiefly  to  ascertain  species, 
whose  archetypes  exist  in  the  mind.  A  good  definition 
-.consists  of  two  parts ;  by  one  part  are  marked  those 
objects  with  which  the  thing  defined  has  any  common 
qualities ;  by  the  other  part  are  marked  those  qualities 
which  characterize  the  thing  defined  alone.  Nothing 
more  can  be  done  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  any  object^ 
than  to  point  out  those  objects  with  which  it  has  any 
common  qualities,  and  next  to  enumerate  the  qualities 
peculiar  to  itself.  Hence  the  logical  rule,  that  every 
definition*  should  consist  of  a  genus  and  a  specific  dif- 

[*  As  division  ascertains  the  various  classes  of  objects  united  under  one 
conception,  so  does  definition  ascertain  those  common  marks  which  all  the 
objects  possess,  or  that  common  nature  represented  by  the  conception 


KULES    OF    DEFINITION.  45 

ference,  the  genus  denoting  the  common  qualities,  and 
the  specific   difference   the   characteristic  or  peculiar 

ones. 

Suppose,  for  example,  it  were  required  to  define  what  the  mathe- 
maticians call  a  square,  or  a  parallelogram,  these  most  accurate  ut 
all  logicians  will  tell  us,  that  "  a  square  is  a  figure  which  has  four 
equal  sides,  and  four  right  angles,"  and  that  "  a  parallelogram  is  a 
figure  that  has  four  angles,  and  four  sides,  the  opposite  angles  and 
sides  only  being  equal." 

The  things  defined  are  species,  that  is,  the  square  and  the  paral- 
lelogram are  not  a  square  and  parallelogram  which  exist  in  some 
book,  or  are  delineated  on  a  particular  board  ;  they  stand  for  the  en- 
tire species  of  squares  and  parallelograms,  and  mark  the  properties 
common  to  all  the  individuals  of  these  species.     The  first  part  of  the 


The  rules  of  definition  may  be  stated,  as  a  help  to  understanding  the  pro- 
cess itself. 

(1.)  A  definition  must  recount  the  essential  attributes  of  the  thing  defined. 
Thus,  in  defining  "  words"  as  u  the  articulate  signs  of  thoughts,"  we  are 
not  to  introduce  such  a  superfluous  mark  as  "  words  are  the  articulate  signs 
by  which  an  orator  expresses  his  thoughts  ;"  for  whilst  this  is  true,  it  is  not 
necessarily  found  in  the  conception  in  our  mind,  and  consequently  has  no 
place  in  the  act  of  analyzing  it. 

(2.)  The  definition  mvst  not  contain  the  name  of  the  thing  defined;  as  this  is 
precisely  the  word  we  are  bound  to  explain.  Thus,  if  "  life"  is  defined  to 
be  "the  sum  of  the  vital  functions,"  we  have  not  logically  defined  "  life," 
as  the  word  "vital,"  which  implies  it,  stands  unexplained  in  the  defi- 
nition. 

(3.)  A  definition  must  be  precisely  adequate  to  the  species  defined.  If 
it  explain  a  species  below,  it  is  said  to  be  too  narrow,  as  where  "triangle" 
is  defined  "  a  rectilinear  figure  with  three  equal  sides  and  angles."  If  it 
is  applicable  to  the  genus  above,  it  is  too  wide,  as  when  we  define  u  words" 
as  the  "  sign  of  thoughts,"  whereas  there  are  other  signs  also. 

(4.)  A  definition  must  not  be  expressed  in  obscure,  or  figurative,  or  am- 
biguous language.  The  Divine  Nature  has  been  represented  as  "  a  circle 
whose  centre  is  everywhere,  and  whose  circumference  is  nowhere;"  but 
this  bold  figure  cannot  for  a  moment  be  accounted  a  definition. 

(5.)  A  definition  must  not  be  negative.  "Evil  is  that  which  is  not 
good."  "  A  point  is  that  which  has  no  parts  and  no  magnitude."  These 
definitions  are  to  be  judged  according  to  our  view  of  the  possibility  of  find- 
ing others  of  the  positive  form.  Some  conceptions  are  in  their  nature 
negative,  as  indivisibility,  blindness,  and  must  be  defined  negatively.— 
Thomson  .1 


4:0  DEFINITION EXAMPLES. 

definition  refers  them  to  their  genus,  or  characterizes  them  by  the 
name  of  figures,  by  which  it  is  signified  that  they  have  something 
in  common  with  all  other  mathematical  species,  circles,  triangles, 
rhombuses,  ellipses,  namely,  they  include  space,  and  are  bounded 
by  lines.  The  second  part  of  the  definition  exhibits  their  specific 
difference,  or  enumerates  the  peculiar  properties  which  distinguish 
them  from  all  the  other  species  of  the  same  genus;  squares  have 
four  right  angles,  and  four  equal  sides ;  parallelograms  have  also 
four  angles  and  four  sides,  the  opposite  angles  and  sides  only  being 
equal,  which  no  other  species  have  but  themselves. 

If  I  define  eloquence  to  be  the  art  of  speaking  or  writing  well, 
logic  the  art  of  reasoning  well,  statuary  the  art  of  forming  an  exact 
resemblance  of  the  human  shape  in  marble,  painting  the  art  of  de- 
lineating a  resemblance  of  the  same  shape  on  canvas  by  means  of 
oil  colors,  I  refer  all  these  species  to  their  genus,  and  mark  proper- 
ties in  which  they  all  agree,  namely,  in  being  arts,  or  something 
acquired  by  industry  and  practice,  and  then  I  mention  the  proper- 
ties which  distinguish  these  arts  from  all  other  arts,  and  from  one 
another ;  eloquence  by  speaking  or  writing  well,  logic  by  reasoning 
well,  statuary  by  forming  a  resemblance  of  the  human  shape  in 
marble,  painting  by  delineating  a  similar  resemblance  on  canvas. 

If,  again,  I  define  morality  to  be  the  science  which  teaches  to  be 
wise,  virtuous,  and  happy ;  politics  the  science  which  teaches  to 
provide  for  the  prosperity  of  communities,  or  large  bodies  of  men ; 
mathematics  the  science  which  teaches  to  compute  quantity  ;  pneu- 
matics the  science  which  teaches  the  properties  of  spirits,  or  the 
doctrine  of  fluids ;  optics  the  science  which  teaches  the  theory  oi 
vision  and  colors :  I  refer,  first,  all  these  branches  of  knowledge  to 
their  next  genus,  science,  by  which  I  signify,  that  they  all  agree  in 
presenting  some  useful  truths  to  the  mind,  and  that  they  are  sup- 
ported by  satisfactory  evidence.  In  the  second  place,  I  distinguish 
each  science  from  the  rest,  and  from  all  other  sciences  not  men- 
tioned, by  specifying  as  above  the  particular  truths  which  it  incul- 
cates. 

Definition  might  certainly  be  employed  to  discrimi- 
nate complex  ideas  on  every  occasion,  and  might  su- 
persede both  enumeration  and  description ;  but  in  all 
such  cases,  the  specific  difference  would  become  either 
an  enumeration  or  a  description.  Indeed,  there  is  no  ma- 
terial difference  between  these  methods  of  ascertaining 


SPECIFIC    DIFFERENCE.  *7 

ideas,  except  in  the  length  of  the  specific  difference. 
An  enumeration,  or  a  description,  either  includes  or 
supposes  a  genus,  to  which  the  idea  explained  refers ; 
and  the  specific  difference  of  every  definition  is  either 
an  enumeration  or  a  description. 

For  example,  the  enumeration  formerly  advanced,  of  the  ideas 
expressed  by  the  word  honor,  may  easily  be  converted  into  a  defi- 
nition, of  which  the  specific  difference  will  become  the  enumeration 
itself.  "  Honor  is  a  disposition  which  prompts  us  to  regard  truth 
in  our  words,  generosity  in  our  actions,  candor  in  our  thoughts, 
and  to  entertain  resentment  of  insult  or  affront."  In  like  manner, 
I  may  convert  the  description  of  a  horse  into  a  definition,  of  which 
the  description  will  constitute  the  specific  difference.  I  may  call 
him  an  animal  of  a  cylindrical  body,  long  and  taper  legs,  high 
neck,  beautiful  head,  of  a  bay  color,  gentle  temper,  easy  motion, 
and  fit  for  riding.  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  when  the  spe- 
cific difference  resolves  itself  into  an  enumeration,  or  a  description, 
it  is  of  little  consequence  to  distinguish  the  genus.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  it  is  of  consequence  to  distinguish  the  genus,  the  spe- 
cific difference  seldom  consists  of  more  than  one  or  two  properties. 
Definition  is  always  used  in  the  last  case,  and  enumeration  or  de- 
scription in  the  two  first.  Enumeration  is  commonly  employed  to 
explain  complex  ideas,  of  which  it  is  of  little  consequence  to  men- 
tion the  genus ;  description,  to  ascertain  complex  ideas,  the  arche- 
types of  which  are  objects  of  sight ;  and  definition,  to  ascertain. the 
abstract  ideas  of  species. 

With  respect  to  definition,  it  is  proper  further  to  ob- 
serve, that  we  must  never  attempt  to  apply  it  to  simple 
ideas,  because  they  are  immediately  derived  from  per- 
ception, prompted  by  the  objects  or  operations  which 
suggest  them  ;  and  no  definition  or  explication  can  ren- 
der them  more  distinct  or  intelligible  than  they  are. 
Even  the  mathematicians  have  not  always  been  suffi- 
ciently attentive  to  this  remark. 

The  word  ratio  denotes  the  idea  of  equality  or  inequality,  which 
results  from  the  comparison  of  two  magnitudes  of  the  same  kind 
in  point  of  quantity  ;  as  when  one  of  the  magnitudes  h  said  to  be 


48  SIMPLE   IDEAS    NOT   TO   BE    DEFINED. 

equal  to,  greater  or  less  than  the  other,  or  to  hold  to  it  some  fixed 
proportion.  The  idea  appears  to  be  simple,  at  least  no  words  can 
make  it  plainer  than  the  actual  comparison  of  the  magnitudes  by 
which  it  is  prompted.  Yet  all  the  editions  of  Euclid  I  have  seen, 
previous  to  the  one  published  by  Dr.  Simpson  of  Glasgow,  present 
definitions  of  it.  "  Ratio,"  we  are  told,  "  is  a  habitude  of  magni- 
tudes of  the  same  kind,  according  to  quantity."  Habitude  is  a 
word  at  least  as  unintelligible  as  ratio ;  yet  it  seems  no  plainer 
word  could  be  found.  The  truth  is,  the  definition  should  not  have 
been  attempted,  and  Simpson  has  accordingly  expunged  it. 

Motion  is  another  simple  idea,  on  which  Aristotle,  and  the 
schoolmen  after  him,  have  exercised  their  ingenuity,  and  have  pro- 
duced the  following  famous  specimen  of  jargon.  They  tell  us,  that 
motion  is  "  actus  entis  in  potentia,  quatenus  in  potentia,"  the  act 
of  a  being  in  energy,  as  far  as  it  is  in  energy.  Even  later  and  bet- 
ter philosophers,  who  define  motion  by  "  a  passage  from  one  place 
to  another,"  do  not  make  the  matter  much  plainer.  They  only 
substitute  one  word  for  another,  and  it  is  difficult  to  decide  whe- 
ther motion  is  better  explained  by  passage,  or  passage  by  motion. 

As,  then,  complex  ideas  only  are  susceptible  of  ex- 
plication in  any  of  the  ways  I  have  mentioned,  if  we 
would  preserve  perspicuity,  careful  attention  must  be 
paid  that  the  same  meaning,  thus  settled,  shall  be  in- 
variably retained.  The  determination  of  this  point  is 
simple  and  easy,  and  may  always  be  accomplished  by 
substituting  the  explication  in  the  place  of  the  term  de- 
fined. "If  this  be  practicable,  and  the  sense  be  pre- 
served, we  may  be  confident  we  have  not  changed  the 
meaning  of  the  term. 

Before  I  relinquish  this  branch  of  the  subject  I  must 
observe,  that  although,  in  compliance  with  the  exam- 
ple of  all  logical  writers,  I  have  hitherto  considered, 
and  shall  through  the  whole  of  this  course  continue  to 
consider,  all  knowledge  as  composed  of  ideas,  and  shall 
call  every  impression  made  on  the  mind,  whether  de- 
rived from  an  external  or  an  internal  archetype,  by  this 
name :  yet  that  some-  late  writers  of  eminence  have 


DEFINITIONS    OF    NAMES    AND    OF   THINGS.  49 

called  these  impressions  by  other  names  than  that  of 
ideas.  All  impressions,  then,  prompted  by  archetypes, 
which  have  a  real  existence  without  the  mind,  they 
distinguish  by  the  name  of  perceptions.  All  impres- 
sions, of  wThich  the  archetypes  have  no  real  existence, 
but  are  the  creatures  of  the  imagination,  as  a  mountain 
of  gold,  a  sea  of  milk,  they  denominate  coyiceptions. 
Those  impressions  only  they  call  ideas,  which  have 
been  formerly  received  into  the  mind,  and  are  again 
recalled  by  memory.  You  will  find  this  explanation 
useful  in  reading  some  metaphysical,  and  even  some 
critical  writers ;  but  it  is  more  convenient  for  our  pur- 
pose to  give  the  name  of  idea  to  every  impression, 
whether  simple  or  complex,  and  from  whatever  source 
it  may  be  derived. 

[Definitions  have  been  divided  into  those  of  names  and  those  of 
things :  the  former  explain  the  meaning  of  a  term,  the  latter  the 
nature  of  a  thing,  the  last  being  the  most  important. 

The  distinction  between  nominal  and  real  definitions,  between 
definitions  of  words  and  what  are  called  definitions  of  things, 
though  conformable  to  the  ideas  of  most  of  the  Aristotelian  logi- 
cians, cannot  be  maintained.  We  apprehend  that  no  definition  is 
ever  intended  to  "  explain  and  unfold  the  nature  of  the  thing." 
No  definition  can  unfold  its  whole  nature;  and  every  proposition 
in  which  any  quality  whatever  is  predicated  of  the  thing,  unfolds 
some  part  of  its  nature. 

The  true  state  of  the  case  we  take  to  be  this.  All  definitions  are 
of  names  and  of  names  only :  but  in  some  definitions  it  is  clearly 
apparent,  that  nothing  is  intended  except  to  explain  the  meaning 
of  the  word  ;  while  in  others,  besides  explaining  the  meaning  of  the 
word,  it  is  intended  to  be  implied  that  there  exists  a  thing  corre- 
sponding to  the  word.  Whether  tins  be  or  be  not  implied  in  any 
given  case,  cannot  be  collected  from  the  mere  form  of  the  expres- 
sion. a  A  centaur  is  an  animal,  with  the  upper  parts  of  a  man 
and  the  lower  parts  of  a  horse,"  and  u  A  triangle  is  a  rectilineal 
figure  with  three  sides,"  are,  in  form,  expressions  precisely  similar; 
although  in  the  former  it  is  not  implied  that  any  thing,  conforma- 
able  to  the  term,  really  exists,  while  in  the  latter  it  is,  as  may  be 

3 


50  DEFINITION    AND    FUSTULATE. 

seen  by  substituting  in  both  definitions  the  word  means  for  Is.  Id 
the  first  expression,  "  A  centaur  means  an  animal,  &c,"  the  sense 
would  remain  unchanged :  in  the  second,  "  A  triangle  means,  &c," 
the  meaning  would  be  altered,  since  it  would  be  obviously  impos- 
sible to  deduce  any  of  the  truths  of  geometry  from  a  proposition 
expressive  only  of  the  manner  in  which  we  intend  to  employ  a  par- 
ticular sign. 

There  are,  therefore,  expressions,  commonly  passing  for  defini- 
tions, which  include  in  themselves  more  than  the  mere  explanation 
of  the  meaning  of  a  term.  But  it  is  not  correct  to  call  an  expres- 
sion of  this  sort  a  peculiar  kind  of  definition.  Its  difference  from 
the  other  kind  consists  in  this — that  it  is  not  a  definition,  but  a 
definition  and  something  more.  The  definition  above  given  of  a 
triangle,  obviously  comprises  not  one  but  two  propositions,  perfect- 
ly distinguishable.  The  one  is,  u  There  may  exist  a  figure,  bound- 
ed by  three  straight  lines :"  the  other,  "  And  this  figure  may  be 
termed  a  triangle."  The  former  of  these  propositions  is  not  a  defi- 
nition at  all :  the  latter  is  a  mere  nominal  definition,  or  explanation 
of  the  use  and  application  of  a  term.  The  first  is  susceptible  of 
truth  or  falsehood,  and  may  therefore  be  made  the  foundation  of  a 
train  of  reasoning.  The  latter  can  neither  be  true  nor  false :  the 
only  character  it  is  susceptible  of,  is  that  of  conformity  or  discon- 
formity  to  the  ordinary  usage  of  language. 

There  is  a  real  distinction,  then,  between  definitions  of  names 
and  what  are  erroneously  called  definitions  of  things;  but  it  is, 
that  the  latter,  along  with  the  meaning  of  a  name,  covertly  asserts 
a  matter  of  fact.  This  covert  assertion  is  not  a  definition,  but  a 
postulate.  The  definition  is  a  mere  identical  proposition,  which 
gives  information  only  about  the  use  of  language,  and  from  which 
no  conclusions  affecting  matters  of  fact  can  possibly  be  drawn. 
The  accompanying  postulate,  on  the  other  hand,  affirms  a  fact, 
which  may  lead  to  consequences  of  every  degree  of  importance. 
Tt  affirms  the  real  existence  of  things  possessing  the  combination  of 
attributes  set  forth  in  the  definition ;  and  this,  if  true,  may  be  a 
foundation  sufficient  on  which  to  build  a  whole  fabric  of  scientific 
truth.— MilVs  Logic,  pp.  98,  99.] 


INVESTIGATION    OF   TRUTH    AND    KNOWLEDGE.  51 


LECTURE  IV. 

KNOWLEDGE   AND    TRUTH,  WHAT? THE   RESULT  OF  INTUITION  OK 

OF   REASONING DIFFERENT    KINDS    OF    PROPOSITIONS SOUR- 
CES WHENCE  DERIVED. 

In  former  lectures  I  have  considered  ideas  as  simple, 
as  complex,  distinct  or  confused,  adequate  or  inade- 
quate, particular  or  abstract ;  and  I  have  illustrated  at 
considerable  length  the  pains  we  must  take,  and  the 
rules  we  must  follow,  in  order  to  have  them  in  the  most 
perfect  state,  and  to  obtain  over  them  the  most  com- 
plete command.  All,  however,  I  have  hitherto  ad- 
vanced, is  a  mere  preparation  of  the  materials  of  logic  ; 
we  have  not  yet  taken  the  least  step  towards  applying 
them  to  any  use  in  the  investigation  of  truth  and  knowl- 
edge.    To  this  application  I  am  now  to  proceed. 

The  investigation  of  truth  and  knowledge  consists  of 
two  operations.  The  first  compares  two  ideas,  in  order 
to  perceive  in  them  agreement  or  disagreement;  the 
second  compares  two  ideas,  by  the  help  of  one  or  more 
intermediate  ideas.  The  truth  or  knowledge  acquired 
by  the  first  operation  is  said  to  result  from  judgment  ;* 
the  truth  or  knowledge  acquired  by  the  second  opera- 
tion is  said  to  result  from  reasoning.     I  begin  with 


[*It  is  hardly  necessary  to  remark,  that  judgment  enters  as  an  element 
into  almost  all  our  mental  acts.  We  think  in  judgments;  that  is,  we  are 
always  affirming  one  thing  of  another,  and  we  do  not  consider  any  thing 
else  to  be  thinking.  To  conceive  of  things  without  forming  judgments,  is 
to  make  no  progress.  We  can  only  be  said  to  think  when  we  fcrm  a  judg- 
ment respecting  two  conceptions,  in  which  one  is  affirmed  of  the  other.— 
Dr.  Wayland.]  v  . 


52  KNOWLEDGE — TRUTH. 

judgment,  and  the  truth  and  knowledge  which  are  at- 
tainable by  its  means. 

Two  preliminary  questions  occur :  what  is  knowl- 
edge ?  and,  what  is  truth  ?  We  are  familiarized  with 
these  words,  and  we  are  not  disposed  to  suspect  there 
is  any  mystery  in  their  meaning.  But  it  is  not,  per- 
haps, so  obvious  as  is  generally  supposed  ;  and  it  is  of 
bo  much  importance  in  our  present  inquiries,  that  we 
must  not  proceed  without  attempting  to  ascertain  it. 
Knowledge,  then,  I  assert,  is  the  perception  of  the 
agreement  of  ideas  with  one  another;  truth,  is  the 
agreement  of  ideas  with  words.  But  what,  it  will  again 
be  asked,  perhaps,  is  the  signification  of  these  words, 
agreement  and  disagreement?  I  reply,  that  the  signifi- 
cation of  these  words  is  not  always  the  same,  but  varies 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  science,  art,  or  subject, 
about  which  the  ideas  are  conversant.  A  few  examples 
will  be  the  best  illustration. 

In  arithmetic  and  mathematics,  the  only  comparison  of  ideas 
which  can  take  place  relates  to  the  equality  or  inequality  of  the 
quantities;  agreement  denotes  equality — disagreement,  inequality. 
When  I  compare  the  quantities  four  and  five,  I  perceive  that  they 
are  unequal,  or  that  the  ideas  of  them  disagree.  I  perceive  further, 
if  I  add  one  to  four,  that  these  two  together  will  form  a  compound 
quantity,  which  will  be  exactly  equal  to  five,  or  that  the  ideas  tour 
and  one  conjoined  will  agree  with  the  idea  five.  My  knowledge, 
then,  that  four  is  not  equal  to  five,  but  that  four  and  one  are  equal 
to  five,  is  the  intuitive  perception  I  have  that  the  idea  of  four  disa- 
grees with  the  idea  of  five,  while  the  idea  of  four  and  one  together 
agrees  with  the  idea  of  five. 

In  like  manner,  from  the  ideas  I  have  of  a  right  angle,  or  half  a 
light  angle,  or  from  the  ideas  I  have  of  an  acre,  and  half  an  acre, 
1  know  certainly  that  the  half  right  angle  disagrees  with,  or  is  a  less 
quantity  than  the  whole  right  angle — that  the  half  acre  disagrees 
with,  or  is  a  less  quantity  than  the  whole  acre;  and  that  if  I  double 
the  half  right  angle  and  the  half  acre,  I  shall  form  two  compound 
quantities,  the  ideas  of  which  will  agree  respectively  with  those  of 


UNIVERSITY 

Of 
KNOWLEDGE CERTAIN    OR    PROBABLE.  53 

the  whole  right  angle  and  the  whole  acre.  The  perception  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas,  in  all  these  cases,  is  the  same 
thing  with  the  knowledge  of  the  equality  or  inequality  of  the  quan- 
tities compared. 

If,  in  natural  philosophy,  I  compare  body  or  matter  with  divisi- 
bility, I  immediately  discover  that  divisibility  applies  to,  or  is  a 
property  of,  matter ;  in  other  words,  I  find  that  the  ideas  of  matter 
and  divisibility  agree  together,  and  I  know  that  matter  is  divisible. 
Agreement,  in  this  case,  signifies  property  or  relation,  not  equality, 
as  in  the  preceding  cases.  If  I  maintain,  in  morals,  that  a  good 
man  is  happy ;  or  in  politics,  that  a  wise  king  is  a  blessing  to  his 
people ;  or  in  arts,  that  industry  is  commonly  attended  with  suc- 
cess, my  knowledge  of  all  these  maxims  is  perfectly  the  same  thing 
with  the  agreement  I  perceive  between  the  ideas  of  a  good  man 
and  happiness,  of  a  wise  king  and  the  happiness  of  his  people,  of 
industry  and  the  acquisition  of  wealth. 

Truth  relates  to  the  enunciation  of  knowledge,  and 
is  the  agreement  of  ideas  with  words.  If  I  assert  that 
the  British  is  a  free  government,  and  that  the  English 
are  more  industrious  than  any  other  nation  in  Europe, 
I  maintain  truth,  because  my  words  actually  correspond 
to  accurate  ideas  of  the  fact3.  If,  again,  I  say  that  the 
three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
I  express  a  truth,  because  it  is  demonstrable  that  my 
words  and  ideas  agree.  Falsehood,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  the  disagreement  of  words  with  ideas  [i.  e.,  with  ac- 
curate ideas  of  the  facts  of  the  case] ;  as  when  it  is 
asserted  that  the  British  government  is  despotic,  or 
that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  three 
right  angles.  A  mistake,  is  the  actual  disagreement  of 
words  with  ideas,  when  we  suppose  that  they  agree. 
The  ignominious  falsehood  called  a  lie,  is  the  disa- 
greement of  words  with  ideas,  uttered  with  an  intention 
to  deceive. 

Knowledge,  further,  is  of  two  kinds,  certain  and  prob- 
able. Certain  knowledge  takes  place  when  the  mind  is 
perfectly  satisfied  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of 


64  PROPOSITIONS- -FOUNDED    ON    INTUITION. 

its  ideas.*  Probable  knowledge  takes  place  when  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas  is  not  so  clear  as  to 
afford  perfect  satisfaction,  and  the  degrees  of  proba- 
bility are  greater  or  less,  according  as  the  satisfaction  is 
more  or  less  perfect. 

In  judging  of  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  ideas, 
we  must  examine  them  in  pairs,  and  the  words  in  which 
we  express  that  judgment  form  a  sentence,  called  a 
proposition.  For  example,  if  the  idea  of  a  whole  be 
compared  with  the  idea  of  a  part,  it  is  immediately 
found  that  they  disagree;  and  this  judgment  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  following  proposition:  "The  whole  is 
greater  than  any  of  its  parts."  But,  if  the  idea  of  the 
whole  be  compared  with  the  idea  of  all  its  parts  taken 
together,  it  is  found  that  they  agree;  and  this  judg- 
ment is  expressed  by  the  following  proposition  :  "  The 
whole  is  equal  to  all  its  parts  taken  together." 

If  the  agreement  or  disagreement  be  perceived  by  bare 
juxtaposition  of  the  ideas,  without  the  intervention  of 
any  intermediate  idea,  the  evidence  of  the  proposition 
is  said  to  be  intuitive.  But,  if  the  agreement  or  disa- 
greement be  perceived  by  means  of  some  intermediate 
idea,  or  train  of  ideas,  the  mind  then  must  proceed  by 
steps.  It  must  compare  the  first  idea  of  the  proposition 
with  the  first  intermediate  idea,  and  pass  a  judgment 
on  their  agreement  or  disagreement.  It  must  next  com- 
pare the  first  intermediate  idea  with  the  second  inter- 

[*  Knowledge  is  a  clear  and  certain  conception  of  that  which  is  true,  and 
implies  three  things:  firm  belief — of  what  is  true — on  sufficient  grounds. 

Our  knowledge  is  of  two  kinds:  6f  facts,  and  of  truths.  A  fact  is  any 
thing  that  has  been,  or  is.  We  derive  our  knowledge  of  facts  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses. 

Truth  is  an  exact  accordance  with  what  has  been,  is,  or  shall  be.  There 
tte  two  methods  of  ascertaining  truth :  (1)  by  comparing  known  facta  with 
each  other;  (2)  by  comparing  known  truths  with  each  other.  Hence, 
truths  are  inferences,  either  from  facts  or  other  truths. — Davit?  Logic  nj 
Mathematics.] 


PROPOSITIONS — FOUNDED   ON   REASONING.  55 

mediate  idea,  and  pass  a  similar  judgment.  It  must 
proceed,  in  like  manner,  through  all  the  intermediate 
ideas,  and  pass  similar  judgments,  till  it  comes  to  com- 
pare the  last  intermediate  idea  with  the  latter  idea  of 
the  proposition  ;  and  from  all  these  intermediate  judg- 
ments the  conclusive  judgment  is  deduced,  concerning 
the  agreement  or  disagreement  cf  the  two  primary  ideas 
of  the  proposition.  In  this  case  the  evidence  of  the 
proposition,  declarative  of  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment of  the  two  primary  ideas,  is  said  to  be  founded 
on  reasoning. 

Hence  it  appears  that  all  knowledge,  whether  it  he 
the  offspring  of  intuition  or  the  result  of  reasoning,  is 
denoted  by  propositions,  which  express  the  agreement 
or  disagreement  of  ideas ;  that  each  proposition  con- 
tains two  ideas,  simple  or  complex,  besides  the  assertion 
of  agreement  or  disagreement ;  and  that  the  proposition 
which  denotes  agreement  may  be  called  affirmative, 
that  which  denotes  disagreement  may  be  called  nega- 
tive. u  That  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to 
two  right  angles,"  is  an  affirmative  proposition;  "that 
a  part  is  not  equal  to  the  whole,"  is  a  negative  one. 

The  two  capital  ideas  constitute  two  parts  of  a  propo- 
sition. The  first  idea,  or  sometimes  several  ideas  con- 
sidered as  one,  is  that  of  which  something  is  affirmed 
or  denied,  and  is  therefore  called  the  subject  of  the 
proposition ;  the  second  idea,  or  sometimes  several  ideas 
considered  as  one,  is  the  property,  or  quality,  or  attri- 
bute, which  is  either  affirmed  or  denied  to  belong  to, 
or  to  agree  with,  the  first  idea,  and  is  therefore  called 
the  predicate  of  the  proposition.  "  The  three  angles  of 
a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles,"  is  a  proposi- 
tion, of  which  the  idea  of  the  three  angles  forms  the 
subject,  and  the  idea  of  equality  to  two  right  angles 
forms  the  predicate.     The  affirmation  contained  in  the 


56  SUBJECT PREDICATE COPULA. 

word  are  is  commonly  called  by  logicians  the  copula  01 
connective  of  the  proposition.* 

[Mr.  Thomson  more  briefly  thus  defines  these  several  parts  of  a 
proposition  or  judgment  : 

Every  judgment  has  three  parts:  the  subject,  or  notion  about 
which  the  judgment  is;  the  predicate,  or  notion  with  which  the 
subject  is  compared ;  and  the  copula,  or  nexus,  which  expresses  the 
mode  of  connection  between  them.  The  subject  and  predicate  are 
called  the  terms  of  the  judgment,  i.  e.,  the  extremes  or  boundaries 
(termini)  which  it  brings  together.] 

[The  subject  (Dr.  "Wayland  remarks)  may  be  either 
an  individual  or  a  species, — the  predicate  must  be  a 
genus  ;  that  is,  it  must  designate  a  larger  class  than 
the  subject.  In  a  proposition,  we  therefore  affirm  that 
a  particular  individual  is  included  within  a  particular 

[*  The  copula  is  the  sign  denoting  that  there  is  an  affirmation  or  denial. 
and  thereby  enabling  the  hearer  or  reader  to  distinguish  a  proposition  from 
any  other  kind  of  discourse.  Thus,  in  the  proposition,  "  The  earth  is  round," 
the  predicate  is  the  word  round,  which  denotes  the  quality  affirmed,  or  (as 
the  phrase  is)  predicated  ;  the  earth,  words  denoting  the  object  which  that 
quality  is  affirmed  of,  compose  the  subject;  the  word  is,  which  serves  as 
the  connecting  mark  between  the  subject  and  predicate,  to  show  that  one 
of  them  is  affirmed  of  the  other,  is  called  the  copula. 

A  predication  is  sometimes  distinguished  from  every  other  kind  of  dis- 
course, by  a  slight  alteration  in  one  of  the  words,  called  an  inflection ;  as 
when  we  say,  Fire  burns ;  the  change  of  the  second  word  from  burn  to 
burns,  showing  that  we  mean  to  affirm  the  predicate  burn  of  the  subject 
fire.  But  this  function  is  more  commonly  fulfilled  by  the  word  is,  when  an 
affirmation  is  intended ;  is  not,  when  a  negative  ;  or  by  some  other  part  of 
the  verb  to  be. 

It  is  apt  to  be  supposed  that  the  copula  is  much  more  than  a  mere  sign 
of  predication ;  that  it  also  signifies  existence.  In  the  proposition,  "Soc- 
rates is  just,"  it  may  seem  to  be  implied  that  not  only  the  quality  just  can 
be  affirmed  of  Socrates,  but  moreover  that  Socrates  is,  that  is  to  say,  exists. 
This,  however,  only  shows  that  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  the  word  is  ;  a  word 
which  not  only  performs  the  function  of  the  copula  in  affirmations,  but  has 
also  a  meaning  of  its  own,  in  virtue  of  which  it  may  itself  be  made  the 
predicate  of  a  proposition.  That  the  employment  of  it  as  a  copula. does 
not  necessarily  include  the  affirmation  of  existence,  appears  from  such  a 
proposition  astnin,  "  A  centaur  is  a  fiction  of  the  poets  ;"  where  it  cannot  pos- 
sibly be  implied,  that  a  centaur  exists,  since  the  proposition  itself  expressly 
asserts  that  the  thing  has  no  real  existence.— rMill's  Look,  pp.  12,  53.] 


DIFFERENT   KINDS   OF   PROPOSITIONS.  57 

class.  Hence  every  proposition  must  be  either  true  or 
false.  The  subject  is  either  included  within  the  class 
designated  by  the  predicate,  or  it  is  not.  It  cannot  be 
neither  within  nor  without  it.] 

[Judgments  (or  propositions),  according  to  the  com- 
mon account  of  relation,  are  divided  into  three  classes  : 
the  categorical,  the  hypothetical,  and  the  disjunctive. 

The  categorical  judgment  is  one  in  which  one  con- 
ception is  affirmed  to  belong  or  not  to  belong  to  another, 
as,  "  Men  are  endowed  with  conscience  ;"  "  An  enslaved 
people  cannot  be  happy." 

The  hypothetical  expresses  seemingly  a  relation  be- 
tween two  judgments,  as  cause  and  effect,  as  condition 
and  conditioned  ;  for  example,  "  If  the  autumn  is  very 
dry,  the  turnip  crop  is  scanty ;"  "  If  the  heart  is  right, 
so  will  the  actions  be." 

The  disjunctive  judgment  expresses  the  relation  (ap- 
parently) of  two  or  more  judgments  which  cannot  be 
true  together,  and  one  or  other  of  which  must  be 
true  ;  as,  "  Either  the  Bible  is  false,  or  holiness  ought 
to  be  followed ;"  or  the  proverb,  "  A  man  is  either  a 
fool  or  a  physician  at  forty." — Thomson.'] 

Propositions,  further ,  are  distinguished  by  different 
names,  according  to  the  clearness  of  the  evidence  by 
which  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  subject  and 
predicate  is  evinced.  If  the  evidence  be  perfectly  sat- 
isfactory, the  proposition  is  denominated  certain.  If 
the  evidence  be  not  perfectly  satisfactory,  it  is  denomi- 
nated probable  ;  and  it  is  more  or  less  probable,  accord- 
ing as  the  evidence  is  more  or  less  satisfactory.  If  the 
evidence  for  the  agreement  of  the  subject  and  predicate 
balance  the  evidence  for  their  disagreement,  the  propo- 
sition is  called  doubtful.  If  the  evidence  be  stronger 
on  the  side  of  disagreement,  it  gets  the  name  of  im~ 
probable  ;  and  the  improbability  will  be  the  greater,  ad 

8« 


58  DIFFERENT   KINDS    OF    PROPOSITIONS. 

the  evidence  of  disagreement  shall  increase.  If  the 
proposition  bear  an  affirmation  contrary  to  [accurate] 
ideas,  it  obtains  the  name  of  false.  If  the  affirmation 
be  conformable  to  [such]  ideas,  it  is  denominated  true. 

Propositions,  also,  are  divided  into  universal,  par- 
ticular, singular,  and  indefinite.  A  proposition  is 
universal,  when  the  subject  of  it  comprehends  an  en- 
tire genus  or  species.  Thus,  "  All  animals  are  endowed 
with  life  and  organization,"  is  a  universal  proposition, 
because  the  subject  of  it  includes,  and  the  predicate  ap- 
plies to,  all  living  creatures,  or  to  a  whole  genus.  "  All 
men  are  liable  to  err,"  is  another  universal  proposition, 
because  the  subject  includes,  and  the  predicate  applies 
to,  a  whole  species,  or  every  individual  of  the  human 
race.  A  particular  proposition  denotes  a  limited  01 
partial  meaning  of  the  subject,  or  signifies  that  it  does 
not  include  an  entire  genus  or  species;  and,  in  this 
case,  the  restricting  words,  some,  few,  many,  &c,  usu- 
ally precede  the  subject  of  the  proposition.  For  exam- 
ple :  "  Few  men  spend  all  their  time  to  the  best  advan- 
tage ;"  "  Many  men  repent  of  their  folly  when  it  is  too 
late ;"  are  both  particular  propositions,  because  they 
include  a  part  only  of  the  human  species  to  which  they 
refer. 

A  singular  proposition  has  an  individual  for  its  sub- 
ject ;  as  when  we  say,  "  Alexander  conquered  Persia ;" 
u  Caesar  was  assassinated  in  the  senate-house."  An  in- 
definite proposition  relates  to  one  individual  among 
many,  and  is  commonly  introduced  by  the  indefinite 
article :  "  A  wise  man  guides  his  affairs  with  discre- 
tion ;"  "A  fool  is  perpetually  betraying  his  ignorance 
and  impudence."  Propositions  likewise  are  denomi- 
nated conditional,  when  they  express  condition  or  de- 
pendence, "  If  people  break  the  laws,  they  will  be  pun- 
ished ;"  or  relative,  if  they  denote  consequence  or  con- 


PROPOSITIONS,    EXPRESSIVE    OF    RELATIONS.  59 

nection,  "Though  he  fall,  yet  will  he  rise  again."  But 
distinctions  of  this  kind  seem  to  belong  more  to  gram 
mar  than  to  logic. 

[Propositions  are  nothing  more  than  expressions  of  relations  of 
one  kind  or  another  which  we  have  previously  recognized :  there 
are  the  relations  of  position,  resemblance  or  difference,  proportion, 
degree,  and  comprehension. 

I  judge  that  A  is  actually  higher  than  B,  though  at  first  sight  it 
might  appear  to  be  lower ;  i.  e.,  I  recognize  the  relation  of  position 
which  they  bear  to  each  other.  1  judge  that  this  picture  resembles 
my  friend,  in  certain  respects,  and  that  it  is  entirely  unlike  him  in 
others :  i.  e.,  I  am  impressed  with  the  relations  of  resemblance  and 
dissimilarity,  which  exist  between  the  picture  and  my  friend.  I 
judge  that  two  is  to  four,  as  this  latter  number  is  to  eight ;  i.  e.,  I 
feel  the  relation  of  proportion  which  the  numbers  bear  to  one 
another.  I  judge  that  a  house  consists  of  its  foundation,  roof,  differ- 
ent apartments,  <fcc. ;  i.  e.,  I  feel  the  relation  of  these  parts  to  one  com- 
prehensive whole.  A  mental  judgment  is  a  mere  feeling  or  notion 
of  relation ;  and  when  utterance  is  given  to  it  by  words,  it  becomes 
a  proposition.  Two  are  the  half  of  four.  The  words  embody  a 
recognized  relation  between  two  and  four. 

The  relation  of  comprehension  is  that,  the  recognition  of  which 
is  usually,  at  least,  involved  in  what  we  call  an  act  of  reasoning. 
Dr.  Brown  thinks  that  all  these  various  relations  may  be  resolved 
into  the  single  relation  of  comprehension,  or  the  relation  of  a  whole 
to  the  separate  parts  included  under  it.  It  is  not  necessary,  how- 
ever, to  push  our  analysis  so  far.  A  whole  may  be  regarded  by  us 
as  made  up  of  parts,  which  admit  of  actual  separation  from  each 
other — as  in  the  case  of  a  book,  and  its  covers  and  leaves ;  or  of 
qualities  which  have  no  independent  existence — as  when  we  say  of 
gold,  it  is  ductile,  yellow,  &c.  "  A  flake  of  snow,"  says  Dr.  Brown, 
u  is  composed  of  particles  of  snow  which  exist  separately ;  and  this 
composition  of  separate  particles  in  seeming  coherence,  is  one  spe- 
cies of  totality.  But  the  same  snow,  without  any  integral  division, 
may  be  considered  by  us  as  possessing  Various  qualities,  which  qual- 
ities are  part  of  our  complex  notion  of  snow,  as  a  substance."  It 
is  the  faculty  of  recognizing  relations  which  enables  us  to  feel  that 
the  flake  comprehends  the  particles  of  which  it  is  composed,  and 
that  our  general  notion  of  snow  comprehends  a  notion  of  the  variom 
properties  which  it  possesses. 


60  VARIOUS   SOURCES    OF   PROPOSITIONS. 

An  affirmative  proposition  of  this  kind  is,  then,  built  upon  a  pre» 
viously-felt  relation  of  comprehension  ;  since  it  enumerates  or  predi- 
cates some  quality  or  attribute  of  a  subject,  which  may  be  said  tc 
form. a  part  of  the  subject  itself,  and  the  notion  of  which  is  a  con- 
stituent of  our  complex  conception  of  the  subject.  The  one  quality 
of  which  we  speak  is  comprehended,  and  felt  to  be  so,  with  other 
qualities,  in  that  general  aggregate  to  which  our  state  is  to  belong. 
"Gold  is  ductile;"  i.e.,  our  complex  conception  of  gold  compre- 
hends the  particular  notion  of  ductility.  Every  affirmative  propo- 
sition, then,  of  this  kind,  involves  a  mental  analysis  of  a  complex 
notion.  Our  notion  of  snow  is  complex ;  i.  e.,  it  is  as  if  it  were 
made  up  of  the  conceptions  of  the  individual  qualities  which  it  pos- 
sesses. We  cannot,  accordingly,  affirm  snow  to  be  white,  till,  by  a 
process  of  mental  analysis,  we  have  ascertained  that  whiteness  is  a 
constituent  part  of  our  conception  of  snow ;  though  the  proposition 
itself  reunites  this  elementary  part  to  the  complex  notion  again. — 
Payne's  El.  Mental  Science. 

The  application  of  these  remarks  to  the  subject  of  Reasoning, 
will  be  found  in  a  note  at  the  end  of  Lect.  viii.] 

Propositions  sometimes  receive  different  names,  ac- 
cording to  the  hinds  of  evidence  by  which  they  are 
supported.  The  chief  of  these  kinds  are,  sensation, 
consciousness,  intuition,  reasoning,  and  testimony.  It 
is  of  consequence  to  consider  propositions  with  regard 
to  these  kinds  of  evidencej  because  they  ]ead  us  to  the 
capital  sources  of  human  knowledge. 

Thousands  of  propositions,  and  much  useful  knowl- 
edge, are  derived  from  the  external  senses  and  feelings. 
By  these  we  are  made  acquainted  with  all  the  objects 
in  nature,  which  can  contribute  either  to  use  or  to  pleas- 
ure ;  and  of  all  the  propositions  derived  from  the  testi- 
mony of  these  senses  and  feelings,  we  never,  in  the 
intercourse  of  life,  presume  to  entertain  the  slightest 
doubt.  We  believe  that  the  city,  the  house,  the  man, 
the  horse,  the  tree,  the  fish  we  behold,  really  exist,  and 
possess  those  properties  or  qualities  which  we  perceive 
to  belong  to  them.     We  never  hesitate  whether  the 


PROPOSITIONS    DKRIVED    FROM    SENSATION.  Gl 

propositions  containing  the  result  of  our  perceptions  re- 
specting them  are  true.  We  hesitate  as  little  about 
propositions  significant  of  the  reality  of  our  bodily  feel- 
ings, and  of  our  desires  to  gratify  them ;  such  as,  that 
hunger,  thirst,  pain,  are  uneasy  sensations,  from  which 
all  men  wish  to  be  relieved,  and  that  rest  after  fatigue 
is  a  source  of  pleasure.  In  all  these  cases,  no  means  of 
conviction  are  presented  to  the  mind,  besides  percep- 
tions and  feelings.  The  knowledge,  accordingly,  derived 
from  this  source,  is  often  called  the  dictates  of  sense ; 
and  the  sentences  that  denote  it  are  sometimes  termed 
sensible  propositions. 

T  have  observed,  that  no  man,  in  mixing  with  the  world,  or 
when  engaged  in  business,  can  permit  himself  one  moment  to  dis- 
credit the  evidence  of  his  senses,  or  to  disbelieve  the  information 
he  receives  through  that  channel.  Some  philosophers,  however, 
in  speculation,  have  ventured  to  question  the  credibility  of  this  evi- 
dence, and  have  not  scrupled  to  conclude,  that  from  any  thing  we 
know,  all  the  splendid  exhibitions  of  nature  and*  art,  with  which 
the  world  abounds,  may  be  no  more  than  phantoms  of  the  imagi- 
nation, a  magnificent  display  of  ideal  scenery  without  reality. 
They  have  applied  a  similar  theory  to  the  evidence  of  internal  sen- 
sation or  consciousness,  and,  finding  it  equally  unworthy  of  credit, 
they  have  ventured  to  annihilate  the  immaterial  world  also ;  and 
thus,  banishing  both  matter  and  spirit  from  the  universe,  they  have 
left  in  nature  nothing  of  real  existence  but  ideas  and  imaginary 
powers  to  prompt  these  ideas.  A  philosophy  so  bold  and  tremen- 
dous in  its  consequences,  cannot  fail  to  excite  a  little  our  curi- 
osity ;  and  as  it  has  subsisted  long  in  the  world,  and  has  attracted 
a  good  deal  of  attention,  some  account  of  it  may  be  expected.* 

[*  The  account,  given  by  the  author,  of  the  speculations  of  Aristotle, 
Epicurus,  Locke,  Hume,  and  others,  is  here  omitted,  as  belonging  more 
appropriately  to  a  general  work  on  mental  science. — Ed.\ 


62  PROPOSITIONS    DERIVED   FROM   CONSCIOUSNESS. 


LECTURE  V. 

PROPOSITIONS    DERIVED    FROM    CONSCIOUSNESS,    INTUITION,  REA- 
SONING, TESTIMONY INFERENCE    OR    REASONING  IN  GENERAL 

PREJUDICES. 

Consciousness  is  a  copious  source  of  knowledge,  and 
furnishes  evidence  of  the  truth  of  a  numerous  class  of 
propositions.  By  it  we  gain  an  acquaintance  with  the 
human  constitution,  particularly  with  the  important 
operations  of  the  understanding,  the  imagination,  and 
the  passions.  If  I  affirm  that  the  imagination  is 
pleased  with  a  fine  prospect,  a  beautiful  landscape,  an 
elegant  exhibition  of  art,  whether  in  writing,  painting, 
statuary,  or  architecture ;  if  I  assert  that  the  under- 
standing is  delighted  with  the  discovery  of  truth  on  all 
subjects,  and  'in  all  degrees,  from  the  lowest  stage  of 
probability  to  the  most  triumphant  evidence  of  intuition 
or  demonstration ;  if  I  maintain  that  all  our  passions 
were  given  us  for  wise  and  good  purposes ;  that  all  the 
gratifications  of  them,  within  the  limits  prescribed  by 
reason  and  virtue,  are  pleasant,  salutary,  and  commend- 
able ;  and  that  all  irregular  gratifications  are  not  only 
improper  in  themselves,  but  are  also  painful  and  de- 
structive ;  I  have  hardly  any  proof  to  produce  of  the 
numerous  propositions,  which  express  the  various  cases 
into  which  these  views  of  the  human  mind  may  be  re- 
solved, except  an  appeal  to  the  consciousness  of  the 
person  I  wish  to  convince. 

If  he  shall  deny  that  his  imagination  is  captivated  with  a  beauti- 
ful scene  of  nature  or  art ;  if  he  shall  declare  that  his  understand- 
ing receives  no  pleasure  in  the  discovery  of  truth ;  or  that  the 
gratification  of  a  regular  passion  yields  him  no  joy,  while  the  agi 


PROPOSITIONS    SUPPORTED    BY    CONSCIOUSNESS.  63 

tation  of  an  irregular  one  fills  him  with  satisfaction ;  all  I  can  urge 
is,  that  he  mistakes  his  constitution,  or  that  the  structure  of  it  is 
different  from  that  of  most  other  men.  But  if  he  persists  in  main- 
taining the  consciousness  of  the  truth  of  what  he  asserts,  I  can 
only  oppose  a  contrary  consciousness  on  my  part.  We  must  con- 
tinue of  different  opinions,  for  I  can  produce  no  arguments  to  per- 
suade him  to  adopt  my  sentiments. 

From  this  view  of  knowledge  it  will  appear,  that 
many  moral  and  political  propositions,  many  which 
communicate  truth  in  oratory,  poetry,  criticism,  and 
business,  are  principally,  if  not  entirely,  supported  by 
consciousness. 

If  I  assert  that  all  men  applaud  a  generous  or  a  grateful  action, 
and  detest  an  unjust  or  a  cruel  one ;  tkat  kings  are  prone  to  tyran- 
nize over  their  subjects,  or  that  the  people  are  disposed  to  insult 
and  oppose  their  rulers ;  that  the  beauties  of  eloquence  and  poetry 
are  felt  by  all  mankind,  even  the  most  unpolished  and  unlearned ; 
that  the  rules  of  criticism  are  nothing  more  than  the  theories  of 
emotions  and  passions ;  that  prudence  and  industry  are  the  best 
and  surest  means  of  attaining  success  in  business,  while  folly  and 
idleness  are  commonly  attended  with  misfortune  and  contempt ; 
what  do  I  but  appeal  to  consciousness  concerning  the  truth  of  the 
propositions  I  advance  ?  If  I  gain  not  immediate  assent,  all  I  can 
do  to  procure  it  is,  to  enumerate  examples  by  which  the  opinions 
I  maintain  have  been  verified,  and  to  hold  forth  these  as  documents 
of  general  consciousness  in  support  of  the  judgment  I  have  formed. 
In  a  word,  in  all  these  subjects  the  most  satisfactory  evidence  and 
the  best  theories  are  founded  on  the  nature  of  the  human  constitu- 
tion. The  most  sagacious  and  successful  moralists,  politicians, 
critics,  and  observers  of  human  affairs,  ground  their  maxims  and 
their  observations  on  the  qualities  of  the  mind,  of  which  they  are 
conscious  themselves,  or  of  which  they  discover  that  others  are 
conscious. 

Intuition  is  another  copious  source  of  knowledge, 
and  communicates  conviction  of  the  truth  of  all  those 
propositions  which  are  denominated  self-evident.  In- 
tuition is  the  peiception  of  the  agreement  or  disagree 
ment  of  two  ideas  on  bare  juxtaposition,  without  the 


64  INTUITIVE    PROPOSITIONS. 

intervention  of  any  third  iiea;  and  the  proposition 
which  expresses  our  judgment  of  that  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement is  said  to  be  supported  by  intuitive  evi- 
dence.* All  the  axioms  of  mathematics  and  arith- 
metic, as,  "  Two  straight  lines  cannot  contain  a  space," 
"Things  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  an- 
other," u  Two  and  three  are  equal  to  five,"  u  Two  and 
three  are  not  equal  to  six ;"  all  the  principles  adopted 
in  physical  science,  as,  "  A  body  cannot  be  in  two  places 
at  the  same  time,"  *'  Nothing  can  produce  nothing," 
"  It  is  impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to 
be ;"  all  the  maxims  relative  to  identity,  as,  "  Matter 
is  matter,"  and  u  Spirit  is  spirit ;"  form  intuitive  propo- 
sitions. All  certain  reasoning,  commonly  called  de- 
monstration, must  begin  with  a  comparison  of  two 
ideas  expressed  by  an  intuitive  proposition  ;  and  every 
proposition  expressive  of  the  agreement  of  any  two  in- 
termediate ideas,  or  of  every  successive  step  of  the  de- 
monstration, must  be  intuitive.  These  are  the  chief 
cases  of  intuitive  truth.  I  must,  however,  observe,  be- 
fore I  leave  this  topic,  that  axioms,  of  which  some 
philosophers  seem  to  be  so  fond,  and  which  they  hold 
forth  as  the  foundations  of  all  science,  appear  so  far 


[*  Truths  are  known  to  us  in  two  ways :  some  are  known  directly,  and 
of  themselves ;  some  through  the  medium  of  other  truths.  The  former 
are  the  subjects  of  intuition  ;  the  latter,  of  inference.  The  truths  known 
by  intuition  are  the  original  premises  from  which  all  others  are  inferred. 
Our  assent  to  the  conclusion  being  grounded  upon  the  truth  of  the  premi- 
ses, we  never  could  arrive  at  any  knowledge  by  reasoning,  unless  some- 
thing could  be  known  antecedently  to  all  reasoning. 

The  object  of  logic  is  to  as-certain  how  we  come  by  that  portion  of  our 
knowledge  (much  the  greatest  portion)  which  is  not  intuitive ;  and  by 
vhat  oriterion  we  can,  in  matters  not  self-evident,  distinguish  between 
things  proved  and  things  not  proved,  between  what  is  worthy  and  what  is 
unworthy  of  belief.  Of  the  various  questions  which  the  universe  presents 
to  our  inquiring  faculties,  some  are  Boluble  by  direct  consciousness,  others 
only  by  means  of  evidence.  Logic  is  concerned  wrtJb  these  last.—  MLW& 
Logic,  pp.  3, 12.] 


INUTILITY    OF   AXIOMS    IN   REASONING.  65 

from  being  such,  that  no  reasoning  is  ever  founded  on 
them,  and  that  they  are  of  no  essential  use  in  a  course 
of  reasoning.  What  is  an  axiom?  It  is  a  general 
proposition,  including  a  number  of  particular  cases, 
and  declarative  of  an  intuitive  truth,  which  truth  must 
be  as  obvious,  when  surveyed  in  any  of  the  particular 
cases,  as  in  the  general  proposition ;  and,  if  this  be 
true,  the  axiom  cannot  be  of  any  use,  for  the  applica- 
tion of  it  to  the  particular  case  can  afford  no  light  which 
the  mind  did  not  possess  before  that  application.  I 
shall  illustrate  this  remark  by  a  few  examples,  which 
will  make  it  very  plain. 

If  I  say  that  two  and  three  are  equal  to  four  and  one,  I  am  per- 
fectly satisfied  of  the  equality  of  these  two  quantities,  before  the 
application  of  the  axiom,  that  "  Things  equal  to  the  same  thing 
are  equal  to  one  another,"  and  before  I  add,  that  they  are  both 
equal  to  five.  The  axiom  adds  no  light  to  my  conceptions.  It 
does  no  more  than  repeat,  in  general  terms,  what  was  expressed 
more  simply,  if  not  more  intelligibly,  in  particular  terms.  If  from 
two  lines,  each  a  mile  long,  I  take  away  respectively  a  half 
mile,  I  cannot  question  a  moment,  that  the  remaining  half  miles 
are  equal  to  one  another,  although  I  had  never  heard  of  the  axiom, 
M  If  equals  are  taken  from  equals,  the  remainders  will  be  equal." 
If  from  a  field  of  an  acre  in  extent,  I  take  away  half  an  acre,  and 
throw  it  into  an  adjacent  field,  I  have  the  most  entire  conviction 
that  the  extent  of  the  first  field  will  be  much  less  than  it  was  be- 
fore the  division,  without  having  recourse  to  the  axiom,  "  The 
whole  is  greater  than  a  part."  If  I  infer  that  something  must 
have  existed  from  eternity,  because  something  now  exists,  my  con- 
viction is  complete,  before  I  reflect  on,  or  perhaps  know,  the  scho- 
lastic maxim,  "  Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,"  w  Nothing  can  produce  noth- 
ing." If  I  am  certain  that  the  sun  is  above  the  horizon,  I  con- 
clude with  entire  confidence,  that  he  is  not  also  below  it,  although 
I  am  unacquainted  with  the  axiom,  "  Bodies  cannot  be  in  different 
places  at  the  same  time."  If,  having  two  lines,  one  half  a  mile, 
and  the  other  a  quarter  of  a  mile  long,  I  add  to  each  a  whole  mile, 
I  am  perfectly  satisfied  that  the  new  line,  composed  of  the  mile  and 
half,  is  longer  than  that  composed  of  the  mile  and  the  quarter.  I 
procure  no  additional  conviction  whatever  from  the  application  of 


66  INUTILITY   OF   AXIOMS    IN    REASONING. 

the  axiom,  u  If  equals  be  added  to  unequals,  the  wholes  will  be  un- 
equal.'' 

What  judgment,  then,  shall  we  hold  concerning  these 
axioms,  which  have  made  so  much  noise  in  the  world, 
which  have  been  considered  as  the  foundations  oi 
science,  the  dictates  of  common  sense,  the  first  princi- 
ples of  knowledge,  and  of  which  even  the  mathemati- 
cians, the  most  accurate  of  all  logicians,  appear  to  be  so 
fond  ?  We  cannot  hesitate,  I  think,  to  admit,  though 
they  supply  the  appearance  of  sagacity  and  attention, 
yet  that  they  are  of  little  importance  in  reasoning,  and 
that  from  them  no  useful  truth  can  be  derived.  From 
all  the  examples  I  have  produced,  it  is  apparent  that 
they  are  general  expressions  of  truths,  which  are  at 
least  as  obvious  in  the  particular  cases  included  under 
these  general  expressions.  Of  what  service,  then,  can 
they  be,  unless  they  should  help  us  to  discover  new 
particular  cases,  with  which  we  were  formerly  unac- 
quainted ?  But  this  service  they  cannot  perform,  for  the 
axiom  is  not  applicable  till  we  have  found,  by  other 
means  than  by  its  aid,  that  under  it  is  comprehended 
the  particular  case. 

Neither  are  they  of  any  use  to  silence  skeptics  or 
perverse  reasoners,  who  may  be  disposed  to  controvert, 
the  plainest  truths. 

Suppose,  for  example,  I  should  be  told  that  four  and  two  are  not 
equal  to  five  and  one,  though  both  are  equal  to  six,  and  that  I 
might  silence  such  an  absurd  reasoner  by  the  help  of  the  axiom, 
M  Things  equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one  another ;"  how 
should  this  axiom  silence  him  ?  Does  it  furnish  any  new  evidence? 
No!  Have  I  given  any  proof  of  it?  No;  it  needs  none.  Why, 
then,  is  he  bound  to  believe  it  ?  because  he  gave  his  assent  to  it  on 
learning  mathematics,  and  all  men  admit  it  to  be  true.  But  might 
he  not  have  withheld  his  assent  in  learning  mathematics,  as  well  as 
now,  since  no  proof  was  then  pretended  to  be  given?  Do  not  all 
men  assent  as  readily,  that  four  and  two  are  equal  to  fi\  e  and  one 


INUTILITY    OF   AXIOMS    IN    REASONING.  67 

as  they  do  to  the  axiom,  "Things  equal  to  the  same  thing,  are 
equal  to  one  another?"  The  axiom  has  no  evidence  to  command 
assent,  which  every  case  included  in  it  has  not ;  and  if  any  reason- 
er  be  so  absurd  as  to  controvert  either  the  axiom  or  the  case,  he 
should  be  permitted  to  remain  in  error,  as  unworthy  or  incapable 
of  conviction.  The  fair  inquirer  has  then  reached  the  true  princi- 
ples of  argumentation,  not  axioms,  but  the  perception  of  the  agree- 
ment of  ideas,  and  he  must  remain  satisfied,  for  the  nature  of 
things  and  the  faculties  of  the  human  mind  admit  no  higher  evi- 
dence. 

That  axioms  are  superfluous,  even  in  mathematical 
reasoning,  seems  to  be  obvious  from  the  manner  in 
which  Euclid  himself  sometimes  employs  them.  He 
generally  mentions  them  when  the  cases  they  include 
occur,  but  he  sometimes  reasons  without  them.  He 
adopts  some  propositions  as  axioms,  while  he  rejects  or 
neglects  others  equally  important,  and  equally  entitled 
to  attention. 

I  shall  produce  a  curious  example  of  his  practice  in  this  article, 
which  I  believe  has  not  been  commonly  observed.  He  proposes, 
as  axioms,  that  "  Things,  doubles  or  halves  of  the  same  thing,  are 
equal."  Nobody  can  doubt  their  truth,  but  why  did  he  not  in- 
form us  that  he  might  propose  many  more  axioms  of  the  same 
sort  ?  that  "  Things  triple,  quadruple,  ten  times,  a  hundred  times, 
any  number  of  times  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one  another;" 
which  are  equally  true,  if  not  equally  necessary,  with  those  he  has 
thought  proper  to  specify.  He  should  at  least  have  introduced  one 
more  of  these  axioms,  namely,  that  things  quadruple  of  the  same 
thing  are  equal,  because  without  it,  if  axioms  are  necessary  in 
mathematical  reasonings,  one  of  his  demonstrations  is  inconclusive 
and  incomplete. 

The  demonstration  to  which  I  allude  is  found  in  the  eighth  pro- 
position of  the  second  book  of  the  Elements,  where  he  infers  that 
two  quantities  are  equal,  because  each  of  them  is  quadruple  of  a 
third  quantity,  though  he  has  produced  no  axiom  which  holds 
forth  this  truth.  Euclid  cannot  be  defended  by  maintaining  that 
the  equality  of  all  quantities,  equimultiples  of  the  same  quantity, 
is  implied  in  the  axioms  which  assert,  that  "  Things,  doubles  or 
halves  of  the  same  things,  are  equal ;"  because  the  truth  which. 


68  PROPOSITIONS    SUPPORTED    BY    REASONING. 

in  the  proposition  quoted,  he  assumes  without  an  axiom,  is  not 
more  evident  than  the  truths  are,  to  which  he  has  applied  axioms. 
Besides,  the  accuracy  of  mathematical  reasoning  and  expression 
certainly  required  that  Euclid  should  have  said  so,  if  he  intended 
to  include  the  equality  of  all  equimultiples  of  the  same  quantity  in 
that  of  .the  halves  or  doubles  of  it.  The  better  account  of  the  mat- 
ter seems  to  be,  if  an  axiom  was  unnecessary  in  one  of  these  cases, 
it  was  equally  so  in  any  other ;  but  that,  as  the  cases  of  the  equal- 
ity of  the  doubles  and  halves  of  the  same  quantities  frequently  oc- 
curred, they  had  the  good  fortune  to  be  honored  with  axioms  tc 
support  them ;  though  the  conviction  of  the  mind,  and  the  legiti- 
macy of  the  demonstration,  were  as  complete  without  them  as  with 
them. 

Reasoning  supports  an  exceedingly  numerous  class 
of  propositions,  more  numerous,  I  believe,  than  all  the 
other  kinds  of  evidence  put  together.  But  I  mean  not 
now  to  discuss  the  nature  of  it,  nor  to  explain  the  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  evidence  it  supplies.  That  task  be- 
longs to  the  third  part  of  this  course,  and  it  is  not  my 
intention  to  anticipate  it.  I  mean  to  mention  here 
only  the  extent  of  these  propositions,  or  the  various 
branches  of  knowledge  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  rea 
soning  to  establish  and  support.  Almost  all  the  propo- 
sitions, then,  of  science,  most  of  those  of  the  arts  and 
of  business,  in  a  word,  those  of  all  cases  in  which  the 
mind  receives  either  certain  or  probable  conviction  by 
the  exercise  of  its  rational  faculties,  belong  to  this  class. 
It  is  not  easy  to  explain  the  nature  of  these  proposi- 
tions without  discussing  the  different  kinds  of  evidence 
by  which  they  are  supported.  I  therefore  defer  the  il- 
lustration of  them  till  I  treat  of  that  evidence. 

Testimony  was  the  last  source  of  knowledge,  and  the 
last  species  of  evidence  which  I  purposed  to  explain. 
It  is  founded  in  the  trust  we  repose  in  the  veracity  of 
our  fellow- creatures,  in  their  intercourse  with  one  an- 
other, and  is  of  very  extensive  use.  All  the  credit  of 
history,  all  the  intelligence  of  places,  men,  and  things. 


TESTIMONY.  69 

we  cannot  n  person  examine :  all  the  security  society 
can  confer  on  life  and  property  in  courts  of  justice;  all 
the  information  of  business  and  social  life,  depend  en- 
tirely on  the  opinion  we  have  that  men  will  tell  truth 
in  their  communications  to  one  another.  In  many  cases 
the  evidence  of  testimony  affords  a  high  degree  of  satis- 
faction; but  the  degrees  of  satisfaction  decrease,  till 
they  degenerate  into  that  equivocal  state,  in  which 
probability  for  and  against  truth  are  so  equally  poised 
as  to  leave  the  mind  in  a  state  of  suspense. 

Two  causes  chiefly  induce  us  to  distrust  the  credi- 
bility of  testimony — suspicion  that  the  relator  was  not 
fully  informed,  or  that  his  interest  might  influence  him 
to  utter  falsehood.  The  presence  of  either  or  of  both 
of  these  causes  is  a  sufficient  reason  for  hesitation.  But 
where  neither  takes  place,  we  seem  to  have  no  reason 
to  distrust  the  information  of  testimony.  Truth  is  con- 
genial to  the  mind  of  man.  It  is  more  easy  to  tell  truth 
than  to  utter  falsehood.  It  is  not  easy  to  utter  falsehood 
with  success.  Some  time  must  elapse  before  the  mind 
can  acquire  those  habits  and  that  composure  which  are 
necessary  to  secure  falsehood  from  the  inconsistency 
and  embarrassment  which  instantly  proclaim  its  base 
ness  and  its  insincerity.  Though  the  evidence  of  testi- 
mony cannot  be  deemed  equivalent  to  that  of  demon- 
stration, or  to  that  of  the  senses,  yet  in  most  cases  it 
would  be  ridiculous  to  indulge  the  least  suspicion. 

That  there  are  such  cities  as  Paris,  Kome,  or  Pekin,  that  Alex- 
ander conquered  a  great  part  of  the  western  quarter  of  Asia,  and 
that  J"  Jius  Ceesar  was  killed  in  the  senate-house,  are  all  facts  of 
which  we  cannot  entertain  the  smallest  douht.  The  conviction  we 
have  of  the  truth  of  such  facts  is  called  certainty,  and  the  impres- 
sion made  on  the  mind  by  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  general  is 
termed  belief.  The  impression  which  results  from  divine  testi- 
mony, or  the  evidence  of  revelation,  has  obtained  the  name  of  faith. 
But  a  future  opportunity  will  display  more  fully  the  credibility  of 
testimony. 


70  INFERENCE. 


OF  INFEKENCE,  OR  REASONING,  IN  GENEKAL. 
(Extracted  from  Mill's  Logic,  pp.  108-112.) 

[We  say  of  a  fact,  or  statement,  that  it  is  proved, 
when  we  believe  its  truth  by  reason  of  some  other  fact 
or  statement  from  which  it  is  said  to  follow.  Most  of 
the  propositions,  whether  affirmative  or  negative,  uni- 
versal, particular,  or  singular,  which  we  believe,  are 
not  believed  on  their  own  evidence,  but  on  the  ground 
of  something  previously  assented  to,  and  from  which 
they  are  said  to  be  inferred.  To  infer  a  proposition 
from  a  previous  proposition  or  propositions ;  to  give 
credence  to  it,  or  claim  credence  for  it,  as  a  conclusion 
from  something  else,  is  to  reason,  in  the  most  extensive 
sense  of  the  term.  There  is  a  narrower  sense  in  which 
the  name  reasoning  is  confined  to  the  form  of  inference 
which  is  termed  ratiocination,  and  of  which  the  syllo- 
gism is  the  general  type. 

§  1.  There  are  some  cases  in  which  the  inference  is 
apparent,  not  real,  and  which  must  not  he  confounded 
with  cases  of  inference  properly  so  called. 

This  occurs  when  the  proposition  ostensibly  inferred 
from  another  appears,  on  analysis,  to  be  merely  a  repe- 
tition of  the  same,  or  part  of  the  same,  assertion,  which 
was  contained  in  the  first.  All  the  cases  mentioned  in 
books  of  logic  as  examples  of  equivalence- of  proposi- 
tions, are  of  this  nature.  Thus,  if  we  were  to  argue — 
"  No  man  is  incapable  of  reason,  for  every  man  is  ra- 
tional ;"  or,  "  All  men  are  mprtal,  for  no  man  is  exempt 
from  death,"  it  would  be  plain  that  we  were  not  prov- 
ing the  proposition,  but  only  appealing  to  another  mode 
of  wording  it,  which  may  or  may  not  be  better  adapted 
to  suggest  the  real  proof,  but  which  contains  in  itself  no 
shadow  of  proof. 

Another  case  is  where,  from  a  universal  proposition'. 


INFERENCE.  71 

toe  affect  to  infer  another  which  differs  from  it  only  in 
being  particular ;  as,  "All  A  is  B,  therefore  some  A  is 
B  ;"  "  No  A  is  B,  therefore  some  A  is  not  B."  This, 
too,  is  not  to  conclude  one  proposition  from  another, 
but  to  repeat  a  second  time  something  which  had  been 
asserted  at  first,  with  the  difference  that  we  do  not  here 
repeat  the  whole  of  the  previous  assertion,  but  only  an 
indefinite  part  of  it. 

A  third  case  is  where,  the  antecedent  having  affirmed 
a  predicate  of  a  given  subject,  the  consequent  affirms  of 
the  sams  subject  something  already  connoted  {implied) 
by  the  former  predicate  ;  as,  "Socrates  is  a  man,  there- 
fore Socrates  is  a  living  creature" — where  all  that  is 
connoted  by  living  creature  was  affirmed  of  Socrates 
when  he  was  asserted  to  be  a  man.  If  the  propositions 
are  negative,  we  must  invert  their  order,  thus :  Socrates 
is  not  a  living  creature,  therefore  he  is  not  a  man  ;  for 
if  we  deny  the  less,  the  greater,  which  includes  it,  is 
already  denied  by  implication.  These,  therefore,  are 
not  really  cases  of  inference ;  and  yet  the  trivial  exam- 
ples by  which,  in  manuals  of  logic,  the  rules  of  the  syl- 
logism are  illustrated,  are  often  of  this  ill-chosen  kind, 
demonstrations  in  form,  of  conclusions  to  which  who- 
ever understands  the  terms  used  in  the  statement  of  che 
data,  has  already  and  consciously  assented. 

The  most  complex  case  of  this  sort  of  apparent  infer- 
ence, is  what  is  called  the  conversion  of  propositions, 
which  consists  in  making  the  predicate  become  a  sub- 
ject, and  the  subject  become  a  predicate,  and  framing 
out  of  the  same  terms,  thus  reversed,  another  proposi- 
tion, which  must  be  true  if  the  former  is  true.  Thus, 
from  the  particular  affirmative  proposition,  "  Some  A 
is  B,"  we  may  infer  that,  "  Some  B  is  A."  From  the 
universal  negative,  "No  A  is  B,"  we  may  conclude  that, 
"No  B  is  A."    From  the  universal  affirmative  proposi- 


72  CASES   OF   APPARENT    INFERENCE. 

tion,  "All  A  is  B,"  it  cannot  be  inferred  that,  "All  B 
is  A ;"  though  all  water  is  liquid,  it  is  not  implied  that 
all  liquid  is  water,  but  it  is  implied  that  some  liquid  is 
so;  and  hence  the  proposition,  "All  A  is  B,"  is  legiti- 
mately convertible  into,  "  Some  B  is  A."  This  process, 
which  converts  a  universal  proposition  into  a  particular, 
is  termed  conversion  per  accidens.  From  the  proposi- 
tion, "  Some  A  is  not  B,"  we  cannot  even  infer  that, 
"Some  B  is  not  A ;"  though  some  men  are  not  English- 
men, it  does  not  follow  that  some  Englishmen  are  not 
men.  The  only  legitimate  conversion,  if  such  it  can  be 
called,  of  a  particular  negative  proposition,  is  in  the 
form,  "  Some  A  is  not  B,"  therefore,  "  Something  which 
is  not  B  is  A,"  and  this  is  termed  conversion  by  contra- 
position. In  this  case,  however,  the  predicate  and  sub- 
ject are  not  merely  reversed,  but  one  of  them  is  altered. 
Instead  of  [A]  and  [B],  the  terms  of  the  new  proposition 
are  [a  thing  which  is  not  B],  and  [A].  The  original 
proposition,  "  Some  A  is  not  B,"  is  first  changed  into  a 
proposition  equivalent  to  it,  u  Some  A  is  ca  thing  which 
is  not  B ;' "  and  the  proposition,  being  now  no  longer  a 
particular  negative,  but  a  particular  affirmative,  admits 
of  conversion  in  the  first  mode,  or,  as  it  is  called,  simple 
conversion. 

In  all  these  cases  there  is  not  really  any  inference; 
there  is  in  the  conclusion  no  new  truth,  nothing  but 
what  was  already  asserted  in  the  premises,-and  obvious 
to  whoever  apprehends  them.  The  fact  asserted  in  the 
conclusion  is  either  the  very  saw^e  fact,  or  part  of  the 
fact,  asserted  in  the  original  propositioii.  This  follows 
from  our  previous  analysis  of  the  import  of  propositions. 
When  we  say,  for  example,  "  Some  lawful  sovereigns 
ire  tyrants,"  we  mean  to  assert  that  the  attributes  con- 
noted by  the  term  "  lawful  sovereign,"  and  the  attri- 
butes connoted  by  the  term  "tyrant,"  sometimes  coexist 


CASES    OF   APPARENT    INFERENCE.  f8 

in  the  same  individual.  Now  this  is  also  precisely  what 
we  mean  when  we  say  that  some  tyrants  are  lawful  sov- 
ereigns ;  which,  therefore,  is  not  a  second  proposition 
inferred  from  the  first,  any  more  than  the  English  trans- 
lation of  Euclid's  Elements  is  a  collection  of  theorems 
different  from  and  consequences  of  those  contained  in 
the  Greek  original. 

Again,  if  we  assert,  "  No  great  general  is  a  fool,"  we 
mean  that  the  attributes  connoted  by  "  great  general," 
and  those  connoted  by  "fool,"  never  coexist  in  the 
same  subject ;  which  is  also  the  exact  meaning  which 
we  express  when  we  say,  that  no  fool  is  a  great  general. 

When  we  assert  that  all  quadrupeds  are  warm- 
blooded, we  assert,  not  only  that  the  attributes  con- 
noted by  "  quadruped,"  and  those  connoted  by  u  warm- 
blooded," sometimes  coexist,  but  that  the  former  never 
exist  without  the  latter.  Now,  the  proposition,  "  Some 
warm-blooded  creatures  are  quadrupeds,"  expresses  the 
first  half  of  this  meaning,  dropping  the  latter  half,  and, 
therefore,  has  been  already  affirmed  in  the  antecedent 
proposition,  "  All  quadrupeds  are  warm-blooded ;"  but 
that  all  warm-blooded  creatures  are  quadrupeds,  or,  in 
other  words,  that  the  attributes  connoted  by  "  warm- 
blooded" never  exist  without  those  connoted  by  "quad- 
rupeds," has  not  been  asserted,  and  cannot  be  inferred. 
In  order  to  reassert,  in  an  inverted  form,  the  whole  of 
what  was  affirmed  in  the  preposition,  "All  quadrupeds 
are  warm-blooded,"  we  must  convert  it  by  contra-posi- 
tion,  thus :  "  Nothing  which  is  not  warm-blooded  is  a 
quadruped."  This  proposition,  and  t^he  one  from  which 
it  is  derived,  are  exactly  equivalent,  and  either  of  them 
may  be  substituted  for  the  other ;  for,  to  say  that  when 
the  attributes  of  a  quadruped  are  present,  those  of  a 
warm-blooded  creature  are  present,  is  to  say,  that  when 
the  latter  are  absent  the  former  are  absent. 


74  OPPOSITION   OF   PROPOSITIONS. 

In  a  manual  for  young  students,  it  would  be  proper 
to  dwell  at  greater  length  upon  the  conversion  and 
equipollency  (equivalence)  of  propositions.  For,  al- 
though that  cannot  be  called  reasoning  or  inference 
which  is  a  mere  reassertion  in  different  words  of  what 
had  been  asserted  before,  there  is  no  more  important 
intellectual  habit,  nor  any  the  cultivation  of  which  falls 
more  strictly  within  the  province  of  the  art  of  logic, 
than  that  of  discerning  rapidly  and  surely  the  identity 
of  an  assertion  when  disguised  under  the  diversity  of 
language.  That  important  chapter  in  logical  treatises 
which  relates  to  the  opposition  of  propositions,  is  of  use 
chiefly  for  this  purpose.  Such  considerations  as  these, 
that  contrary  propositions  may  both  be  false,  but  can- 
not both  be  true ;  that  sub-contrary  propositions  may 
both  be  true,  but  cannot  both  be  false ;  that  of  two  sub- 
alternate  propositions,  the  truth  of  the  universal  proves 
the  truth  of  the  particular,  and  the  falsity  of  the  partic- 
ular proves  the  falsity  of  the  universal,  but  not  vice  versa 
— are  apt  to  appear,  at  first  sight,  very  technical  and 
mysterious,  but  when  explained,  seem  almost  too  ob- 
vious to  reauire  so  formal  a  statement,  since  the  same 
amount  of  explanation  which  is  necessary  to  make  the 
principles  intelligible  would  enable  the  truths  which 
they  convey  to  be  apprehended  in  any  particular  case 
which  can  occur  *     In  this  respect,  however,  these 

NoA1!"B;[contradictories- 

&>mt  A  £b,  I  also  contradictories. 

All  A  is  B,  "J 

Some  A  is  B, 

and  \  respectively  subalternate. 

No  A  is  B, 

Some  A  is  not  B,  I 


INDUCTION.  i  -> 

axioms  of  logic  are  on  a  level  with  those  of  mathe- 
matics. 

§  2.  Having  noticed,  in  order  to  exclude  from  the 
province  of  reasoning,  or  inference  properly  so  called, 
the  cases  in  which  the  progress  from  one  truth  to 
another  is  only  apparent,  the  logical  consequent  being 
a  mere  repetition  of  the  logical  antecedent ;  we  now 
pass  to  those  which  are  cases  of  inference  in  the  proper 
acceptation  of  the  term,  those  in  which  we  set  out  from 
known  truths,  to  arrive  at  others  really  distinct  from 
them. 

Reasoning,  in  the  extended  sense  in  which  I  use  the 
term,  and  in  which  it  is  synonymous  with  inference,  is 
popularly  said  to  be  of  two  kinds : — reasoning  from 
particulars  to  generals,  and  reasoning  from  generals  to 
particulars ;  the  former  being  called  induction,  the 
latter,  ratiocination,  or  syllogism.  It  will  presently  be 
shown  that  there  is  a  third  species  of  reasoning,  which 
falls  under  neither  of  these  descriptions,  and  which, 
nevertheless,  is  not  only  valid,  but  the  foundation  of 
both  the  others. 

The  meaning  intended  by  the  above  expressions  is, 
that  induction  is  inferring  a  proposition  from  proposi- 
tions less  gmeral  than  itself;  and  ratiocination  is  in- 
ferring a  proposition  from  propositions  equally  or  more 
general.  When,  from  the  observation  of  a  number  of 
individual  instances,  we  ascend  to  a  general  proposi- 
tion; or  when,  by  combining  a  number  of  general 
propositions,  we  conclude  from  them  another  proposi- 
tion still  more  general,  the  process,  which  is  substan- 
tially the  same  in  both  instances,  is  called  induction. 
When  from  a  general  proposition,  not  alone  (for  from  a 
single  proposition  nothing  can  be  concluded  which  is 
not  involved  in  the  terms),  but  by  combining  it  with 
other  propositions,  we  infer  a  proposition  of  the  same 


76  INDUCTION. 

degree  of  generality  with  itself,  or  a  less  general  propo- 
sition, or  a  proposition  merely  individual,  the  process  is 
ratiocination.  When,  in  short,  the  conclusion  is  more 
general  than  the  largest  of  the  premises,  the  argument 
is  commonly  called  induction ;  when  less  general,  or 
equally  general,  it  is  ratiocination. 

Induction  is,  without  doubt,  a  process  of  real  infer- 
ence. The  conclusion  in  an  induction  embraces  more 
than  is  contained  in  the  premises.  The  principle  or 
law  collected  from  particular  instances,  the  general 
proposition  in  which  we  embody  the  result  of  our  ex- 
perience, covers  a  much  larger  extent  of  ground  than 
the  individual  experiments  which  are  said  to  form  its 
basis.  A  principle  ascertained  by  experience  is  more 
than  a  mere  summing  up  of  what  we  have  specifically 
observed  in  the  individual  cases  that  we  have  examined  ; 
it  is  a  generalization  grounded  on  those  cases,  and  ex- 
pressive of  our  belief,  that  what  we  there  found  true,  is 
true  in  an  indefinite  number  of  cases  which  we  have 
not  examined,  and  are  never  likely  to  examine.  In 
every  induction  we  proceed  from  truths  which  we  know, 
to  truths  which  we  did  not  know;  from  facts  certified 
by  observation,  to  facts  which  we  have  not  observed, 
and  even  to  facts  not  capable  of  being  now  observed ; 
future  facts,  for  example,  but  which  we  do  not  hesitate 
to  believe  upon  the  sole  evidence  of  the  induction  itself. 
—MilVs  Logic,  pp.  108-112.] 

[We  return  now  to  Professor  Barron's  Lecture.*] 
I  have  now  explained  the  nature  of  propositions;  I 
have  specified  the  different  kinds  into  which  they  may 
be  divided  ;  and  I  have  enumerated  the  principal  sorts 
of  evidence  by  which  they  are  supported.  From  what 
1  have  advanced,  it  has  appeared  that  all  the  proposi 

[*  For  some  excellent  remarks  on  Induction  and  Deduction,  from  Thomson's  Lawi 
of  Thought,  refer  to  the  concluding  chapter  of  this  volume  J       ' 


THE    PROPER    FUNCTIONS    OF    JUDGMENT.  77 

tions  into  which  knowledge  may  be  formed,  are  resolva- 
ble into  an  affirmation  or  negation  of  the  agreement  of 
the  two  terms  or  ideas  of  wThich  they  consist ;  and  that 
the  judgment  the  mind  passes  on  this  agreement  or  dis- 
agreement, is  then  proper  and  just,  when  it  corresponds 
to  the  degree  of  evidence  by  which  the  proposition  is 
supported.  The  perfection  of  judgment  is,  to  compare 
our  ideas  fairly  and  candidly,  either  by  juxtaposition, 
as  in  the  case  of  intuitive  propositions,  or  by  the  inter- 
vention of  intermediate  ideas,  when  proof  is  requisite, 
and  to  pass  a  decision  on  that  comparison,  according  to 
truth  and  justice,  unbiased  by  partiality  or  prejudice, 
unseduced  by  fallacious  appearances  in  things,  ambi- 
guities in  words,  or  any  disposition  to  deceive,  or  to  be 
deceived. 

As,  then,  the  purpose  of  all  our  inquiries  is,  to  dis- 
cover truth  and  knowledge,  and  as  the  completion  of 
this  discovery  consists  in  discerning  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  our  ideas,  it  is  plain  that  we  cannot 
proceed  one  step  without  having  constant  recourse  to 
the  operation  of  judgment.  We  exert  it  immediately 
in  cases  of  intuition  ;  we  exert  it  at  the  conclusion  of 
every  process  of  reasoning,  in  determining  whether  two 
principal  ideas  agree  or  disagree;  and  we  exert  it  in 
every  step  of  that  process,  in  deciding  concerning  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  each  couple  of  interme- 
diate ideas.  The  candid  inquirer,  therefore,  should 
study  to  preserve  his  mind  in  a  state  fitted  to  perform 
this  operation  in  a  proper  manner,  and  to  divest  it  of  all 
obstructions  or  incumbrances  which  may  interfere  with 
its  success.  Without  this  precaution,  it  is  vain  to  pre- 
tend to  discover  truth,  because  we  shall  only  perplex  and 
discompose  our  minds,  spend  our  time  in  irksomeness 
to  ourselves,  in  disturbance  to  others,  and  sink  deeper 
in  falsehood  and  in  error.     After  all  the  candor  and 


78 

patience  we  can  exercise,  the  investigation  of  knowl 
edge  is  a  painful  and  laborious  task  ;  but  our  labor  and 
time  are  totally  thrown  away,  without  a  legitimate  ex- 
ertion of  judgment.  It  is,  therefore  ^  a  matter  of  the 
highest  importance,  in  searching  for  truth,  to  hriow 
those  impediments  which  obstruct  the  rectitude  of  our 
judgments,  and  to  learn  the  rules  we  m,ust  observe,  in 
order  to  conduct  them  with  justice  and  expedition. 
This  is  a  subject  deserving  most  serious  attention,  and 
must  not  be  forgotten  in  a  system  of  logic. 

Erroneous  judgments  are  denominated  prejudices,  or 
rash  judgments  /  that  is,  judgments  passed  before  we 
have  duly  examined  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case 
on  which  we  intend  to  decide.  Prejudices  generally 
relate  to  opinions ;  prepossessions,  to  attachments :  the 
former  refer  chiefly  to  things,  the  latter  to  persons. 
But  I  intend  here  that  prejudices  should  comprehend 
all  the  impediments  wThich  interfere  wTith  our  forming 
[right]  judgments  of  every  sort,  whether  respecting 
things  or  persons.  Prejudices  are  arranged  by  Lord 
Bacon  under  four  heads,  wrhich  he  calls,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  schools,  Idola  Tribus,  the  prejudices  of 
the  species ;  Idola  Fori,  the  prejudices  of  language ; 
Idola  Specus,  the  prejudices  of  the  individual ;  and 
Idola  Theatri,  the  prejudices  of  authority.  These 
terms,  though  scholastic,  are  extremely  significant.  It 
is  seldom  we  find  the  language  of  the  schoolmen  so  re- 
plete with  meaning.  Prejudices  are  not  improperly 
distinguished  by  the  title  of  Idola ;  because  they  occupy 
the  place  of  truth  in  the  mind,  in  the  same  manner  as 
the  idol  attracts  in  the  temple  the  devotion  which  be- 
longs to  the  Author  of  nature. 

The  Idola  Tribus  are  the. prejudices  common  to  all 
mankind,  and  arise  from  the  natural  imbecility  and 
vanity  of  the  mind,  or  from  *iie  influence  which  imagina- 


PREJUDICES    OF   THE   SPECIES.  TO 

tion,  passion,  affection,  and  attachment  have  upon  the 
operations  of  the  understanding.  The  Idola  Fcn%i  in- 
clude the  erroneous  judgments  into  which  we  are  led 
by  the  inaccuracy  or  the  abuse  of  language.  The  Idola 
Sjoecns  comprehend  those  prejudices  which  result  from 
peculiar  circumstances,  from  constitution  of  mind  or 
body,  from  education,  from  habit,  or  from  accident. 
The  Idola  Theatri  are  the  errors  into  which  we  are  de- 
coyed by  public  opinion,  by  authority,  by  custom,  by 
fashion,  or  by  any  other  means  which  mankind  employ 
to  pervert  the  judgments  of  one  another.  These  divi- 
sions contain,  if  not  all,  at  least  the  chief  materials  of 
our  prejudices.  I  shall  therefore  resume  them,  and 
point  out  the  particulars  contained  under  each.  I  begin 
with  the  Prejudices  of  the  species. 

Though  the  human  understanding,  assiduously  em- 
ployed and  properly  directed,  might  have  proceeded 
much  farther  than  it  has  done  in  the  investigation  of 
knowledge,  yet,  so  limited  are  its  powers,  that  there  is 
much  reason  to  apprehend  its  progress,  in  the  most  fa- 
vorable circumstances,  cannot  be  very  great.  Thousands 
of  subjects  daily  occur,  concerning  which  we  are  totally 
ignorant,  and  concerning  which  any  industry  we  can 
exert  cannot  be  supposed  to  remove  that  ignorance. 

The  substance  and  many  of  the  operations  of  all  existences,  cor- 
poreal and  spiritual,  are  now,  and  perhaps  will  remain,  altogether 
unknown.  We  comprehend  nothing  of  either,  but  a  few  of  their 
qualities.  All  the  assimilating  powers  of  nature,  by  which  animals 
are  produced,  and  reared,  and  live,  and  act,  by  instinct  or  design ; 
by  which  plants  grow  to  various  sizes,  cpnsist  of  texture  so  differ- 
ent, display  colors  so  beautiful  %id  so  numerous ;  and  by  which 
minerals  so  precious,  and  so  dissimilar,  are  formed  in  the  bowels  of 
the  earth ;  constitute  an  immense  field  of  inquiry,  in  a  great  meas- 
ure beyond  our  reach.  All  investigations  which  involve  the  idea  of 
infinity,  whether  with  regard  to  excellence,  space,  or  time,  exceed 
our  comprehension  ;  because  of  infinity  we  have  no  adequate  con- 


80  PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    SCHOOLMEN. 

ception,  and  can  only  approach  it  negatively  by  discovering  whnt 
it  is  not.  All  inquiries,  also,  about  futurity,  however  anxiously 
pursued  by  men  in  all  ages  and  situations,  surpass  the  human 
powers  of  research,  if  we  except  the  very  short  progress  which  the 
sagacity  of  some  men  may  make,  guided  by  the  imperfect  and  falli- 
ble aid  of  experience  and  analogy. 

Limited,  then,  as  the  mind  of  man  is  in.  its  inquiries, 
by  the  nature  of  many  subjects  themselves,  and  numer- 
ous as  still  are  the  fields  of  accessible  knowledge,  un- 
touched or  unexplored ;  such,  notwithstanding,  is  its 
vanity,  its  folly,  or  its  presumption,  that  more  perhaps 
of  its  time  and  its  industry  has  been  employed  in 
searching  for  what  is  not  to  be  found,  than  in  investiga- 
ting what  is  useful  and  intelligible. 

Is  it  not  deplorable,  that  so  much  ingenuity  should  have  been 
thrown  away,  even  in  enlightened  times,  on  skeptical  and  useless  in- 
quiries concerning  the  nature  and  existence  of  matter  and  spirit, 
without  attending  to  what  is  of  real  importance,  the  qualities  and 
operations  of  both,  from  which  useful  knowledge  concerning  them 
might  have  been  deduced  ?  Is  it  not  equally  lamentable,  that  the 
true  method  of  prosecuting  the  study  of  nature  should  have  been 
unknown  till  the  days  of  Lord  Bacon  ?  and  that  philosophers 
should  have  been  so  misled,  or  so  absurd,  as  to  retire  to  their 
closets,  and  to  form  theories  to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  the 
heavens  and  the  earth,  without  consulting  the  facts  which  they 
every  day  beheld  ? 

But  all  the  abuses  and  misapplications  of  human  ingenuity  com- 
bined, furnish  nothing  equal  to  those  of  the  schools  for  near  five 
hundred  years,  from  the  middle  of  the  eleventh  century  to  the  re- 
vival of  learning  in  the  sixteenth.  Never  did  any  set  of  philosophers 
labor  so  strenuously  and  successfully  to  enlighten  the  mind  of  man, 
and  to  promote  the  discovery  of  truth,  as  the  schoolmen  did  to 
confound  all  human  inquiry,  and  to  interrupt  all  progress  in  knowl- 
edge. Never  were  subtilty  and  ingenuity  employed  so  preposter- 
ously, in  pretending  to  teach  the  method  of  investigating  truth,  and 
exposing  error,  without  communicating  any  useful  information.* 

[*  "  The  works  of  Aristotle,  translated  into  barbarous  Latin,  formed  the 
groundwork  of  what  has  been  called  the  philosophy  of  the  schoolmen  ;  who 


THE  SCHOOL-LOOrC.  :  81- 


LECTURE  VI. 

PREJUDICES. 

"Vanity  and  presumption  have  not  been  engaged 
more  successfully  in  obstructing  the  progress  of  general 
knowledge,  than  the  imagination,  the  passions,  and 
self-interest,  have  been  employed  in  clouding  the  mind 
with  prejudices  respecting  society,  business,  arts,  and 
social  intercourse.  National  partialities  are  so  insuper- 
able in  the  most  enlightened  and  civilized  periods,  that 
it  seems  impossible  for  the  people  in  general  of  any 
nation,  to  do  justice  in  the  judgments  they  form,  of  the 
capacity,  the  ingenuity,  the  courage,  or  the  integrity  of 
their  rivals. 

The  proud  Jews  of  old  treated  all  the  rest  of  mankind  with  con- 
tempt ;  and  if  they  admitted  them  to  be  creatures  of  the  Author 
of  nature,  they  accounted  them  unworthy  of  his  care,  inonopo- 

never  rightly  understood  Aristotle,  and  enlarged  and  disfigured  his  logio 
by  endless  and  insignificant  commentaries.  The  school-logic  was  taught 
in  all  universities  before  the  Reformation,  and  in  not  a  few  of  them  since. 
It  was,  indeed,  almost  the  only  thing  that  was  then  taught  in  those  semi- 
naries ;  and  so  eagerly  was  it  run  after,  that  Duns  Scotus,  a  great  teacher 
of  it  at  Oxford,  is  said  to  have  had  at  one  time  twenty  thousand  scholars. 
This  is  not  probable;  and,  if  true,  can  be  accounted  for  in  no  other  way 
than  by  supposing  that,  in  an  ignorant  age,  the  man  who  could  dispute,  or 
speak  fluently,  would  be  admired  as  a  prodigy,  and  might  acquire  among 
the  common  people  what  influence  he  pleased.  It  is  to  be  observed,  too, 
that  the  school-logic  was  found  to  be  a  good  support  to  the  Romish  religion, 
and  was  by  the  Church  of  Rome  patronized  accordingly.  For  th's  log  c,  by 
tx)t)fiuing  men's  minds  within  the  narrow  circle  of  its  own  rules,  and  making 
them  more  attentive  to  words  than  to  things,  and  totally  regardless  of  na- 
ture, checked  all  freedom  of  inquiry  ;  and,  by  promoting  a  habit  of  arguing 
against  one's  belief,  as  well  as  for  it,  had  a  tendency  to  prevent  serious 
thinking,  to  harden  the  heart,  to  pervert  the  understanding,  and  to  make 
tuerrmdifferent  about  the  Uuth.v'—  -Beatti&s  Moral  Science,-^.  55&-6«]  -  - 

4» 


82  NATIONAL   PARTIALITIES. 

lizing  his  attention  and  his  providence  to  themselves.  The  Greeks, 
vain  of  their  enterprise,  their  learning,  and  their  arts,  considered 
all  other  nations,  even  the  refined  and  luxurious  Persians,  as  bar- 
barians, and  held  in  little  estimation  their  manners,  their  arts,  and 
their  fidelity.  The  Athenians  represented  their  rivals,  the  Spar- 
tans, as  ignorant,  rude,  ambitious,  and  as  destitute  of  every  quality 
except  stratagem  and  patience.  The  Spartans  retaliated  the  op- 
probrious epithets  of  fickle,  factious,  sophistical,  impertinent;  of 
restless,  loquacious,  turbulent,  and  ostentatious.  The  Romans, 
like  the  Greeks,  stigmatized  with  the  appellation  of  barbarous  the 
rest  of  the  world.  They  vilified  the  military  character  of  the  Car- 
thaginians and  Macedonians.  They  ridiculed  the  mercantile  spirit 
of  the  former,  converted  their  national  faith  into  a  proverb  of  re- 
proach, and  scarcely  left  them  a  single  civil  virtue. 

But,  though  superior  liberality  of  sentiment  certainly 
prevails  in  modern  times ;  and  nations,  having  much 
more  intercourse,  survey  their  neighbors  with  less  aver- 
sion and  suspicion ;  yet  there  is  scarcely  to  be  found, 
even  among  men  of  letters,  that  candor  and  generosity 
which,  disdaining  all  partial  and  local  attachments, 
constitute  the  philosopher  the  citizen  of  the  world. 
All  the  civilized  nations,  I  believe,  of  modern  Europe, 
discover  among  their  countrymen  knowledge,  genius, 
and  industry,  superior  to  what  are  to  be  found  in  simi- 
lar circumstances  among  any  of  their  neighbors.  The 
French,  the  English,  the  Italians,  will  not,  I  conceive, 
readily  yield  to  one  another  precedency  in  science 
or  arts. 

In  private  life,  the  prevalence  of  imagination,  of 
passion,  and  of  attachment,  extinguishes  almost  every 
ray  of  impartiality  and  justice  in  the  judgments  of  men. 
The  power  of  imagination  is  so  prevalent  in  some 
minds  as  to  render  them  altogether  impatient  under  the 
irksome  operation  of  comparing  ideas ;  and  they  hasten 
to  any  judgment,  however  erroneous,  rather  than  con- 
tinue in  a  state  of  suspense.  The  greater  part  of  man- 
kind are  guided  more  by  their  imagination  and  feeling 


THE   JUDGMENT   PERVERTED   BY   THE    PASSIONS.         88 

than  by  reason.  An  analogy  or  a  figure  influences 
them  more  than  an  argument.  They  will  go  with  the 
multitude,  however  misguided,  rather  than  stand  single 
on  the  side  of  justice  and  truth. 

The  passions  pervert  judgment  still  more  than  the 
imagination,  and  there  is  hardly  any  thing  we  wish  to 
think  right  and  reasonable,  which  we  will  not  quickly 
find  arguments  for  judging  to  be  so.  The  spirit  of 
party,  and  the  passions  it  prompts,  appear  on  many  oc- 
casions to  eradicate  every  idea  of  equity,  candor,  and 
consistency.  Men  oppose  to-day  what  they  supported 
yesterday ;  they  reprobate  measures  as  void  of  faith, 
honor,  and  integrity,  which  they  formerly  maintained 
to  be  the  result  of  wisdom  and  discernment,  and  the 
source  of  the  most  important  public  good.  When  our 
own  interest  comes  in  competition  with  that  of  others, 
it  is  almost  impossible  to  survey  the  subject  of  dispute 
with  an  impartial  eye.  In  all  such  cases,  men  of  can 
dor,  conscious  of  their  imperfection,  renounce  judgment 
altogether,  or  endeavor  to  contemplate  their  situation 
and  attachments  in  the  light  they  could  view  those  ot 
neutral  persons.  It  is,  indeed,  exceedingly  difficult  to 
emancipate  the  mind  entirely  from  these  causes  of  erro- 
neous judgment ;  but  every  inquirer  should  make  the 
attempt,  as  he  may  be  assured  his  researches  otherwise 
will  never  be  attended  with  pleasure  or  success. 

[Some  important  suggestions  on  this  subject  we  here  subjoin, 
from  Dr.  Watts.  Logic,  Part  ii.,  chap.  iii.  The  various  passions  or 
affections  of  the  mind  lead  the  judgment  astray  from  truth.  It  is 
love  that  makes  the  mother  think  her  qwn  child  the  fairest,  and 
will  sometimes  persuade  us  that  a  blemish  is  a  beauty.  Hope  and 
desire  make  an  hour  of  delay  seem  as  long  as  two  or  three  hours. 
Hope  inclines  us  to  think  there  is  nothing  too  difficult  to  be  at- 
tempted. Despair  tells  us  that  a  brave  attempt  is  mere  rashness, 
and  that  every  difficulty  is  insurmountable.  What  could  persuade 
the  wise  men  and  philosophers  of  a  popish  country  to  believe  the 


31  JUDGMENT    WARPED    BY    THE    FEELINGS. 

gross  absurdities  of  the  Romish  Church,  but  the  fear  of  torture  or 
death,  the  galleys  or  the  Inquisition  ? 

The  fondness  we  have  for  self  and  the  relation  which  othei  per 
sons  bear  to  ourselves,  furnish  us  with  another  long  list  of  preju- 
dices. We  are  generally  ready  to  fancy  that  every  tiling  of  our 
own  has  something  peculiarly  valuable  in  it,  when  indeed  there  is 
no  other  reason  but  because  it  is  our  own.  We  entertain  the  best 
opinion  of  the  persons  of  our  own  party,  and  easily  believe  evil 
reports  of  persons  of  a  different  sect  or  faction.  We  set  up  our 
own  opinions  in  religion  and  philosophy  as  the  tests  of  orthodoxy 
and  truth.  We  are  thus  tempted  to  pervert  even  the  sacred  books 
of  Scripture  to  make  them  speak  our  own  sense.  When  our  own 
inclination,  or  ease,  or  honor,  or  profit  tempt  us  to  the  practice  of 
any  thing,  how  do  we  strain  our  thoughts  to  find  arguments  for  it 
and  persuade  ourselves  it  is  lawful ! 

In  matters  of  equity  between  man  and  man,  our  Saviour  has 
taught  us  to  put  my  neighbor  in  place  of  myself,  and  myself  in 
place  of  my  neighbor,  rather  than  be  bribed  by  this  corrupt  princi 
pie  of  self-love  to  do  injury  to  my  neighbor. 

Again,  the  peculiar  tempers  and  humors  of  the  mind  influence 
the  judgment  and  occasion  many  mistakes.  The  credulous  man  is 
ready  to  receive  every  thing  for  truth  that  has  but  a  shadow  of 
evidence ;  he  is  ready  to  resign  his  own  opinion  to  the  first  objec- 
tion which  he  hears,  and  to  receive  any  sentiments  of  another  that 
are  asserted  with  a  positive  air  and  with  much  assurance.  The  man 
of  contradiction  stands  ready  to  oppose  every  thing  that  is  said. 
He  gives  but  slight  attention  to  the  reasons  of  other  men,  from  an 
inward  scornful  presumption  that  they  have  no  strength  in  them. 

Again,  the  dogmatist  is  sure  of  every  thing,  and  the  skeptic  be- 
lieves nothing.  The  former  adopts  his  opinions  hastily  and  on  in- 
sufficient grounds,  and  then  will  hear  no  arguments- to  the  con- 
trary :  the  latter  will  not  take  pains  to  search  things  to  the  bot- 
tom, but  when  he  sees  difficulties  on  both  sides,  resolves  to  believe 
neither  of  them. 

Some  men  believe  a  doctrine  merely  because  it  is  ancient,  others 
because  it  is  new :  some  will  not  believe  a  proposition  in  theology 
if  it  is  mysterious,  while  others  would  on  that  account  receive  it 
more  readily.] 

The  Idola  Fori,  which  originate  from  language,  the 
^reat  instrument  of  social   communication,  form   the. 


IDOLA    SPECUS.  •  85 

second  class  of  prejudices.  The  principal  inconvenien- 
ces they  occasion,  result  from  the  use  of  words  which 
have  no  meaning,  or  which  bear,  in  our  apprehension, 
a  meaning  more  or  less  extensive  than  they  ought  to 
have.  I  am,  however,  fortunately  relieved  from  the 
necessity  of  recapitulating  and  exposing  them,  by  what 
I  advanced  in  a  former  lecture  concerning  the  ambigui- 
ties of  general  terms,  and  the  manner  of  ascertaining 
them  by  enumeration.  What  I  there  observed  refers, 
indeed,  to  the  enunciation  of  single  ideas ;  but  no  more 
is  necessary  to  obtain  a  distinct  and  just  judgment.  If 
language  exhibit  single  ideas  perspicuously  and  fully, 
it  has  done  all  that  can  be  expected  from  it.  If  an  er- 
roneous judgment  shall  still  be  passed,  the  understand- 
ing must  bear  the  blame,  while  the  expression  will  de- 
serve no  censure. 

The  next  class  of  prejudices,  denominated  Idola 
Specus,  include  all  those  errors  in  judgment  into  which 
men  are  seduced  from  circumstances  peculiar  to  them- 
selves, from  the  constitution  of  their  minds  or  bodies, 
rank  in  life,  education,  or  course  of  study. 

Infinite,  almost,  is  the  variety  of  the  external  appear- 
ance of  the  human  race,  and  no  less  various,  perhaps, 
are  the  constitutions  of  the  minds  of  men.*  For  this 
reason  unanimity  is  nut  to  be  looked  for,  even  concern- 
ing business  and  the  common  intercourse  of  life,  far  less 
concerning  speculative  tenets  of  difficult  conception, 
probably  in  some  cases  of  exceptionable  evidence.  If 
judgments  are  formed  by  candid  men  on  such  topics, 


[*  Some  men  have  a  native  obscurity  of  conception  whereby  they  are 
hindered  from  attaining  clear  and  distinct  ideas.  Some  bave  a  defect  of 
memory,  so  that  they  are  not  capable  of  comparing  their  present  ideas 
with  a  great  variety  of  others,  in  order  to  secure  themselves  .Sm  incon- 
sistency in  judgment.  Others  scarcely  ever  take  a  survey  of  things  wide 
enough  to  judge  wisely  and  consistently.     See  Waits,  part  ii.  obap.  iihl 


86  JUDGMENT   BIASED   BY    EDUCATION. 

they  will  be  different,  suitable  to  the  different  aspects 
in  which  the  objects  appear  to  their  respective  appre- 
hensions. No  inconvenience  ensues  from  these  differ- 
ent judgments,  either  in  affairs  or  in  speculation,  if  men 
are  animated  by  charity  and  proper  respect  for  the 
opinions  of  their  neighbors  as  well  as  for  their  own. 
They  add  variety  to  conversation  and  to  action,  corre- 
spondent to  the  difference  which  nature  has  established 
in  the  individuals  of  the  species.  They  inspire  patience 
and  toleration,  which  afford  exercise  for  several  of  the 
most  amiable  and  social  virtues. 

If  any  nation,  then,  or  large  society  of  men,  pretend 
to  be  unanimous  about  tenets  speculative  in  their  na- 
ture and  remote  from  vulgar  comprehension,  those  of 
religion  itself  not  excepted,  the  whole  almost  of  the 
judgments  from  which  that  unanimity  springs  must  be 
indigested  if  not  inadequate;  that  is,  they  must  be  the 
judgments  of  teachers  or  leaders,  adopted  without  ex- 
amination. Their  followers  are  generally  incapable  of 
forming  opinions  for  themselves,  on  account  either  of 
the  imbecility  of  their  faculties  or  the  abstract  nature 
of  the  topics ;  and  of  course  their  assent,  founded  on 
pretended  judgment,  is  no  better  than  acquiescence  in 
the  judgments  of  those  they  revere,  concerning  subjects 
which  they  do  not  fully  understand. 

Education,  the  professed  purpose  of  which  is  to  lead 
us  to  the  temple  of  truth  by  the  easiest  and  shortest 
road,  will  not  readily  be  supposed  to  retard  or  embar- 
rass our  progress  in  that  course  in  which  it  pretends  to 
be  a  guide.  It  is,  however,  certain,  that  no  station  we 
can  occupy,  no  discipline  we  can  undergo,  is  more  fre- 
quently prolific  of  partial  judgments* 

[*  How  many  fooleries  are  instilled  into  us  by  our  nurses,  our  fellow- 
children  ;  by  servants  or  unskilful  teachers,  which  are  maintained  through 
life!     We  choose  our  particular  sect  and  party  iu  the  civil,  the  xeligiou* 


ERROR    OF    EDUCATION.  87 

In  all  periods  of  society,  teachers  have  too  commonly  been  more 
concerned  to  inculcate  the  philosophy  of  their  sect,  or  the  religion 
of  their  church,  than  the  pure  doctrines  of  truth ;  and  the  inexpe- 
rience of  youth,  with  the  respect  they  naturally  entertain  for  ad- 
vanced years  and  superior  wisdom,  cannot  often  fail  to  render  such 
education  a  hot-bed  of  errors  and  prejudices.  History  and  experi- 
ence teem  with  examples  of  the  fertility  of  this  soil,  and  teach,  in 
the  strongest  language,  the  necessity  of  the  most  assiduous  atten- 
tion, to  prevent  or  eradicate  the  plentiful  crop  of  noxious  plants 
with  which  it  is  in  hazard  of  being  overrun. 

The  fundamental  error,  perhaps,  of  education,  has 
consisted  in  addressing  truth,  whether  prudential,  moral, 
or  philosophical,  to  the  memory  rather  than  to  the  un- 
derstanding. It  is  commonly  supposed,  if  a  great  deal 
of  information  be  lodged  in  the  mind,  and  committed 
to  the  custody  of  faithful  recollection,  that  it  will  prove 
a  plentiful  and  useful  magazine,  from  which  the  pupil 
may  draw  with  facility  and  advantage  every  supply  he 
may  need  in  the  conduct  of  life.  But  it  is  unfortunate- 
ly forgotten,  that  accumulation  of  truth  is  only  half  the 
business  of  instruction,  and  is  not  even  the  more  im- 
portant half.  The  more  important  part  is  to  acquire 
the  habit  of  employing  to  some  good  purpose  the  ac- 
quisitions of  memory,  by  the  exercise  of  the  understand- 
ing about  them ;  and,  till  this  habit  be  acquired,  these 
acquisitions  will  not  be  found  of  very  great  use. 

With  regard  to  prudential  truth,  or  the  conduct  of  a 
pupil  respecting  his  instructors,  his  parents,  his  friends, 
his  equals,  his  attachments  and  amusements,  the  great 
fundamental  rule  seems  to  be,  that  good  behavior  is 
both  his  duty  and  his  interest,  and  that  upon  his  ob- 


and  the  learned  life,  by  the  influence  of  education.  The  Turks  are  taught 
early  to  believe  in  Mahomet,  the  Jews  in  Moses ;  the  heathens  worship  a 
multitude  of  gods,  under  the  force  of  their  education,  and  it  would  be 
well  if  there  were  not  millions  of  Christians,  who  have  little  more  to  say 
for  their  religion  than  that  they  were  born  and  bred  up  in  it. —  Watts.] 


88"  PREJUDICES    RESULTING    FROM    EDUCATION. 

servation  of  it  his  treatment  and  gratifications  will  de 
pend. 

If  the  uniform  and  discreet  conduct  of  the  teacher,  or  the  parent, 
makes  him  consider  what  his  behavior  is,  and  forces  him  to  reason 
about  the  practice  of  it,  he  will  be  happy  and  satisfied,  he  will  be 
attentive  and  civil  to  others,  and  he  will  be  prepared  to  judge  for 
himself  in  the  conduct  of  life,  when  he  shall  be  obliged  to  think  and 
act  without  direction.  But  if  he  have  no  rule  of  conduct  but  the 
dictates  of  every  sudden  whim  which  may  arise  in  his  own  fantas- 
tic imagination,  or  which  the  occasional  indulgence  or  severity  of 
an  indiscreet  superintendent  may  suggest,  his  conduct  will  be  the  re- 
sult of  foolish  attachments  or  aversions,  of  caprice,  or  of  passion. 
His  wants  will  be  multiplied  beyond  the  bounds  of  nature,  and  the 
circumstances  of  his  situation ;  he  will  be  miserable  himself,  dis- 
gusting to  others.  Advice  and  instruction  will  have  with  him  no 
useful  influence.  His  subjection  to  authority  will  be  his  utter 
aversion,  because  it  interferes  with  his  gratifications.  His  applica- 
tion to  study  will  be  disagreeable,  because  he  has  no  conception  of 
the  utility  of  knowledge.  From  such  a  train  of  unfortunate  preju- 
dices, what  other  conduct  can  ensue  than  we  often  survey? 
.Namely,  a  headlong  career  of  the  most  unlimited  gratification,  as 
soon  as  he  is  emancipated  from  that  mortifying  restraint  from  which 
he  has  long  wished  so  ardently  to  disengage  himself;  and  an  in- 
surmountable aversion  to  every  path  of  inquiry  and  truth,  into 
which  it  had  been  the  purpose  of  education  to  lead  him. 

Though  these  fatal  consequences  of  improper  instruc- 
tion are  fortunately  not  very  frequent,  yet  numerous 
examples  occur  of  prejudices  implanted  by  the  author- 
ity of  teachers,  relative  to  philosophical,  political,  and 
prudential  truth,  which  have  produced  effects  not  a  little 
detrimental.  The  lectures  of  philosophy  in  ancient 
Greece,  tended  more  to  inculcate  the  particular  tenets 
of  the  Epicureans,  the  Stoics,  and  the  Academics,  than 
the  science  of  human  nature,  and  the  doctrines  of  wis- 
dom. Aristotle  was  perhaps,  more  anxious  to  excite 
admiration, than  to  extend  useful  knowledge;  to  consti- 
tute a  new  sect  of  inquirers,  than  to  promote  the  influ 


EXAMPLES    FROM   ENGLISH    HISTORY.  89 

ence  of  'ruth.  From  the  abuse,  at  least  of  his  logic, 
flowed  a  corruption  of  the  education  of  Europe,  which 
for  many  centuries  not  only  did  not  point  out,  but  ob- 
structed every  avenue  to  improvement. 

That  no  ray  of  useful  information  should  have  transpired  amid 
all  the  industry,  and  acuteness,  and  even  ingenuity  of  the  scholastic 
doctors,  can  only  be  explained  from  the  vanity  and  futility  of  the 
learning  they  inculcated.  When  the  art  of  reasoning  itself  was 
converted  into  an  engine  of  sophistry  and  deceit,  when  the  educa- 
tion of  the  most  learned  and  elevated  members  of  society  consisted 
in  subtle  wrangling  and  syllogistic  disputation,  can  we  wonder  that 
the  understandings  of  men  should  be  debased  and  disgraced  by  the 
admission  of  the  most  palpable  inconsistencies,  and  that  the  stupen- 
dous fabric  of  Popish  superstition,  the  most  presumptuous  system 
that  ever  insulted  human  reason,  should  have  been  then  received 
and  established? 

The  history  of  Great  Britain  presents  two  striking  ex- 
amples of  the  pernicious  effects  of  the  prejudices  of  edit 
cation,  one  political,  and  the  other  religious.  Charles 
the  First  lost  his  life  and  his  crown  by  the  arbitrary 
maxims  of  government  he  had  received  from  his  ances- 
tors. James  the  Second  lost  his  crown  by  the  Popish 
education  he  had  received  in  France. 

Though  Charles  the  First  is  commonly  called  a  martyr  to  the 
doctrine  and  worship  of  the  Church  of  England,  and  is  accounted 
by  the  vulgar  to  have  sacrificed  his  life  in  defending  her  against  the 
bigotry  and  violence  of  sectaries,  whose  hatred  to  her  and  him  was 
insatiable;  yet  it  is  well  known,  that  his  attachment  to  that  church 
was  neither  the  first  nor  the  chief  cause  of  the  discontents  which 
generated  and  prolonged  the  civil  war.  Religious  jealousies  and 
fears  were  then  employed,  as  they  have  often  been,  to  rouse,  and 
'rritate,  and  alienate  the  people.  But  the1  encroachments  on  prop- 
erty contrary  to  law,  and  the  levying  of  money  without  consent  ot 
Parliament,  alarmed  all  wise  men,  and  excited  that  tremendous 
spirit  of  resistance  which  terminated  in  the  lamentable  fate  of  the 
monarch,  and  the  destruction  of  the  constitution,  evils  that  seem  tc 
have  exceeded  in  magnitude  every  wish  or  conception  of  the  pat- 


90  EFFECTS   OF   PARTY    SPIRIT. 

riots  who  first  opposed  the  arbitrary  measures  of  the  crown.  That 
Charles  knew  the  constitution  reprobated  the  levying  of  money  b\ 
his  own  authority,  we  have  no  reason  to  doubt ;  but  he  had  been 
fatally  educated  in  principles  which  suggested,  that  cases  of  neces- 
sity, or  the  wants  of  princes,  were  superior  to  the  constitution  or 
the  laws  ;  and  that,  if  Parliament  refused  to  grant  what  supplies  he 
thought  necessary,  a  case  of  necessity  took  place,  and  he  was  at 
liberty  to  exert  his  sovereign  power,  to  provide  for  the  salvation  of 
the  state. 

The  education  of  James  the  Second  in  France,  and  his  attach- 
ment to  Popery,  were  the  springs  of  the  Revolution,  and  of  the 
ejection  of  the  family  of  Stuart  from  the  throne  of  their  ancestors. 
Nothing  perhaps  but  the  bigotry  of  that  prince  could  have  saved 
the  liberties  of  this  country  from  extinction.  Could  he  have  relin- 
quished his  attachment  to  Popery,  could  he  have  suspended  or 
moderated  that  attachment,  he  might  have  reigned  without  a  par- 
liament, and  trampled  on  the  laws  and  religion  of  his  subjects.  His 
finances,  by  economy  and  good  management,  were  in  perfect  order, 
and  nearly  adequate  to  the  annual  expenses  of  government.  The 
calamities  and  disasters  of  the  late  civil  wars  were  fresh  in  the 
memories  of  men,  and  all  ranks  were  reluctant  to  renew  them. 
The  enthusiastic  spirit  which  had  inflamed  the  body  of  the  nation 
against  his  father,  had  now  nearly  spent  its  force,  and  nothing 
seemed  wanting  to  success  but  to  allow  the  minds  of  men  to  cool, 
and  to  habituate  them  to  the  slavery  that  was  preparing  for  them. 
The  blind  zeal,  however,  of  the  king,  and  his  intemperate  attach- 
ment to  his  religion,  for  the  happiness  of  this  land  of  liberty, 
hastened  every  event  to  a  crisis.  They  so  completely  disgusted 
friends  and  enemies,  that  the  people,  with  the  most  unprecedented 
unanimity,  pushed  from  a  throne,  without  violence  or  convulsion,  a 
monarch  and  a  family,  who  would  have  sacrificed  the  happiness 
and  peace  of  a  great  nation  to  an  absurd  system  of  foreign  super- 
stition. 

The  Idola  Theatri  constitute  the  last  class  of  preju- 
dices of  which  I  have  to  speak.  They  generate  all  those 
erroneous  judgments  which  result  from  the  malignant 
influence  of  society,  and  which  may  be  comprehended 
under  the  effects  of  party  spirit,  of  fashion,  and  of  an 
thority. 

Party  spirit  has  in  all  ages  been  the  most  formida 


EFFECTS   OF   PARTY   SPIRIT.  91 

ble  enemy  to  sound  judgment  in  philosophy,  in  politics 
and  in  affairs.  No  man,  it  would  seem,  ever  retained 
either  discernment  or  candor  to  withstand  its  seduction, 
after  allowing  it  to  get  possession  of  his  breast.  The 
only  safety  for  the  impartiality  of  the  mind,  the  only 
means  of  preserving  the  solidity  and  equity  of  its  deci- 
sions, is  to  fly  from  the  evil,  and  to  avoid  the  infection. 
If  we  advance  within  the  sphere  of  its  attraction,  we  are 
undone. 

It  would  be  endless  to  enumerate  the  examples  of  the 
baneful  influence  of  this  spirit,  which  history  and  ex- 
perience so  plentifully  supply.  Numerous  and  violent 
are  the  contentions  it  has  produced  in  science,  in  re- 
ligion, and  in  business.  When  engaged  in  a  party,  wTe 
retain  no  rule  of  judgment  but  the  opinion  of  the  people 
with  whom  we  associate.  Every  thing  they  think,  or 
say,  or  do,  is  right,  proceeds  from  honorable  and  useful 
motives,  and  is  directed  to  the  accomplishment  of  some 
important  end.  All  our  friends  are  men  of  discern- 
ment, of  integrity,  of  generosity,  of  liberal  minds,  of 
impartial  views,  and  of  great  virtues.  The  case  of  our 
antagonists,  their  motives,  qualities,  and  conduct,  are 
directly  the  reverse.  Their  designs  are  the  result  of 
imprudence,  folly,  or  iniquity.  Weakness,  wickedness, 
or  selfishness,  mark  all  their  plans,  and  disfigure  all 
their  operations.  They  inherit  no  spark  of  discretion, 
enterprise,  or  public  spirit.  Truth  is  thus  suppressed  or 
misrepresented  ;  and  in  all  the  subjects  of  contest,  there 
will  not  be  found,  on  either  side,  a  single  sound  or  im- 
partial judgment.  , 

Religious  party  spirit,  in  former  ages,  chiefly  misled 
and  agitated  the  minds  of  men.  Happily  for  the  honor 
and  peace  of  the  present  age,  the  influence  of  this  most 
malignant  disposition  is  now  nearly  extinguished.  The 
progress  of  truth  and  knowledge  has  not  been  a  little 


02  PRWUDICES   OF    FASHION.      - 

extended  and  accelerated  by  this  fortunate  event.  Po- 
litical party  spirit,  however,  still  keeps  strong  hold  ot 
the  minds  of  men  ;  and  the  misrepresentations  and 
falsehoods  witli  which  it  corrupts  their  hearts,  and  mis- 
leads their  judgments,  are  sufficiently  discernible.  Did 
not  attachment  to  party  blind  the  understanding,  and 
obliterate  the  feelings  of  modesty  and  candor,  men 
would  be  ashamed  of  the  contempt  or  neglect  with 
which  they  receive  the  plainest  truths.  On  some  occa- 
sions, indeed,  this  spirit  appears  to  prompt  suc^  par- 
tiality, as  not  only  despises  the  dictates  of  truth  and 
reason,  but  disregards  even  the  most  important  inter- 
ests of  society,  provided  it  may  accomplish  its  favorite 
objects  of  ambition. 

The  prejudices  of  fashion  seduce  and  pervert  a-11 
mankind.  Every  thing  feels  its  influence.  All  ranks 
are  subjected  to  its  power.  Manners,  arts,  language, 
dress,  amusements,  studies,  science,  even  laws  and  reli- 
gion, are  not  exempted  from  its  sway.  Fashion  is,  on 
many  occasions,  the  opinion  of  the  majority  of  society, 
or  of  the  more  illustrious  part  of  it;  and  so  ductile  are 
the  minds  of  many  men,  that  they  consider  its  dictates 
as  of  superior  authority  to  those  of  reason  itself.  Of  all 
our  prejudices,  however,  those  supported  by  fashion  are 
perhaps  the  most  justifiable,  at  least  they  are  often  the 
most  difficult  to  surmount.  In  all  matters  of  indiffer- 
ence, it  would  seem,  we  should  submit  to  fashion  ;  and 
as  we  would  not  choose  to  follow  any  authority  in  j  udg- 
ing  of  right  and  wrong,  so  it  appears  unreasonable  to 
be  singular  in  cases  where  neither  is  concerned. 

[Fashion  has  a  most  powerful  influence  on  our  judg- 
ments, for  it  employs  those  two  strong  engines  of  fear 
and  shame  to  operate  upon  our  understanding  with 
unhappy  success.  We  are  ashamed  to  believe  or  tc 
profess  an  unfashionable  opinion  in  philosophy,  and  a 


PREJUDICES    OF    AUTHORITY.  93 

cowardly  soul  dares  not  so  much  as  indulge  a  thought 
contrary  to  the  established  or  fashionable  faith,  nor  act 
in  opposition  to  custom,  though  it  be  according  to  the 
dictates  of  reason.  I  confess  there  is  a  respect  due  to 
mankind  which  should  incline  even  the  wisest  of  men 
to  follow  the  innocent  customs  of  their  country  in  the 
outward  practices  of  civil  life,  and  in  some  measure  to 
submit  to  fashion  in  all  indifferent  affairs,  where  reason 
and  Scripture  make  no  remonstrance.  But  the  judg- 
ments of  the  mind  ought  to  be  forever  free,  and  not 
biased  by  the  customs  and  fashions  of  any  age  or  na- 
tion whatsoever. —  Watts^] 

The  prejudices  of  fashion  are  nearly  allied  to  those  of 
authority.  They  differ  only  in  the  extent  of  the  source 
from  which  they  are  derived.  Under  the  former,  we 
are  guided  by  the  practice  or  opinion  of  the  great  body 
of  the  people ;  under  the  latter,  we  follow  the  opinions 
and  example  of  eminent  individuals.  Authority  is  most 
detrimental  to  all  inquiries  after  truth,  and  has  perhaps 
obstructed  more  the  progress  of  knowledge  than  all 
other  causes  conjoined.  It  has  infested  and  corrupted 
the  investigations  of  philosophy  in  all  ages.  Even  the 
enlightened  spirit  of  the  present  age  is  not  altogether 
delivered  from  its  dominion.. 

Whenever  men  pretend  to  teach  knowledge,  by 
adopting  systems  without  consulting  nature,  the  influ- 
ence of  authority  must  be  unlimited  and  indisputable, 
because  the  inquirer  has  sought  for  no  test  of  truth  but 
the  opinion  of  the  author  of  the  system.  It  is  fortunate 
for  knowledge  that  this  mode  of  philosophizing  is  now 
exploded,  and  will  never  perhaps  regain  establishment. 
After  reigning  uncontrollably  from  the  days  of  Aristotle 
to  those  of  Descartes,  it  was  consigned  to  oblivion,  with 
all  the  speculations  of  this  eminent  projector,  by  the 
sound  philosophy  of  Kewton.     The  general  prevalence 


94         THE  AUTHORITY  OF  FOREFATHERS. 

of  the  experimental  method,  recommended  by  Bacon, 
has  gained  entire  ascendency  in  every  enlightened  na- 
tion of  Europe. 

Had  the  Cartesian  mode  of  philosophizing  continued 
to  prevail,  the  true  system  of  nature  had  remained  un- 
known. It  was  the  banishment  of  authority,  and  the 
investigation  of  nature,  that  revealed  her  secrets.  If 
the  influence  of  authority  shall  revive,  the  knowledge 
of  these  secrets  may  be  withdrawn.  Let,  then,  the 
opinions  of  every  theorist  be  examined  with  perfect 
patience  and  impartiality,  but  never  let  his  authority 
supply  the  place  of  argument. 

[As  sources  of  prejudice,  the  authority  of  our  fore- 
fathers, and  of  ancient  authors,  is  most  remarkable.  It 
is  granted  that  the  ancients  had  many  wise  and  great 
men  among  them,  and  some  of  their  writings,  which 
time  has  delivered  down  to  us,  are  truly  valuable;  but 
those  writers  lived  rather  in  the  infant-state  of  the 
world,  and  the  philosophers  as  well  as  the  polite  au- 
thors of  our  age  are  properly  the  elders,  who  have  seen 
the  mistakes  of  the  younger  ages  of  mankind,  and  cor- 
rected them  by  observation  and  experience. 

Some  persons  believe  every  thing  that  their  kindred, 
their  parents,  and  their  tutors  believe.  I  freely  grant 
that  parents  are  appointed  by  God  and  nature  to  teach 
us  all  the  sentiments  and  practices  of  our  younger  years 
— and  happy  are  those  whose  parents  lead  them  into 
the  paths  of  wisdom  and  truth.  I  grant,  further,  that 
when  persons  come  to  years  of  discretion,  and  judge  for 
themselves,  they  ought  to  examine  the  opinions  of  their 
parents  with  the  greatest  modesty,  and  with  an  humble 
deference  to  their  superior  character;  they  ought>,  in 
matters  perfectly  dubious,  to  give  the  preference  to 
their  parents'  advice,  and  always  to  pay  them  the  first 
respect,  nor  ever  depart  from  their  opinions  and  prac- 


AUTHORITY    OF    PARENTS,    ETC.  95 

tice,  till  reason  and  conscience  make  it  necessary.  But, 
after  all,  it  is  possible  that  parents  may  be  mistaken, 
and  therefore  reason  and  Scripture  ought  to  be  our 
final  rules  of  determination  in  matters  that  relate  to 
this  world  and  that  which  is  to  come. 

To  believe  in  all  things  as  our  predecessors  did,  is  the 
ready  way  to  keep  mankind  in  an  everlasting  state  of 
infancy,  and  to  lay  an  eternal  bar  against  the  improve- 
ment of  our  reason  and  of  our  happiness. 

Besides,  let  us  consider  that  the  great  God,  our  com- 
mon Maker,  has  never  given  one  man's  understanding 
a  legal  and  rightful  sovereignty  to  determine  truths  for 
others,  at  least  after  they  are  past  the  state  of  childhood 
or  minority.  No  single  person,  how  learned,  and  wise, 
and  great  soever,  or  whatsoever  natural,  or  civil,  or 
ecclesiastical  relation  he  may  have  to  us,  can  claim  this 
dominion  over  our  faith. 

It  is  proper  to  take  notice,  however,  that  as  education, 
custom,  and  authority  are  no  sure  evidence  of  truth,  so 
neither  are  they  certain  marks  of  falsehood;  for  reason 
and  Scripture  may  join  to  dictate  the  same  things 
which  our  parents,  our  tutors,  our  friends,  and  our  coun- 
try believe  and  profess.  Yet  there  appears  sometimes 
in  our  age  a  pride  and  petulancy  in  youth,  zealous  to 
cast  off  the  sentiments  of  their  fathers  and  teachers,  on 
purpose  to  show  that  they  carry  none  of  the  prejudices 
of  education  and  authority  about  them.  They  indulge 
all  manner  of  licentious  opinions  and  practices,  from  a 
vain  pretence  of  asserting  their  liberty.  But,  alas !  this 
is  but  changing  one  prejudice  for  another,  and  some- 
times it  happens,  by  this  means,  that  they  make  a  sac- 
rifice both  of  truth  and  virtue  to  the  vile  prejudices  of 
their  pride  and  sensuality. 

There  is  another  tribe  of  prejudices  which  are  more 
akin  to  those  of  authority,  and  that  is,  when  we  receive 


96  MANNER    OF    PRESENTING    A    DOCTRINE. 

a  doctrine  because  of  the  manner  in  which  it  is  pro- 
posed to  us  by  others.  Neither  the  positive,  the  awful 
or  solemn,  the  terrible  or  the  gentle  methods  of  address, 
carry  any  certain  evidence  with  them  that  truth  lies  on 
that  side.  In  such  a  degenerate  world  as  we  live  in, 
wre  must  learn  to  distinguish  well  between  the  substance 
of  any  doctrine  and  the  manner  of  address,  either  in 
proposing,  attacking,  or  defending  it — and  thereby  set- 
ting a  just  and  secure  guard  of  reason  and  conscience 
over  all  the  exercises  of  our  judgments,  resolving  to 
yield  to  nothing  but  the  convincing  evidence  of  truth, 
religiously  obeying  the  light  of  reason  in  matters  of  pure 
reason,  and  the  dictates  of  revelation  in  things  that  re- 
late to  our  faith. —  Watts'  Logic,  part  ii.  chap,  iii.] 


LECTURE  VII. 

RULES     TO     PREVENT    PREJUDICES PRINCIPLES     AND     RULES     OF 

JUDGMENT. 

I  have  now  treated  pretty  fully  of  prejudices,  to  pre- 
pare us  to  detect  them,  and  to  put  us  on  our  guard 
against  them,  because  they  are  most  detrimental  in  the 
investigation  of  knowledge.  I  intimated  formerly,  that 
I  intended  to  point  out,  not  only  the  rocks  and  shelves, 
which  we  must  avoid,  but  to  present  the  compass  by 
which  we  must  steer,  in  order  to  perform  a  successful 
voyage  on  the  hazardous  sea  of  inquiry.  I  proceed 
to  perform  this  promise,  and  to  conclude  the  branch  of 
logic  under  discussion,  by  subjoining  a  few  rules  which 
must  direct  our  practice,  if  we  expect  to  form  just  and 
useful  judgments. 


RULES    TO    PREVENT    PREJUDICES.  97 

1.  Beware  of  precipitation,  and  never  decide  concern- 
ing the  truth  or  falsehood  of  any  proposition,  till  you 
have  attended  to  all  the  preliminaries  formerly  m,en- 
tioned :  whether  the  words  accurately  express  the  ideas, 
whether  you  have  distinct  conceptions  of  the  ideas, 
whether  your  minds  are  divested  of  prejudices,  and 
whether  you  have  fully  canvassed  the  evidence. 

I  do  not  maintain  that  all  this  precaution  is  necessary 
to  prevent  mistake  in  every  judgment  we  form.  In  all 
sciences,  arts,  and  affairs,  we  pass  many  judgments 
without  much  attention  or  premeditation,  because  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  ideas  compared  is 
obvious  on  the  slightest  inspection.  But  when  the  pur- 
suit of  truth  solicits  us  into  new,  and  perhaps  obscure, 
paths  of  inquiry;  when  we  reach  judgments,  which 
lead  to  inferences  extraordinary  and  alarming;  or,  when 
our  decisions  differ  from  those  of  men  eminent  for  ca- 
pacity and  discernment,  or  are  likely  to  involve  us  in 
controversy,  we  should  reiterate,  with  patient  attention, 
every  precaution. 

Such  a  practice  is  suitable  to,  and  is  demanded  by, 
the  character  of  a  candid  inquirer.  It  may  perhaps 
retard  our  progress,  but  it  will  cause  us  to  march  on 
surer  ground.  It  will  habituate  our  minds  to  accuracy, 
and  will  give  us  confidence  in  their  operations.  It 
will  save  the  irksome  sensation  which  results  from  the 
detection  of  precipitation  and  mistake  ;  and  it  may  pre- 
vent much  trouble  by  excluding  errors  from  theories, 
which,  if  carelessly  or  rashly  overlooked  in  their  prin- 
ciples, may  lay  in  ruins  the  la^or  of  many  painful 
hours. 

The  most  patient  investigators  have  always  been  the 
most  successful  inquirers,  and  the  most  prudent  and 
fortunate  men  have  generally  been  most  remarkable 
for  the  candor  and  the  coolness  of  their  understandings. 


98  BACON   AND   NEWTON. 

The  two  greatest  philosophers  the  world  ever  saw,  Lord  Bacon 
and  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  are  in  nothing  so  much  superior  to  all  other 
philosophers,  as  in  the  deliberation  and  patience  with  which  they 
proceeded  in  their  researches.  No  confidence,  no  presumption,  no 
vain  censure  of  the  precipitancy  of  former  inquirers,  no  zeal  for 
party,  no  partiality  to  system  or  authority,  ever  mislead  their 
minds  or  disgrace  their  investigations.  They  seek  truth  alone,  and 
they  search  for  her  with  the  caution  of  men  conscious  of  her  im- 
portance, and  of  the  difficulty  of  finding  her.  They  embrace  her 
with  cordiality  wherever  they  meet  her,  but  they  will  not  adopt 
speculation  for  fact,  nor  be  satisfied  with  the  semblance  in  place  of 
the  reality. 

Prudent  judgment  in  business  chiefly  distinguishes 
the  wise  man  from  the  fool.  The  fool  frequently  pos- 
sesses sensibility,  vivacity,  recollection,  and  informa- 
tion. He  is  often  in  these  articles  superipr  to  the  man 
of  wisdom  and  discretion,  but  he  cannot,  or  will  not, 
make  a  proper  use  of  the  materials  he  has  provided. 
He  finds  ideas  to  agree  which  do  not  agree.  He  judges 
precipitately  and  erroneously.  His  conduct  is  directed 
by  his  judgments.  His  opinions,  accordingly,  expose 
him  to  ridicule  and  contempt,  and  his  actions  to  re- 
proach and  misfortune. 

The  essence  of  wisdom,  on  the  other  hand,  consists  in 
the  passing  of  just  judgments  on  the  men  and  the 
things  about  which,  in  the  affairs  of  life,  we  are  called 
to  decide.  It  is  the  offspring  or  companion  of  discern- 
ment, and  discernment  is  nothing  more4han  that  pru- 
dent examination,  previous  to  judgment,  which  leads  to 
decide  according  to  truth.  The  wise  man,  it  is  said, 
sees  farther  into  futurity  than  other  men,  or  excels  in 
the  faculty  of  anticipation  ;  but  this  superiority  is  an 
evidence  only  of  the  accuracy  of  his  judgment  relative 
to  things  past.  He  supposes  that  future  events,  in 
similar  circumstances,  will  resemble  the  past.  His 
conceptions  of  the  past -are  accurate,  and  he  can  scarce 
ly  err  in  his  opinions  of  the  future 


SUSPENSE    IN    JUDGING.  99 

2.  If,  after  employing  every  precaution,  you  still 
find  information  incomplete,  or  ideas  not  sufficiently 
clear,  suspend  judgment  till  further  investigation  or 
greater  experience  shall  qualify  you  to  decide. 

I  am  aware  that  this  rule  may  be  supposed  to  be 
comprehended  under  the  preceding  ;  because,  if  we 
never  judge  with  precipitation,  we  must,  eventually, 
suspend  that  operation  whenever  the  evidence  is  not 
satisfactory.  But  the  prudent  and  rational  conduct  this 
rule  inculcates  is  so  momentous,  both  in  science  and  in 
business,  that  it  appeared  to  merit  a  separate  enuncia- 
tion and  illustration. 

A  degree  of  skepticism,  which  presupposes  a  doubt 
of  the  truth  of  every  proposition  we  have  not  examined, 
is  requisite  to  every  candid  inquirer.  But  to  many 
minds  hesitation  and  suspense  are  uneasy  feelings,  and 
they  are  impatient  to  reach  a  determination.  In  many 
instances,  if  we  proceed  with  propriety,  we  must  ob- 
serve the  necessity  of  suspense  of  judgment,  because 
our  inquiries  terminate  in  subjects  beyond  our  compre- 
hension. The  cases,  however,  to  which  I  would  espe 
cially  apply  this  rule,  are  those  in  which  judgment 
comes  within  our  comprehension;  but  we  hesitate, 
either  because  ideas  are  not  sufficiently  distinct,  or  be- 
cause we  have  not  discovered  the  intermediate  steps 
which  show  their  relation.  In  such  cases  a  candid  in- 
quirer must  suspend  judgment,  because  he  can  do  noth 
ing  else.  Should  he  go  on,  it  is  perfect  accident  if  he 
reach  a  just  determination. 

When  the  mind  is  embarrassed  and  perplexed,  it  is 
often  proper  to  relinquish  the  subject  of  inquiry  for 
some  time ;  and  to  resume  it,  after  an  interval  of  other 
employment.  Its  faculties  return  to  the  charge  with 
new  vigor,  more  experience,  quicker  discernment,  and 
frequently  with  success.    But  the  more  common  inethori 


100  SUSPENSE   IN   JUDGING. 

is,  to  pore  upon  the  topic  which  engages  attention,  and 
instead  of  seeking  for  intermediate  ideas,  if  it  be  a  sub- 
ject of  argument,  or  further  information,  if  it  be  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  inquirer  retires  to  his  closet,  and  forms 
theories  which  have  no  foundation  either  in  reason  or 
in  truth.  This  spirit  is  fortunately  banished,  in  a  great 
measure,  from  the  regions  of  philosophy,  but  it  still  re- 
mains in  politics  and  in  business. 

A  theoretical  politician  is  exceedingly  wise  in  conversation,  but 
his  speculations  are  rarely  verified  by  experience.  He  proceeds  on 
fallacious  principles.  He  reasons  on  the  supposition,  that  the  mo- 
tives and  conduct  of  men  are  what  they  should  be;  or  that  men 
will  act  from  steady  principles  of  justice  or  interest.  But  the  far 
greater  part  of  their  actions  is  the  result  of  unaccountable  at- 
tachment or  passion,  of  fancy,  feeling,  whim,  caprice.  These  can 
make  no  part  of  any  theory,  because  they  transcend  all  rules  of 
calculation,  and  falsify  every  conclusion  founded  on  reason  and 
common  sense.  A  man,  therefore,  who  wishes  to  gain  real  influ- 
ence in  the  world,  will  never  rest  resolutions  on  speculation.  He 
will  mix  with  mankind,  and  accommodate  his  opinions  to  charac- 
ters and  circumstances;  and  if  these  lead  not  to  decision,  he  will 
patiently  suspend  judgment,  and  remain  inactive ;  or  he  will  act  so 
ambiguously,  that  he  may  avail  himself  of  better  information  when 
it  shall  occur. 

Suspense  of  judgment,  at  least  suspense  in  uttering 
judgments,  if  they  contain  any  thing  harsh,  disagree- 
able, unpleasant,  or  even  unpolite,  is  particularly  neces- 
sary in  all  good  company,  and  among  all  men  of  knowl- 
edge. Without  this  exercise  of  civility  we  cannot  ex- 
pect to  be  favored  with  the  communications  of  superior 
information.  We  cannot  render  ourselves  acceptable 
to  those  from  whom  we  may  derive  the  most  essential 
benefits.  We  shall  discompose  and  embarrass  delicate 
society,  we  shall  be  exposed  to  critical  reprehension,  or 
involved  in  controversy,  the  bane  of  all  good  inter- 
course, and  insuperable  impediments  in  the  acquisition 
of  truth 


SATISFACTION    WI'^H    PROPER    EVIDENCE.  101 

Modesty  in  judgment  is  peculiarly  graceful  and 
promising  in  young  inquirers.  It  is  always  interpreted 
in  the  most  favorable  sense  ;  as  a  mark  of  ingenuousness, 
and  a  consciousness  of  the  difficulty  of  attaining  useful 
knowledge ;  dispositions  which  powerfully  solicit  liberal 
and  enlightened  minds  to  impart  important  aid.  On 
the  other  hand,  petulance,  forwardness,  and  presump- 
tion, subject  young  inquirers  to  every  disadvantage,  and 
to  many  mortifications.  They  alarm  men  of  superior 
parts  and  improvement,  and  render  them  averse  to  in- 
timacy with  persons  from  whom  nothing  is  to  be  ex- 
pected but  irritation  and  disgust.  They  bring  into  sus- 
picion the  soundness  of  their  understandings ;  so  that 
these  can  hardly  obtain  the  reputation  of  just  judgment 
even  when  it  is  deserved. 

3.  Be  satisfied  with  the  evidence  which  the  nature  of 
a  proposition  admits. 

To  decide  without  evidence,  is  weakness  and  absur- 
dity. To  be  satisfied  with  no  evidence,  is  skepticism. 
To  demand  the  same  kind  or  degree  of  evidence  for 
every  proposition,  is  unnatural  and  unreasonable.  The 
propositions  of  science,  of  arts,  and  of  business,  are  sup- 
ported by  different  kinds  of  evidence.  No  candid  rea- 
son er  will  demand  the  same  species  of  evidence  for 
them  all.  He  is  entitled  to  no  other  than  the  nature  of 
each  affords.  Few  subjects  admit  that  complete  convic- 
tion which  excludes  the  possibility  of  doubt.  The  far 
greater  part  presents  only  higher  or  lower  degrees  of 
probability.  Though  in  the  sciences  of  quantity  the 
mind  proceeds  on  the  firm  ground  of  demonstration,  it 
would  be  absurd  to  expect  equal  satisfaction  in  morals, 
politics,  or  natural  history,  because  these  sciences  are 
incapable  of  such  evidence. 

Moral  and  political  propositions  are  supported  by  evidence  de- 
duced from  the  human  constitution,  the  order  of  nature,  the  hap- 


102  COMPARATIVE    VALUE   OF   TESTIMONY. 

piness  of  individuals,  and  of  communities,  which  is  far  from  being 
so  conclusive  and  direct  as  to  exclude  hesitation,  or  even  difference 
of  opinion  :  yet  these  propositions  involve  truths  very  important  to 
mankind.  The  rewards  or  punishments,  assigned  by  their  own 
minds,  by  the  opinions  of  their  fellow-creatures,  and  by  the  laws  of 
society,  depend  upon  them. 

hi  natural  history,  which  furnishes  an  account  of  animals,  vege- 
tables, and  minerals :  in  geography,  which  supplies  instruction  con- 
cerning the  surface  of  the  earth,  what  parts  are  covered  with  land 
or  water,  where  hills,  valleys,  capes,  cities  are  situated,  tides  run, 
and  winds  blow:  in  civil  history  which  recounts  the  transactions, 
opinions,  and  manners  of  nation.*  in  former  times :  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  and  civil  government,  which  applies  the  laws  of 
the  community  to  the  actions  of  individuals,  in  order  to  protect  the 
lives  and  property  of  the  innocer  t,  and  to  punish  the  guilty  :  in  the 
relations  we  daily  receive  from  foreign  countries,  concerning  the 
public  events  of  nations,  or  the  .ndustry,  customs,  and  sentiments 
of  individuals : — in  all  these  cases  we  must  depend  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony  ;  and  if  the  information  be  not  in  its  nature  in- 
credible, and  we  have  no  reason  to  question  the  veracity  of  the 
relater,  we  ought  to  be  satisfied  with  that  evidence. 

Testimony  is  perhaps  among  the  least  satisfactory 
channels  by  which  truth  is  conveyed  to  the  mind.  It 
is  less  satisfactory  than  those  of  intuition  and  reasoning, 
at  least  in  the  sciences  of  quantity.  It  is  also  inferior 
to  those  of  consciousness  and  sensation ;  but  it  is,  not- 
withstanding, of  high  importance  to  the  comfort,  peace, 
and  happiness  of  society.  No  inconvenience  results 
from  following  it  with  discretion.  Were  it  rejected, 
every  disorder  and  danger  would  ensue.  Man  is  made 
to  be  satisfied  with  it.  His  situation  often  admits  noth- 
ing more  convincing.  It  was  chiefly  to  vindicate  the 
credibility  of  this  species  of  evidence,  to  which  inquirers 
Bometimes  will  not  allow  the  influence  it  deserves,  that 
I  advanced  the  rule  under  consideration ;  and  it  may 
not  be  improper  to  sketch  the  limits  within  which  this 
evidence  appears  to  be  unexceptionable. 


EVIDENCE   IF   TESTIMONY.  10S 

The  first  thing  to  be  considered,  then,  is  the  nature 
of  the  narration  which  solicits  our  belief;  because,  if 
it  be  incredible,  we  need  not  go  farther  ;  we  may  reject 
the  testimony  without  examination,  because  we  are 
more  certain  that  what  is  incredible  cannot  be  true,  than 
we  can  be  certain  of  the  truth  of  any  testimony.  A 
narration  is  incredible  in  two  ways,  either  by  containing 
an  action  in  itself  impracticable,  or  by  containing  cir- 
cumstances contradictory  to  one  another. 

If,  for  instance,  we  were  told,  that  an  ordinary  man  bore  a 
mountain  on  his  back  from  Italy  to  France ;  or  that  there  are  men 
in  the  world  who  believe  two  and  three  make  six ;  we  would  reject 
such  relations  as  unworthy  of  the  least  credit,  because  they  con- 
tain actions  and  opinions  which  contradict  all  our  conceptions  and 
experience  of  human  powers  and  faculties.  If,  again,  a  relation 
represent  the  performer  of  an  action  in  different  places  at  the  same 
time,  we  refuse  credit,  because  it  involves  a  contradiction,  and  sup- 
poses the  coexistence  of  things  which  we  know  to  be  impossible. 
But  if  the  action  be  practicable,  if  the  agent  be  adequate  to  the  per- 
formance, and  if  the  account  be  intelligible  and  consistent,  the  next 
step  is  to  examine  the  nature  of  the  testimony ;  and  if  that  also  be 
unexceptionable,  the  mind  is  prepared  to  believe,  and  it  will  be  im- 
patient if  not  permitted  to  bestow  assent. 

The  circumstances  of  inquiry  relative  to  the  credit 
bility  of  the  testimony,  are,  whether  the  relater  was 
fully  informed  of  the  nature  and  particulars  of  the  ac- 
tion ;  and  whether  he  could  be  seduced  by  any  temp- 
tation to  misrepresent  them. 

The  article  of  full  information  may  be  subdivided 
into  several  other  inquiries  ;  whether  the  action  was  an 
object  of  the  senses  of  the  relater ;  whether  he  had  full 
time  to  examine  it,  and  possessed  the  perfect  use  of  his 
faculties  at  the  time  of  examination  ;  whether  he  exam- 
ined the  same  action,  or  similar  actions,  at  different 
times,   and   always  formed  similar  judgments;    and, 


104  EVIDENCE   OF   TESTIMONY. 

finally,  whether  this  account  is  supported,  at  least  not 
contradicted,  by  other  accounts  of  credit.* 

With  regard  to  the  character  of  the  relater,  we  have 
reason  to  rely  on  his  veracity,  if  we  have  no  cause  to 
doubt  it ;  and  if,  at  the  same  time,  marks  of  sincerity, 
attention,  or  discernment  appear,  we  cannot  demand 
better  foundation  for  assent.  If  an  historian  be  exposed 
to  no  temptation  to  falsify  or  misrepresent,  we  suppose 
that  he  relates  the  truth  ;  because  it  is  much  more  easy 
to  relate  truth  than  to  relate  falsehood.  Truth  requires 
no  anxious  caution  to  preserve  consistency,  no  struggle 
to  repress  the  remonstrances  of  conscience,  which  even 
the  most  abandoned  men  cannot  altogether  silence.  It 
follows  the  natural  and  consistent  train  of  causes  and 
effects.  It  presents  a  credibility  and  authority  which 
command  conviction. 

But  if,  besides  a  general  attachment  to  truth,  we  dis- 
cover in  an  historian  other  symptoms  of  integrity,  such 
as  relating  truth  when  it  was  his  interest  to  conceal  or 
misrepresent  it,  when  it  might  hurt  friends,  gratify  ene- 
mies, or  expose  himself  to  danger  from  the  resentment 
of  those  whom  it  might  offend  ;  we  have  the  best  reason 
to  credit  his  testimony  ;  because  he  discovers  not  only 
great  attachment  to  truth,  but  the  strongest  aversion  to 
falsehood,  and  evinces,  that  the  temptations  which  in- 
duce men  of  little  virtue  to  disguise  truth,  and  those  of 
no  virtue  to  suppress  it,  do  not  affect  him.     He  is  at 


[*  Says  Dr.  Whately :  "  When  the  question  is  as  to  a  fact,  it  is  plain  we 
have  to  look  chiefly  to  the  honesty  of  a  witness,  his  accuracy,  and  his  means 
of  getting  information.  When  the  question  is  ahout  a  matter  of  opinion,  it 
is  e»v  ally  plain  that  his  ability  to  form  a  judgment  is  no  less  to  be  taken 
into  account.  But  though  this  is  admitted  by  all,  it  is  very  common  with  in- 
considerate persons  to  overlook,  in  practice,  the  distinction,  and  to  mistake 
as  to  what  it  is  that,  in  each  case,  is  attested." 

For  further  excellent  remarks  on  Testimony,  consult  Whately's  Rhetoric, 
part  i.  chap.  ii.  §  4.] 


EVIDENCE   OF   TESTIMONY.  105 

least  sincere,  and  his  testimony  must  be  believed,  unless 
it  can  be  proved  that  he  was  misinformed  or  mistaken. 

If  a  narration  be  consistent,  the  only  ground  for 
charging  its  author  with  mistake  or  misinformation,  is 
its  contradiction  of  other  accounts  of  credit,  or  its  con- 
taining transactions  of  which  we  can  explain  neither  the 
motives  nor  the  manner.  If  two  historians  contradict 
one  another,  which  seldom  happens  unless  in  cases  of 
the  most  violent  prevalence  of  party  spirit,  the  evidence 
of  both  will  be  destroyed,  or  the  small  portion  of  credit 
that  remains  will  operate  in  favor  of  the  more  respecta- 
ble author.  If  one  author  omit  what  is  related  by 
another,  the  omission  may  excite  suspicion,  but  forms 
no  direct  argument  against  the  credibility ;  because 
many  circumstances  unknown  to  us  might  occasion  the 
oversight  of  which  we  complain. 

Neither  is  the  containing  of  transactions,  of  which 
we  cannot  explain  the  motives  or  the  manner,  a  good 
argument  against  the  authenticity  of  a  narrative ;  be- 
cause the  deficiency  may  be  chargeable  on  the  hearer 
or  the  reader,  not  on  the  relater.  Men  of  all  ages 
measure  the  motives,  opinions,  and  actions  of  others, 
however  different  from  themselves  in  constitution,  or 
dissimilar  in  situation,  by  their  own ;  and  we  need  not 
be  told  that  nothing  can  be  more  fallacious  than  such  a 
standard.  A  remarkable  passage  of  history  may  be 
produced  to  illustrate  this  observation. 

Herodotus,  in  travelling  to  collect  materials  for  his  history  of 
Greece,  received  intelligence  that  some  Phoenician  seamen  had  em- 
barked on  the  Red  Sea,  sailed  round  the  south  coast  of  Africa,  and 
returned  home  by  the  Columns  of  Hercules,  or  the  Straits  of  Gib- 
raltar. In  which  voyage  they  must  have  circumnavigated  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  commonly  accounted  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
discoveries  of  modern  enterprise.  The  historian  subjoins  his  own 
opinion ;  that  the  incident  was  incredible,  because  the  voyagers  re- 
ported that  in  sonn  part  of  their  navigations  they  bad  beheld  the 

5« 


106  PRACTICE   OF   RULES   OF   LOGIC. 

ecliptic,  or  the  line  of  motion  of  the  sun,  situated  to  the  north  of 
the  zenith  of  their  course.  The  historian,  however,  judged  by  a 
false  standard ;  he  condemned  as  incredible  what  he  did  not  under- 
stand ;  because  it  was  unknown,  perhaps,  in  his  time,  that  the  ap- 
pearance specified  actually  takes  place,  in  the  navigation  he  had 
related.  He  reprobates  the  account  for  a  circumstance  which  is 
the  most  plausible  characteristic  of  its  authenticity ;  for  it  could 
haidly  be  supposed  to  have  been  conjectured  unless  it  had  been 
seen. 

I  have  now  offered  every  rule  and  observation  which 
appeared  of  importance  to  be  attended  to  in  forming 
our  judgments  in  science,  arts,  and  business.  I  have 
unfolded  the  sources  of  those  prejudices  which  obstruct 
the  rectitude  of  our  judgments ;  I  have  inculcated  pa- 
tience and  attention  in  forming  them  when  we  have  full 
information;  I  have  enjoined  suspense  of  judgment 
when  information  is  wanting  or  deficient ;  I  have  rec- 
ommended, finally,  satisfaction  with  the  best  evidence 
that  can  be  procured,  and  the  propriety  of  judging  and 
acting  on  that  evidence.  I  know  nothing  more  that 
can  be  done  to  render  our  judgments  sound  and  logic- 
al, but  that  we  carefully  habituate  ourselves  to  the 
practice  of  these  rules.  Without  practice  in  this  art, 
as  in  all  others,  performance  will  be  awkward  and  im- 
perfect; the  rules  will  soon  be  forgotten,  or  will  cease 
to  have  effect.  They  may  become  the  subject  of  a  little 
speculation,  or  conversation,  perhaps ;  but  will  be  of 
no  service  in  the  search  of  truth  or  in  the  conduct  of 
life. 

A  man  ignorant  of  all  rule,  but  habituated  to  candid 
and  diligent  exercise  of  his  faculties,  will  decide  more 
expeditiously  and  accurately  than  one  skilled  in  all  the 
theory  of  reasoning  without  the  practice.  No  theory 
of  any  art  can  make  an  expert  practitioner;  Logic 
pretends  not  to  make  mechanical  reasoners.  All  it 
does.-all  it  cau  do,  is  to  show  the  way  to  find  out  truth, 


PRINCIPLES    AND   RULES    OF   JUDGMENT.  107 

and  to  guide  the  exertions  of  our  faculties  in  the  pur- 
suit of  it.  But  if  inquirers  will  neither  travel  in  the 
road  that  leads  to  the  temple  of  truth,  nor  employ  their 
faculties  to  discriminate  her  when  they  have  reached 
her  sacred  residence ;  if  they  will  not  attempt  to  ob 
tain  an  acquaintance  and  intimacy  with  her,  her  hand- 
maid, logic,  can  furnish  them  no  further  service.  She 
must  leave  them  to  that  ignorance  and  insignificance  to 
which  they  seem  consigned  by  nature  ;  and  must  solace 
herself  by  lending  aid  to  candidates  who  will  be  more 
grateful  for  her  favors,  and  improve  them  to  better 
advantage. 


PRINCIPLES    AND    RULES    OF   JUDGMENT 

IN  MATTERS  OF  REASON  AND  SPECULATION. 
[Condensed  from  Watts'  Logic,  Part  II.,  Chapter  V.] 

1.  Whatsoever  is  sufficiently  clear  and  evident  ought 
not  to  be  denied,  though  there  are  other  things  belong- 
ing to  the  same  subject  which  cannot  be  comprehended 

2.  If  any  opinion  proposed  has  equal  arguments  for 
and  against  it,  we  must  remain  in  perfect  suspense 
about  it  till  convincing  evidence  appear  on  one  side. 

3.  Of  two  opinions,  if  one  has  unanswerable  difficul- 
ties attending  it,  we  must  not  reject  it  immediately,  but 
ascertain  whether  the  contrary  opinion  has  not  difficul- 
ties as  unanswerable. 

4.  If  each  opinion  has  objections  against  it  which 
we  cannot  answer  or  reconcile,  we  should  rather  em- 
brace that  which  has  the  least  difficulties  in  it,  and 
which  has  the  best  arguments  to  support  it ;  and  let 
our  assent  bear  proportion  to  the  superior  evidence. 

5.  If  any  doctrine  has  very  strong  and  sufficient  evi- 
dence to  command  owr  assent,  we  should  not  reject  it 


108  PRINCIPLES   AND   RULES   OF    JUDGMENT. 

because  there  are  some  objections  urged  against  it  which 
we  may  not  be  able  to  answer  /  for  otherwise  a  common 
Christian  would  be  baffled  out  of  every  article  of  his 
faith,  and  must  renounce  even  the  dictates  of  his  reason 
and  his  senses. 

6.  Where  two  extremes  are  proposed,  either  in  mat- 
ter of  speculation  or  practice,  and  neither  of  them  has 
convincing  evidence,  it  is  generally  safest  to  take  the 
middle  way,  which  is  more  likely  to  come  near  the 
truth  than  doubtful  extremes. 

7.  When  two  different  propositions  have  each  very 
strong  evidence,  and  do  not  plainly  appear  inconsistent, 
we  may  believe  both  of  them,  though  we  cannot  at  pres- 
ent see  the  way  to  reconcile  them.  Reason,  as  well  as 
our  own  consciousness,  assures  us  that  the  will  of  man 
is  free,  and  that  multitudes  of  human  actions  are  in  that 
respect  contingent ;  and  yet  reason  and  scripture  assure 
us  that  God  foreknows  them  all,  and  this  implies  a  cer- 
tain fatality.  Now,  though  learned  men  have  not  to 
this  day  hit  on  any  so  clear  and  happy  method  as  is 
desired  to  reconcile  these  propositions,  yet  since  we  do 
not  see  a  plain  inconsistency  in  them  we  justly  believe 
them  both,  because  their  evidence  is  great. 

8.  Let  us  not,  therefore,  too  suddenly  determine  in 
Uffioult  matters,  that  two  things  are  utterly  inconsistr 
ent  •  for  there  are  many  propositions  which  may  ap- 
pear inconsistent  at  first,  and  yet  afterwards  we  find 
their  consistency,  and  the  way  of  reconciling  them  may 
be  made  plain  and  easy ;  as  also  there  are  other  propo- 
sitions which  may  appear  consistent  at  first,  but  after 
due  examination  we  find  their  inconsistency. 

9.  For  the  same  reason  we  should  not  call  those  diffi- 
culties utterly  insoluble,  or  those  objections  unanswera- 
ble, which  we  are  not  presently  able  to  answer.  Time 
and  diligence  may  give  more  light. 


PRINCIPLES    AND   RULES    OF   JUDGMENT.  109 

10.  If  we  happen  to  have  our  chief  arguments  for 
any  opinion  refuted,  toe  should  not  immediately  give 
up  the  opinion  itself  j  for,  perhaps,  it  may  be  a  truth 
still,  and  we  may  find  it  to  be  supported  by  other  argu- 
ments, which  we  might  once  think  weaker,  or  perhaps 
by  new  arguments  which  we  knew  not  before. 

11.  We  ought  to  esteem  that  to  he  sufficient  evidence  of 
a  proposition  where  both  the  hind  and  the  force  of  the 
arguments  or  proofs  are  as  great  as  the  nature  of  the 
thing  admits,  and  as  the  necessity  or  exigence  of  the 
case  requires.  So  if  we  have  a  credible  and  certain 
testimony  that  Christ  rose  from  the  dead,  we  are  not  to 
expect  mathematical  or  ocular  demonstration  for  it,  at 
least  in  our  day. 

12.  Though  we  should  seek  what  proofs  may  be  at- 
tained of  any  proposition,  and  we  should  receive  any 
number  of  arguments  which  are  just  and  evident  for  the 
confirmation  of  the  same  truth,  yet  we  must  not  judge 
of  the  truth  of  any  proposition  by  the  number  of  argu- 
ments which  are  brought  in  support  of  it,  but  by  the 
strength  and  weight  of  them. 

13.  Yet  where  certain  evidence  is  not  to  be  found  or 
expected,  a  considerable  number  of  probable  arguments 
carry  great  weight  with  them  even  in  matters  of  specu- 
lation. That  is  a  probable  hypothesis  in  philosophy  or 
theology,  which  goes  farthest  towards  the  solution  of 
i>? any  difficult  questions  arising  on  any  subject. 


IN   MATTERS    OF   MORALITY    AND   RELIGION. 

By  matters  of  morality  and  religion,  are  meant  thos< 
things  which  relate  to  our  duty  to  God,  ourselves,  or  om 
fellow-men.  The  words  vice  and  virtue  chiefly  imply 
the  r-elation  of  our  actions  to  men  and  this  world  :  sin 


110  PRINCIPLES   AND   PULES    OF   JUDGMENT. 

and  holiness  rather  imply  their  relation  to  God  and  the 
other  world. 

1.  The  will  of  our  Maker,  whether  discovered  by  reason 
or  revelation,  carries  the  highest  authority  with  it,  and 
is  therefore  the  highest  rule  of  duty  to  intelligent  crea- 
tures ;  a  conformity  or  non-conformity  to  which,  deter- 
mines their  actions  to  be  morally  good  or  evil. 

2.  Whatsoever  is  really  an  immediate  duty  towards 
ourselves,  or  towards  our  fellow-creatures,  is  more  re- 
motely a  duty  to  God,  and  therefore  in  the  practice  of 
it  we  should  have  an  eve  to  the  will  of  God  as  our  Kule, 
and  to  his  glory  as  our  End. 

3.  Our  wise  and  gracious  Creator  has  closely  united 
our  duty  and  our  happiness  together,  and  has  connected 
sin  or  vice  and  punishment  together,  both  in  the  nature 
of  things  and  by  his  own  positive  appointment. 

4.  Conscience  should  seek  all  due  information  in  order 
to  determine  what  is  duty  and  what  is  sin,  because  hap- 
piness and  misery  depend  upon  it. 

5.  On  this  account  our  inclination  to  present  temporal 
good,  and  our  aversion  to  present  temporal  evil,  must 
be  wisely  overbalanced  by  the  consideration  of  future 
and  eternal  good  or  evil ;  that  is,  happiness  or  misery : 
and  for  this  reason  we  should  not  omit  or  commit  a 
sin,  to  gain  any  temporal  good  or  to  avoid  any  temporal 
evil. 

6.  As  there  are  some  duties  much  more  important 
than  others  are,  so  every  duty  requires  our  application 
to  understand  and  practise  it,  in  proportion  to  its  im- 
portance. 

7.  Where  tvvo  duties  seem  to  stand  in  opposition  to 
each  other,  and  we  cannot  practise  both,  the  less  must 
give  way  to  the  greater,  and  the  omission  of  the  less  is 
not  sinful. 

S.  In  actions  where  there  maybe  some  scruple  about 


RULES    IN    MATTERS    OF    HUMAN    PRUDENCE.  Ill 

the  duty  or  lawfulness  of  them,  we  should  choose  always 
the  safest  side,  and  abstain  as  far  as  we  can  from  the 
practice  of  things  whose  lawfulness  wTe  suspect. 

9.  In  some  of  the  outward  practices  and  forms  of  re- 
ligion, as  well  as  human  affairs,  there  is  frequently  a 
present  necessity  of  speedy  action  in  one  way  or  another. 
In  such  a  case,  having  surveyed  the  arguments  on  both 
sides,  as  far  as  time  and  circumstances  admit,  we  must 
guide  our  practice  by  those  reasons  which  seem  at  the 
time  to  overbalance  the  rest ;  yet  always  reserving  room 
to  admit  further  light  and  evidence  when  such  occur- 
rences return  again.  It  is  a  preponderation  of  circum- 
stantial arguments  that  must  determine  our  actions  in  a 
thousand  cases. 


IN  MATTERS  OF  HUMAN  PRUDENCE. 

1.  Our  regard  to  persons  or  things  should  be  gov- 
erned by  the  degrees  of  concernment  we  have  with 
them,  the  relation  we  have  to  them,  or  the  expectation 
we  have  from  them. 

2.  We  should  always  consider  whether  the  thing  we 
pursue  be  attainable ;  whether  it  be  worthy  of  our  pur- 
suit ;  whether  it  be  worthy  of  the  means  used  in  order 
to  attain  it. 

3.  Though  a  general  knowledge  of  things  be  useful 
in  science  and  in  human  life,  yet  we  should  content 
ourselves  with  a  more  superficial  knowledge  of  those 
things  which  have  the  least  relation  to  our  chief  end 
and  design.  We  should  not  grasp  at  every  thing,  lest  in 
the  end  we  attain  nothing. 

4.  Where  the  case  and  circumstances  of  wise  and 
good  men  resemble  our  own  case  and  circumstances, 
we  may  borrow  a  great  deal  of  instruction  towards  our 


112  RULES    IN    MATTERS    OF    DIVINE    TESTIMONY. 

present  conduct  from  their  example ;  as  well  as  in  all 
cases  we  may  learn  much  from  their  conversation  and 
advice. 


IN    MATTERS   OF   DIVINE   TESTIMONY. 

As  human  testimony  acquaints  us  with  matters  of 
fact,  both  past  and  present,  which  lie  beyond  the  reach 
of  our  own  personal  notice;  so  Divine  testimony  is 
suited  to  inform  us  both  of  the  nature  of  things,  as  well 
as  of  matters  of  fact ;  and  of  things  future,  as  well  as  of 
present  or  past. 

Whatsoever  is  dictated  to  us  by  God  himself,  or  by 
men  who  are  divinely  inspired,  must  be  believed  with 
full  assurance.  Reason  demands  of  us  to  believe  what- 
soever Divine  revelation  dictates  ;  for  God  is  perfectly 
wise,  and  cannot  be  deceived;  he  is  faithful  and  good, 
and  will  not  deceive  his  creatures ;  and  when  reason 
has  found  out  certain  marks  or  credentials  of  Divine 
testimony  to  belong  to  any  proposition,  there  remains 
then  no  further  inquiry  to  be  made,  but  only  to  find  out 
the  true  sense  and  meaning  of  that  which  God  hae  re- 
vealed ;  for  reason  itself  demands  the  belief  of  it. 


DIFFERENT   KINDS   OF   SEASONING.  113 


LECTURE  VIII. 

REASONING MATHEMATICAL MORAL POLITICAL PRUDEN- 
TIAL  PROBABLE  REASONING. 

I  have  discussed  every  topic  introductory  to  the  art 
of  reasoning.  I  have  explained  the  sources  from  which 
ideas  are  received,  and  the  methods  we  must  employ  to 
render  them  clear,  adequate,  and  conclusive.  I  have 
explained  the  nature  of  the  propositions  into  which 
they  may  be  formed,  and  the  judgments  whicli  we 
must  pass  on  these  propositions.  I  have,  finally,  de- 
lineated the  prejudices  which  pervert  our  judgments; 
and  I  have  attempted  to  establish  the  rules  we  must 
follow,  if  we  expect  to  form  them  with  accuracy  and 
justice.  It  remains  only,  to  complete  this  department 
of  the  course,  that  I  treat  of  reasoning,  or  the  method 
of  ascertaining  propositions,  by  means  of  intermediate 
ideas,  or  proof  s,  whether  demonstrative  or  probable. 

I  formerly  observed,  that  all  knowledge  is  either 
intuitive,  demonstrative,  or  probable.  The  first,  intui- 
tive knowledge,  is  so  extremely  circumscribed,  that  if 
man  had  no  other  method  of  comparing  ideas,  and  ex- 
tending information,  though  he  might  be  wiser  than  the 
beasts  of  the  field  or  the  fowls  of  the  air,  yet  he  would 
be  ignorant  of  all  science  and  arts.  All  individuals 
and  communities  would  be  nearly  in  the  same  state  of 
improvement.  The  only  difference  among  them  would 
result  from  their  quickness  or  sagacity  in  perceiving 
self-evident  propositions. 

As  it  is,  then,  the  exercise  of  his  reasoning  faculty  by 
which  man  attains  the  most  decisive  eminence  in  the 


114:  THE  PROCESS   OF   REASONING. 

creation,  by  which  he  ascends  far  above  the  inferior 
animals,  and  by  which  different  men  and  different  com- 
munities are  conspicuously  exalted  one  above  another, 
ill  all  those  acquisitions  which  cultivate,  civilize,  adorn, 
and  enlighten  the  mind  of  man,  it  is  a  matter  of  the 
most  important  concern  to  examine  what  sort  of  opera- 
tion reasoning  is,  how  we  shall  perform  it  with  most 
expedition  and  success,  and  how  we  shall  avoid  those 
errors  by  which  many  reasoners  in  all  ages  have  been 
led  astray.  To  assist  in  this  delicate  and  arduous  un- 
dertaking, is  the  object  of  the  discussion  on  which  I  am 
now  to  enter. 

Reasoning  begins  where  intuition  ends,  and  consists 
in  finding  out  the  truth  of  a  proposition,  or  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  its  subject  and  predicate,  by 
the  help  of  intermediate  ideas.  The  intermediate  ideas 
form  the  steps,  or  links,  by  which  the  mind  passes  from 
the  first  of  the  primary  ideas  to  the  last,  or  from  the 
subject  of  any  proposition  to  its  predicate,  and  finally 
perceives  their  relation.  Reasoning  assumes  differeni 
names,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  steps,  or  of  the 
links  which  display  the  relation  between  the  primary 
ideas.  If  the  mind  attain  complete  satisfaction  in  every 
step  of  its  progress,  or  in  the  successive  comparison  of 
every  pair  of  ideas,  it  is  said  to  acquire  certainty  of  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  two  primary  ideas, 
and  the  reasoning  is  called  demonstrative. 

If  the  agreement  of  the  intermediate  ideas  with  one 
another  and  with  the  extremes  is  not  perfectly  satisfac- 
tory— that  is,  if  the  steps  of  the  reasoning  leave  the 
mind  under  some  degree  of  hesitation,  the  reasoning  is 
denominated  probable,  and  the  reasoner  attains  proba- 
bility only  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition  he  investigates. 
Where  certainty  terminates,  probability  commences ; 
and  the  latter  admits  numerous  degrees,  from  the  high 


BELIEF,  AND   DEGREES    OF   BELIEF.  115 

est  degree,  which  stands  next  to  certainty,  to  the  lowest, 
which  makes  so  little  impression  as  to  permit  the  mind 
to  remain  in  a  state  of  suspense. 

If  a  proposition,  supported  by  probable  evidence,  re- 
late to  speculation,  the  judgment  formed  concerning  it 
is  often  called  opinion;  if  it  relate  to  facts,  chiefly  sup- 
ported by  testimony,  the  judgment  is  generally  called 
helief*     In  explaining,  then,  the  branch  of  logic  now 


[*  Belief  and  degrees  of  belief .  In  forming  any  judgment,  we  cannot 
avoid  attaching  to  it  a  particular  degree  of  credence,  which  might  be,  and 
often  is,  expressed  by  the  insertion  of  some  adverb  to  qualify  the  copula, 
thus:  "To-morrow  will  (possibly)  be  fine;"  and,  "Two  straight  lines  (in- 
disputably) cannot  inclose  a  space."  Although  one  of  these  judgments 
admits  a  degree  of  doubt  which  the  other  excludes,  the  difference  lies  in 
our  knowledge  of  the  things  spoken  of,  rather  than  in  the  things  them- 
selves. 

The  amount  of  belief  which  we  have  in  our  judgment  has  been  called  its 
modality,  as  being  the  mode  in  which  we  hold  it  for  truth.  Arranging  the 
degrees  of  modality  in  an  ascending  scale,  we  find  that  a  judgment  may  be — 

1.  Possible,  where,  upon  the  first  view,  we  have  no  cause  to  think  that 
the  predicate  may  not  be  truly  said  of  the  subject,  but  have  not  examined. 
Does  this  amount  to  a  judgment?  or  is  it  the  step  which  must  precede  the 
formation  of  the  weakest  kind  of  judgment? 

2.  Doubtful,  where  we  have  tested  it  in  some  cases,  and  found  that  Bome 
fceem  to  confirm  it,  whilst  some  are  doubtful. 

3.  Probable,  where  all  the  trials  we  have  made  are  favorable,  but  the 
oumber  of  them  is  not  sufficient  to  warrant  certainty. 

4.  Morally  certain  for  the  thinker  himself,  where,  from  examination  oi 
the  matter,  or  prejudice,  or  interest,  he  has  formed  his  own  belief,  but  can- 
not put  forward  sufficient  grounds  for  it,  so  as  to  control  that  of  others. 

5.  Morally  certain  for  a  class  or  school,  where  the  judgment  rests  on 
grounds  which  are  sufficient  for  all  men  of  the  same  habits  of  thought,  or 
the  same  education  as  the  thinker. 

o.  Morally  certain  for  all ;  as,  for  example,  the  belief  that  there  is  a  future 
state,  which,  though  not  absolutely  demonstrable,  rests  upon  such  grounds 
that  it  ought  to  influence  the  conduct  {mores)  of  every  man. 

7.  Physically  certain,  with  a  limit,  where  the  judgment  is  grounded  on 
an  induction  supposed  to  be  complete,  but  with  the  possibility  that  future 
induction  may  supersede  it. 

8.  Physically  certain,  without  limitation;  as  our  belief  in  the  law  of 
gravitation,  the  law  of  chemical  affinity,  &c. 

9.  Mathematically  certain,  where  doubt  cannot  be  admitted.  Ex.  gr.. 
the  axiom — "Two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a  space;"  or  the  theorem, 
"The  angles  at  the  base  of  an  isosceles  triangle  are  equal." 


116  DEMONSTRATIVE   REASONING. 

before  us,  all  we  have  to  do  is  to  discuss,  first,  the  na- 
ture of  demonstrative  reasoning  •  secondly,  that  of 
probable  reasoning *  and  to  point  out  the  sciences  and 
arts  in  which  they  are  respectively  employed.  All  rea- 
soning is  either  of  the  one  kind  or  the  other ;  and  in 
every  science  or  art  in  which  conviction  reaches  not 
certainty,  we  must  be  content  with  probability.  After 
I  have  finished  the  explanation  of  legitimate  reasoning, 
I  shall  investigate  the  nature  of  sophistry,  and  point  out 
the  chief  methods  by  which  mankind  in  all  ages  have 
imposed  on  themselves,  or  misled  others.  I  shall  con- 
clude the  course  with  an  account  of  the  syllogism  of 
Aristotle,  and  a  discussion  of  its  merit  as  a  mode  of 
reasoning.* 

Mathematics  and  arithmetic,  I  must  again  remark, 
are  the  only  sciences  susceptible  of  demonstrative  proof  , 
which  is  so  satisfactory  and  cogent  as  to  exclude  even 
the  supposition  of  falsehood.  Other  sciences  in  their 
principles  may  perhaps  furnish  proofs  nearly,  if  not 
completely  demonstrative ;  but  in  the  detail  they  ex- 
hibit nothing  better  than  probability.  The  high  evi- 
dence of  the  sciences  of  quantity,  independent  of  the 
importance  of  the  truths  they  teach,  renders  them  a 
good  exemplification  of  the  rules  of  logic ;  and  one  ot 
the  best  methods  of  becoming  a  good  reasoner,  is  to  be 
familiar  with  the  processes  of  investigation  they  supply. 


All  these  degrees  of  belief  may,  upon  a  broader  principle  of  division,  be 
resolved  into  three.  Our  judgments,  according  to  Aristotle,  are  either 
problematical,  assertive,  or  demonstrable— the  results  of  opinion,  of  belief, 
or  of  science. — Thomson's  Laws  of  Thought,  §120.] 

[*  The  word  reasoning  is  ambiguous.  In  one  of  its  acceptations,  it 
means  syllogism,  or  the  mode  of  inference  which  may  be  called  concluding 
from  generals  to  particulars.  In  another  of  its  senses,  to  reason,  is  simply 
to  infer  any  assertion  from  assertions  already  admitted,  and  in  this  sense 
induction  is  as  much  entitled  to  be  called  reasoning  as  the  demonstrations 
o*" geometry. — MUl'i  Logic] 


DEMONSTRATIVE    REASONING.  117 

To  illustrate  the  nature  of  demonstrative  reasoning, 
„  sfoall  analyze  some  propositions  of  the  Elements  of 
Euclid.  Reasoning  is  a  successive  comparison  of  every 
pair  of  ideas,  from  the  first  to  the  last,  or  from  the  idea 
which  forms  the  subject  of  the  proposition,  to  the  one 
which  forms  the  predicate ;  and  in  demonstration  every 
comparison  is  intuitively  certain.  When  these  ideas 
are  found  to  agree,  the  demonstration  is  finished,  and 
the  reasoning  is  concluded.  I  begin  with  the  first  prop- 
osition of  the  first  book  of  the  Elements,  which  proposes, 
"  To  describe  an  equilateral  triangle  on  a  given  straight 
line."  I  pass  over  the  operations  by  which  the  triangle 
in  the  figure  is  described,  because  I  mean  to  analyze 
only  the  reasoning  of  the  proposition. 

After  the  figure  is  constructed  on  the  given  line,  the  proposition 
to  be  proved  is,  that  "  the  triangle  so  constructed  is  equilateral,  or 
has  all  its  sides  equal."  The  subject  of  the  proposition,  or  the  first 
idea  of  it,  is  that  of  the  triangle  described ;  the  predicate  of  the 
proposition,  or  the  second  idea  of  it,  is  that  of  the  equality  of  the 
sides  of  the  triangle.  Now,  it  is  not  intuitively  certain  that  the 
three  sides  are  all  equal  to  one  another ;  therefore  some  interme- 
diate ideas  must  be  placed  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate 
of  the  proposition,  to  show  their  agreement.  The  process  consists 
of  two  steps,  or  one  intermediate  idea  is  necessary  to  prove  the 
proposition.  The  first  step  is  the  com- 
parison of  the  base  A  B  with  one  of  the 
sides  A  C ;  and  of  their  equality  we  have 
intuitive  certainty,  because,  by  the  de- 
scription of  the  figure,  they  are  semi- 
diameters,  or  radii  of  the  same  circle. 
The  second  step  is  the  comparison  of  the  same  side  or  base  \  B 
with  the  other  side  B  C ;  and  of  their  equality,  also,  we  have  intui- 
tive certainty,  as  they  are  both  semi-diameters  of  another  circle. 
This  step  finishes  the  demonstration.  The  base  is  found  to  agree 
with  both  the  sides ;  and  the  triangle  must  be  equilateral,  because 
all  the  sides  are  equal.  The  subject  and  predicate  of  the  proposition 
are  found  exactly  to  agree. 

In  the  famous  forty -seventh  proposition  of  the  first  book  of  tb« 


118  DEMONSTRATIVE    REASONING. 

Elements,  the  truth  to  be  established  is,  "  That  in  a  right-angled 
triangle,  the  square  of  the  side  opposite  to  the  right  angle  is  equal 
in  quantity  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other  sides."  The 
square  opposite  to  the  right  angle  is  the  subject,  the  sum  of  the  two 
other  squares  is  the  predicate,  and  the  idea  of  the  extent  of  the  first 
square  is  to  be  compared  with  the  idea  of  the  sum  of  the  other  two 
squares.  The  process  is  long  and  beautiful,  and  I  shall  point  out 
the  different  steps. 

The  first  step  is  to  prove  that  G  A  C  is  one  straight  line,  and 
H  A  B  another,  in  order  to  lay  a  foundation  for  demonstrating  that 
the  triangle  FB  C  is  equal  to  half  the  square  FA,  and  the  triangle 
A  B  D  equal  to  half  the  parallelogram 
B  L.  The  next  step  is  to  prove  the  tri- 
angle A  B  D  equal  to  the  triangle  F  B  0. 
The  third  step  is  to  prove  the  triangle 
A  B  D  equal  to  half  the  parallelogram 
B  L,  and  the  triangle  F  B  0  equal  to  half 
the  square  F  A ;  and  hence  to  infer  the 
equality  of  the  square  F  A  to  the  parallel- 
ogram B  L.  Three  similar  steps  are  ne- 
cessary to  find  the  square  A  K  equal  to 
the  parallelogram  0  L  ;  and  hence  to  infer  the  equality  of  the  whole 
square  B  K  to  the  two  squares  FA  and  A  K,  which  establishes  the 
agreement  of  the  subject  and  predicate  of  the  proposition;  or  that 
the  square  of  the  side  opposite  to  the  right  angle,  is  equal  to  the 
squares  of  the  two  other  sides.  To  complete  this  process,  then, 
there  are  necessary  these  six  capital  steps,  and  each  of  these  in- 
cludes one  or  more  subordinate  steps,  so  that  the  sum  of  the  sub- 
ordinate steps  amounts  to  no  fewer  than  twelve ;  and  if  these  are 
added  to  the  six  capital  ones,  it  appears,  that  to  prove  this  propo- 
sition, there  are  requisite  eighteen  intermediate  Ideas.  The  mind 
has  a  clear  and  distinct  perception  of  the  agreement  of  every  pair 
of  ideas ;  and  as  the  effect  is  proportional  to  the  cause,  it  obtains 
the  most  complete  certainty  of  the  truth  of  the  proposition.* 

All  reasoning  has  this  in  common  with  demonstra- 
tion, that  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  primary 
ideas  must  be  proved  by  intermediate  ideas  ;  the  differ- 


[*  Dr.  Abererombie  furnishes  some  admirable  remarks  upon  mathe- 
matical reasoning,  pp.  202-4,  InteU.  Powtrs.] 


PROBABLE    REASONING.  119 

ence  is,  that  the  agreement  of  the  intermediate  ideas 
with  one  another,  and  with  their  primary  ideas,  amounts 
not  to  certainty ;  it  is  no  more  than  probable.* 

From  this  view  it  will  appear,  that  the  far  greater 
part  of  knowledge,  and  even  the  most  interesting  and 
important  part,  that  which  concerns  morality,  politics, 
the  useful  arts,  and  business,  is  not  supported  by  better 
evidence  than  probability.  The  probability,  however, 
in  many  cases  is  highly  convincing,  approaches  very 
near  to  certainty,  and  affords  good  ground  for  acting 
upon  it  with  perfect  confidence  and  satisfaction.  It  has 
often  been  wished,  and  sometimes  asserted,  that  mo- 
rality particularly  might  be  fortified  with  the  evidence 
of  certainty ;  but  there  is  much  reason  to  apprehend 
that  the  undertaking  would  be  unsuccessful.  The  duties 
mankind  owe  to  the  Author  of  nature,  to  their  fellow- 
creatures,  and  to  themselves,  thougli  palpable  and  ob- 
vious in  their  principles,  yet  when  pursued  through  the 
ramifications  in  which  they  unfold  themselves,  they 
deviate  into  relations  where  the  agreement  of  ideas  is 
neither  clear  nor  adequate. 

That  all  men  should  revere  their  Maker,  and  should  perform 
every  duty  they  conceive  will  be  acceptable  to  him ;  that  they 
should  do  good  to  their  fellow-creatures,  and  should  not  wantonly 
hurt  or  injure  them ;  that  they  should  live  in  temperance  and  mod- 
eration, in  order  to  insure  the  highest  happiness  their  constitutions 
can  enjoy ;  are  all  conclusions,  of  the  justness  of  which  nobody  can 
doubt,  any  more,  perhaps,  than  they  can  doubt  that  two  and  three 
make  five,  or  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two 
right  angles.  The  agreement  of  the  idea  we  have  of  man,  with 
those  [which  we  have]  of  his  Creator,  and  our  fellow-creature,  infers 
these  duties  with  an  evidence  which  approaches  very  near,  if  it  do 
not  reach,  demonstration.     But  when  we  descend  to  investigate  the 


|  *  At  the  close  of  the  lecture  wiL  be  added,  from  the  pen  of  the  late 
Dr.  George  Payne,  an  admirable  view  of  the  nature  of  Probable  Keasoi  ing 
which  should  be  carefullv  studied  and  mastered.  I 


120  EXAMPLES    OF    PROBABLE    REASONING. 

nature  of  particular  acts  of  regard  to  God,  or  of  intercourse  with 
our  fellow-creatures;  our  scale  applies  not  accurately,  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  ideas  is  not  perfectly  clear ;  and  we  are 
not  certain,  at  least  we  do  not  agree,  where  regard  to  the  Almighty 
terminates,  and  disregard  begins ;  where  justice  or  charity  ceases, 
and  injustice  or  severity  commences.  Till  this  can  be  done,  we  have 
no  reason  to  expect  that  the  precepts  of  morality  shall  be  supported 
by  the  evidence  of  demonstration. 

The  same  species  of  reasoning  applies  to  the  evidence 
of  other  sciences,  of  arts,  and  of  business.  In  them  all 
the  mind  discovers  only  moral  certainty,  that  is,  differ- 
ent degrees  of  probable  evidence,  according  as  the 
agreement  of  ideas  is  more  or  less  clear  and  satisfactory. 
To  illustrate  these  observations,  I  shall  produce  a  few 
examples.  Suppose  some  reasoning  were  employed  to 
recommend  the  love  of  God,  or  to  prove  this  proposi- 
tion, that  man  ought  to  love  God.  The  agreement  of 
ideas  in  moral  reasoning,  I  have  formerly  observed,  re- 
lates to  propriety,  fitness,  reasonableness.  The  propo- 
sition, then,  involves  the  question  whether  the  idea  we 
have  of  such  an  imperfect,  dependent  creature  as  man, 
agrees  with  the  idea  of  his  exerting  love  towards  the 
great,  wise,  and  good  Being  who  made  the  universe,  or 
whether  it  be  fit,  proper,  and  right  that  man  should  love 
God? 

To  prove  this  proposition,  I  might  employ  several  intermediate 
ideas  ;  I  might  first  show  that  the  Almighty  is  the  most  amiable 
Being  in  the  universe,  and  that  he  possesses  all  those  attributes  of 
goodness,  wisdom,  and  power,  most  calculated  to  excite  attachment. 
The  amiableness  of  God  would  -thus  involve  a  large  collection  of 
particulars,  or  subordinate  ideas,  which  altogether  would  constitute 
what,  in  the  science  of  morals,  is  denominated  an  argument.  I 
might  prove,  secondly,  that  the  love  of  God  is  the  surest  means  ot 
happiness  to  ourselves.  It  will  communicate  self-approbation,  con 
fidence  in  the  wisdom  of  Providence  and  the  administration  of  hu- 
man affairs;  and  will  extirpate  those  anxieties  and  fears  which 
haunt  and  distract  weak  and  vicious  men.   The  illustration  of  thest 


EXAMPLES    OF    PROBABLE    REASONING.  121 

topics,  also,  would  include  a  great  number  of  subordinate  ideas,  and 
would  constitute  another  argument  for  the  love  of  God.  I  might 
further  insist  that  love  to  God  is  reasonable  and  proper,  in  return 
for  the  numerous  instances  of  kindness,  mercy,  and  love,  he  daily 
exerts  towards  us.  The  illustration  of  these  instances,  likewise, 
would  comprehend  many  subordinate  ideas,  and  would  furnish  a 
third  argument  in  support  of  the  proposition. 

Suppose,  again,  it  were  to  be  inferred  from  future 
punishment  that  men  must  be  free  agents,  or  that  the 
idea  of  future  punishment  agrees  with  that  of  self- 
determination,  or  the  freedom  of  action.  The  following 
train  of  intermediate  ideas  will  show  that  agreement. 

Future  punishment  must  be  inflicted  by  the  Almighty ;  the  Al- 
mighty can  inflict  no  punishment  not  just ;  the  punished,  of  course, 
must  be  guilty ;  they  could,  then,  have  done  otherwise,  and  conse- 
quently must  be  free  agents.  This  train  of  ideas,  more  shortly  ex- 
pressed, will  stand  thus  :  Future  punishment — God  the  punisher — 
punishment  just — punished  guilty — could  have  done  otherwise — 
self-determination.  In  this  piece  of  reasoning  there  are  four  inter- 
mediate ideas,  and  five  comparisons  are  made  to  discover  the 
agreement  with  the  extremes,  and  with  one  another.  The  agree- 
ment between  the  adjacent  ideas  in  every  movement,  appears  with 
a  high  degree  of  conviction  ;  and  were  each  of  the  ideas  illustrated 
at  some  length,  according  to  the  common  mode  of  reasoning  on 
moral  topics,  the  whole  would  form  an  elegant  deduction,  and 
would  communicate  a  very  vivid  impression. 

Let  us  suppose,  further,  the  following  political  propo- 
sition were  proposed  to  be  proved  ;  and  let  us  consider 
the  nature  of  the  reasoning  requisite  to  establish  it: 
u  Industry  is  the  capital  source  of  national  prosperity." 
The  ideas,  or  terms,  as  the  logicians  express  themselves, 
to  be  compared,  are  those  pf  industry  and  national 
prosperity.  I  must  also  remark,  that  agreement  of 
ideas  in  politics  refers,  riot  to  reasonableness  and  fitness, 
as  in  morals,  but  to  public  utility,  or  national  happi- 
ness. Tfye  meaning,  then,  of  the  proposition  will  be, 
that  industry  makes  a  nation  prosperous,  by  extending 

6 


122  EXAMPLES    OF    PKOBABLE   REASONING. 

its  opulence  and  exalting  its  reputation,  in  support  of 
which  I  may  argue  in  the  following  train : 

Industry  increases  the  population  of  a  country,  by  providing 
subsistence  for  additional  inhabitants.  An  increase  of  inhabitants 
increases  commerce  and  manufactures.  Commerce  and  manufac- 
tures procure  riches  from  foreign  nations  of  less  industry.  These 
riches  prompt  a  spirit  of  enterprise  still  further  to  extend  commerce 
and  manufactures.  Hence  new  nerves  to  domestic  industry.  The 
comforts,  and  many  of  the  luxuries  of  life,  are  provided  for  all  the 
members  of  the  community.  Ample  security  is  found  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  these  advantages  by  the  national  reputation  they  pro- 
cure, and  the  large  resources  of  money  and  men  they  supply  to 
maintain  it.  But  national  prosperity  consists  in  these  things  which 
I  have  enumerated ; — a  wealthy,  sober,  industrious,  and  numerous 
people,  respectable  at  home,  and  formidable  abroad.  Each  of  the 
steps  might  have  been  illustrated  at  considerable  length,  and  might 
have  formed  a  very  pleasant  and  satisfactory  discussion.  They 
may  also  be  condensed  into  more  narrow  bounds,  and  may  form 
the  following  series  ready  for  the  nearest  comparison.  National 
industry — increase  of  people — improvements  in  commerce  and 
manufactures — national  riches — national  enterprise — people  at 
home,  numerous  and  happy,  respectable  and  formidable  abroad — 
national  prosperity.  This  series  presents  five  intermediate  ideas ; 
and  six  comparisons  are  requisite  to  afford  conviction  of  the*  agree- 
ment of  the  first  idea  with  the  last,  or  of  the  subject  of  the  propo 
sition  with  its  predicate. 

In  the  specimens  I  have  advanced  from  morals  and 
politics,  the  evidence,  you  will  observe,  though  highly 
satisfactory,  is  still  no  more  than  probable;  and  ap- 
pears not  with  that  commanding  tone  which  compels 
assent.  Skeptical  men  may  find  reason  to  suspend  as- 
sent, and  disputatious  men  may  raise  difficulties,  which 
we  are  obliged  to  admit  are  not  destitute  of  foundation. 
Accordingly,  against  every  step  of  the  preceding  politi- 
cal series,  some  cause  of  hesitation  may  be  started. 

It  may  be  urged,  that  industry  is  not  always  attended  with  an 
increase  of  people ;  it  may  even  sometimes  produce  the  contrary 
offect ;  it  may  induce  the  people  to  emigrate  to  other  countries, 


VALUE    OF    PROBABLE    REASONING.  123 

where  their  labor  will  be  better  rewarded  than  at  home.  It  may 
be  urged  again,  that  the  most  warlike  and  powerful  nations  are 
often  the  poorest  and  most  hardy,  while  arts  and  industry  only 
supply  riches  to  tempt  such  adventurers  to  seize  both  the  country 
and  its  wealth.  It  may  be  contended,  that  arts  and  industry  ener- 
vate mankind,  multiply  wants  and  vices,  and  render  people  miser- 
able in  the  midst  of  every  provision  for  happiness ;  that  they  re- 
press all  the  great  and  splendid,  and  consequently  many  of  the 
most  pleasant  exertions  of  the  mind.  It  is  the  possibility  of  con- 
structions of  this  sort,  in  all  probable  investigations,  which  dimin- 
ishes their  evidence,  and  renders  the  conviction  they  produce  infe- 
rior to  that  of  demonstration. 

But,  however  susceptible  of  controversy  these  speci- 
mens of  reasoning  may  be,  they  are  much  more  satis- 
factory than  many  of  the  conjectural  opinions  on  which 
men  must  every  day  act  in  some  of  the  most  important 
concerns  of  life.  Many  of  the  engagements  we  form, 
every  new  line  of  life  on  which  we  enter,  involve  nu- 
merous considerations  to  determine  our  conduct,  which 
are  scarcely  supported  by  better  evidence  than  specula- 
tion. The  wisdom  of  the  most  prudent  man  is  fre- 
quently not  more  meritorious  than  the  sagacity  which 
leads  him  to  conjecture  with  most  probability,  or  which 
teaches  him  to  proceed  with  recollection  and  attention 
to  surrounding  objects,  so  as  to  avail  himself  of  events 
as  they  occur. 

I  mention  these  particulars  to  evince,  that  we  have 
no  good  reason  to  be  dissatisfied  with  our  condition, 
though  we  should  not  receive,  on  many  subjects  of 
knowledge,  other  evidence  for  truth  than  that  of  proba- 
bility. It  is  sufficient  to^guide  us  to  happiness,  while 
uncertainty  about  futurity  in  particular  is,  perhaps,  one 
of  the  most  merciful  dispensations  with  which  the 
providence  of  heaven  could  have  favored  mankind. 
The  highest  happiness  we  can  partake  in  this  world,  is 
extremely  circumscribed.      One  of  the  chief  ingredi- 


124  ANALOGICAL    REASONING. 

ents  of  our  enjoyments  is  hope  ;  and  were  onr  anticipa 
tions  and  conjectures  about  futurity  less  equivocal,  our 
hopes  would  be  correspondently  diminished.  In  our 
deepest  distress,  our  ignorance  of  what  is  to  come  is  so 
great  as  never  to  preclude  hope.  We  sometimes  expe- 
rience relief,  contrary  to  every  view  of  probability,  and 
every  expectation :  and  we  have  always  the  consolation 
of  looking  forward,  and  hoping  fur  better  days. 

In  our  reasonings  of  anticipation,  we  proceed  chiefly 
by  analogy.  We  suppose  that  the  future  will  resemble 
the  past.  In  the  negotiations  of  business,  and  in  fore- 
casting the  probable  consequences  of  any  plan  of  con- 
duct, we  must  conclude,  that  similar  causes  will  pro- 
duce similar  effects ;  that  men  will  act  in  time  to  come 
as  they  have  done  in  time  past ;  and  that  the  course  of 
nature  will  proceed  by  the  established  rules  which 
have  directed  it  since  the  world  began.  We  argue 
from  the  characters,  the  opinions,  the  interests,  the  pas- 
sions, the  weaknesses,  and  the  caprices  of  men  ;  and  we 
endeavor  to  form  systems  of  conduct  for  them,  derived 
from  the  situations  which  they  occupy.  The  trains  of 
reasoning  we  adopt  in  such  cases,  are  in  a  great  meas- 
ure hypothetical ;  and  the  probability  of  the  evidence 
frequently  is  of.,  the  lowest  kind.  .  Conjectures  often  so 
counterbalance  one  another,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in  a 
state  of  total  suspense. 


OBSERVATIONS  ON  PROBABLE  REASONING. 
[From  Dr.  George  Payne's  Mental  Science.] 

[According  to  Dr.  Thomas  Brown,  reasoning,  as  ex- 
pressed in  words,  consists  of  a  series  of  propositions, 
each  of  which  embodies  and  expresses  a  feeling  of  the 
relation  of  comprehension.  "Man  is  an  intellectual 
being.;  he  should  not,  therefore,  pursue  the  gra^ifica-. 


ANALYSIS    OF    PROBABLE    REASONING.  125 

tions  of  sense  only."  The  preceding  sentence  contains 
two  distinct  propositions ;  and  the  whole  is  an  effect  of 
what  is  called  reasoning.  Each  of  these  propositions 
expresses  nothing  more  than  a  recognized  relation — the 
relation  of  comprehension.  The  first  one  exhibits  some- 
thing which  forms  a  part  of  our  complex  notion  of  man, 
viz.,  intellect ;  the  second,  something  which  enters  into 
our  complex  notion  of  an  intellectual  being,  viz.,  eleva- 
tion above  the  pleasure  of  mere  appetites.  u  In  a  single 
proposition,"  says  Dr.  Brown,  u  we  take  one  step,  or 
feel  one  relation ;  in  an  enthymeme  we  take  two  steps, 
or  feel  two  relations  ;  in  a  syllogism  we  take  three  steps, 
or  feel  three  relations  :  whatever  is  affirmed  in  any 
stage  of  our  reasonings,  is  a  relation  of  some  sort, — of 
which,  as  felt  by  us,  the  proposition  that  affirms  the  re- 
lation is  only  a  verbal  statement." 

All  reasoning,  then,  verbally  expressed,  consists  of  a 
series  of  propositions :  but  every  series  of  propositions 
does  not  constitute  reasoning.  M  God  is  infinitely  wise," 
"  Man  is  prone  to  err,"  "  Heaven  is  the  abode  of  hap- 
piness." Here  is  a  series  of  propositions,  each  of  them 
embodying  a  judgment,  or  the  notion  of  a  relation; 
but  there  is  no  ratiocination  here.  To  constitute  reason- 
ing, there  must  be  a  certain  connection  in  the  proposi- 
tions enunciated,  by  which  the  last  is  connected  as  ef- 
fectually as  the  second  with  the  first. 

What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  this  connection  of  the 
propositions  in  a  process  of  reasoning?  This  will,  per- 
haps, be  best  ascertained  by' examining  a  particular 
instance,  viz.,  u  Man  is  possessed  of  intellect,  will,  free- 
dom, &c. ;  he  is,  therefore,  a  capable  subject  of  moral 
government."  In  this  example,  the  term  man  is  what 
is  called  the  subject  of  the  first  proposition ;  and  his 
affirmed  capability  of  moral  government  is  denomina- 
ted its  predicate.     It  will  be  observed,  however,  that 


l26  analysis  of  probable  reasoning. 

this  predicate  becomes  the  subject  of  the  second  propo- 
sition, which,  when  fully  expressed,  stands  as  follows  : 
A  being  possessed  of  intellect,  will,  &c,  is  a  capable 
subject  of  moral  government.  We  are  accordingly  led 
by  this  particular  instance  to  the  general  doctrine  that, 
to  confer  upon  a  series  of  propositions  a  claim  to  the 
character  of  reasoning,  it  is  essential  that  the  predicate 
of  each  of  the  propositions  constitute  the  subject  of  the 
proposition  which  immediately  follows  it ;  in  that  case 
the  predicate  of  the  last  will  be  as  certainly  connected 
with  the  subject  of  the  first  proposition,  as  though  they 
stood  in  juxtaposition.  By  lengthening  the  preceding 
series  of  propositions,  the  truth  and  importance  of  this 
statement  will  be  rendered  apparent. 

Man  is  possessed  of  intellect,  will,  freedom,  &c. 

The  possessor  of  intellect,  &c,  is  a  capable  subject  of 
moral  government. 

A  capable  subject,  &c,  &c.,  may  expect  that  his  con- 
duct will  hereafter  undergo  the  scrutiny  of  the  Judge 
of  all. 

In  the  above  series,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  predicate 
of  the  first  becomes  the  subject  of  the  second  proposi- 
tion,— and  the  predicate  of  the  second,  the  subject  of 
the  third  ;  and  further,  that  the  subject  man  of  the  first 
is  connected  with  the  predicate  of  the  last :  thus,  Man 
may  expect  that  his  conduct  will  hereafter  undergo,  &c. 

The  reason  of  this  connection  will  be  apparent,  when 
it  is  remembered  that  each  of  the  predicates  declares 
what  is  comprehended  in  the  complex  notion  expressed 
by  its  subject.  The  possession  of  intellect,  will,  &c,  is 
involved  in  our  complex  notion  of  man  ;  capacity  of 
moral  government  is  involved  in  our  complex  notion  of 
a  being  possessing  intellect,  &c,  &c. ;  and  the  certainty 
of  the  scrutiny  referred  to  is  involved  in  our  complex 
notion  of  a  capable  subject  of  moral  government.    Now, 


ANALYSIS    OF   PROBABLE  REASONING.  127 

if  the  second  is  involved  in  the  first — the  third  in  the 
second — and  the  fourth  in  the  third — it  is  manifest  that 
the  fourth  is  as  really  involved  in  the  first  as  in  the 
third.  And  thus  it  is  in  every  train  of  reasoning,  how- 
ever long  that  train  may  be.  An  analysis  takes  place 
in  our  mind,  of  the  complex  notion  denoted  by  the  first, 
or  original  subject,  in  consequence  of  which  we  are 
enabled  to  predicate  something  of  it.  That  which  is 
thus  predicated  undergoes  a  similar  process  of  analysis, 
the  result  of  which  is  embodied  in  the  subsequent  prop- 
osition ;  so  that  when  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion, 
how  distant  soever  it  may  be,  the  last  predicate  is  as 
truly  contained  in  the  first  as  is  its  particular  predicate, 
though  it  does  not  become  visible  to  us  till  exhibited, 
as  it  were,  in  its  elementary  state,  by  the  repetition  of 
analysis  after  analysis.] 


LECTURE  IX. 

DIFFERENT     PROCESSES     OF    REASONING EXAMINATION    OF    THE 

VALIDITY    OF    A    PROCESS    OF    REASONING DIFFERENT    KINDS 

OF     SOPHISTRY THE    VARIOUS     USE    AND    ORDER    OF    SEVERAL 

KINDS    OF    PROPOSITIONS  AND  OF   ARGUMENTS THE   EXERCISE 

OF  A  SOUND  JUDGMENT. 

In  the  preceding  lecture  I  explained  the  nature  of 
reasoning,  and  the  different  degrees  of  evidence  it  con- 
veys to  the  mind,  according  as  it  is  demonstrative  or 
probable.  I  have  shown  that  it  consists  in  perceiving 
whether  ideas  agree  or  disagree ;  and  I  have  illustrated 
the  meaning  of  this  agreement  in  mathematics,  morals, 
politics,  and  business.     It  only  remains,  that  I  explain 


128  REASONING DIRKCT    OR    INDIRECT. 

the  different  methods,  in  common  use,  of  distributing  or 
arranging  ideas  in  different  processes  of  reasoning. 

In  this  view,  reasoning  is  said  to  be  either  direct  or 
indirect.  In  direct  reasoning,  we  prove  a  proposition 
in  the  manner  I  have  explained,  by  finding  interme- 
diate ideas  that  show  the  agreement  of  the  terms  of 
which  it  consists.  In  indirect  reasoning,  we  do  not 
trace  the  agreement  of  the  terms  of  a  proposition ;  it- 
takes  place  only  when  the  predicate  of  a  proposition 
admits  an  alternative,  and  when  either  the  predicate  or 
the  alternative  must  be  true,  or  must  agree  with  the 
subject  of  the  proposition,  because  they  exhaust  every 
case  that  can  exist.  We  prove  that  the  alternative 
annot  be  true,  and  therefore  the  predicate  must  be 
true.  An  example  will  make  this  matter  perfectly 
clear. 

Euclid  lays  down  this  proposition — u  That  a  straight  line  drawn 
at  right  angles  from  the  extremity  of  a  diameter,  falls  without  the 
circle."  No  intermediate  idea,  it  seems,  occurred,  by  which  he 
could  deduce  the  proof  directly  from  the  nature  of  the  circle,  or  of 
the  perpendicular  or  the  extremity  of  the  diameter.  He  proceeds, 
therefore,  by  indirect  demonstration,  and  introduces  an  alternative. 
The  perpendicular  must  fall  either  without  the  circle,  or  within  it. 
No  third  supposition  can  be  made  relative  to  the  manner  of  its 
falling,  for  it  cannot  fall  upon  the  circumference  of  the  circle,  ex- 
cept in  one  point.  He  proves  that  the  alternative  cannot  be  true, 
or  that  the  perpendicular  cannot  fall  within  the  circle.  The  predi- 
cate, then,  must  be  true,  that  the  perpendicular  falls  without  the 
circle. 

Again — "  The  moon  is  either  an  opaque  or  a  transparent  body." 
It  is  not  transparent,  because,  if  it  were,  it  would  transmit  the  rays 
of  the  sun  when  it  comes  between  the  sun  and  the  earth ;  and  no 
eclipse  of  the  sun  could  happen  from  the  intervention  of  it  between 
the  sun  and  the  earth ;  but  this  conclusion  is  contrary  to  truth, 
for  such  eclipse  does  happen.  The  alternative,  therefore,  that  the 
moon  is  a  transparent  body  must  be  false,  and  consequently  the 
predicate  must  be  true,  than  the  moon  is  an  opaque  body.  The 
refutation  of  the  alternative  is  always  pursued  till  it  terminates  in 


DIRECT    AND    INDIRECT  REASONING    COMPARED.        129 

some  contradiction,  falsehood,  or  absurdity ;  and  on  this  account 
indirect  reasoning  is  sometimes  called  u  reductio  ad  absurdum"  by 
the  logicians. 

It  has  often  been  disputed,  whether  indirect  reasoning 
is  less  elegant  and  satisfactory  than  direct ;  but  I  need 
not  spend  time  in  remarks  on  this  controversy.  Both 
convey  truth  with  perfect  evidence  ;  and  when  a  rea- 
soner  has  got  possession  of  an  indirect  proof,  he  will  not, 
I  believe,  trouble  himself  much  in  searching  for  a  direct 
one.  It  is,  however,  generally  supposed,  that  mathe- 
maticians never  employ  the  former  but  in  cases  of 
necessity,  when  they  cannot  have  recourse  to  the  latter. 
The  great  number  of  beautiful  specimens  of  demonstra- 
tion of  which  their  science  is  susceptible,  may  rendei 
them  nice  or  delicate  even  about  the  elegance  and 
manner  of  their  reasonings ;  but  on  other  subjects,  and 
in  other  sciences,  when  the  mind  is  glad  to  reach  im* 
portant  truth  on  any  terms,  it  will  be  abundantly  satis- 
fied with  good  indirect  proof.  It  may,  perhaps,  be 
doubted  whether  the  charge  of  inelegance  is  not  the 
offspring  of  squeamishness  and  caprice,  rather  than  of 
just  taste.  An  indirect  train  of  ideas  is  often  long,  and 
is  conjoined  with  as  much  clearness  and  propriety  as 
any  direct  one.  The  step  from  the  falsehood  of  the 
alternative  to  the  truth  of  the  predicate,  is  perfectly 
satisfactory,  if  not  elegant ;  and  it  may  be  added,  that 
indirect  reasoning  imparts  variety  to  the  nature  of  the 
proof.* 

[  *  Dr.  Watts  thus  describes  some  arguments  of  an  indirect  form : 
(1.)  WThen  some  contradictory  proposition  is  proved  to  be  false,  improba- 
ble, or  impossible ;  or  when,  upon  supposition  of  the  falsehood,  or  denial 
of  the  original  proposition,  some  absurdity  is  inferred.  This  is  called  a 
proof  per  impossibile,  or  a  reductio  ad  absurdum.  (2.)  When  some  other 
proposition  is  proved  to  be  true,  which  is  less  probable ;  and  thence  it 
follows  that  the  original  proposition  is  true,  because  it  is  more  probable. 
(3.)  When  any  other  proposition  is  proved,  upon  which  it  was  before 
agreed  to  yield  the  original  question.]       *''.*'  •  - 

6« 


130  A    PRIORI    AND   A   POSTERIORI    REASONING. 

Reasoning,  further,  is  said  to  proceed  either  a  priori, 
or  a  posteriori — a  distinction  which  relates  entirely  to 
cause  and  effect.  In  reasoning  a  priori,  we  begin  with 
the  cause,  and  infer  from  it  the  reality  or  the  species  ot 
the  effect.  In  reasoning  a  posteriori,  we  reverse  this 
process ;  we  begin  with  the  effect,  and  reason  back- 
ward from  it,  to  the  establishment  of  the. existence  and 
qualities  of  the  cause. 

If,  for  example,  I  maintain,  that  the  soul  of  man  is  a  thinking 
substance,  and  therefore  that  it  is  immaterial,  because  matter  can- 
not think ;  and  hence  again  infer  that  it  is  immortal,  because  what 
is  immaterial  cannot  die  or  be  destroyed — I  reason  a  priori  ;  I  de- 
duce the  effect  from  its  cause,  and  prove  the  soul  to  be  immortal 
from  the  nature  of  its  constitution.  If,  again,  I  argue  that  the 
people  who  live  fifteen  degrees  further  east  than  we  will  have  their 
day  beginning  and  ending  an  hour  sooner  than  ours ;  that  naviga- 
tors, of  course,  who  have  sailed  fifteen  degrees  eastward  will  have 
lost  an  hour  of  our  day,  and  will  have  gained  an  hour  from  the  day 
of  the  people  of  that  longitude ;  that  these  navigators  will  expe- 
rience a  similar  loss  and  gain  in  point  of  time,  for  every  fifteen  de- 
grees eastward  on  the  face  of  the  globe ;  and  that,  as  they  must 
pass  through  four  and  twenty  times  fifteen  degrees  in  sailing  round 
the  globe,  so,  on  returning  home,  they  will  calculate  time  a  day 
sooner  than  their  countrymen,  because  they  have  lost  twenty-four 
hours  of  the  time  of  their  countrymen  in  their  voyage:  in  this 
process  I  reason  a  priori,  because  I  deduce  a  curious  fact,  verified 
by  experience,  from  the  figure  of  the  earth,  round  which  the  navi- 
gation is  performed. 

In  reasoning  a  posteriori,  we  argue  from  the  effect  to 
the  cause,  and  conclude  from  the  former  the  nature  or 
existence  of  the  latter. 

For  example,  from  the  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness  discernible 
in  all  the  works  of  nature,  I  infer  that  there  must  be  some  wise, 
benevolent,  and  omnipotent  cause,  from  which  these  effects  proceed. 
I  cannot  doubt  of  the  effects,  because  I  experience  them  every  mo- 
ment of  my  existence ;  I  can  as  little  doubt  that  they  must  proceed 
from  some  cause,  and  that  the  cause  must  possess  the  qualities 
conspicuous  in  the  effects.     I  observe,  again,  that  the  shadow  ot 


ARGUMENTS    WITH    RESPECT    TO    SUBJECT-MATTER.       131 

the  earth  projected  on  the  face  of  the  moon,  in  a  lunar  eclip?e,  is  of 
a  circular  form ;  and  from  this  effect  I  justly  infer  that  the  figure  of 
the  earth  is  round,  because  this  figure  only  could  produce  such  a 
shadow. 

Keasonings  a  priori  are  much  circumscribed,  because 
causes  are  seldom  so  well  known  as  their  effects.  From 
effects,  chiefly,  we  ascend  to  the  knowledge  of  causes 
and  on  this  account,  reasoning  a  posteriori  is  much 
more  frequent.  It  is  much  employed  in  inquiries  into 
nature ;  it  is  the  groundwork  of  the  famous  method  of 
induction  for  investigating  natural  knowledge,  recom- 
mended in  the  "  Novum  Organum"  of  Lord  Bacon  ; 
and  it  is  of  frequent  use  in  politics  and  morals. 

The  best  way  to  obtain  an  acquaintance,  both  with  the  Author 
of  nature,  and  with  the  secondary  causes  which  produce  the  effects 
we  daily  behold,  is  to  survey  with  patience  the  effects  themselves, 
because  we  have  no  means  of  information  concerning  the  causes, 
except  in  this  channel.  In  like  manner,  to  understand  the  duties  a 
man  owes  to  his  country,  or  to  his  neighbor,  we  must  scrutinize 
his  constitution,  what  forms  the  happiness  of  such  a  being,  both  as 
a  member  of  society  and  a  moral  agent ;  what  are  his  mental  facul- 
ties and  his  bodily  powers,  his  attachments  and  antipathies,  his 
gratifications  and  his  wants.  In  all  these  inquiries  we  begin  from 
the  effect,  and  ascend  to  the  cause,  or  we  reason  a  posteriori. 

[We  will  now  leave  our  author  for  a  while,  and  draw 
upon  Dr.  Whately : 

He  distributes  arguments  with  respect  to  their  sub- 
ject-matter, into  two  great  classes,  viz. :  First,  such 
arguments  as  might  have  been  employed — not  as  argu- 
ments, but — to  account  for  the  fact  or  principle  main- 
tained, supposing^  its  truth  granted.  Secondly,  such  as 
could  not  be  so  employed.  The  former  class  (the  a 
priori)  is  manifestly  argument  from  cause  to  effect,  since 
to  account  for  any  thing  signifies  to  assign  the  cause  of 
it ;  this  is  the  popular  sense. 

As  far,  then,  as  any  cause,  popularly  speaking,  hms 


132     ARGUMENTS    FROM    AN    EFFECT   TO    A    CONDITION. 

a  tendency  to  produce  a  certain  effect,  so  far  its  exist 
ence  is  an  argument  for  that  effect.  If  the  cause  be 
fully  sufficient,  and  no  impediments  intervene,  the  effect 
in  question  follows  certainly ;  and  the  nearer  we  ap- 
proach to  this,  the  stronger  the  argument.  This  is  the 
kind  of  argument  which  produces  (when  short  of  abso- 
lute certainty)  that  species  of  the  probable  which  is 
usually  called  the  "plausible." 

The  second  class  of  arguments  (referred  to  above)  are 
designated  by  the  terms  "sign"  and  "example."  The 
former  is  an  argument  from  an  effect  to  a  condition  ; — 
a  species  of  argument  of  which  the  analysis  is  as  fol- 
lows :  As  far  as  any  circumstance  is  what  may  be 
called  a  condition  of  the  existence  of  a  certain  effect  or 
phenomenon,  so  far  it  may  be  inferred  from  the  exist- 
ence of  that  effect :  if  it  be  a  condition  absolutely  essen- 
tial, the  argument  is,  of  course,  demonstrative ;  and  the 
probability  is  the  stronger  in  proportion  as  we  approach 
to  that  case. 

As  an  instance,  a  man  is  suspected  as  the  perpetrator 
of  a  murder,  from  the  circumstance  of  his  clothes  being 
bloody ;  the  murder  being  considered  as  in  a  certain 
degree  a  probable  condition  of  that  appearance ;  i.  e., 
it  is  presumed  that  his  clothes  would  not  otherwise  have 
been  bloody.  Again,  from  the  appearance  of  ice,  we 
infer,  decidedly,  the  existence  of  a  temperature  not 
above  the  freezing-point,  that  temperature  being  an 
essential  condition  of  the  crystallization  of  water. 

Among  the  circumstances  which  are  conditional  to 
any  effect,  must  evidently  come  the  cause  or  causes ; 
and  if  there  be  only  one  possible  cause,  this  being  abso- 
lutely essential,  may  be  demonstratively  proved  from 
the  effect :  if  the  same  effect  might  result  from  other 
causes,  then  the  argument  is,  at  best,  but  probable.  But 
it  is  to  be  observed,  that  there  are  also  many  circum 


ARGUMENTS    FROM    AN    EFFECT    TO    A    CONDITION.      13 3 

stances  which  have  no  tendency  to  produce  a  certain 
effect,  though  it  cannot  exist  without  them,  and  from 
which  effect,  consequently,  they  may  be  inferred  as 
conditions,  though  not  causes :  e.  g.,  a  man's  being 
14  alive  one  day,"  is  a  circumstance  necessary,  as  a  con- 
dition, to  his  "  dying  the  next,"  but  has  no  tendency  to 
produce  it ;  his  having  been  alive,  therefore,  on  the  for- 
mer day,  may  be  proved  from  his  subsequent  death,  but 
not  vice  versa. 

It  is  to  be  observed,  therefore,  that  though  it  is  very 
common  for  the  cause  to  be  proved  from  its  effect,  it  is 
never  so  proved,  so  far  forth  as  it  is  a  cause,  but  so  far 
♦brth  as  it  is  a  condition,  or  necessary  circumstance. 

A  cause,  again,  may  be  employed  to  prove  an  effect 
(this  being  the^^  class  of  arguments),  so  far  as  it  has 
a  tendency  to  produce  the  effect,  even  though  it  be  noi 
at  all  necessary  to  it  (i.  e.,  when  other  causes  may  pro- 
duce the  same  effect) ;  and  in  this  case,  though  an 
effect  may  be  inferred  from  the  cause,  the  cause  can- 
not be  inferred  from  the  effect :  e.  g.,  from  a  mortai 
wound  you  may  infer  death,  but  not  vice  versa. 

Lastly,  when  a  cause  is  also  a  necessary  or  probable 
condition,  i.  e.,  when  it  is  the  only  possible  or  only 
likely  cause,  then  we  may  argue  both  ways:  e.g.,  we 
may  infer  a  general's  success  from  his  known  skill,  or 
his  skill  from  his  known  success  (in  this,  as  in  all  cases, 
assuming  what  is  the  tetter  known  as  a  proof  of  what  is 
less  known,  denied,  or  doubted) :  these  two  arguments 
belonging,  respectively,  to  the  two  classes  originally  laid 
down. 

The  phrase  ^  a  priori"  argument,  is  generally  under- 
stood to  extend  to  any  argument  drawn  from  an  antece- 
dent or  a  forerunner,  whether  a  cause  or  not ;  e.  g.,  "  the 
mercury  sinks,  therefore  it  will  rain."  Now  this  argu- 
ment being  drawn  from  a  circumstance  whichj  though 


i34  ambiguous  words. 

an  antecedent,  is  not  a  cause,  would  fall  not  under  the  for- 
mer but  under  the  latter  of  the  classes  laid  down ;  since 
when  rain  comes,  no  one  would  account  for  the  phenom- 
enon by  the  falling  of  the  mercury,  which  they  would 
call  a  "  sign"  of  rain ;  and  yet  most,  perhaps,  would  class 
this  among  "  a  priori"  arguments.  In  like  manner,  the 
expression,  "  a  posteriori"  arguments,  would  not  in  its 
ordinary  use  coincide  precisely,  though  it  would  very 
nearly,  with  the  second  class  of  arguments. 

Many  writers,  in  investigating  the  cause  to  which 
any  fact  or  phenomenon  is  to  be  attributed,  have  as- 
signed that  which  is  not  a  cause,  but  only  a  ^m^that 
the  fact  is  so  ;  and  have  thus  been  led  into  an  endless 
train  of  errors  and  perplexities. 

The  word  why,  as  an  interrogative,  is  employed  in 
three  senses,  viz.,  "  By  what  proof?"  (or  reason). 
"  From  what  cause  ?"  "  For  what  purpose  ?"  This 
last  is  commonly  called  the  "  final  cause  :"  e.  g.,  "  Why 
is  this  prisoner  guilty  of  the  crime  ?"  "  Why  does  a 
stone  fall  to  the  earth?"  u  Why  did  you  go  to  Lon- 
don?" Much  confusion  has  arisen  from  not  distin- 
guishing these  different  inquiries. 

Ambiguity  has  arisen  from  the  same  words  having 
come  to  be  applied,  in  common,  to  diverse  kinds  of 
sequence ;  e.  g.,  an  effect  is  said  to  "  follow"  from  a 
cause,  and  a  conclusion  to  "  follow"  from  the  premises ; 
the  words  "  cause"  and  u  reason"  are  each  applied  indif- 
ferently, both  to  a  cause  properly  so  called,  and  to  the 
premise  of  an  argument,  though  "  reason,"  in  strictness 
of  speaking,  should  be  confined  to  the  latter.  "  There- 
fore," "  hence,"  "  consequently,"  &c,  and  also  "  since," 
"  because,"  and  "  why,"  have  likewise  a  corresponding 
ambiguity. 

As  before  remarked,  "  reason"  is  employed  to  signify 
the  premise,  or  premises  of  an  argument:  especially 


ARGUMENT    FR.^M    PROGRESSIVE    APPROACH.  135 

the  minor  premise ;  and  it  is  from  "  reason"  in  this 
sense  that  the  word  "  reasoning"  is  derived.  It  is  also 
very  frequently  used  to  signify  a  cause ;  as  when  we 
say,  in  popular  language,  that  the  "reason  of  an  eclipse 
of  the  sun  is,  that  the  moon  is  interposed  between  it 
and  the  earth."  This  should  he  strictly  called  the 
cause.  On  the  other  hand,  "  because"  (i.  e.,  u  by 
cause")  is  used  to  introduce  either  the  physical  cause 
or  the  logical  proof;  and  "  therefore,"  "hence,"  "  since," 
"  follow,"  "  consequence,"  and  many  other  kindred 
words,  have  a  corresponding  ambiguity :  e.  g.,  "  the 
ground  is  wet,  because  it  has  rained ;"  or,  "  it  has 
rained,  and  hence  the  ground  is  wet :"  this  is  the  as- 
signment of  the  cause.  Again,  "  it  has  rained  because 
the  ground  is  wet ;"  "  the  ground  is  wet,  and  therefore 
it  has  rained  ;"  this  is  assigning  the  logical  proof :  the 
wetness  of  the  ground  is  the  cause,  not  of  the  rain  hav- 
ing fallen,  but  of  our  knowing  that  it  has  fallen.  And 
this  probably  it  is  that  has  led  to  the  ambiguous  use  in 
all  languages  of  almost  all  the  words  relating  to  these 
two  points. 

Next  may  be  considered  the  argument  from  Pro- 
gressive Approach.  In  this  species,  the  force  of  the 
series  of  arguments  results  from  the  order  in  which 
they  are  considered,  and  from  their  progressive  tendency 
to  establish  a  certain  conclusion. 

For  example  :  One  part  of  the  law  of  nature,  called 
the  vis  inertias,  is  established  by  the  argument  alluded 
to ;  viz.,  that  a  body  set  in  motion  will  eternally  con- 
tinue in  motion,  wi,th  uniform  velocity,  in  a  right  line, 
so  far  as  it  is  not  acted  upon  by  any  causes  which  retard 
or  stop,  accelerate  or  divert  its  course.  Now,  as  in 
every  case  which  can  come  under  our  observation,  some 
such  causes  do  intervene,  the  assumed  supposition  is 
practically  impossible,  and  we  have  no  opportunity  of 


136  ARGUMENT    CALLED 

verifying  the  law  by  direct  experiment ;  but  we  may 
gradually  approach  indefinitely  near  to  the  case  sup- 
posed, and  on  the  result  of  such  experiments  our  con- 
clusion is  founded.  We  find  that  where  a  body  is  pro- 
jected along  a  rough  surface,  its  motion  is  speedily  re- 
tarded and  soon  stopped ;  if  along  a  smoother  surface, 
it  continues  longer  in  motion  ;  if  upon  ice,  longer  still ; 
and  the  like  with  regard  to  wheels,  &c,  in  proportion 
as  we  gradually  lessen  the  friction  of  the  machinery: 
and  if  we  remove  the  resistance  of  the  air,  by  setting  a 
wheel  or  a  pendulum  in  motion  under  an  exhausted  re- 
ceiver, the  motion  is  still  longer  continued.  Finding, 
then,  that  the  effect  of  the  original  impulse  is  more 
and  more  protracted,  in  proportion  as  we  more  and 
more  remove  the  impediments  to  motion  from  friction 
and  the  resistance  of  the  air,  we  reasonably  conclude, 
that  if  this  could  be  completely  done  (which  is  out  of 
our  power),  the  motion  would  never  cease,  since  what 
appear  to  be  the  only  causes  of  its  cessation  would  be 
absent. 

Dr.  Whately  adds  a  similar  progressive  argument  for 
the  being  and  attributes  of  God,  and  for  religious  toler- 
ation.— Rhetoric,  part  i.  chap.  ii.  §  6. 

In  the  next  place,  under  the  head  of  Example,*  Dr. 

[*  The  Example  is  an  argument  which  proves  something  to  be  true  in  a 
particular  case  from  another  particular  case.  Thus,  "  Harvey  might  expect 
to  be  persecuted  for  his  discovery  of  the  circulation  of  the  blood,  because 
Galileo  was  for  his  discovery."  But  the  connection  between  two  distinct 
facts  can  only  depend  upon  their  coming  under  some  common  law,  and 
therefore  in  the  Example  the  proof  is'  not  of  one  particular  judgment  by 
another,  but  of  a  particular  by  means  of  a  universal,  for  which  another  par- 
ticular is  the  sign.    Thus : 

Galileo  was  persecuted — 

Galileo  was  a  discoverer  in  science ; 

Therefore  all  discoverers  are  likely  to  be  persecuted. 

Harvey  is  a  discoverer, 

Therefore  he  too  will  be  persecuted. 
This  argument  is  called  "  rhetorical  induction  ;"  it  diffexs  from  inductior 


INDUCTION.  137 

Whately  comprehends  the  arguments  designated  by  the 
various  names  of  induction,  experience,  analogy,  parity 
of  reasoning,  &c,  all  of  which  are  essentially  the  same 
as  to  fundamental  principles  :  for,  in  all  the  arguments 
designated  by  these  names,  it  will  be  found,  that  we 
consider  one  or  more  known  individual  objects  or  in- 
stances of  a  certain  class  as  a  fair  sample,  in  respect 
of  some  point  or  other  of  that  class  ;  and,  consequently, 
draw  an  inference  from  them  respecting  either  the  whole 
class,  or  other  less  known  individuals  of  it. 

We  do  not,  strictly  speaking,  reason  by  induction, 
but  reason  from  induction,  i.e.,  from  our  observations 
on  one,  or  on  several  individuals,  we  draw  a  conclusion 
respecting  the  class  they  come  under  ;  or,  in  like  man- 
ner, from  several  species,  to  the  genus  which  compre- 
hends them :  e.  g.,  "  The  earth  moves  round  the  sun  in 
an  elliptical  orbit ;  so  does  Mercury,  and  Venus,  and 
Mars,  &c. ;  therefore  a  planet  (the  common  term  com- 
prehending these  singulars)  moves  round,"  &c.  "  Philip 
wras  reckless  of  human  life  ;  so  was  Alexander ;  so  was 
Caesar,  &c. ;  therefore  this  is  the  general  character  of  a 
conqueror?'' 

In  such  arguments  it  is  assumed,  that  what  belongs  to 
the  individual,  or  individuals  we  have  examined,  be- 
longs (certainly  or  probably,  as  the  case  may  be),  to  the 
whole  class  under  which  they  come. 

With   respect   to   the    argument    from    experience  / 

proper  in  bringing  in  only  one  example  instead  of  many,  and  in  going  on 
to  prove  another  particular  case,  instead  of  stopping  at  the  general  law. 
This  difference  disappears,  if,  with  Diogenes,  Laertius,  and  Cicero,  we  de- 
scribe induction  as  an  argument  from  particulars  to  like  particulars. 

The  plan  in  this  kind  of  argument  is  obvious  ;  but  the  nearer  the  predi- 
cate of  the  second  premise  approaches  to  distribution  (the  introduction  ol 
the  whole  of  their  subject),  the  less  probable  is  an  error.  If  it  could  be 
Bhown  that  "  Galileo  was  a  fair  sample  of  all  discoverers,"  the  mode  would 
be  formally  correct.  But  in  its  weaker  form  it  is  perpetually  employed  — 
Thomson.'] 


138       ARGUMENT   FROM   EXPERIENCE    AND   ANALOGY. 

strictly  speaking,  we  know  by  experience  only  the  past 
and  what  has  occurred  under  our  own  observation ; 
thus,  we  know  by  experience  that  the  tides  have  daily 
ebbed  and  flowed  during  such  a  time,  and  from  the  tes- 
timony of  others,  as  to  their  own  experience,  that  the 
tides  have  formerly  done  so ;  and  from  this  experience 
we  conclude,  by  induction,  that  the  same  phenomenon 
will  continue. 

The  word  analogy,  again,  is  generally  employed  in 
the  case  of  arguments  in  which  the  instance  adduced 
is  somewhat  more  remote  from  that  to  which  it  is  ap- 
plied ;  e.  g.,  a  physician  would  be  said  to  know  by  ex- 
perience the  noxious  effects  of  a  certain  drug  on  the 
human  constitution,  if  he  had  frequently  seen  men 
poisoned  by  it ;  but  if  he  thence  conjectured  that  it 
would  be  noxious  to  some  other  species  of  animal,  he 
would  be  said  to  reason  from  analogy,  the  only  differ- 
ence being,  that  the  resemblance  is  less  between  a 
man  and  a  brute  than  between  one  man  and  another ; 
and  accordingly,  it  is  found  that  many  brutes  are  not 
acted  upon  by  some  drugs  which  are  pernicious  to 
man. 

But,  more  strictly  speaking,  analogy  ought  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  direct  resemblance,  with  which  it  is 
often  confounded.  Analogy,  being  a  "  resemblance  of 
ratios,"  that  should  strictly  be  called  an  argument  from 
analogy  in  which  the  two  things  (viz.,  the  one  from 
which,  and  the  one  to  which  we  argue)  are  not  necessa- 
rily themselves  alike,  but  stand  in  similar  relations  to 
some  other  things ;  or,  in  other  words,  that  the  common 
genus  which  they  both  fall  under,  consists  in  a  relation. 
Thus  an  egg  and  a  seed  are  not  in  themselves  alike,  but 
bear  a  like  relation  to  the  parent  bird  and  to  her  future 
nestling  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  old  and  young 
plant  on  the  other,  respectively ;  this  relation  being  the 


CAUTIONS    CONCERNING    ANALOGY.  139 

genus  which  both  fall  under:  and  many  arguments 
might  be  drawn  from  this  analogy. 

In  this  kind  of  argument  one  error,  which  is  very 
common,  and  wThich  is  to  be  sedulously  avoided,  is  that 
of  concluding  the  things  in  question  to  he  alike  because 
they  are  analogous:  to  resemble  each  other  in  them- 
selves, because  there  is  a  resemblance  in  the  relation 
they  bear  to  certain  other  things;  wThich  is  manifestly 
a  groundless  inference.  Many  persons  are  guilty  of 
this  mistake  who  are,  or  ought  to  be,  familiar  with  the 
Scripture  parables ;  in  which  the  words  "  compare"  and 
"liken"  are  often  introduced,  where  it  is  evident  that 
there  could  have  been  no  thought  of  any  direct  resem- 
blance. A  child  of  ten  years  old  would  hardly  be 
guilty  of  such  a  blunder  as  to  suppose  that  members  of 
the  church  are  literally  "  like"  plants  of  corn — sheep — 
fish  caught  in  a  net, — and  fruit-trees. 

Another  caution  is  applicable  to  the  whole  class  of 
arguments  from  example  /  viz.,  not  to  consider  the  re- 
semblance or  analogy  to  extend  further  (i.  e.,  to  more 
particulars)  than  it  does.  In  the  parable  of  the  unjust 
steward,  an  argument  is  drawn  from  analogy  to  recom- 
mend prudence  and  foresight  to  Christians  in  spiritual 
concerns,  but  it  would  be  absurd  to  conclude  that  fraud 
was  recommended  to  our  imitation ;  and  yet  mistakes 
very  similar  to  such  a  perversion  of  that  argument  are 
by  no  means  rare. 

Against  both  these  mistakes  our  Lord's  parables  are 
guarded. in  two  ways.  1st.  He  selects,  in  several  of 
them,  images  the  most  remote  possible  from  the  thing 
to  be  illustrated  in  almost  every  point  except  the  one 
that  is  essential,  as  in  the  parable  referred  to  just  above. 
2dly.  He  employs  a  great  variety  of  images  in  illustra- 
ting each  single  point ;  e.  g.,  a  field  of  corn — a  net 
cast  into  the  sea — a  grain  of  mustard-seed — a  lump  of 


14U  PAKABLKS    OF    CHRIST. 

leaven,  &c.  For,  as  the  thing  to  be  illustrated  cannot 
have  a  direct  resemblance,  or  a  complete  analogy,  in  all 
these  different  things,  we  are  thus  guarded  against  tak- 
ing for  granted  that  this  is  the  case  with  any  one  of 
them. 

It  may  be  added  that  the  variety,  and  also  the  ex- 
treme commonness  of  the  images  introduced,  serve  as  a 
help  to  the  memory  by  creating  a  multitude  of  associa- 
tions. Our  Lord  has  inscribed  his  lessons  on  almost 
every  object  around  us. 

And,  moreover,  men  are  thus  guarded  against  the 
mistake  they  are  so  prone  to,  and  which,  even  as  it  is, 
they  are  continually  falling  into,  of  laying  aside  their 
common  sense  altogether  in  judging  of  any  matter  con- 
nected with  religion  ;  as  if  the  rules  of  reasoning  which 
they  employ  in  temporal  matters,  were  quite  unfit  to  be 
employed  in  spiritual. 

It  may  be  added,  that  illustrations  drawn  from  things 
considerably  remote  from  what  is  to  be  illustrated  will 
often  have  the  effect  of  an  "  a  fortiori"  argument,  as  in 
some  of  the  parables  just  alluded  to,  and  in  that  where 
Jesus  says,  "  If  ye  then,  being  evil,  know  how  to  give 
good  gifts  to  your  children,  how  much  more"  &-c. 

So,  also,  in  the  Apostle  Paul's  illustration  from  the 
Isthmian  Games,  u  Now,  they  do  it  to  obtain  a  corrup- 
tible crown ;  but  we,  an  incorruptible,"  &c. 

Sound  judgment  and  vigilant  caution  are  nowhere 
more  called  for  than  in  observing  what  differences  (per- 
haps seemingly  small)  do,  and  what  do  not,  nullify  the 
analogy  between  two  cases.  And  the  same  may  be 
said  in  regard  to  the  applicability  of  precedents  or  ac- 
knowledged decisions  of  any  kind,  such  as  Scripture 
precepts,  &c,  all  of  which,  indeed,  are  in  their  essence 
of  the  nature  of  example  :  since  every  recorded  decla- 
ration or  injunction  may  be  regarded — in  connection 


SMALL    DIFFERENCES    NULLIFY    ANALOGY.  141 

with  the  persons  to  whom,  and  the  occasion  on  which 
it  was  delivered — as  a  known  case;  from  w7hich,  conse- 
quently, we  may  reason  to  any  other  parallel  case,  and 
the  question  which  we  must  be  careful  in  deciding  will 
be  to  whom,  and  to  what  it  is  applicable.  For,  a  seem- 
ingly small  circumstance  wTill  often  destroy  the  analo- 
gy, so  as  to  make  a  precedent,  precept,  &c,  inapplica- 
ble :  and  often,  on  the  other  hand,  some  difference,  in 
itself  important,  may  be  pointed  out  between  two  cases, 
which  shall  not  at  all  weaken  the  analogy  in  respect  of 
the  argument  in  hand.  And  thus  there  is  danger  both 
of  being  misled  by  specious  arguments  of  this  descrip- 
tion, which  have  no  real  force,  and  also  of  being  stag- 
gered by  plausible  objections  against  such  examples  or 
appeals  to  authority,  &c,  as  are  perfectly  valid.  Hence 
Aristotle  observes,  that  an  opponent,  if  he  cannot  show 
that  the  majority  of  instances  is  on  his  side,  or  that 
those  adduced  by  his  adversary  are  inapplicable,  con- 
tends that  they,  at  any  rate,  differ  in  something  from 
the  case  in  question. 

Many  are  misled,  in  each  way,  by  not  estimating 
aright  the  degree  and  the  hind  of  difference  between 
the  two  cases.  For  example,  the  Apostle  Paul  recom- 
mends to  the  Corinthians  celibacy  as  preferable  to  mar- 
riage :  hence  some  religionists  have  inferred  that  this 
holds  good  in  respect  of  all  Christians.  Now  in  many 
most  important  points  Christians  of  the  present  day  are 
in  the  same  condition  as  the  Corinthians,  but  they  were 
liable  to  plunder,  exile,  and  many  kinds  of  bitter  perse- 
cutions from  their  fellow-citizens ;  and  it  appears  that 
this  was  the  very  ground  on  which  celibacy  was  recom- 
mended to  them,  as  exempting  them  from  many  afflic- 
tions and  temptations  which  in  such  troublous  times  a 
family  would  entail.  Now  it  is  not,  be  it  observed,  on 
the   intrinsic  importance  of  this   difference   between 


142  ANALYTIC    AND   SYNTHETIC   REASONING. 

them  and  us  that  the  question  turns ;  but  on  its  impor 
tance  in  reference  to  the  advice  given.  For  other  il- 
lustrations consult  Whately's  Rhet,  part  i.  chap.  ii.  §  7. 

The  phrase  "  parity  of  reasoning"  is  commonly  em- 
ployed to  denote  analogical  reasoning.] 

[We  now  return  to  our  author.] 

The  last  distinction  of  reasoning  divides  it  into 
analytic  and  synthetic,  and  refers  chiefly  to  mathemat- 
ical reasonings.  Analysis  forms  an  elegant  method  of 
investigating  the  legitimacy  of  demonstrations.  Syn- 
thesis puts  together  the  different  steps  after  investiga- 
tion, so  as  to  make  out  a  proof,  and  is  the  same  thing 
with  direct  reasoning. 

The  ancients  carried  on  analysis  by  means  of  mathematical 
figures;  the  great  instrument  of  it  in  modern  times  is  algebra. 
Many  examples  of  the  ancient  analysis  are  to  be  found  in  Apollo- 
nius  Pergaeus,  De  Sectione  Rationis,  and  in  the  problems  published 
by  the  late  Dr.  Steuart,  of  Edinburgh.  Every  treatise  of  algebra, 
but  particularly  that  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  will  furnish  specimens 
of  the  modern  analysis  by  letters  or  symbols.  All  the  demonstra- 
tions of  the  Elements  of  Euclid  exhibit  examples  of  synthesis; 
and  I  need  not  produce  any  of  them.  I  shall,  therefore,  offer  only 
one  example  of  analysis.  The  purpose  of  it  is  to  try  the  legitimacy 
of  an  investigation,  or  to  discover  whether  the  intermediate  ideas, 
by  which  a  mathematician  suspects  a  demonstration  may  be  ac- 
complished, are  sufficient  for  that  purpose.  He  begins  with  sup- 
posing that  the  ideas  are  good  media  for  demonstrating  the  propo- 
sition in  question,  and  constructs  his  figure  on  that  hypothesis. 
He  supposes,  further,  the  thing  done  that  a  problem  requires,  or 
the  truth  established  which  a  theorem  proposes  to  prove.  He  sets 
out  from  the  proposition,  and  reasons  backward  to  the  beginning 
of  it ;  and  if  he  encounter  no  contradiction,  or  terminate  in  no 
absurdity,  he  concludes  the  media  to  be  pertinent  and  legitimate; 
if  he  land  in  an  absurdity  or  contradiction,  he  infers  that  the 
media  are  improper,  and  that  the  synthetical  demonstration  will  be 
inconclusive.* 

[*  See  Dugald  Stewart's  Works,  vol.  ii.  chap.  ix.  §  3,  for  a  full  descrip- 
tion of  the- import  of  the  words  analysis  and  Synthesis.] 


VALIDITY    OF    A    PROCESS    OF    REASONING.  143 

If,  for  example,  it  were  required  to  analyze  the  first  proposition 
of  the  first  book  of  the  Elements  of  Euclid,  which  proposes  to  de- 
scribe an  equilateral  triangle  on  a  given  straight  line.  The  mathe- 
matician would  describe  a  triangle  on  the  given  line,  and  would 
suppose  it  equilateral.  He  would  reason  thus :  If  the  triangle  be 
equilateral,  then  making  one  end  of  the  base  a  centre,  and  descri- 
bing a  circle  with  the  length  of  it  as  a  radius,  the  circle  will  pass 
through  the  other  extremities  of  the  base,  and  of  one  of  the  sides ; 
so  that  the  base  and  one  of  the  sides  must  become  radii  of  the  same 
circle.  It  another  circle  be  described  from  the  other  end  of  the 
base,  with  the  same  base  taken  as  a  radius,  this  circle  will  pass 
through  the  other  extremities  of  the  base  and  of  the  other  side. 
The  two  circles,  therefore,  are  equal,  because  their  radii  are  so. 
This  step  finishes  the  analysis,  and  proves  the  media  to  be  legiti- 
mate, because  the  reasoning  backward  has  reached  its  principle, 
the  equality  of  the  two  circles,  from  which  the  synthesis  begins,  or 
from  which  the  truth  of  the  proposition,  that  the  triangle  is  equi- 
lateral, is  demonstrated. 

Logicians  mention  some  other  distinctions  of  reason- 
ing, which  I  shall  shortly  explain,  because  they  some- 
times occur  in  conversation,  and  often  in  books.  When 
we  argue  from  principles,  or  opinions,  admitted  by  the 
person  with  whom  we  reason,  whether  they  be  true  or 
not  in  themselves,  we  are  said  to  employ  an  argumen- 
tum ad  hominem.  When  we  urge  in  our  defence  some 
eminent  authority,  which  an  antagonist  is  ashamed  to 
oppose,  we  are  said  to  employ  an  argumentum  ad  vere- 
cundiam.  When  we  perplex  or  puzzle  an  adversary, 
we  offer  what  is  called  argumentum  ad  ignorantiam. 


EXAMINATION   OF   THE   VALIDITY   OF   A   PROCESS    OF 
REASONING. 
) 
[From  Dr.  Abercrombie's  "  Intellectual  Powers."] 

[In  examining  the  validity  of  a  process  of  reasoning, 
the  mental  operation  which  we  ought  to  perform  may 
be  guided  by  the  following  considerations : 


144  VALIDITY    OF    A    PROCESS    OF    REASONING. 

1.  What  statements  does  the  author  propose  as  mat- 
ters  of  fact  /  are  these  authentic ;  are  they  really  bear- 
ing upon,  or  connected  with,  the  subject ;  do  they  com- 
prise a  full  and  fair  view  of  all  the  facts  which  ought 
to  be  brought  forward  in  reference  to  the  inquiry;  have 
we  reason  to  suspect  that  any  of  them  have  been  dis- 
guised or  modified, — that  important  facts  have  been 
omitted  or  kept  out  of  view, — that  the  author  has  not 
had  sufficient  opportunities  of  acquiring  the  facts  which 
he  ought  to  have  been  possessed  of, — or  that  he  has 
been  collecting  facts  on  one  side  of  a  question,  or  in 
support  of  a  particular  opinion  ? 

2.  What  propositions  are  assumed,  either  as  first  or 
intuitive  truths,  or  as  deductions  arising  out  of  former 
processes  of  investigation ;  and  are  we  satisfied  that 
these  are  all  legitimate  and  correct?  In  particular, 
does  he  make  any  statement  in  regard  to  two  or  more 
events  being  connected  as  cause  and  effect  /  and  is  this 
connection  assumed  on  sufficient  grounds ;  does  he  as- 
sume  any  general  principle  as  applicable  to  a  certain 
class  of  facts  /  is  this  principle  in  itself  a  fact,  and  does 
it  really  apply  to  all  the  cases  which  he  means  to  in- 
clude under  it ;  have  wTe  any  reason  to  believe  that  it  has 
been  deduced  from  an  insufficient  number  of  facts, — or 
is  it  a  mere  fictitious  hypothesis,  founded  upon  a  prin- 
ciple which  cannot  be  proved  to  have  a  real  existence  ? 

3.  Do  these  assumed  principles  and  facts  really  be- 
long to  the  same  subject — or,  in  other  words,  do  the 
facts  belong  to  that  class  to  which  the  principles  apply? 

4.  Are  the  leading  terms'  which  he  employs  fully  and 
distinctly  defined  as  to  their  meaning  ;  does  he  employ 
them  in  their  common  and  recognized  acceptation ;  and 
Joes  -he  uniformly  use  than  in  the  same  sense;  or 
does  he  seem  to  attach  different  meanings  to  the  same 
term  in  different  parts  of  the  argument? 


VALIDITY    OF    A    PROCESS    OF    REASONING.  145 

5.  What  are  the  new  conclusions  which  he  deduces 
from  the  whole  mew  of  the  subject;  are  these  correct 
and  valid  ;  and  do  they  really  follow  from  the  premises 
laid  down  in  the  previous  parts  of  his  argument?  For, 
on  this  head,  it  is  always  to  be  kept  in  mind,  that  a  con- 
clusion may  be  true,  while  it  does  not  follow  from  the 
argument  that  has  been  brought  to  prove  it :  in  such  a 
case  the  argument  is  false. 

Much  of  the  confusion,  fallacy,  and  sophistry  of  rea- 
soning arises  from  these  points  not  being  sufficiently 
attended  to,  and  distinctly  and  rigidly  investigated. 
An  argument  may  appear  fair  and  consecutive,  but 
when  we  rigidly  examine  it  we  may  find  that  the  rea- 
soner  has,  in  his  premises,  contrived  to  introduce  some 
statement  which  is  not  true  in  point  of  fact,  or  some 
bold  general  position  which  is  not  correct,  or  not 
proved  ;  or  that  he  has  left  out  some  fact,  or  some  prin- 
ciple, which  ought  to  have  been  brought  forward  in  a 
prominent  manner,  as  closely  connected  with  the  in- 
quiry. Hence  the  necessity  for  keeping  constantly  in 
view  the  various  sources  of  fallacy  to  which  every  process 
of  reasoning  is  liable,  and  for  examining  the  elements 
rigidly  and  separately  before  we  admit  the  conclusion. 

A  process  of  reasoning  is  to  be  distinguished  from  a 
process  of  investigation  j  and  both  ma}7  be  illustrated 
in  the  following  manner : 

All  reasoning  must  be  founded  on  facts,  and  the  as- 
certained relations  of  these  facts  to  each  other  /  viz., 
those  of  resemblance,  cause,  effect,  &c.  The  statement 
of  an  ascertained  relation  of  two  facts  to  each  other  is 
called  a  proposition)  such  as, — that  A  is  equal  to  B; 
that  C  has  a  close  resemblance  to  D ;  that  E  is  the 
cause  of  F,  &c.  These  statements,  propositions,  or  as- 
certained relations,  are  discovered  by  intuition  or  by 
processes  of  investigation. 


J  46  VALIDITY    OF   A   PROCESS   OF   REASONING. 

In  a  process  of  reasoning ,  again,  we  take  a  certain 
n  umber  of  such  propositions  or  ascertained  relations, 
and  deduce  from  them  certain  other  truths  or  relations, 
arising  out  of  the  mutual  connection  of  some  of  these 
propositions  to  each  other.  Thus,  if  I  state  as  proposi- 
tions, ascertained  by  processes  of  investigation,  that  A 
is  equal  to  B,  and  that  B  is  equal  to  C,  I  immediately 
decide  by  a  single  step  of  reasoning  that  A  is  equal  to 
C  in  consequence  of  the  mutual  relation  which  both  A 
and  C  have  to  B. 

Such  a  process  may  be  rendered  more  complicated  in 
two  ways : — 1.  By  the  number  of  such  ascertained  re- 
lations, which  we  require  to  bear  in  mind  and  compare 
with  each  other  before  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion. 
Thus  the  relation  that  A  is  equal  to  E  might  rest  on 
such  a  series  of  relations  as  the  following :  A  is  equal 
to  B  ;  B  is  the  double  of  C ;  C  is  the  half  of  D  ;  T>  is 
equal  to  E ;  therefore  A  is  equal  to  E. 

2.  By  the  propositions  which  are  the  conclusions  of 
one  or  more  steps  in  a  process  becoming  the  premises  in 
a  subsequent  step.  Thus, — I  may  take  as  one  process, 
A  is  equal  to  B,  and  B  is  equal  to  C ;  therefore  A  is 
equal  to  C ; — and,  as  a  distinct  process,  C  is  equal  to  D 
and  D  is  equal  to  E ;  therefore  C  is  equal  to  E.  The 
conclusions  from  these  two  processes  I  then  take  as  the 
premises  in  a  third  process,  thus :  It  has  been  proved 
that  A  is  equal  to  C,  and  that  C  is  equal  to  E ;  there- 
fore A  is  equal  to  E. 

In  examining  the  validity  of  such  processes,  there 
are  two  circumstances  or  objects  of  inquiry  which  we 
ought  to  keep  constantly  in  view : 

1.  Have  we  confidence  in  the  accuracy  of  the  alleged 
facts  and  ascertained  relations  which  form  the  premi- 
ses? Can  we  rely  on  the  process  of  investigation  by 
which  it  is  said  to  have  been  ascertained  that  A  is 
equal  to  B,  and  that  B  is  equal  to  C,  &e  3 


VALIDITY    OF    A    PROCESS    OF    REASONING.  147 

2.  Are  the  various  propositions  in  the  series  so  rela- 
ted as  to  bring  out  a  new  truth  or  a  new  relation  f 
For  it  is  to  be  kept  in  mind,  that  a  series  of  proposi- 
tions may  all  be  true  and  yet  lead  to  nothing :  such 
propositions,  for  example,  as  that  A  is  equal  to  B,  C  is 
equal  to  D,  E  is  equal  to  F.  There  is  here  no  mutual 
relation,  and.  no  new  truth  arises  out  of  the  series.  But 
when  I  say  A  is  equal  to  B,  and  B  is  equal  to  C,  a  new 
truth  is  immediately  disclosed  in  consequence  of  the 
relation  which  both  A  and  C  have  to  B ;  namely,  that 
A  is  equal  to  C. 

Inventive  genius,  in  regard  to  processes  of  reasoning % 
consists  in  finding  out  relations  or  propositions  which 
are  thus  capable  of  disclosing  new  truths  or  new  rela- 
tions ;  and  in  placing  them  in  that  order  which  is  cal- 
culated to  show  how  those  new  relations  arise  out  ot 
them.  This  is  the  exorcise  of  a  reflecting  mind ;  and 
there  may  be  much  acquired,  knowledge,  that  is,  many 
facts  accumulated  by  memory  alone,  without  any  de- 
gree of  this  exercise  or  habit  of  reflection.  But  both 
are  required  for  forming  a  well-cultivated  mind :  the 
memory  must  be  stored  with  information,  that  is,  ascer- 
tained facts  and  ascertained  relations ;  and  the  power 
of  reflection  must  be  habituated  to  discover  new  truths 
or  new  relations  by  a  comparison  of  these  facts  and  as- 
certained relations  with  each  other.  For  the  disco veiy 
of  new  truths  may  consist  either  of  new  facts  or  of  new 
relations  among  facts  previously  known.  Thus,  it  might 
happen  that  we  had  long  been  familiar  with  two  facts, 
without  being  aware  that  they  had  any  particular  con- 
nection. If  we  were  then  to  ascertain  that  the  one  was 
the.cause  of  the  other,  it  would  be  a  real  and  important 
discovery  of  a  new  truth,  though  it  wxmld  consist  only 
of  a- new  relation  between  facts  which  had  long  been 
known  to  us.] 

[We  return  now  to  Professor  Barron's  Lectnre.1 


148  IGNORATIO    ELENCHI. 


Logicians  have  divided  sophistry  also  into  different 
kinds ;  the  most  remarkable  of  which  it  will  be  proper 
to  specify,  because  they  are  very  common.  The  first  is 
called  Ignoratio  Elenchi,  and  consists  in  mistaking  or 
misrepresenting  the  state  of  the  question  under  discus- 
sion. This  species  occurs  in  most  controversies,  but 
particularly  in  political  ones,  which  now  chiefly  engage 
men  of  learning  and  ability.  Religious  and  philosophi- 
cal controversies  have,  fortunately  for  the  peace  of  so- 
ciety, almost  totally  disappeared.  The  moment  a  writer 
engages  in  controversy,  in  spite  of  all  the  attention  he 
can  maintain,  partialities  lay  hold  of  his  mind ;  his  pas- 
sions warp  and  mislead  his  understanding.  He  reads 
the  performances  of  his  antagonist  under  the  influence 
of  dispositions  which  induce  him  to  mistake  their  mean- 
ing. He  discovers  malevolent  or  insidious  designs, 
which  are  perceptible  by  nobody  but  himself;  and  he 
imputes  principles  and  views  to  his  opponent  which  the 
latter  never  entertained  or  disavows.  He  introduces 
principles  and  views  of  his  own,  and  he  reasons  and 
speculates  about  them  as  if  they  were  admitted  by  the 
opposite  party.* 

[*  Dr.  Watts  thus  states  and  illustrates  the  Ignoratio  EUnchi : — It  occurs 
•when  something  else  is  proved  which  has  neither  any  necessary  connection  or 
consistency  with  the  thing  inquired,  and  consequently  gives  no  determination 
to  the  inquiry,  though  it  may  seem  at  first  sight  to  determine  the  question  ;  as 
if  any  should  conclude  that  St.  Paul  was  not  a  native  Jew,  by  proving  that 
he  was  born  a  Roman  :  or  if  they  should  pretend  to  determine  that  he  was 
neither  Roman  nor  Jew,  by  proving  that  he  was  born  in  Tarsus  in  Cihcia. 
These  sophisms  are  refuted  by  showing  that  all  these  three  may  be  true, 
for  he  was  born  of  Jewish  parents  in  the  city  of  Tarsus,  and  by  some  pecu- 
liar privilege  granted  to  his  parents  or  his  native  city,  he  was  born  a  deni- 
zen of  Rome.  Thus  not  one  of  these  three  characters  of  the  apostle  is  in- 
consistent with  the  others,  and  therefore  the  proving  of  one  of  thew  to  be 
true  does  not  refute  the  others. 

Dispute™,  when  they  grow  warm,  are  apt  to  run  into  this  fallacy.    Thev 


Of    THE 

UNIVERSr 

or 

PETITIO    PRINCIPII.  149 

2.  Another  species  of  sophistry  is  called  Petitio  Prin- 
eipii,  and  consists  in  assuming  as  true  the  proposition 
under  debate.  This  species  is  not  very  frequent  in  busi- 
ness, because  few  men  are  so  void  of  discernment,  or  so 
destitute  of  delicacy  and  regard  to  truth,  as  confidently 
to  maintain  what  they  have  not  attempted  to  prove.  It 
is  not,  however,  unfrequent  in  philosophical  and  politi- 
cal investigations,  in  which,  either  on  account  of  the  in- 
tricacy or  uncertainty  of  the  subjects,  disputants  arro- 
gate more  liberty  of  obtruding  their  opinions  upon  their 
antagonists,  or  presume  more  readily  that  a  bold  asser- 
tion may  be  admitted  for  a  proof. 

The  Peripatetics  pretended  to  prove  that  the  centre  of  the  earth 
is  the  centre  of  the  universe,  by  the  following  manifest  petitio  prin- 
cipii.  M  All  bodies  must  move  towards  the  centre  of  the  universe, 
but  we  find  from  experience  that  all  bodies  move  towards  the  cen- 
tre of  the  earth ;  therefore  the  centre  of  the  earth  is  the  centre  of 
the  universe."  This  argument  proves  nothing ;  for  although  we 
allow  that  all  bodies  with  which  we  are  acquainted,  move  towards 
the  centre  of  the  earth,  yet  it  does  not  follow  that  all  bodies  in  the 
universe  move  towards  the  centre  of  the  earth.  The  truth  is,  that 
a  body  near  the  surface  of  the  earth,  moves  towards  it  only  by  the 
difference  of  attraction  it  exerts  above  the  other  great  bodies  in  na- 
ture; that  all  the  bodies  in  the  solar  system  are  attracted  towards  a 
pomt  near  the  surface  of  the  sun  ;  and  that  all  the  bodies  of  our  so- 
lar system,  and  perhaps  of  all  the  systems  of  the  universe,  are  at- 


dress  up  the  opinion  of  their  adversary  as  they  please,  and  ascribe  senti- 
ments to  him  which  he  does  not  acknowledge  ;  and  when  they  have,  with 
a  great  deal  of  pomp,  attacked  and  confounded  these  images  of  straw  of 
their  own  making,  they  triumph  over  their  adversary  as  though  they  had 
utterly  confuted  his  opinion. 

.  It  is  a  fallacy  of  the  same  hind  which  a  disputant  is  guilty  of,  when  he 
finds  that  he  cannot  fairly  prove  the  question  first  proposed  :  he  then  with 
subtlety  turns  the  discourse  aside  to  some  other  kindred  point  which  he  can 
prove ,  and  exults  in  that  n<ew  argument  wherein  his  opponent  never  contra- 
dicted, him. 

The  way  to  prevent  this  fallacy,  is  by  keeping  the  eye  fixed  on  the  pre- 
cise point  of  dispute,  and  neither  wandering  from  it  ourselves,  nor  suffering 
our  antagonist  to  wander  from  it,  or  substitute  any  thing  else  in  its  room.} 


150    ARGUMENT   FROM    ONE    PARTICULAR    TO    ANOTHER. 

tracted  towards  some  other  point,  surely  not  the  centre  of  the 
earth,  which  is  the  centre  of  the  whole  * 

3.  Sophistry,  again,  frequently  appears  in  arguing 
from  one  particular  to  another,  or  in  inferring  general 
conclusions  from  particular  cases.  The  logicians  call 
it  a  "dicto  secundum  quid,  ad  dictum  simpliciter." 

The  argument  of  the  Epicureans  of  old,  to  prove  the  gods  of  hu- 
man shape,  affords  a  pertinent  example  of  this  sort  of  sophistry. 
They  maintained  that  the  human  was  the  most  beautiful  form  of  all 
those  with  which  men  were  acquainted,  or  of  which  they  had  any 
conception,  but  the  most  beautiful  form  is  always  supposed  to  be- 
long to  the  gods,  the  best  of  beings  in  the  universe ;  it  was,  there- 
fore, reasonable  to  conclude,  that  they  were  endued  with  the  hu- 
man form.  No  connection  subsists  between  the  nature  of  mau 
and  that  of  the  gods,  to  induce  us  to  believe  the  latter  must  pos- 
sess the  shape  of  the  former;  and  we  cannot  infer,  because  the 
figure  of  man  is  the  most  beautiful  we  are  acquainted  with,  that 
therefore  the  form  of  the  gods,  admitting  them  to  have  some  form, 
cannot  be  more  beautiful  than  the  human.  The  argument,  that  the 
form  of  a  pine-apple,  being  the  most  beautiful,  perhaps,  of  vegetable 
forms,  is  also  the  form  of  the  gods,  would  be  equally  conclusive. 
It  would  be  an  inference  from  one  particular  to  another,  between 
which  there  is  no  relation ;  or  which  have  nothing  in  common, 
whence  such  an  inference  can  be  deduced. 

Should  I,  again,  conclude,  from  the  foolish  or  iniquitous  behavior 
of  some  individuals,  of  a  numerous  order  of  men,  that  ail  the  order 
are  fools  or  rogues ;  or,  from  the  unwholesomeness  or  bad  taste  of 
some  sort  of  animal  and  vegetable  food,  that  all  sorts  are  unwhole- 


[*  Dr.  Watts  defines  this  sophism  as  a  supposition  of  what  is  not  granted  ; 
that  is,  when  any  proposition  is  sought  to  be  proved  by  the  same  proposition  in 
other  words,  or  by  something  that  is  equally  uncertain  and  disputed :  as  if  any 
one  undertake  to  prove  that  the  human  soul  is  extended  through  all  the 
parts  of  the  body,  because  it  resides  in  every  member,  which  is  but  the 
same  thing  in  other  words.  Or,  if  a  Papist  should  pretend  to  prove  that 
his  religion  is  the  only  catholic  religion,  and  is  derived  from  Christ  and  his 
apostles,  because  it  agrees  with  the  doctrine  of  all  the  fathers  of  the  Church, 
all  the  holy  martyrs,  and  all  the  Christian  world  throughout  all  ages: 
whereas  this  is  the  great  point  in  contest,  whether  their  religion  does  agree 
with  that  of  all  the  ancients  and  the  primitive  Christians,  or  no.j 


FALSE    HYPOTHESES.  151 

some  or  unpleasant ;  or,  because  many  bad  kings  and  magistrates 
have  been  in  the  world,  that  all  kings  and  magistrates  are  bad 
men ;  I  argue  from  premises  insufficient  to  support  my  inference, 
because  I  extend  the  latter  much  farther  than  the  former,  and  sup- 
pose there  are  no  exceptions,  where  there  may  be  thousands.  This 
illegitimate  and  illiberal  logic  frequently  appears  in  the  intercourse 
of  society,  when  all  the  connections,  the  family,  the  friends,  the 
order  of  an  impudent  or  a  criminal  person,  are  branded  with  the 
improprieties  and  the  errors  of  which  he  only  has  been  guilty; 
while  they  entertain,  perhaps,  a  more  lively  disapprobation  of  his 
conduct  than  those  who  load  them  with  reproach.  It  is,  indeed, 
difficult  to  decide  whether  such  a  spirit  is  more  characteristic  of 
cruelty,  or  want  of  candor.  It  is  cruel,  for  it  displays  a  strong  dis- 
position to  criminate  the  innocent,  and  to  pour  into  a  delicate  and 
honorable  mind  that  pungent  vexation  which  results  from  the  loss 
of  reputation,  under  a  consciousness  of  having  done  nothing  to  de- 
serve such  a  misfortune.  It  is  void  of  candor,  because  no  inter- 
course has  subsisted  between  the  culprit  and  the  party  accused, 
which  can  authorize  any  inference  of  blame  from  the  one  to  the 
other;  and  it  is  not  a  little  uncandid  to  deduce  an  inference  with- 
out, or  contrary,  to  premises. 

4.  Many  errors  and  much  false  reasoning  result 
from  forming  hypotheses,  to  account  for  the  phenomena 
of  nature,  or  the  actions  of  men,  without  endeavoring 
to  investigate  the  true  causes  and  motives  from  the 
effects.  This  species  of  sophistry  the  logicians  call 
Causam  assignare  quw  causa  non  est.  Philosophers 
and  speculative  politicians  have  been  most  prone  to  in- 
dulge in  this  kind  of  ratiocination,  and  many  curious 
examples  of  it  are  to  be  found  in  physical  books,  and 
in  real  life. 

Before  the  illustrious  reformation  of  philosophy  introduced  by 
Lord  Bacon,  and  prosecuted  since  his  time  by  modern  philosophers, 
particularly  by  Sir  Isaac"  Kewton,  the  whole  science  of  nature  was 
occupied  about  hypotheses.  A  philosopher  never  looked  out  to 
obtain  knowledge  of  the  effects  and  operations  actually  existing,  till 
he  had  formed  in  his  closet  some  theory  concerning  them,  and  then 
he  proceeded  to  twist  and  to  violate  every  appearance,  till  it  should 


152  FALSE   HYPOTHESES. 

accord  with  the  speculation  he  had  thought  proper  to  adopt.  One 
of  the  most  prolific  of  these  theories  was  the  abhorrence  which 
philosophers  supposed  nature  entertained  against  a  vacuum. 
Prompted  by  the  excessive  obstinacy  of  this  disposition,  she  made 
the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  replenish  every  vacuity  which  the 
ordinary  operations  of  causes,  or  the  artifices  of  men,  might  attempt 
to  impose  upon  her.  Hence  a  bottle,  out  of  which  the  air  had  been 
extracted,  was  broken  to  pieces,  not  by  the  weight  of  the  external 
air,  its  tru3  cause,  but  by  the  abhorrence  nature  entertained  of  a 
vacuum.  Water  ascended  in  a  pump,  not  from  the  pressure  of  the 
atmosphere,  but  from  the  same  abhorrence  of  a  vacuum. 

All  the  heavenly  bodies,  says  Aristotle,  in  his  Physics,  must  move 
in  circles,  because  a  circle  is  the  most  perfect  of  all  figures,  and  be- 
cause bodies  moving  in  such  figures  meet  with  least  resistance.  We 
would  have  been  much  obliged  to  him,  had  he  told  us  how  he  knew 
that  the  circle  is  the  most  perfect  of  all  figures,  and  that  bodies 
moving  in  circles  meet  with  least  resistance ;  but  both  these  reasons 
are  mere  suppositions,  contrary  to  truth,  as  well  as  the  opinion  that 
the  heavenly  bodies  move  in  circles,  which  he  might  have  found  to 
be  erroneous  by  a  little  observation.  The  same  philosopher  offers 
the  following  singular  ratiocination,  to  support  the  hypothesis  he 
had  adopted  concerning  the  eternity  and  perfection  of  the  world : 
"The  world  is  a  perfect  production,  because  it  is  composed  of 
bodies ;  and  bodies  are  perfect  magnitudes,  because  they  consist  of 
three  dimensions,  length,  breadth,  and  thickness,  and  cannot  admit 
of  more.  Lines  are  not  perfect  magnitudes,  because  they  have 
length  only,  which  may  easily  be  made  to  move  into  a  surface. 
Surfaces  are  not  perfect  magnitudes,  because  they  have  only  length 
and  breadth,  which  may  easily  be  made  to  move  into  a  solid." 

All  this  reasoning  is  mere  conjecture,  and  relates  to  the  qualities 
only  of  magnitudes,  not  in  the  least  to  their  merits.  The  occult 
qualities  of  the  same  author,  and  his  followers,  are  not  more  satis- 
factory sources  of  natural  knowledge.  The  pulse  beats  ;  the  load- 
stone points  to  the  pole ;  tartar  is  emetic ;  poppy  produces  sleep — 
because  there  is  a  beating  quality  in  the  pulse,  an  attractive  quality 
in  the  loadstone,  an  emetic  quality  in  tartar,  and  a  soporific  quality 
in  poppy.  Such  philosophizing  resembles-  the  play  of  children,  or 
the  ridicule  empyrics,  rather  than  the  serious  investigations  of 
grave  inquirers.  It  furnishes  a  humiliating  picture  of  the  progress  of 
natural  philosophy  among  the  ancients,  when  such  reasoning  could 
be  committed  to  writing,  or  could  find  any  readers  and  admirers. 


FALSE    HYPOTHESES.  153 

Some  apology,  however,  may  be  offered  for  the  an- 
cients, because  they  had  not  a  Bacon  to  point  out  the 
genuine  sources  of  natural  knowledge,  and  to  guide 
their  steps  in  the  investigation  of  it ;  but  what  excuse 
shall  we  offer  for  Descartes,  who,  after  the  days  of 
Bacon — after  considerable  progress  had  been  made  by 
Kepler  and  Copernicus  in  discovering  the  true  theory 
of  the  solar  system — pretended  to  impose  on  the  world 
a  whimsical  hypothesis,  the  result  of  the  most  romantic 
imagination  in  philosophy,  destitute  of  all  foundation  in 
experience,  and  contradictory  to  the  greater  part  of  the 
phenomena.  It  is  still  more  astonishing  that  such  a 
system  should  have  found  abettors,  and  that  the  philos- 
ophy of  Newton  should  have  had  to  struggle  hard  for 
a  considerable  time  before  it  could  obtain  a  complete 
victory. 

To  account,  then,  for  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  Des- 
cartes filled  the  solar  system  with  spherical  vortices,  or  circular 
currents  of  fluid  matter,  by  which  he  supposed  the  primary  planets 
were  carried  in  streams  round  the  sun,  and  the  secondary  planets 
in  similar  streams  round  their  primaries.  But  may  we  not  ask  a 
thousand  unanswerable  questions  with  respect  to  this  wild  theory  ? 
Is  the  specific  gravity  of  the  matter  which  composes  these  vortices 
greater  than  that  of  the  planets  it  supports  and  carries  along,  wThile 
no  glasses  have  rendered  it  visible  ?  Whence  is  it  supplied — what 
makes  it  move — or  has  it  any  thing  in  common  with  any  known 
fluid  ?  What  produces  the  cohesion  of  its  parts — or  how  are  the 
particles  of  one  vortex  prevented  from  interference  with  the  par- 
ticles of  other  vortices,  even  when  they  intersect  one  another?  If 
all  be  resolved  into  the  power  of  Omnipotence,  the  causes  of  whose 
operations  are  inexplicable  or  unknown,  what  need  was  there  for 
vortices  as  a  secondary  cause  ?  The  only  conceivable  use  of  them 
is  to  carry  on  the  motipns  of  the  heavenly  bodies ;  and  it  was  surely 
as  easy  for  Omnipotence  to  accomplish  that  purpose  without  them 
as  with  them.  They  seem  not  superior  in  respect  of  ingenuity  as  a 
philosophical  cause,  to  the  contrivance  of  the  Indian  sciolist,  who 
introduced  the  back  of  a  tortoise  to  support  the  elephant  which 
supported  the  globe  of  the  earth. 


154  REASONING    IN    A    CIRCLE. 

[In  the  language  of  Dr.  Watts :  "There  is  scarcely 
any  thing  more  common  in  human  life  than  the  sort  of 
deceiiful  argument  just  explained.  If  any  two  acciden- 
tal events  happen  to  concur  [to  be  contemporaneous], 
one  is  presently  made  the  cause  of  the  other. 

"  This  sophism  was  found  even  in  the  early  ages  of  the  world. 
When  the  holy  Job  was  surrounded  with  uncommon  miseries,  his 
own  friends  inferred  that  he  was  a  most  heinous  criminal,  and 
charged  him  with  aggravated  guilt  as  the  cause  of  his  calamities, 
though  God  himself  by  a  voice  from  heaven  solved  this  uncharitable 
sophism,  and  cleared  his  servant  Job  of  that  severe  charge. 

u  By  the  same  sophism,  the  Reformation  from  Popery  has  been 
charged  with  the  murder  and  blood  of  millions,  which,  in  truth,  is 
to  be  imputed  to  the  tyranny  of  the  princes  and  the  priests,  who 
would  not  suffer  the  people  to  reform  their  sentiments  and  their 
practices  according  to  the  word  of  God.  Thus  Christianity,  in  the 
early  ages,  was  charged  by  the  heathens  with  all  the  calamities 
which  befell  the  Roman  empire,  because  the  Christians  renounced 
the  heathen  gods  and  idols." 

"  The  way  to  relieve  ourselves  from  such  sophisms, 
and  to  secure  ourselves  from  the  danger  of  falling  into 
them,  is  an  honest  and  diligent  inquiry  into  the  real 
causes  of  things,  with  a  constant  watchfulness  against 
all  those  prejudices  that  might  warp  the  judgment 
aside  from  truth  in  that  inquiry."] 

5.  Another  species  of  sophistry  is  reasoning  in  a 
circle',  or  the  assuming  of  one  proposition  to  prove  an- 
other, and  then  resting  the  proof  of  the  first  on  the  evi- 
dence of  the  second.  The  writers  of  the  church  of  Rome 
are  often  accused  of  committing  such  blunders.  They 
first  prove  the  divine  auth6rity  of  their  church  from  the 
holy  Scriptures,  and  then  they  employ  the  infallibility 
of  the  pope  to  confirm  their  interpretation  of  the  Scrip- 
tures. They  establish  the  infallibility  of  the  pope  by 
the  testimony  of  the  senses,  and  they  employ  the  same 
infallibility  to  destroy  the  testimony  of  the  senses,  when 


ILLUSTRATIONS   INSTEAD   OF    PROOFS.  155 

these  remonstrate  against  the  credibility  of  the  doctrine 
of  transubstantiation. 

[The  following  valuable  additions  on  this  subject  are 
derived  from  Dr.  Abercrombie's  "  Intellectual  Powers," 
part  iii.  sec.  4. 

6.  A  pregnant  source  of  fallacy  is  where  a  reasoner 
assumes  a  principle,  and  then  launches  out  into  various 
illustrations  and  analogies  which  are  artfully  made  to 
hear  the  appearance  of  proofs.  The  cautions  to  be  kept 
in  mind  in  such  a  case  are,  that  the  illustrations  and  the 
analogies  may  be  of  importance,  provided  the  principle 
has  been  proved ;  but  that  if  it  has  not  been  proved,  the 
illustrations  must  go  for  nothing,  and  even  analogies 
seldom  have  any  weight  which  can  be  considered  as  of 
the  nature  of  evidence.  Fallacies  of  this  class  are  most 
likely  to  occur  in  the  declamations  of  public  speakers, 
and  when  they  are  set  off  with  all  the  powers  of  elo- 
quence, it  is  often  difficult  to  detect  them. 

The  questions  which  the  hearer  should  propose  to 
himself  in  such  cases,  are — Does  this  really  contain  any 
proof  bearing  upon  the  subject,  or  is  it  mere  illustration 
and  analogy,  in  itself  proving  nothing  ?  If  so,  has  the 
reasoner  previously  established  his  principle,  or  has 
he  assumed  it,  and  trusted  to  these  analogies  as  his 
proofs  \ 

7.  A  fallacy  somewhat  analogous  to  the  preceding, 
consists  in  arguing  for  or  against  a  doctrine  on  the 
ground  of  its  supposed  tendency,  leaving  out  of  view  the 
primary  question  of  its  truth. 

Thus,  a  speculator  in  theology  will  contend,  in  regard 
to  a  doctrine  which  he  opposes,  that  it  is  derogatory  to 
the  character  of  the  Deity;  and,  respecting  another 
which  he  brings  forward,  that  it  represents  the  Deity 
in  an  aspect  more  accordant  with  the  benignity  of  his 
character.     The  previous  question  in  all  such  cases  isr 


156  FALLACIES    IN    ANALOGICAL   REASONING. 

not  what  is  most  accordant  with  our  notions  respecting 
the  divine  character,  but  what  is  truth. 

8.  When  a  principle  which  is  true  of  one  case,  or  one 
class  of  cases,  is  extended  by  analogy  to  others  which 
differ  in  some  important  particulars.  The  caution  to 
be  observed  here,  is,  to  inquire  strictly  whether  the 
cases  are  analogous,  or  whether  there  exists  any  'differ- 
ence which  makes  the  principle  not  applicable. 

An  example  of  this  fallacy  is  found  in  Mr.  Hume's 
objection  to  miracles,  that  they  are  violations  of  the  es- 
tablished order  of  nature.  The  cases  are  not  analo- 
gous ;  for  miracles  do  not  refer  to  the  common  course 
f  nature,  but  to  the  operation  of  an  agency  altogether 
ew  and  peculiar.  Arguments  founded  upon  analogy, 
therefore,  require  to  be  used  with  the  utmost  caution 
when  they  are  employed  directly  for  the  discovery  or 
the  establishment  of  truth. 

But  there  is  another  purpose  to  which  they  may  be 
applied  with  much  greater  freedom,  namely,  for  repel- 
ling objections.  Thus,  if  we  find  a  person  bringing  ob- 
jections against  a  particular  doctrine,  it  is  a  sound  and 
valid  mode  of  reasoning  to  contend  that  he  receives 
ioctrines  which  rest  upon  the  same  kind  of  evidence  ; 
or  that  similar  objections  might  be  urged  with  equal 
force  against  truths  which  it  is  impossible  to  call  in 
question.  It  is  in  this  manner  that  the  argument  from 
analogy  is  employed  in  the  valuable  work  of  Bishop 
Butler.  He  does  not  derive  from  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture any  direct  argument  in  support  of  natural  or  re- 
vealed religion  ;  but  shows  that  many  of  the  objections 
which  are  urged  against  the  truths  of  religion  might 
be  brought  against  circumstances  in  the  economy  and 
course  of  nature  which  are  known  and  undoubted 
facts. 

9.  A  fallacy  the  reverse  of  ths  former  is  used  by 


INVERTING  "PROPOSITIONS        J  157 

sophistica  writers ;  namely,  when  two  cases  are  strictly 
analogous*,  they  endeavor  to  prove  that  they  are  not  so 
by  pointing  out  trivial  differences,  not  calculated  in 
any  degree  to  weaken  the  force  of  the,  analogy. 

10.  When  a  true  general  principle  is  made  to  apply 
exclusively  to  one  fact,  or  one  class  of  facts,  while  it  is 
equally  true  of  various  others.  This  is  called  in  logical 
language  the  no- -distribution  of  the  middle  term. 

In  an  example  given  by  logical  writers,  one  is  sup- 
posed to  maintain  that  corn  is  necessary  for  life,  because 
food  is  necessary  for  life,  and  corn  is  food.  It  is  true 
that  food  is  necessary,  but  this  does  not  apply  to  any 
one  particular  kind  of  food :  it  means  only  that  food  ot 
some  kind  or  other  is  so.  When  simply  stated,  the  fal- 
lacy of  such  a  position  is  at  once  obvious,  but  it  may 
be  introduced  into  an  argument  in  such  a  manner  as 
not  to  be  so  immediately  detected. 

11.  When  an  acknowledged  proposition  is  inverted, 
and  the  converse  assumed  to  be  equally  true. 

We  may  say,  for  example,  that  a  badly  governed 
country  must  be  distressed  ;  but  we  are  not  entitled  to 
assume  that  every  distressed  country  is  badly  governed, 
for  there  may  be  many  other  sources  of  national  dis- 
tress. I  may  say  u  all  wise  men  live  temperately,"  but 
it  does  not  follow  that  every  man  who  lives  temperately 
is  a  wise  man. 

It  is,  at  the  same  time,  to  be  kept  in  mind  that  some 
propositions  do  admit  of  being  inverted  and  still  re- 
maining equally  true.  This  holds  most  remarkably 
of  propositions  which  are  universally  negative,  as  in 
an  example  given  by  writers  on  logic — uNo  rumi 
nating  animal  is  a  beast  of  prey."  It  follows,  as  equal- 
ly true,  that  no  beast  of  prey  ruminates.  But  if  I  were 
to  vary  che  proposition  by  saying,  u  All  animals  which 
do  not  xiiminate  are  beasts  of  prey,"  this  would  be  ob- 


158        FALLACY    OF   DIVISION    AND    OF   COMPOSITION. 

viously  false :  for  it  does  not  arise  out  of  the  formei 
statement. 

12.  A  frequent  source  of  fallacy  among  sophistical 
writers,  consists  in  boldly  applying  a  character  to  a  clast 
of  facts  in  regard  to  which  it  carries  a  general  aspect 
of  truth,  without  attention  to  important  distinctions  by 
which  the  statement  requires  to  be  modified. 

Thus  it  has  been  objected  to  our  belief  of  the  mira- 
cles of  the  sacred  writings,  that  they  rest  upon  the  evi- 
dence of  testimony,  and  that  testimony  is  fallacious. 
Now,  when  we  speak  of  testimony  in  general,  we  may 
say,  with  an  appearance  of  truth,  that  it  is  fallacious. 
But,  in  point  of  fact,  testimony  is  to  be  referred  to  vari- 
ous species;  and  though  a  large  proportion  of  these 
may  be  fallacious,  there  is  a  species  of  testimony  on 
which  we  rely  with  absolute  confidence  ; — that  is,  we 
feel  it  to  be  as  improbable  that  this  kind  of  testimony 
should  deceive  us,  as  that  we  should  be  disappointed  in 
our  expectation  of  the  uniformity  of  nature. 

The  kind  of  sophism  now  referred  to,  seems  to  corre- 
spond with  that  which  logical  writers  have  named  the 
fallacy  of  division.  It  consists  in  applying  to  facts  in 
their  separate  state  what  only  belongs  to  them  collec- 
tively. The  converse  of  it  is  the  fallacy  of  composition. 
It  consists  in  applying  to  the  facts  collectively  what  be 
longs  only  to  them,  or  to  some  of  them^  in  their  sepa- 
rate state ; — as  if  one  were  to  show  that  a  certain  kind 
of  testimony  is  absolutely  to  be  relied  on,  and  thence 
were  to  contend  that  testimony  in  general  is  worthy  of 
absolute  confidence. 

13.  A  frequent  fallacy  consists  in  first  overturning  an 
unsound  argument,  and  thence  reasoning  against  the 
doctrine  which  this  argument  was  meant  to  support 
This  is  the  part  of  a  mere  casuist,  not  of  a  sincere  in- 
quirer after  truth :  for  it  by  no  means  follows  that  a 


AN  ARGUMENT  PARTLY  TRUE,  PARTLY  FALSE.   159 

doctrine  is  false  because  unsound  arguments' have  been 
adduced  in  support  of  it.  Some  remarkable  examples 
of  this  fallacy  relate  to  those  important  principles  com- 
monly called  first  truths,  which  admit  of  no  processes 
of  reasoning,  and  consequently  are  in  no  degree  affect- 
ed by  arguments  exposing  the  fallacy  of  such  processes. 

We  learn  from  this,  on  the  other  hand,  the  impor- 
tance of  avoiding  all  weak  and  inconclusive  arguments 
or  doubtful  statements,  for,  independently  of  the  open- 
ing which  they  give  for  sophistical  objections,  it  is  ob- 
vious that  on  other  grounds  the  reasoning  is  only  en- 
cumbered by  them.  It  is  the  part  of  the  casuist  to 
rest  the  weight  of  his  objections  on  such  weak  points, 
leaving  out  of  view  those  which  he  cannot  contend 
with.  It  may  even  happen  that  a  conclusion  is  true, 
though  the  whole  reasoning  may  have  been  weak,  un- 
sound, and  irrelevant.  The  casuist,  of  course,  in  such 
a  case  attacks  the  reasoning  and  not  the  conclusion. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  may  be  much  in  an  argu- 
ment which  is  true,  or  which  may  be  conceded  /  while 
the  most  important  part  of  it  is  untrue  and  the  conclu- 
sion false.  An  inexperienced  reasoner,  in  such  a  case, 
thinks  it  necessary  to  combat  every  point,  and  thus  ex- 
poses himself  to  sound  replies  from  his  adversary  on 
subjects  which  are  of  no  importance.  A  skilful  rea- 
soner concedes  or  passes  over  all  such  positions,  and 
rests  his  attack  on  those  in  which  the  fallacy  is  really 
involved. 

An  example  illustrative  of  this  subject  is  familiar  to 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  controversy  respect- 
ing our  idea  of  cduse  and  effect.  Mr.  Hume  stated  in  a 
clear  manner  the  doctrine,  that  this  idea  is  derived  en- 
tirely from  our  experience  of  a  uniform  sequence  of  two 
events ;  and  founded  on  this  an  argument  against  our 
belief  in  a  great  First  Cause.    This  led  to  a  contTo- 


160  FALLACIES    INTRODUCED  OBLIQUELY.'  . 

versy  respecting  the  original  doctrine  itself;  and  it  is 
not  many  years  since  it  was  contended  by  respectable 
individuals,  that  it  is  nothing  less  than  the  essence  ot 
atheism  to  maintain  that  our  notion  of  cause  and  effect 
originates  in  the  observation  of  a  uniform  sequence.  It 
is  now,  perhaps,  universally  admitted  that  this  doctrine 
is  correct,  and  that  the  sophism  of  Mr.  Hume  consisted 
in  deducing  from  it  conclusions  which  it  in  no  degree 
warranted.  This  important  distinction  we  formerly  al- 
luded to,  namely,  that  our  idea  of  cause  and  effect,  in 
regard  to  any  two  individual  events,  is  totally  distinct 
from  our  intuitive  impression  of  causation,  or  our  abso- 
lute conviction  that  every  event  must  have  an  adequate 
cause. 

14.  A  sophism  somewhat  connected  with  the  former 
consists  in  disproving  a  doctrine,  and  on  that  account 
assuming  the  opposite  doctrine  to  he  true.  It  may  be 
true,  but  its  truth  does  not  depend  upon  the  falsehood 
of  that  which  is  opposed  to  it ;  yet  this  will  be  found 
a  principle  of  not  unfrequent  occurrence  in  unsound 
reasonings. 

15.  Fallacies  are  often  introduced  in  what  may  he 
termed  an  oblique  manner,  or  as  if  upon  a  generally 
admitted  authority.  The  effect  of  this  is  to  take  off 
the  appearance  of  the  statement  being  made  directly 
by  the  author,  and  resting  upon  his  own  authority,  by 
which  we  might  be  led  to  examine  its  truth.  For  this 
purpose  it  is  put,  perhaps,  in  the  form  of  a  question,  or 
is  introduced  by  such  expressions  as  the  following : — 
"  It  is  a  remarkable  fact,"  "  It  is  somewhat  singular," 
"  It  has  been  argued  with  much  justice,"  "  It  will  be 
generally  admitted,"  6zc. 

16.  Fallacy  may  a^ise  from  leaving  the  main  sub- 
ject of  discussion,  and  arguing  upon  points  which 
have  hut  a  secondary  relation  to  it.    This  is  one  of-  the 


FALLACIES  IN  THE  USE  OF  TERMS.        161 

resources  of  the  casuist  when  he  finds  himself  in  the 
worst  of  the  argument. 

Nearly  allied  to  this,  is  the  art  of  skilfully  dropping 
part  of  a  statement^  when  the  reasoner  finds  he  cannot 
support  it,  and  going  on  boldly  with  the  remainder  as 
if  he  still  maintained  the  whole. 

17.  Mitch  of  the  fallacy  and  ambiguity  of  processes 
of  reasoning  depends  entirely  on  the  use  of  terms. 
This  may  consist  in  two  contending  parties  using  the 
same  word  in  different  meanings,  without  denning  what 
their  meanings  are ;  in  one  or  both  using  terms  in  a 
sense  different  from  their  commonly  recognized  accepta- 
tion, or  in  using  them  in  ane  sense  in  one  part  of  the 
argument,  and  in  another  in  a  different  part  of  it.  Such 
disputes,  accordingly,  are  often  interminable  ;  and  this 
mode  of  disputation  is  one  of  the  great  resources  of  the 
casuist,  or  of  him  who  argues  for  victory,  not  for  truth. 

The  remedy  is,  that  every  reasoner  shall  be  required 
clearly  to  define  the  terms  which  he  employs  :  and  that 
in  every  controversy  certain  premises  or  preliminaries 
shall  be  fixed  in  which  the  parties  are  agreed.  The 
ambiguity  of  terms  is  in  fact  so  extensive  a  source  of 
fallacy  that  scarcely  any  sophistical  argument  will  be 
found  free  from  it;  as  in  almost  every  language  the 
same  term  is  used  with  great  diversity  of  mean- 
ings. 

Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  term  faith.  It  means 
a  mere  system  of  opinions,  confidence  in  testimony, 
reliance  on  the  integrity,  fidelity,  and  stability  of  char- 
acter of  other  beings,  an  act  of  the  understanding  in 
regard  to  abstract  truth  presented  to  it,  and  a  mental 
condition  by  which  truths  of  another  description  exert 
a  uniform  influence  over  the  moral  feelings,  the  will, 
and  the  whole  character.  In  the  controversies  which 
have  arisen  out  of  this  word,  it  will  probably  be  found 


162        DISTORTED    VIEWS    AND    PARTIAL    STATEMENTS. 

that  these  various  meanings  have  not  been  sufficiently 
distinguished  from  each  other. 

A  celebrated  passage  in  the  u  Spirit  of  Laws"  has 
been  justly  referred  to  as  a  remarkable  example  of  the 
tame  kind  of  sophism.  "The  Deity,"  says  Montes- 
quieu, "has  his  laws  ;  the  material  wTorld  its  laws  ;  in- 
telligences superior  to  man  their  laws ;  the  brutes  their 
laws  ;  man  his  laws."  In  this  short  passage  the  term 
laws  is  employed,  probably  in  four  senses,  remarkably 
different. 

18.  There  are  various  other  sources  of  fallacy,  con- 
sisting chiefly  in  the  use  of  arguments  which  cannot  be 
admitted  as  relevant  in  regard  to  the  process  of  rea- 
soning, though  they  may  carry  a  certain  weight  in  ref- 
erence to  the  individuals  concerned.  Among  these 
may  be  reckoned  appeals  to  high  authorities,  to  popu- 
lar prejudices,  or  to  the  passions  of  the  multitude;  and 
what  is  called  the  argumentum  ad  hominem.  If  a 
person,  for  example,  be  arguing  in  support  of  a  particu- 
lar rule  of  conduct,  we  may  retort  upon  him  that  his 
own  conduct,  in  certain  instances,  was  in  direct  oppo- 
sition to  it.  This  may  be  very  true  in  regard  to  the 
individual,  but  can  have  no  influence  in  the  discussion 
of  the  question. 

19.  One  of  the  most  common  sources  of  fallacy  con- 
sists of  distorted  views  and  partial  statements, — such 
as  facts  disguised,  modified,  or  collected  T>n  one  side  of 
a  question ;  or  arguments  and  authorities  adduced  in 
support  of  particular  opinions,  leaving  out  of  view  those 
which  tend  to  different  conclusions. 

Misstatement,  in  one  form  or  another,  may  indeed 
be  considered  as  a  most  fruitful  source  of  controversy ; 
and,  amid  the  contests  of  rival  disputants,  the  chief  dif- 
ficulty which  meets  the  candid  inquirer  after  truth  is  tc 
have  the  subject  presented  to  his  mind  without  distortion 


SOUND    EXERCISE    OF    JUDGMENT.  163 

Hence  the  importance,  in  every  inquiry,  of  suspend- 
ing our  judgment,  and  of  patiently  devoting  ourselves 
to  clear  the  subject  from  all  imperfect  views  and  par- 
tial statements.  Without  the  most  anxious  attention  to 
this  rule,  a  statement  may  appear  satisfactory,  and  a 
deduction  legitimate,  which  are  in  fact  leading  us  wide- 
ly astray  from  the  truth. 


THE  SOUND  EXERCISE  OF  JUDGMENT  DISTINGUISHED  FROM 
THE  ART  OF  DISPUTATION. 

[From  Abercrombie.] 

The  sound  exercise  of  judgment  is  widely  distinct 
from  the  art  of  ingenious  disputation.  The  object  of 
+he  former  is  to  weigh  fully  and  candidly  all  the  rela- 
tions of  things,  and  to  give  to  each  fact  its  proper 
weight  in  the  inquiry :  the  aim  of  the  latter  is  to  seize 
with  rapidity  particular  relations,  and  to  find  facts 
bearing  upon  a  particular  view  of  a  subject.  This 
habit,  when  much  exercised,  tends  rather  to  withdraw 
the  attention  from  the  cultivation  of  the  former.  Thus 
it  has  not  unfrequently  happened  that  an  ingenious 
pleader  has  made  a  bad  judge ;  and  that  acute  and 
powerful  disputants  have  perplexed  themselves  by  their 
own  subtleties,  fill  they  have  ended  by  doubting  of 
every  thing.  The  same  observation  applies  to  contro- 
versial writing;  and  hence  the  hesitation  with  which 
we  receive  the  arguments  and  statements  of  a  keen  con- 
trovertist,  and  the  necessity  of  hearing  both  sides. 

We  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  though  there 
may  be  original  differences  in  the  power  of  judgment, 
the  chief  source  of  the  actual  varieties  in  this  impor- 
tant function  is  rather  to  be  found  in  its  culture  an  I 
regulation. 


164  HOW    THE   JUDGMENT    IS   IMPAIRED. 

1.  The  judgment  is  impaired  by  deficient  culture. 
This  is  exemplified   in  that  listless  and  indifferent 

habit  of  mind  in  which  there  is  no  exercise  of  correct 
thinking,  or  of  a  close  and  continued  application  of  the 
attention  to  subjects  of  real  importance.  Opinions  are 
received  from  others  without  the  exertion  of  thinking 
or  examining  for  one's  self. 

There  is  another  condition  of  mind  in  which  opinions 
are  formed  on  slight  and  partial  examination,  perhaps 
from  viewing  one  side  of  a  question,  or,  at  least,  with- 
out a  full  and  candid  direction  of  the  attention  to  all 
the  facts  which  ought  to  be  taken  into  the  inquiry. 

2.  The  judgment  is  vitiated,  by  want  of  due  regula- 
tion ;  and  this  may  be  ascribed  chiefly  to  two  sources — 
prejudice  and  passion.  Prejudice  consists  in  the  for- 
mation of  opinion  before  the  subject  has  been  examined. 
The  highest  degree  of  it  is  exemplified  in  that  condi- 
tion of  the  mind  in  which  a  man  first  forms. an  opinion 
which  interest  or  inclination  may  have  suggested  ;  then 
proceeds  to  collect  arguments  in  support  of  it ;  and  con- 
cludes by  reasoning  himself  into  the  belief  of  what  he 
wishes  to  be  true. 

The  same  observations  apply  to  passion,  or  the  influ- 
ence exerted  by  the  moral  feelings. 

There  is  one  class  of  truths  to  which  these  facts  ap- 
ply with  peculiar  force,  namely,  those"  which  relate  to 
the  moral  government  of  God,  and  the  condition  of  man 
as  a  responsible  being*  These  great  truths,  and  the 
evidence  on  which  they  are  founded,  are  addressed  to 
our  judgment  as  rational  beings ;  they  are  pressed  upon 
our  attention  as  creatures  destined  to  another  state  of 
existence  ;  and  the  sacred  duty  from  which  no  individ 
ual  can  be  absolved,  is  a  voluntary  exercise  of  his 
thinking  and  reasoning  powers, — it  is  seriously  and  de- 
liberately to  consider.     On  these  subjects  a  man  may 


PRESUMPTIONS  AND  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.      165 

frame  any  system  for  himself,  and  may  rest  in  that  sys- 
tem as  truth  ;  but  the  solemn  inquiry  is,  not  what  opin- 
ions he  has  formed,  but  in  what  manner  he  has  formed 
them.  Has  he  approached  the  great  inquiry  with  a 
sincere  desire  to  discover  the  truth  ;  and  has  he  brought 
to  it  a  mind,  neither  misled  by  prejudice  nor  distorted 
by  the  condition  of  its  moral  feelings ; — has  he  directed 
his  attention  to  all  the  facts  and  evidences  with  an  in- 
tensity suited  to  their  momentous  importance ;  and  has 
he  conducted  the  whole  investigation  with  a  deep  and 
serious  feeling  that  it  carries  with  it  an  interest  which 
reaches  into  eternity  ? 


THE  VARIOUS  USE  AND  ORDER  OF  SEVERAL  KINDS  OF  PRO 
POSITIONS  AND  OF  ARGUMENTS  IN  DIFFERENT  CASES 

[Compiled  from  Whately's  Rhetoric,  Part  I.  Chapter  III.] 

Sec.  1. — Presumptions  and  Burden  of  Proof. 

It  is  a  point  of  great  importance  to  decide  in  each 
case,  at  the  outset,  in  your  own  mind,  and  clearly  to 
point  out  to  the  hearer,  as  occasion  may  serve,  on 
which  side  the  presumption  lies,  and  to  which  belongs 
the  [onus  probandi]  burden  of  proof.  For  though  it 
may  often  be  expedient  to  bring  forward  more  proofs 
than  can  be  fairly  demanded  of  you,  it  is  always  desira- 
ble, when  this  is  the  case,  that  it  should  be  known,  and 
that  the  strength  of  the  cause  should  be  estimated  ac- 
cordingly. 

A  u  presumption"  in  favor  of  any  supposition  means, 
not  a  preponderance  of  probability  in  its  favor,  but 
such  sl  preoccupation  of  the  ground  as  implies  that  it 
must  stand  goo'd  till  some  sufficient  reason  is  adduced 
against  it ;  in  short,  that  the  burden  of  proof  lies  on  the 
side  of  him  who  would  dispute  it.    . 


166  PRESUMPTIONS    AND    BURDEN   OF   PROOF. 

Thus,  it  is  a  well-known  principle  of  the  law,  that 
every  man  (including  a  prisoner  brought  up  for  trial)  is 
to  be  presumed  innocent  till  his  guilt  is  established. 
This  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  we  are  to  take  for 
granted  he  is  innocent ;  for  if  that  were  the  case  he 
would  be  entitled  to  immediate  liberation;  nor  does  it 
mean  that  it  is  antecedently  more  likely  than  not  that 
he  is  innocent ;  or,  that  the  majority  of  those  brought 
to  trial  are  so.  It  evidently  means  only  that  the  u  bur- 
den of  proof"  lies  with  the  accusers;  that  he  is  not  to 
be  called  on  to  prove  his  innocence,  or  to  be  dealt  with 
as  a  criminal,  till  he  has  done  so ;  but  that  they  are  to 
bring  their  charges  against  him,  which  if  he  can  repel, 
he  stands  acquitted. 

Thus,  again,  there  is  a  u  presumption"  in  favor  of  any 
individuals,  or  bodies  corporate,  to  the  property  of 
which  they  are  in  actual  possession.  This  does  not 
mean  that  they  are,  or  are  not,  likely  to  be  the  rightful 
owners ;  but  merely,  that  no  man  is  to  be  disturbed  in 
his  possessions  till  some  claim  against  him  shall  be  es- 
tablished. He  is  not  to  be  called  on  to  prove  his  right, 
but  the  claimant  to  disprove  it,  upon  whom  conse- 
quently the  u  burden  of  proof"  lies. 

A  moderate  portion  of  common  sense  will  enable 
any  one  to  perceive  and  to  show  on  which  side  the  pre- 
sumption lies,  when  once  his  attention  is  called  to  this 
question ;  though,  for  want  of  attention^it  is  often  over- 
looked, and  on  the  determination  of  this  question  the 
whole  character  of  a  discussion  will  often  very  much 
depend.  A  body  of  troops  may  be  perfectly  adequate 
to  the  defence  of  a  fortress  against  any  attack  that  may 
be  made  against  it,  and  yet  if,  ignorant  of  the  advan- 
tage they  possess,  they  sally  forth  into  the  open  field  to 
encounter  the  enemy,  they  may  suffer  a  repulse.  At 
any  rate,  even  if  strong  enough  to  act  on  the  offensive, 


PRESUMPTIONS  AND  BURDEN  OF  PROOF.      167 

they  ought  still  to  keep  possession  of  the  fortress.  In 
like  manner,  if  you  have  the  a  presumption"  on  your 
side,  and  can  but  refute  all  the  arguments  brought 
against  you,  you  have,  for  the  present  at  least,  gained 
a  victory ;  but  if  you  abandon  this  position,  by  suffer- 
ing this  "presumption"  to  be  forgotten,  which  is  in 
fact  leaving  out  one  of  perhaps,  your  strongest  argu- 
ments, you  may  appear  to  be  making  a  feeble  attack, 
instead  of  a  triumphant  defence. 

The  following  are  a  few  of  the  cases  in  which  it  is 
important,  though  very  easy,  to  point  out  where  the 
presumption  lies. 

(1.)  There  is  a  presumption  in  favor  of  every  exist- 
ing institution.  Though  susceptible  of  alteration  for 
the  better,  the  "  burden  of  proof"  to  that  effect  lies 
with  him  who  proposes  an  alteration,  simply  on  the 
ground  that  as  a  change  is  not  a  good  in  itself,  he  who 
demands  a  change  should  show  cause  for  it. 

(2.)  There  is  a  presumption  against  any  thing  para- 
doxical, i.  e.,  contrary  to  the  prevailing  opinion.  It 
may  be  true,  but  the  burden  of  proof  lies  with  him  who 
maintains  it,  since  men  are  not  to  be  expected  to  aban- 
don the  prevailing  belief  till  some  reason  is  shown. 

Hence  it  is,  probably,  that  many  are  accustomed  to 
apply  "  paradox"  as  if  it  were  a  term  of  reproach,  and 
implied  absurdity  or  falsity.  But  correct  use  is  in 
favor  of  the  etymological  sense.  If  a  paradox  is  un- 
supported it  can  claim  no  attention  ;  but,  if  false,  it 
should  be  censured  on  that  ground, — but  not  for  being 
new.  To  those  who,  too  dull  or  too  prejudiced  to  admit 
any  notion  at  variance  with  those  they  have  been  used 
to  entertain  (^apd  <5dfav),  that  may  appear  nonsense 
which  to  others  is  sound  sense.  Thus,  "  Christ  cruci- 
fied" was  "  to  the  Jews  a  stumbling-block"  (paradox), 
u  and  to  the  Greeks,  foolishness ;"  because  the  one  "  re- 


168  PRESUMPTIONS    AND   BURDEN    OF    PROOF. 

quired  a  sign"  of  a  different  kind  from  any  that  ap- 
peared ;  and  the  others  "  sought  after  wisdom"  in  their 
schools  of  philosophy. 

(3.)  Accordingly  there  was  a  presumption  against 
the  Gospel  on  its  first  announcement.  A  Jewish  peas- 
ant claimed  to  be  the  promised  Deliverer,  in  whom  all 
the  nations  of  the  earth  were  to  be  blessed.  The  bur- 
den of  proof  lay  with  him.  No  one  could  be  fairly 
called  on  to  admit  his  pretensions  till  he  showed  cause 
for  believing  in  him.  If  he  "  had  not  done  among 
them  the  works  which  none  other  man  did,  they  had 
not  had  sin." 

Now,  the  case  is  reversed.  Christianity  exists  /  and 
those  who  deny  the  divine  origin  attributed  to  it,  are 
bound  to  show  some  reasons  for  assigning  to  it  a  hu- 
man origin  :  not,  indeed,  to  prove  that  it  did  originate 
*n  this  or  that  way,  without  supernatural  aid,  but  to 
point  out  some  conceivable  way  in  which  it  might  have 
so  arisen. 

It  is,  indeed,  highly  expedient  to  bring  forward  evi- 
dence to  establish  the  divine  origin  of  Christianity ; 
but  it  ought  to  be  more  carefully  kept  in  mind  than  is 
done  by  most  writers,  that  all  this  is  an  argument  u  ex 
abundant!,"  as  the  phrase  is,  over  and  above  what  can 
fairly  be  called  for,  till  some  hypothesis  should  be 
framed  to  account  for  the  origin  of  Christianity  by  hu- 
man means.  The  burden  of  proof  now  lies  plainly  on 
him  who  rejects  the  Gospel ;  which,  if  it  were  not  es- 
tablished by  miracles,  demands  an  explanation  of  the 
greater  miracle, — its  having  been  established,  in  defi- 
ance of  all  opposition,  by  human  contrivance. 

(4.)  It  is  to  be  observed  that  a  presumption  may  he 
rebutted  by  an  opposite  presumption,  so  as  to  shift  the 
burden  of  proof  to  the  other  side.  E.  g.,  Suppose  you 
had  advised  the  removal  of  some  existing  restriction- 


MATTERS    OF    FACT    AND    OF    OPINION.  169 

you  might  be,  in  the  first  instance,  called  on  to  take  the 
burden  of  proof,  and  allege  your  reasons  for  the  change, 
on  the  ground  that  there  is  a  presumption  against  every 
change.  But  you  might  fairly  reply — "True,  but  there 
is  another  presumption  which  rebuts  the  former :  every 
restriction  is  in  itself  an  evil,  and  therefore  there  is  a 
presumption  in  favor  of  its  removal,  unless  it  can  be 
shown  necessary  for  prevention  of  some  greater  evil. 
I  am  not  bound  to  allege  any  specific  inconvenience;  if 
the  restriction  is  unnecessary,  that  is  reason  enough  for 
its  abolition :  its  defenders,  therefore,  are  fairly  called 
on  to  prove  its  necessity." 

Sec.  2. — Matters  of  Fact  and  of  Opinion. 

The  class  of  argument  called  example,  is  not  excluded 
from  the  proof  of  matters  of  opinion  (i.  e.,  where  we  are 
not  said  properly  to  know,  but  to  judge);  since  a  man's 
judgment  in  one  case  may  be  aided  or  corrected  by  an 
appeal  to  his  judgment  in  another  similar  case.  It  is 
in  this  way  that  we  are  directed,  by  the  highest  au- 
thority, to  guide  our  judgment  in  those  questions  in 
which  we  are  most  liable  to  deceive  ourselves :  viz., 
what,  on  each  occasion,  ought  to  be  our  conduct  to- 
wards another,  we  are  directed  to  frame  for  ourselves  a 
similar  supposed  case,  by  imagining  ourselves  to  change 
places  with  our  neighbor,  and  then  considering  how,  in 
that  case,  we  should  in  fairness  expect  to  be  treated. 

This,  however,  which  is  the  true  use  of  the  celebrated 
precept  "  to  do  as  we  would  be  done  by,"  is  often  over- 
looked, and  it  is  spoken  of  as  if  it  were  a  rule  designed 
to  supersede  all  other  moral  maxims,  and  to  teach  us 
the  intrinsic  character  of  right  and  wrong.  This  ab- 
surd mistake  may  be  one  cause  why  the  precept  is  so 
much  more  talked,  than  attempted  to  be  applied.  For 
it  could  npt  be  applied,  with  any  good  result,  by  one 

8 


170  ILLUSTRATION    AND    SIMILE   DISTINGUISHED. 

who  should  have  no  notions  already  formed  of  what  is 
just  and  unjust. 

To  take  one  instance  out  of  many :  if  he  had  to  de- 
cide a  dispute  between  two  of  his  neighbors,  he  would 
be  sure  that  each  was  wishing  for  a  decision  in  his  own 
favor,  and  he  would  be  at  a  loss,  therefore,  how  to  com- 
ply with  the  precept  in  respect  of  either,  without  viola- 
ting it  in  respect  of  the  other.  The  true  meaning  of 
the  precept  plainly  is,  that  you  should  do  to  another,  nol 
necessarily  what  you  would  wish,  but  what  you  would 
expect  as  fair  and  reasonable,  if  you  were  in  his  place. 
This  evidently  presupposes  that  you  have  a  knowledge 
of  what  is  fair  and  reasonable,  and  the  precept  then  fur- 
nishes a  formula  for  the  application  of  this  knowledge, 
in  a  case  where  you  would  be  liable  to  be  blinded  by 
self-partiality. 

Illustration  and  simile  distinguished.  It  is  of  the 
greatest  consequence  to  distinguish  between  examples 
(of  the  invented  kind),  properly  so  called — i.  e.,  which 
have  the  force  of  arguments — and  comparisons  intro- 
duced for  the  ornament  of  style,  in  the  form  either  of 
simile  or  of  metaphor.  Not  only  is  an  injurious  com- 
parison mistaken  for  a  proof,  though  it  be  such  as  when 
tried  by  proper  rules  affords  no  proof  at  all,  but  also,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  real  and  valid  argument  is  not  unfre- 
quently  considered  merely  as  an  ornament  of  style,  if  it 
happen  to  be  such  as  to  produce  that  effect — though 
there  is  evidently  no  reason  why  that  should  not  be  fair 
analogical  reasoning,  in  which  the  new  idea  introduced 
by  the  analogy  chances  tp  be  a  sublime  or  a  pleasing 
one.  E.  g.,  "  The  efficacy  of  penitence,  and  piety,  and 
prayer,  in  rendering  the  Deity  propitious,  is  not  irrec- 
oncilable with  the  immutability  of  his  nature  and  the 
steadiness  of  his  purposes.  It  is  not  in  man's  power  to 
alter  the  course  of  the  sun,  but  it  is  often  in  his  power 


PRECEDENCE   OF  ARGUMENTS    FROM  CAUSE  TO  EFFECT.    171 

to  cause  the  sun  to  shine  or  not  to  shine  upon  him ;  it 
he  withdraws  from  its  beams,  or  spreads  a  curtain  be- 
fore him,  the  sun  no  longer  shines  on  him ;  if  he  quits 
the  shade,  or  removes  the  curtain,  the  light  is  restored 
to  him ;  and  though  no  change  is  in  the  mean  time 
effected  in  the  heavenly  luminary,  but  only  in  himself, 
the  result  is  the  same  as  if  it  were.  Nor  is  the  immu- 
tability of  God  any  reason  why  the  returning  sinner, 
who  tears  away  the  veil  of  prejudice  or  of  indifference, 
should  not  again  be  blessed  with  the  sunshine  of  the 
divine  favor."  The  image  here  introduced  is  ornamen- 
tal, but  the  argument  is  not  the  less  perfect,  since  the 
case  adduced  fairly  establishes  the  general  principle 
required,  that,  "  a  change  effected  in  one  of  two  objects 
having  a  certain  relation  to  each  other,  may  have  the 
same  practical  result  as  if  it  had  taken  place  in  the 
other." 

The  mistake  in  question  is  still  more  likely  to  occur 
when  such  an  argument  is  conveyed  in  a  single  term 
employed  metaphorically,  as  is  generally  the  case 
where  the  allusion  is  common  and  obvious  ;  e.  g.,  u  We 
do  not  receive  as  the  genuine  doctrines  of  the  primitive 
church  what  have  passed  down  the  polluted  stream  of 
tradition."  The  argument  here  is  not  the  less  valid  for 
being  conveyed  in  the  form  of  a  metaphor. 

Sec  3. — Arguments  from  Cause  to  Effect  have  the 
Precedence. 
Men  are  apt  to  listen  with  prejudice  to  the  arguments 
adduced  to  prove  any  thing  which  appears  abstractedly 
improbable,  and, this  prejudice  is  to  be  removed  by  the 
argument  from  cause  to  effect,  which  thus  prepares  the 
way  for  the  reception  of  the  other  arguments.  For 
example,  if  a  man  who  bore  a  good  character  were 
accused  of  corruption,  the  strongest  evidence  against 


172  ARRANGEMENT   OF    ARGUMENTS    IMPORTANT. 

him  might  avail  little;  but  if  he  were  proved  to  be  of 
a  covetous  disposition,  this,  though  it  would  not  alone 
be  allowed  to  substantiate  the  crime,  would  have  great 
weight  in  inducing  his  judges  to  lend  an  ear  to  the 
evidence.     And  thus  in  what  relates  to  the  future  also, 
the  a  priori  argument  and  example  support  each  other. 
A  sufficient  cause  being  established,  leaves  us  still  at 
liberty  to  suppose  that  there  may  be  circumstances 
which  will  prevent  the  effect  from  taking  place ;  but 
examples  subjoined  show  that  these  circumstances  do 
not,  at  least  always,  prevent  that  effect.     On  the  other 
hand,  examples  introduced  at  the  first,  may  be  suspected 
(unless  they  are  very  numerous)  of  being  exceptions  to 
the  general  rule,  instead  of  being  instances  of  it,  which 
an  adequate  cause  previously  assigned  will  show  them 
to  be.     For  example,  if  any  one  had  argued,  from  the 
temptations  and  opportunities  occurring  to  a  military 
commander,  that  Bonaparte  was  likely  to  establish  a 
despotism  on  the  ruins  of  the  French  Republic,  this 
argument,  by  itself,  would  have  left  men  at  liberty  to 
suppose  that  Such  a  result  could  have  been  prevented 
by  a  jealous  attachment  to  liberty  in  the  citizens,  and  a 
fellow-feeling  of  the  soldiery  with  them ;  then,  the  ex- 
amples of  Csesar  and  of  Cromwell  would  have  proved 
that  such  preventives  are  not  to  be  trusted. 

Arrangement  is  a  point  not  perhaps  of  less  conse- 
quence in  argument,  than  in  the  military  art.  For 
example,  in  stating  the  evidences  of  our  religion,  so  as 
to  give  them  their  just  weight,  much  depends  on  the 
order  in  which  they  are  placed.  The  antecedent  prob- 
ability that  a  revelation  should  be  given  to  man,  and 
that  it  should  be  established  by  miracles,  all  would 
allow  to  be,  considered  by  itself,  in  the  absence  of 
strong  direct  testimony,  utterly  insufficient  to  establish 
the  conclusion.  •        '-•..'• 


ILLUSTRATION    OF    THIS.  173 

On  the  other  hand,  miracles,  considered  abstractedly, 
as  represented  to  have  occurred  without  any  occasion 
for  them  or  reason  being  assigned,  carry  with  them 
such  a  strong  inherent  improbability,  as  could  not  be 
wholly  surmounted  even  by  such  evidence  as  would 
fully  establish  any  other  matters  of  fact.  But  the  evi- 
dences of  the  former  class,  however  inefficient  alone 
towards  the  establishment  of  the  conclusion,  have  very 
great  weight  in  preparing  the  mind  for  receiving  the 
other  arguments,  which,  again,  though  they  would  be 
listened  to  with  prejudice  if  not  so  supported,  will  then 
be  allowed  their  just  weight. 

The  writers  in  defence  of  Christianity  have  not  al- 
ways attended  to  this  principle,  and  their  opponents 
have  often  availed  themselves  of  the  knowledge  of  it, 
by  combating  in  detail  arguments,  the  combined  force 
of  which  would  have  been  irresistible.  They  argue 
respecting  the  credibility  of  the  Christian  miracles  ab- 
stractedly, as  if  they  were  insulated  occurrences,  without 
any  known  or  conceivable  purpose;  as,  e.  g.,  "What 
testimony  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  belief  that  a  dead 
man  was  restored  to  life  V  and  then  they  proceed  to 
show  that  the  probability  of  a  revelation,  abstractedly 
considered,  is  not  such  at  least  to  establish  the  fact 
that  one  has  been  given.  Whereas,  if  it  were  first 
proved  (as  may  easily  be  done)  merely  that  there  is  no 
such  abstract  improbability  of  a  revelation  as  to  ex- 
clude the  evidence  in  favor  of  it,  and  that  if  one  were 
given,  it  must  be  expected  to  be  supported  by  miracu- 
lous evidence,  then,  just  enough  reason  would  be  as- 
signed for  the  occurrence  of  miracles,  not  indeed  to 
establish  them,  but  to  allow  a  fair  hearing  for  the  argu- 
ments by  which  they  are  supported. 


174     arrangement  of  premises  and  conclusion. 

Sec.  4. — "When  the  Premises  and  when  the  Conclu- 
sion SHOULD  COME  FIRST. 

A  proposition  that  is  well  known  (whether  easy  to 
be  established  or  not),  and  which  contains  nothing 
particularly  offensive,  should  in  general  be  stated  at 
once,  and  the  proof s  subjoined  /  but  one  not  familiar  to 
the  hearers,  especially  if  it  be  likely  to  be  unacceptable, 
should  not  be  stated  at  the  outset.  It  is  usually  better 
in  that  case  to  state  the  arguments  first,  or  at  least  some 
of  them,  and  then  introduce  the  conclusion,  thus  assu- 
ming in  some  degree  the  character  of  an  investigator. 

This,  indeed,  is  the  usual  and  natural  way  of  speaking 
or  writing,  viz.,  to  begin  by  declaring  your  opinion,  and 
then  to  subjoin  the  reasons  for  it.  It  will  sometimes 
give  an  offensively  dogmatical  air,  to  begin  by  advan- 
cing some  new  and  unexpected  assertion ;  though  some- 
times, again,  this  may  be  advisable,  when  the  argu- 
ments are  such  as  can  be  well  relied  on,  and  the  prin- 
cipal object  is  to  excite  attention  and  awaken  curiosity. 
And  accordingly,  with  this  view,  it  is  not  unusual  to 
present  some  doctrine,  by  no  means  really  novel,  in  a 
new  and  paradoxical  shape. 

But  when  the  conclusion  to  be  established  is  one  likely 
to  hurt  the  feelings  and  offend  the  prejudices  of  the 
hearers,  it  is  essential  to  keep  out  of  sight,  as  much  as 
possible,  the  point  to  which  we  are  tending,  till  the  prin- 
ciples from  which  it  is  to  be  deduced  shall  have  been 
clearly  established  ;  because  men  listen  with  prejudice,  if 
at  all,  to  arguments  that  are  avowedly  leading  to  a  con 
elusion  which  they  are  indisposed  to  admit;  whereas, 
if  we  thus,  as  it  were,  mask  the  battery,  they  will  not 
be  able  to  shelter  themselves  from  the  discharge.  The 
observance,  accordingly,  or  neglect  of  this  rule,  will 
often  make  the  difference  of  success  or  failure. 


•       ADVANCE    FROM    GENERAL    TO    PARTICULAR.  175 

It  will  often  he  advisable  to  advance  very  gradually 
to  the  full  statement  of  the  proposition  required,  and 
to  prove  it,  if  one  may  so  speak,  by  instalments  ;  estab- 
lishing separately,  and  in  order,  each  part  of  the  truth 
in  question. 

Thus  Paley  (in  his  Evidences)  first  proves  that  the 
apostles,  &c,  suffered ;  next,  that  they  encountered 
their  sufferings  knowingly ;  then,  that  it  was  for  their 
testimony  that  they  suffered ;  then,  that  the  events 
they  testified  were  miraculous  ;  then,  that  those  events 
were  the  same  as  are  recorded  in  our  books,  &c,  &c. 

Advance  from  general  to  particular.  It  will  often 
happen  that  some  general  principle,  of  no  very  para- 
doxical character,  may  be  proposed  in  the  outset  (just 
as  besiegers  break  ground  at  a  safe  distance,  and  ad- 
vance gradually  till  near  enough  to  batter) ;  and  when 
that  is  established,  an  unexpected  and  unwelcome  ap- 
plication of  it  may  be  proved  irresistibly. 

We  shall  thus  have  to  reverse,  in  many  cases,  the 
order  in  which,  during  the  act  of  composition  (or  pre- 
meditation), the  thoughts  will  have  occurred  to  our 
minds ;  for  in  reflecting  on  any  subject,  we  are  usually 
disposed  to  generalise  /  to  proceed  from  the  particular 
point  immediately  before  us,  successively,  to  more  an<J 
more  comprehensive  views  ;  the  opposite  order  to  which 
will  usually  be  the  better  adapted  to  engage  and  keep 
up  attention,  and  to  effect  conviction. 

Waiving  a  question.  It  is  often  expedient,  sometimes 
unavoidable,  to  waive  for  the  present  some  question,  or 
'portion  of  a  question,  while  our  attention  is  occupied 
with  another  point.  Now  it  cannot  too  carefully  be 
kept  in  mind,  that  it  is  a  common  mistake  with  inaccu- 
rate reasoners  (and  a  mistake  which  is  studiously  kept 
up  by  an  artful  sophist)  to  suppose  that  what  is  thus 
waived  is  altogether  given  up.     "  Such  a  one  does  not 


176  WAIVING    A    QUESTION. 

attempt  to  prove  this  or  that ;"  "  he  does  not  deny  so 
and  so ;"  "  he  tacitly  admits  that  such  may  be  the 
case,"  &c,  are  expressions  which  one  may  often  hear 
triumphantly  employed  on  no  better  grounds.  And 
yet  it  is  very  common  in  mathematics  for  a  question  to 
be  waived  in  this  manner. 

The  only  remedy  is,  to  state  distinctly  and  repeatedly 
that  you  do  not  abandon  as  untenable  such  and  such  a 
position,  which  you  are  not  at  present  occupied  in  main- 
taining :  that  you  are  not  to  be  understood  as  admitting 
the  truth  of  this  or  that,  though  you  do  not  at  present 
undertake  to  disprove  it. 

When  needful  to  account  for  any  fact.  If  the  argu- 
ment a  priori  has  been  introduced,  in  the  proof  of  the 
main  proposition  in  question,  there  will  generally  be 
no  need  of  afterwards  adducing  causes  to  account 
ror  the  truth  established,  since  that  will  have  been 
already  done  in  the  course  of  the  argument :  on  the 
other  hand,  it  will  often  be  advisable  to  do  this 
when  arguments  of  the  other  class  have  alone  been 
employed. 

For  it  is  in  every  case  agreeable  and  satisfactory,  and 
may  often  be  of  great  utility,  to  explain  where  it  can 
£e  done,  the  causes  which  produce  an  effect  that  is  itself 
already  admitted  to  exist.  But  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  is  of  great  importance  to  make  it  clearly  appear 
which  object  is,  in  each  case,  proposed^;  whether  to 
establish  the  fact,  or  to  account  for  it;  since  otherwise 
we  may  often  be  supposed  to  be  employing  a  feeble  ar- 
gument :  for  that  which  is  a  satisfactory  explanation 
of  an  admitted  fact,  will  frequently  be  such  as  would 
be  very  insufficient  to  prove  ;t,  supposing  it  were 
doubted. 


REFUTATION    OF   OBJECTIONS.  177 

Section  5. — Refutation  of  objections  should  gener- 
erally  be  placed  in  the  midst  of  the  argument /  but 
nearer  the  beginning  than  the  end. 

If,  indeed,  very  strong  objections  have  obtained 
much  currency,  or  have  been  just  stated  by  an  oppo- 
nent, so  that  what  is  asserted  is  likely  to  be  regarded  as 
paradoxical,  it  may  be  advisable  to  begin  with  a  refu- 
tation ;  but  when  this  is  not  the  case,  the  mention  of 
objections  in  the  opening  will  be  likely  to  give  a  para- 
doxical air  to  our  assertion,  by  implying  a  consciousness 
that  much  may  be  said  against  it.  If,  again,  all  men- 
tion of  objections  be  deferred  till  the  last,  the  other 
arguments  will  often  be  listened  to  with  prejudice  by 
those  who  may  suppose  us  to  be  overlooking  what  may 
be  urged  on  the  other  side. 

Sometimes,  indeed,  it  will  be  difficult  to  give  a  sat- 
isfactory refutation  of  the  opposed  opinions  till  we  have 
gone  through  the  arguments  in  support  of  our  own : 
even  in  that  case,  however,  it  will  be  better  to  take 
some  brief  notice  of  them  early  in  the  composition  (or 
discussion),  with  a  promise  of  afterwards  considering 
them  more  fully,  and  refuting  them.  This  is  AristotleV 
usual  procedure. 

A  sophistical  use  is  often  made  of  this  last  rule, 
when  the  objections  are  such  as  cannot  really  be  satis- 
factorily answered.  The  skilful  sophist  will  often,  by 
the  promise  of  a  triumphant  refutation  hereafter,  gain 
attention  to  his  own  statement,  which,  if  it  be  made 
plausible,  will  so  draw  off  the  hearer's  attention  from 
the  objections,  that  a  very  inadequate  fulfilment  of  that 
promise  will  pass  unnoticed,  and  due  weight  will  not  be 
allowed  to  the  objections. 

Two  modes  of  refutation.  The  first  is  Jby  proving 
.the  contradictions  of  the  proposition  we  oppose;  the 

8* 


178     REFUTATION    BY-  DIRECT    OR   INDIRECT   REASONING. 

second,  by  overthrowing  the  arguments  by  which  it  has 
been  supported. 

Direct  and  indirect  reasoning  are  employed  indiffer- 
ently in  refutation  ;  but  the  latter  (in  which  the  absur- 
dity or  falsity  of  a  proposition  opposed  to  our  own  is 
proved)  is  often  chosen,  as  it  affords  an  opportunity  of 
holding  up  an  opponent  to  scorn  and  ridicule,  by  dedu 
cing  some  very  absurd  conclusion  from  the  principles 
he  maintains,  or  according  to  the  mode  of  arguing  he 
employs.  Nor  indeed  can  a  fallacy  be  so  clearly  ex- 
posed to  unlearned  persons  in  any  other  way. 

Ironical  effect  of  indirect  arguments.  When  we 
employ  the  categorical  form,  and  assume  as  true  the 
premises  we  design  to  disprove,  it  is  evident  we  must 
be  speaking  ironically,  and  in  the  character,  assumed 
for  the  moment,  of  an  adversary ;  when,  on  the  contra- 
ry, we  use  the  hypothetical  form,  there  is  no  irony. 
Butler's  Analogy  is  an  instance  of  the  latter  procedure  : 
he  contends  that  if  such  and  such  objections  were  ad- 
missible against  religion,  they  would  be  applicable 
equally  to  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature.  Had 
he,  on  the  other  hand,  assumed,  for  the  argument's  sake, 
that  such  objections  against  religion  are  valid,  and  had 
thence  proved  the  condition  of  the  natural  world  to  be 
totally  different  from  what  we  see  it  to  be,  his  argu- 
ments, which  would  have  been  the  same  in  substance, 
would  have  assumed  the  ironical  form.  This  form  is 
adopted  in  the  "  Historic  Doubts,"  whose  object  is  to 
show  that  objections  similar  to  those  against  the  Scrip- 
ture history,  and  much  more  plausible,  might  be  urged 
against  all  the  received  accounts  of  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte. 

It  is  in  some  respects  a  recommendation  of  this  latter 
method,  and  in  others  an  objection  to  it,  that  the  sophis- 
try of  an  adversary  will  often  be  exposed  by  it  in  a 


SOPHISTRY    EXPOSED    IN    A    LUDICROUS   MANNER.      179 

ludicrous  point  of  view,  and  this  even  when  no  such 
effect  is  designed;  the  very  essence  of  gist  being  its 
mi?nic  sophistry.  This  will  often  give  additional  force 
to  the  argument  by  the  vivid  impression  which  ludic- 
rous images  produce;  but  again  it  will  not  unfrequently 
have  this  disadvantage,  that  weak  men,  perceiving  the 
wit,  are  apt  to  conclude  that  nothing  hut  wit  is  designed, 
and  lose  sight  perhaps  of  a  solid  and  convincing  argu- 
ment, which  they  regard  as  no  more  than  a  good  joke. 
Having  been  warned  that  "  ridicule  is  not  the  test  of 
truth,"  and  that  "  wisdom  and  wit"  are  not  the  same 
thing,  they  distrust  every  thing  that  can  possibly  be  re- 
garded as  witty,  not  having  judgment  to  perceive  the 
combination,  when  it  occurs,  of  wit  with  sound  reason- 
ing. The  ivy-wreath  completely  conceals  from  their 
view  the  point  of  the  Thyrsus. 

Moreover,  if  such  a  mode  of  argument  be  employed 
on  serious  subjects,  some  are  scandalized  by  what  ap- 
pears to  them  a  profanation  ;  not  having  discernment 
to  perceive  when  it  is  that  the  ridicule  does,  and  when 
it  does  not,  affect  the  solemn  subject  itself. 

And,  moreover,  the  resentment  and  mortification  felt 
by  those  whose  unsound  doctrines  or  sophistry  are  fully 
exposed  and  held  up  to  contempt  or  ridicule, — this  they 
will  often  disguise  from  others,  and  sometimes  from 
themselves,  by  representing  the  contempt  or  ridicule 
as  directed  against  serious  or  sacred  subjects,  and  not 
against  their  own  absurdities. 

Too  much  stress  is  often  laid  upon  refutation — in  the 
sense  of  objections  to  the  premises  or  the  reasoning : 
for,  first,  not  only  specious,  but  real  and  solid  argu- 
ments, such  as  it  would  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  re 
fute,  may  be  urged  against  a  proposition  which  is 
nevertheless  true,  and  may  be  satisfactorily  established 
by  a  preponderance  of  probability.     It  is  in  strictly 


180  BALANCING    OF    OBJECTIONS 

scientific  reasoning  alone  that  Jill  the  arguments  which 
lead  to  a  wrong  conclusion  must  be  fallacious.  In 
what  is  called  moral  or  probable  reasoning,  there 
may  be  sound  arguments  and  valid  objection?  on  both 
sides. 

Now,  it  often  happens  that  the  inexperienced  rea- 
soner,  thinking  it  necessary  that  every  objection  &\ould 
be  satisfactorily  answered,  will  have  his  attention  drrwn 
off  from  the  arguments  of  the  opposite  side,  and  will  It 
occupied  perhaps  in  making  a  weak  defence,  while  vie 
tory  was  in  his  hands.  The  objection,  perhaps,  may  be 
unanswerable,  and  yet  may  safely  be  allowed,  if  it  can 
be  shown  that  more  and  weightier  objections  lie  against 
every  other  supposition.  This  is  a  most  important  cau- 
tion for  those  who  are  studying  the  evidences  of  re- 
ligion. Let  the  opposer  of  them  be  called  on,  instead 
of  confining  himself  to  detached  cavils,  and  saying, 
"  How  do  you  answer  this  ?"  and  "  how  do  you  explain 
that  ?"  to  frame  some  consistent  hypothesis  to  account 
for  the  introduction  of  Christianity  by  human  means ; 
and  then  to  consider  whether  there  are  more  or  fewer 
difficulties  in  his  hypothesis  than  in  the  other. 

Sophistical  refutation.  On  the  other  hand,  one  may 
often  meet  with  a  sophistical  refutation  of  objections, 
consisting  in  counter-objections  urged  against  something 
else  which  is  taken  for  granted  to  be,  though  it  is  not 
the  only  alternative.  E.  g.,  If  an  exclusive  attention  to 
mathematical  pursuits  be  objected  to,  it  may  be  an- 
swered by  deprecating  the  exclusion  of  such  studies.  It 
is  thus  that  a  man  commonly  replies  to  the  censure 
passed  on  any  vice  he  is  addicted  to,  by  representing 
some  other  vice  as  worse  :  e.  g.,  if  he  is  blamed  for  be- 
ing a  sot,  he  dilates  on  the  greater  erormity  of  being  a 
thief,  as  if  there  were  any  need  (or  my  apology)  for 
being  either.  .       .  ^ 


DANGER    OF    ADVANCING    TOO    MUCH.  181 

Over-estimate  of  the  force  of  refutation.  Secondly, 
the  force  of  a  refutation  is  often  overrated:  an  argu- 
ment which  is  satisfactorily  answered,  ought  merely  to 
go  for  nothing;  it  is  possible  that  the  conclusion  drawn 
may  nevertheless  be  true ;  yet  men  are  apt  to  take  for 
granted  that  the  conclusion  itself  is  disproved,  when 
the  arguments  brought  forward  to  establish  it  have 
been  satisfactorily  refuted;  assuming,  when  perhaps 
there  is  no  ground  for  the  assumption,  that  these  are  all 
the  arguments  that  could  be  urged. 

Hence  the  danger  of  ever  advancing  more  than  can 
be  well  maintained,  since  the  refutation  of  that  will 
often  quash  the  whole.  A  guilty  person  may  often  es- 
cape by  having  too  much  laid  to  his  charge  :  so  he  may 
also  by  having  too  much  evidence  against  him ;  i.e., 
some  that  is  not  in  itself  satisfactory.  Thus  a  prisoner 
may  sometimes  obtain  acquittal  by  showing  that  one  of 
the  witnesses  against  him  is  an  infamous  informer  an(? 
spy  ;  though  perhaps  if  that  part  of  the  evidence  had 
been  omitted,  the  rest  would  have  been  sufficient  for 
conviction. 

The  maxim  here  laid  down  applies  only  in  those 
causes  where  there  really  are  some  weighty  arguments 
to  be  urged. 

On  the  above  principle,  that  a  weak  argument  is  posi- 
tively hurtful,  is  founded  a  most  important  maxim,  that 
it  is  not  only  the  fairest,  but  also  the  wisest  plan,  tc 
state  objections  in  their  full  force  /  at  least  whenever 
there  does  exist  a  satisfactory  answer  to  them ;  other- 
wise, those  who  hear  them  stated  more  strongly  than  by 
the  uncandid  advocate  who  had  undertaken  to  repel 
them,  will  naturally  enough  conclude  that  they  are  un- 
answerable. And  when  the  objections  urged  are  not 
only  unanswerable,  but  (what  is  more)  decisive, — when 
some  argument  that  has  been  adduced,  or  some. portion 


182       TOO    EARNEST   A    REFUTATION    OF   ARGUMENTS. 

of  a  system,  &c,  is  perceived  to  be  really  unsound,  it  is 
the  wisest  way  fairly  and  fully  to  confess  this,  and 
abandon  it  altogether. 

It  is  important  to  observe,  that  too  earnest  and  elab- 
orate a  refutation  of  arguments  which  are  really  insig- 
nificant, or  which  their  opponent  wishes  to  represent  as 
such,  will  frequently  have  the  effect  of  giving  them  im- 
portance. Whatever  is  slightly  noticed,  and  afterwards 
passed  by  with  contempt,  many  readers  and  hearers 
will  very  often  conclude  (sometimes  for  no  other  reason) 
to  be  really  contemptible.  But  if  they  are  assured  of 
this  again  and  again  with  great  earnestness,  they  often 
begin  to  doubt  it. 

In  other  cases,  also,  it  may  happen  that  it  shall  be 
possible  and  dangerous  to  write  or  speak  too  forcibly. 
When,  indeed,  the  point  maintained  is  one  which  most 
persons  admit,  but  which  they  are  prone  to  lose  sight 
of  or  to  underrate  in  respect  of  its  importance,  or  not 
to  dwell  on  with  an  attention  sufficiently  practical,  that 
is  just  the  occasion  which  calls  on  us  to  put  forth  all 
our  efforts  in  setting  it  forth  in  the  most  forcible  man- 
ner possible.  Yet,  even  here,  it  is  often  necessary  to 
caution  the  hearers  against  imagining  that  a  point  is 
difficult  to  establish,  because  its  importance  leads  us  to 
dwell  very  much  upon  it.  Some,  e.  g.,  are  apt  to 
suppose,  from  the  copious  and  elaborate  arguments 
which  have  been  urged  in  defence  of  the  authenticity 
of  the  Christian  Scriptures,  that  these  are  books  whose 
authenticity  is  harder  to  be  established  than  that  of 
other  supposed  ancient  works ;  whereas,  the  fact  is  very 
much  the  reverse.  But  the  importance  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  proving  any  point  are  very  apt  to  be  con- 
founded together,  though  easily  distinguishable. 

In  combating  deep-rooted  prejudices,  and  maintain- 
ing unpopular  and  paradoxical  truths,  the  point  to  be 


EMPLOYING    TOO    MANY    ARGUMENTS.  183 

aimed  at  should  be,  to  adduce  what  is  sufficient,  and 
not  much  more  than  is  sufficient,  to  prove  your  conclu- 
sion. If  (in  such  a  case)  you  can  but  satisfy  men  that 
your  opinion  is  decidedly  more  probable  than  the  op- 
posite, you  will  have  carried  your  point  more  effectual- 
ly than  if  you  go  on  much  beyond  this  to  demonstrate, 
by  a  multitude  of  the  most  forcible  arguments,  the  ex- 
treme absurdity  of  thinking  differently,  till  you  have 
affronted  the  self-esteem  of  some,  and  awakened  the 
distrust  of  others.  Laborers  who  are  employed  in  dri- 
ving wedges  into  a  block  of  wood,  are  careful  to  use 
blows  of  no  greater  force  than  is  just  sufficient.  If 
they  strike  too  hard,  the  elasticity  of  the  wood  will 
throw  out  the  wedge. 

Another  danger  is  to  be  apprehended  from  employ- 
ing a  great  number  and  variety  of  arguments  (whether 
for  refutation  or  otherwise);  namely,  that  some  of 
them,  though  really  unanswerable,  may  be  drawn  from 
topics  of  which  the  unlearned  reader  or  hearer  is  not, 
by  his  own  knowledge,  a  competent  judge  ;  and  these 
a  crafty  opponent  will  immediately  assail,  keeping  all 
the  rest  out  of  sight,  knowing  that  he  is  thus  transfer- 
ring the  contest  to  another  field,  in  which  the  result  is 
sure  to  be  practically  a  drawn  battle. 

There  is  a  difference  between  simply  disproving  an 
error,  and  showing  whence  it  arose.  Merely  to  prove 
that  a  certain  position  is  untenable,  if  this  be  done 
quite  decisively,  ought,  indeed,  to  be  sufficient  to  in- 
duce every  one  to  abandon  it :  but  if  we  can  also  suc- 
ceed (which  is  usually  a  more  difficult  task)  in  tracing 
the  erroneous  opinion  up  to  its  origin, — in  destroying 
not  only  the  branches  but  the  root  of  the  error, — this 
will  afford  much  more  complete  satisfaction,  and  will 
be  likely  to  produce  a  more  lasting  effect. 

The  arguments  which  s/wuld  be  placed  first  in  order, 


184  ORDER   OF    ARGUMENTS. 

are,  cmteris  paribus,  the  most  obvious,  and  such  as  nat- 
urally first  occur. 

This  is  evidently  the  natural  order ;  and  the  adhe- 
rence to  it  gives  an  easy,  natural  air  to  discourse.  It 
is  seldom,  therefore,  worth  while  to  depart  from  it  for 
the  sake  of  beginning  with  the  most  powerful  argu- 
ments (when  they  happen  not  to  be  also  the  most  ob- 
vious) ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  sake  of  reserving 
these  to  the  last,  and  beginning  with  the  weaker ;  or, 
again,  of  imitating,  as  some  recommend,  Nestor's  plan 
of  drawing  up  troops,  placing  the  best  first  and  last, 
and  the  weakest  in  the  middle. 

It  will  be  advisable,  however  (and  by  this  means  you 
may  secure  this  last  advantage),  when  the  strongest  ar- 
guments naturally  occupy  the  foremost  place,  to  reca- 
pitulate in  a  reverse  order,  which  will  destroy  the  ap- 
pearance of  anti-climax,  and  is  also  in  itself  the  most 
easy  and  natural  mode  of  recapitulation. 


OF  DISPOSITION  OR  METHOD. 
[From  Watts'  Logic] 

It  is  the  art  of  method,  which  must  secure  oui 
thoughts  from  that  confusion,  darkness,  and  mistake 
which  unavoidably  attend  the  meditations  and  discour- 
ses even  of  the  brightest  genius  who  despises  the  rules 
of  it. 

Method  is  the  disposition  of  a  variety  of  thoughts  on 
any  subject  in  such  order,  as  may  best  serve  to  dis- 
cover unknown  truths,  to  explain  and  confirm  truths 
that  are  known,  and  to  fix  them  in  the  memory. 

RULES    OF    METHOD. 

Rule  I.     It  must  be  safe  and  secure  from  error 


RULES    OF   METHOD.  185 

Great  care  must  be  employed  in  laying  the -foundation 
and  forming  the  scheme  of  thought  upon  any  subject. 
Those  propositions  which  are  to  stand  as  first  princi- 
ples, and  on  which  the  whole  argument  depends,  must 
be  well  guarded.  The  general  definitions  and  descrip- 
tions should  be  as  accurate  as  the  nature  of  the  subject 
will  bear.  As  we  proceed  in  our  argument,  no  feeble 
link  must  be  admitted  into  the  chain ;  and  our  argu- 
ment must  be  drawn  up  with  such  just  limitations 
as  may  preclude  or  anticipate  objections,  so  far  as  it 
may  be  done  without  too  much  encumbering  the  pro- 
cess of  argument. 

Rule  II.  The  method  should  be  plain,  and  easy  i.f 
comprehension.  We  should  begin  with  those  things 
which  are  more  obvious,  and  thus  prepare  the  way  for 
those  which  are  more  difficult.  Too  many  thoughts  or 
reasonings  should  not  be  crowded  into  a  single  sen- 
tence or  paragraph.  Numerous  subdivisions  should  be 
avoided. 

Rule  III.  Method  should  be  distinct,  and  each  part 
of  the  subject  should  be  kept  in  its  own  place. 

Rule  IV.  The  method  of  treating  a  subject  should 
be  full,  so  that  nothing  may  be  wanting:  nothing 
which  is  necessary  or  proper  should  be  omitted. 

When  called  to  explain  a  subject,  the  difficult  or 
obscure  parts  should  not  be  passed  over. 

The  parts  or  properties  of  any  subject  should  be 
enumerated  in  a  complete  and  comprehensive  manner. 

In  asserting  or  proving  any  truth,  every  doubtful  or 
disputable  point  should  be  well  supported  and  con- 
firmed. ) 

In  the  illustration  ox  arguing  of  a  point  of  difficulty 
we  may  employ  copiousness  and  diffuseness  of  lan- 
guage, so  as  to  set  the  truth  in  various  lights,  and  turn 
the  various  sides  of  it  to  view. 


186  RULES    OF   METHOD. 

In  drawing  up  a  narrative  of  any  matter  of  fact,  no 
important  circumstance  should  be  omitted. 

This  fulness  of  method  does  not  require  that  every 
thing  should  be  said  which  can  be  said  upon  any  sub- 
ject ;  but  only  so  much  as  is  necessary  to  the  design  in 
view,  and  which  has  a  direct  tendency  to  this  end. 

Eule  V.  As  method  should  be  full  without  de- 
ficiency, so  it  should  be  "brief,  or  without  superfluity. 
All  needless  repetitions  of  the  same  thing  in  different 
parts  of  the  discourse  should  be  avoided :  no  one  part 
should  be  drawn  out  to  a  tedious  length,  or  so  far  as  to 
preclude  a  proper  attention  to  subsequent,  and  perhaps 
more  important  parts  of  a  discourse.  Explicatives 
should  not  be  multiplied  where  there  is  no  difficulty, 
or  darkness,  or  danger  of  mistake.  Nor  should  those 
things  be  sustained  by  a  formal  proof  which  are  too 
plain  to  require  it.  Again,  there  are  other  things  so 
evidently  false  that  they  require  no  refutation. 

There  is  a  happy  medium  to  be  observed  in  our 
method,  so  that  the  brevity  may  not  render  the  sense 
obscure  nor  the  argument  feeble ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  fulness  of  our  method  may  not  waste 
time,  tire  the  hearer,  or  fill  the  mind  with  trifles  and 
impertinences. 

Kule  VI.  The  facts  of  a  discourse  should  be  well 
connected.  Keep  always  in  view  the  main  end  and  de- 
sign, and  let  all  the  parts  of  discourse  iend  visibly  to- 
wards it.  Let  the  mutual  relation  and  dependence  of 
the  several  branches  be  so  just  and  evident,  that  every 
part  may  naturally  lead  onward  to  the  next,  without 
any  large  chasms  to  interrupt  the  scheme.  In  passing 
from  one  part  of  discourse  to  another,  the  most  graceful 
and  appropriate  forms  of  transition  should  be  studied 
and  practised.] 


SYLLOGISM.  187 


LECTURE  X. 


SYLLOGISM. 


In  explaining  the  nature  of  reasoning,  I  have  not 
pretended  to  teach  any  art  regarding  the  investigation 
of  truth  and  knowledge,  except  careful  attention  to 
attain  clear  ideas,  and  patient  comparison  of  these 
ideas.  I  know  no  other  art,  nor  do  I  know  any  useful 
and  successful  inquirer  who  has  employed  any  other. 
From  the  days  of  Aristotle,  however,  to  the  revival  of 
letters,  somewhat  more  than  two  centuries  ago,  all 
learned  men,  almost,  imagined  that  they  possessed  such 
an  art,  and  many  still  hold  the  syllogistic  method  of 
that  eminent  ancient  to  be  what  they  call  an  analysis  of 
the  art  of  reasoning,  though  they  admit  that  it  cannot 
easily  be  employed  to  any  useful  purpose  in  philosophy 
or  business. 

The  history  of  learning  has  not  to  exhibit  another 
such  singular  and  curious  phenomenon,  as  the  progress 
and  the  influence  of  the  logic  of  Aristotle.  It  was  de- 
lineated almost  as  fully  in  the  writings  of  that  author, 
as  it  has  -been  in  the  numerous  and  more  voluminous 
compositions  of  his  followers.  If  we  except  the  addi- 
tion of  examples  of  the  different  figures  and  modes  of 
syllogisms,  little  important  improvement  has  been  add- 
ed to  the  researches  and  explanations  of  the  inventor- 

In  all  Aristotle's  writings  there  is  some  obscurity.  He  either 
had  not,  or  would  not  exert,  the  faculty  of  explaining  his  meaning 
simply  and  intelligibly.  His  expression  is  often  equivocal  and 
abrupt.  His  mode  of  thinking  is  abstract  and  refined,  and  his 
affectation  of  system  is  so  great  that  he  multiplies  divisions  and 


IS8  THE    WORKS    OF    ARISTOTLE. 

subdivisions  without  end.  He  exhausts  the  patience,  and  puzzles 
!  he  attention  of  the  most  partial  and  the  most  intelligent  of  his 
readers.  Of  all  his  numerous  treatises,  however,  his  logic  is  per- 
haps the  most  obscure,  owing  partly  to  the  intricate  nature  of  the 
topics  it  treats,  but  chiefly  to  the  exceedingly  involved  manner  in 
which  he  has  discussed  them.  The  obscurity  and  the  ingenuity  of 
the  works  of  Aristotle  contributed,  perhaps,  to  establish  his  au- 
thority during  the  darkness  of  the  middle  ages.  The  admiration  of 
ignorant  men  is  often  the  surest  support  of  their  attachment;  and 
the  best  method  of  attaining  that  admiration,  is  to  astonish  them 
with  the  discussion  of  mysteries  which  they  do  not  understand. 
Whether  we  shall  allow  this  theory  to  be  satisfactory  or  not,  the 
fact  is  certain,  that  no  doctrines  of  any  other  philosopher  ever  ac- 
quired such  absolute  dominion  over  the  minds  of  men. 

The  works  of  the  Stagirite,  by  a  series  of  events  a  little  singular, 
remained  in  a  great  measure  unknown  for  many  years  after  his 
death.  He  had  left  them  to  Theophrastus,  who  succeeded  him  in 
the  peripatetic  school.  Theophrastus  transmitted  them  to  Neleus, 
his  heir,  who,  after  selling  a  copy  of  them  to  Ptolemy  Philadelphus, 
king  of  Egypt,  conveyed  them  to  Scepsis,  a  city  of  Troas,  his  native 
country,  wjiere  they  were  deposited  in  a  vault,  for  fear,  it  seems, 
they  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  king  of  Pergamus,  to  whom 
that  country  belonged,  and  who,  it  is  probable,  wished  to  appro- 
priate them  at  a  price  much  below  their  value. 

In  this  vault  they  remained  near  a  hundred  and  thirty  years,  till 
they  were  rendered  almost  illegible  by  dampness  and  vermin. 
They  were,  however,  rescued  from  destruction,  and  were  sold,  or 
conveyed  to  Apellicon,  a  peripatetic  philosopher  of  Athens,  who 
caused  them  to  be  transcribed  and  deposited  in  his  library.  There 
they  remained  till  Sylla,  at  the  head  of  a  Koman  army,  in  the 
Mythridatic  war,  conquered  Athens,  when  he  got  possession  of  the 
library  of  Apellicon,  and  transmitted  it  to  Rome.  Tyrannion,  a 
Greek  grammarian,  an  acquaintance  of  Cicero  and  Atticus,  who 
resided  at  Rome,  obtained  a  copy  of  them  by  the  good  offices  of 
the  library-keeper  of  Sylla.  This  critic  was  at  much  pains  to  get 
them  transcribed  and  corrected,  and  from  his  copy,  chiefly,  the 
Romans  seem  to  have  received  their  knowledge  of  the  peripatetic 
philosophy. 

From  the  copy  of  the  works  of  Aristotle  purchased  by  the  king 
of  Egypt,  the  Arabians  probably  first  derived  their  acquaintance 
with  him  ;  but  the  knowledge  of  his  works  in  Italy  appears  to  have 


THE    SCHOOLMEN.  189 

oeen  extinguished  by  the  inundations  of  German  barbarians,  who 
subverted  the  Roman  dominion  in  the  fifth  century.  It  is  at  least 
certain,  that  no  part  of  his  works  was  much  read  or  admired  in 
Europe  till  the  middle  of  the  eleventh  century,  and  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  them  then  acquired  was  chiefly  obtained  from  the  Arabians. 
The  logic  of  Aristotle,  in  particular,  was  formed  for  cavilling  and 
disputation ;  and  it  soon  gained  applause  and  authority,  when  the 
schoolmen,  the  most  subtle  and  disputatious  order  of  men  the  world 
ever  saw,  began  to  attract  the  notice  of  society. 

Lanfranc,  Archbishop  of  Canterbury,  is  commonly  reputed  the 
father  of  this  order,  and  he  was  the  first  who  drew  the  attention  of 
the  public  to  the  works  of  the  Stagirite.  All  learned  men  of  Eu- 
rope soon  became  logicians  and  Aristotelians.  Schools  were  erect- 
ed, colleges  were  endowed,  literary  degrees  were  conferred.  In 
many  cathedrals,  and  in  most  monasteries,  academical  institutions 
were  established ;  and  the  whole  knowledge  then  in  vogue  was  to 
form  syllogisms  with  readiness  and  address,  to  perplex,  confound, 
and  conquer  an  adversary.  Formal  and  public  disputations  were 
frequently  held  among  the  members  of  these  societies,  and  society 
sometimes  challenged  society  to  wage  keen  syllogistic  war  against 
one  another.  Logical  champions  travelled  about,  like  knights- 
errant,  in  quest  of  literary  adventures,  and  entered  the  lists  with 
whatever  combatant  would  venture  to  take  up  their  gauntlet  of 
defiance.  Victory  crowned  a  disputant  with  the  highest  applause, 
and  commonly  procured  him  some  appellation  significant  of  the 
eminence  of  his  syllogistic  powers,  such  as  Doctor  Profundus, 
Subtilis,  Irrefragabilis.  Never  was  the  zeal  of  men  so  great  for  the 
cultivation  of  useful  knowledge,  as  was  the  ambition  of  the  school- 
men to  become  adepts  in  the  art  of  disputation,  and  to  silence  an 
antagonist  whom  they  expected  not  to  convince. 

In  such  an  age,  and  with  such  men,  the  logic  of  Aris- 
totle could  not  fail  to  be  received  with  avidity.  His 
authority  became  supreme  and  indisputable.  It  was 
the  most  insufferable  impudence  to  controvert  his  opin- 
ions, or  even  to  insinuate  suspicion  of  error.  The  sacred 
writings  claimed  not  greater  reverence  than  the  works 
of  this  philosopher,  and  his  name  was  little  less  respect- 
ed than  that  of  Jesus  Christ.  He  was  denominated 
divine;  large  treatises  were  written  to  prove  the  sal- 


190  INFLUENCE   OF   ARISTOTLE. 

vation  of  his  soul ;  he  was  considered  as  the  best  guar- 
dian of  the  Christian  faith  ;  and,  in  several  churches  in 
Germany,  his  morals  were  read  to  the  people  in  place 
of  the  gospels.  Through  the  whole  almost  of  the  scho- 
lastic period,  which  continued  above  five  hundred 
years,  from  the  middle  of  the  eleventh  century  to  the 
middle  of  the  sixteenth,  did  the  authority  of  Aristotle 
remain  uncontrollable  over  the  minds  of  men,  and  did 
eminence  in  the  syllogistic  art  procure  the  greatest 
fame,  and  the  highest  honors. 

But  the  influence  of  the  opinions  of  Aristotle  was 
not  confined  to  the  schools  of  disputation ;  the  civil 
power  sometimes  supported  their  authority ;  and  men 
of  more  erudition,  and  of  more  polished  times  than  the 
schoolmen,  testified  their  approbation  in  terms  of  the 
strongest  applause.  An  era  so  late  as  the  end  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  supplies  a  remarkable  incident  to  il- 
lustrate this  observation. 

Petrus  Ramus,  a  lecturer  in  the  college  of  Navarre,  published  a 
thesis  to  obtain  the  degree  of  Master  of  Arts,  in  which  he  ventured 
to  controvert  some  of  the  tenets,  and  to  censure  the  logic  of  this 
philosopher.  The  aifair  quickly  made  a  great  noise.  France  was 
alarmed,  and  the  University  of  Paris  took  the  matter  under  their 
cognizance.  They  resented  so  highly  the  conduct  of  Ramus,  that 
they  would  not  be  content  with  academical  censures.  They  first 
prosecuted  him  before  the  parliament  of  Paris,  that  some  civil  pun- 
ishment might  be  inflicted  suitable  to  the  enormity  of  the  heresy  of 
which  he  had  been  guilty,  and  which,  they  maintained,  sapped  the 
foundations  of  religion.  Suspicious,  however,  that  the  parliament 
might  not  canvass  the  matter  with  the  same  zeal  and  partiality 
which  animated  themselves,  tfyey  next  employed  every  intrigue  to 
remove  the  discussion  from  the  parliament  to  the  king  and  council. 

Francis  the  First  entered  fully  into  the  views  of  the  university. 
He  appointed  judges  to  try  the  merit  of  the  dispute ;  he  approved 
their  decision,  and  he  published  a  royal  mandate  enjoining  the  ob- 
servation of  it.  The  sentence  is  a  curious  literary  monument,  and 
marks  the  high  ascendency  which  the  writings  of  Aristotle  still 


SYLLOGISM    DEFINED    AND    EXPLAINED.  191 

preserved  over  the  minds  of  their  readers.  It  declared  Ramus 
guilty  of  rashness,  impudence,  arrogance,  and  ignorance ;  that  his 
thesis  was  a  malicious  attack  on  the  logic  of  Aristotle,  which  all 
the  world  admired,  and  which  he  did  not  understand ;  that  the 
publication  of  it  should  be  suppressed  for  the  peace  of  society  and 
the  interest  of  truth ;  and  that  no  person  whatever  should  tran- 
scribe, print,  disperse,  or  read  it,  under  pain  of  the  sverest  punish- 
ment. 

The  purpose  of  the  logic  of  Aristotle,  and  of  the 
numerous  writers  on  the  same  subject  who  have  ap- 
peared since  his  time,  is  to  teach  us  to  reason  by  syllo- 
gism. What,  then,  is  this  wonderful  syllogism  with 
which  mankind  have  been  so  long  and  so  deeply  fas- 
cinated, and  which  they  deemed  the  handmaid  of  truth 
and  the  bulwark  of  religion  '{  Is  there  any  charm  in 
the  name  ?  Will  it  make  us  mechanical  reasoners, 
without  the  necessity  of  using  our  faculties  ?  Can  it 
show  any  other  channel  to  truth  and  knowledge,  than 
that  which  all  men  in  earnest  employ,  and  which  con- 
sists in  the  comparison  of  our  ideas,  in  order  to  discover 
their  agreement  or  disagreement?  To  answer  these 
questions  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  I  must  explain  the 
manner  of  its  formation,  and  unfold  the  ingredients  of 
which  it  consists. 

A  syllogism*  is  an  argument,  or  a  step  of  an  argu- 


[*  When  the  state  of  our  knowledge  does  not  warrant  us  in  judging 
at  once  whether  two  conceptions  agree  or  differ,  we  seek  for  some  other 
judgment  or  judgments  that  contain  the  grounds  for  our  coming  to  a  de- 
cision. This  is  called  reasoning,  which  may  be  defined  "  the  process  of 
deriving  one  judgment  from  another."  The  technical  name  for  that  ono 
single  step  of  the  process,  of  which  the  longest  chains  of  reasoning  are  but 
the  repetition,  is  syllogism  (or  computation),  a  word  which  has  acquired 
its  present  sense  from  tfye  resemblance  between  computation  proper,  i.  e., 
gathering  the  result  of  other  judgments  that  we  call  reasoning.  A  syllo- 
gism has  been  defined,  "  A  sentence  or  thought  in  which,  from  some- 
thing laid  down  and  admitted,  something  distinct  from  what  we  have  laid 
down,  follows  of  necessity.''  The  form  or  essence  of  a  syllogism,  therefore, 
consists,  not  in  the  truth  of  the  judgments  laid  down,  or  of  that  which  is 


193  QUANTITY    AND    QUALITY    OF    PROPOSITIONS. 

merit,  containing  three  propositions,  the  first  called  the 
m,ajor,  the  second  the  minor,  and  the  third  the  conclu- 
sion.    For  example, 

All  animals  are  mortal ; 
Man  is  an  animal ; 
Therefore  man  is  mortal. 

Each  proposition  possesses  quantity  and  quality.  By 
quantity  is  meant,  that  it  is  universal  or  particular  / 
by  quality,  that  it  is  an  affirmative  or  negative.  A 
universal  proposition*  as  was  formerly  explained,  in- 
cludes a  whole  genus,  or  a  whole  species,  and  affirms 
or  denies  something  of  them.  The  major  proposition 
of  the  syllogism  now  adduced  is  an  example.  "  All 
animals  are  mortal,"  is  a  universal  affirmative  propo- 
sition.    Mortality  is  affirmed  of  the  whole  genus  of  ani- 


arrived  at,  but  in  the  production  of  a  new  and  distinct  judgment,  not  a 
mere  repetition  of  the  antecedents,  the  truth  of  which  cannot  be  denied 
without  impugning  those  we  have  already  accepted  for  true. — Thomson.'] 

[*  Universal  judgments  distribute,  i.  e.,  introduce  the  whole  of  their  sub- 
ject. In  "  All  the  fixed  stars  twinkle*'  and  "  No  man  is  wise  at  all  times," 
it  is  obvious  that  we  are  speaking  of  the  whole  of  the  fixed  stars,  and  of 
men,  respectively  ;  and  therefore  each  term  is  distributed. 

Negative  judgments  distribute  the  predicate.  If  u  No  minerals  are  nutri- 
tious for  animals"  is  asserted,  it  means  that  nothing  which  is  nutritious 
for  animals  can  have  the  properties  of  minerals  ;  and  so  the  term  "  Nutri- 
tious for  animals"  is  distributed ;  and  if  we  suppose  that  only  some  nutritious 
things  are  asserted  not  to  agree  with  minerals,  it  would  follow  that  some 
other  nutritious  things  might  agree  with,  i.  e.,  might  be  minerals,  so  that 
we  might  say  at  the  same  time—"  No  minerals  are  nutritious  for  animals," 
and  "  Some  minerals  are  nutritious  for  animals  ;"  whereas  we  know  that 
we  meant  by  the  former  judgment  to  exclude  the  possibility  of  our  receiv- 
ing the  latter.  If  the  predicate  of  a  negative  is  not  distributed,  it  can 
have  no  real  negative  power ;  for  if  the  subject  is  only  excluded  from  one 
part  of  the  predicate,  it  may  be  included  in  some  other  part. 

The  word  all,  in  its  proper  logical  sense,  means  "each  and  every;"  but 
!>.  stands  sometimes  for  "  All  taken  together" — "  All  these  claims  upon  my 
t  ne  overpower  me."  Hence  may  arise  an  ambiguity  ;  instead  of  the  all 
in  its  logical  use,  we  may  put  every  ;  but  to  exercise  the  same  liberty  with 
the  other  sense  of  it  would  be  absurd.  The  example  given  could  not 
mean."  Every  single  claim  upon  my  time  overpowers  me."— Thomson.] 


THE    FOUR    SORTS    OF    PROPOSITION'S.  193 

mals.  "  No  animal  can  live  without  food,"  is  a  uni- 
versal negative  proposition.  A  particular  proposition 
includes  only  a  part  of  a  genus,  or  of  a  species,  and 
affirms  or  denies  something  of  it.  Accordingly,  u  Some* 
animals  are  long  lived,"  is  a  particular  affirmative 
proposition.  "  Some  animals  are  not  endowed  with 
reason,"  is  a  particular  negative  proposition.  Hence 
it  appears  that  four  sorts  of  propositions  only  can  enter 
a  syllogism.  They  must  be  either  universal  affirmatives, 
or  universal  negatives;  particular  affirmatives,  or  par- 
ticular negatives.  These  four  sorts  of  propositions,  for 
the  convenience  of  distinguishing  them,  are  denomina- 
ted by  the  four  following  vowels,  a,  e,  ?',  o.  A,  signifies 
universal  affirmative  ;  e,  universal  negative  ;  t,  particu- 
lar affirmative ;  and  o,  particular  negative.  To  assist 
the  memory,  these  vowels  and  their  properties  are 
formed  into  the  two  following  monkish  verses: 

"  Asserit  e  negat  a,  sed  universaliter  ambse. 
Asserit  i  negat  o,  sed  particulariter  arnbo." 

Although  a  syllogism  consists  of  three  propositions, 
it  contains  only  three  ideas,  which  are  called  terms, 
each  of  which  is  twice  used,  to  make  up  the  proposi- 
tions. One  of  these  ideas,  which  is  always  the  predi- 
cate of  the  conclusion,  is  called  the  major  term ;  an- 
other the  minor  term,  which  is  always  the  subject  of 
the  conclusion ;  and  the  third,  the  middle  term.  The 
reasoning  of  the  syllogism  lies  in  pointing  out  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  major  and  minor 


[*  The  word  some  is  the  cause  of  confusion  in  its  logical  use.  In  what 
sense  is  the  "  some"  of  a  particular  proposition  to  be  understood?  Does 
it  mean,  "Some,  we  know  not  how  many,"  or,  "  A  certain  number  which 
we  may  have  in  our  thoughts  ?"  The  word  appears  to  be  employed  in  the 
two  senses,  of  "  some  or  other"  and  "  some  certain,"  in  common  language  ; 
and  it  becomes  a  question  in  which  sense  it  is  to  be  regarded  in  logic. — 
Thomson.]  •'*     '• 

9  « 


194  MAJOR,    MINOR,    AMD    MIDDLE    TERMS. 

terms,  by  comparing  them  with  the  middle  term.  The 
middle  term  never  appears  in  the  conclusion,  or  third 
proposition ;  it  is  compared  successively  with  the  major 
and  minor  terms  in  the  first  two  propositions,  or  premi- 
ses, as  they  are  sometimes  called.  It  is  twice  used  in 
the  premises ;  it  may  be  either  the  predicate  of  the  ma- 
jor premise,  and  the  subject  of  the  minor ;  or,  it  may 
be  the  subject  of  the  major  premise,  and  predicate  of 
the  minor.  In  like  manner  the  major  and  minor  terms 
stand  once  in  each  premise,  and  they  are  both  used  in 
the  conclusion. 

For  example,  in  the  syllogism  formerly  quoted,  the  minor  term  is 
"  man,"  the  major  term  is  "  mortal,"  and  the  middle  term  is  "  ani- 
mal." In  the  first  premise,  "  All  animals  are  mortal,"  the  middle 
term,  "animal,"  is  compared  with  the  major  term,  "mortal." 
"  Animal"  is  the  subject ;  "  mortal"  is  the  predicate ;  and  it  is  affirm- 
ed or  predicated  of  all  animals,  that  they  are  mortal.  In  the  sec- 
ond premise,  "Man  is  an  animal,"  "man,"  the  minor  term,  is  com- 
pared with  "  animal,"  the  middle  term ;  and  it  is  affirmed,  or 
predicated  of  man,  that  he  is  an  animal.  The  middle  term,  "ani- 
mal," is  the  subject  of  the  former  premise,  and  the  predicate  of 
the  latter.  In  the  conclusion,  "  Man  is  mortal,"  the  minor  term, 
"  man,"  is  inferred  to  agree  with  the  major  term,  "  mortal,"  be- 
cause, in  the  premises,  they  were  both  found  to  agree  with  the 
same  middle  term,  "  animal." 

We  have  now  advanced  a  considerable  way  in  the 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  a  syllogism.  In  order  to 
complete  the  illustration  of  all  those  which  are  denomi- 
nated regular,  or  categorical  syllogisms,  it  will  be  ne- 
cessary only  to  unfold  the  meaning  of  mode  and  figure. 
Figure  relates  to  the  position  of  the  middle  term  j 
mode,  to  the  quantity  and  quality  of  the  propositions 
of  which  the  syllogism  consists. 

The  middle  term  may  be  the  subject  of  the  major  premise,  and 
the  predicate  of  the  minor,  when  the  syllogism  is  of  the  first  figure ; 
or,  it  may  be  the  predicate  of  both  premises,  which  makes  a  syllo 


MODE    AND    FIGURE.  19.r) 

gism  of  the  second  figure;  or,  it  may  be  the  subject  of  both  premi- 
ses, when  the  syllogism  will  be  of  the  third  figure  ;  or,  it  may  be 
the  predicate  of  the  major  premise,  and  the  subject  of  the  minor, 
when  the  syllogism  will  be  of  the  fourth  figure.  As  the  middle 
term  never  appears  in  the  conclusion,  and  must  appear  twice  in 
the  premises,  it  will  appear  that  these  four  are  all  the  positions  of 
which  it  is  susceptible ;  and  consequently  that  the  number  of  fig- 
ures must  also  be  four.  I  should  add  examples  of  each  figure,  but 
'  I  rather  choose  to  defer  them  till  I  have  explained  the  meaning  of 
mode,  when  the  same  examples  will  serve  to  illustrate  both  figures 
and  modes. 

I  have  already  remarked,  that  all  syllogisms  are  com- 
posed of  four  sorts  of  propositions :  universal  affirma- 
tives, or  universal  negatives ;  particular  affirmatives,  or 
particular  negatives;  and  that  these  propositions  are 
discriminated  by  the  vowels  a,  e,  i,  o.  The  mode  of  a 
syllogism  is  determined  by  the  species  of  the  propositions 
of  which  it  is  composed. 

They  may  be  three  universal  affirmatives  marked  by  three  a\  or 
three  universal  negatives  marked  by  three  e%  or  three  particular 
affirmatives  marked  by  three  i's,  or  three  particular  negatives 
marked  by  three  o's ;  or,  they  may  be  two  universal  affirmatives, 
and  one  universal  negative,  marked  by  two  a's  and  one  e ;  or  two 
universal  affirmatives,  and  one  particular  affirmative,  marked  by 
two  a's  and  one  i ;  or  two  universal  affirmatives,  and  one  particu- 
lar negative,  marked  by  two  a's  and  one  o.  Each  of  these  combina- 
tions makes  a  mode ;  and  there  may  be  as  many  modes  in  each 
figure  as  there  are  possible  combinations  of  the  four  vowels.  It  is 
found,  by  computation,  that  the  number  of  possible  combinations 
is  no  fewer  than  sixty-four  for  each  figure,  so  that  all  the  four  fig- 
ures will  furnish  two  hundred  and  fifty -six  modes. 

But  of  these  possible  modes,  a  few  only  form  legiti 
mate  syllogisms.'  The  first  figure  has  no  more  than 
four  conclusive  modes  *  one  consisting  of  three  univer- 
sal  propositions,  denoted  by  three  a's,  to  which  has  been 
given,  by  the  schoolmen,  the  name  of  Barbara,  because 
it  contains  the  vowel  a  three  times.     A  second,  consist- 


196  FIRST    AND   SECOND    FIGURKS. 

ing  of  a  universal  negative  major  proposition,  a  him 
versa]  affirmative  minor  proposition,  and  a  universal 
negative  conclusion,  denoted  by  the  vowels  e,  a,  e}  to 
which  has  been  given  the  name  of  Celarent,  because 
the  vowels  of  this  mode  form  the  vowels  of  that  word. 
A  thirds  containing  a  universal  affirmative  major  propo- 
sition, a  particular  affirmative  minor  proposition,  and  a 
particular  affirmative  conclusion,  denoted  by  the  letters 
a,  f,  %  out  of  which  is  formed  the  word  Darii,  for  the 
name  of  this  mode.  A  fourth,  consisting  of  a  universal 
negative  major  premise,  and  a  particular  affirmative 
minor  premise,  and  a  particular  negative  conclusion, 
marked  by  the  vowels  e,  e,  0,  of  which  has  been  formed 
the  word  Ferio,  for  the  name  of  the  last  mode. 

In  the  second  figure  are  found  also  four  conclusive 
modes  ;  and  the  quantity  and  quality  of  their  propor- 
tions will  be  readily  comprehended  from  their  names, 
in  which,  as  in  the  preceding  figure,  the  vowels  only 
are  significant.  Cesare  is  the  name  of  the  first  mode  ; 
Camestres,  of  the  second  ;  Festino,  of  the  third  ;  Baroco, 
of  the  fourth.  The  third  figure  has  six  modes,  denoted 
by  the  hard  words,  Darapti,  Felapton,  Disamis,  Da- 
tisi,  Bocardo,  Ferison.  Hence  it  appears  that  all  the 
legitimate  modes  of  the  first  three  figures  are  no  more 
than  fourteen.  The  names  of  these  modes  and  figures 
were,  to  aid  the  memory,  formed  by  the  schoolmen  into 
the  following  barbarous  hexameters : 

"Barbara,  Celarent,  Darii,  Ferio,  dato  primse; 
Cesare,  Camestres,  Festino,  Baroco,  secundse ; 
Tertia  grande  sonans  recitat  Darapti,  Felapton  ; 
Adjungens  Disamis,  Datisi,  Bocardo,  Ferison." 

Aristotle  has  not  treated  separately  of  the  modes  of 
the  fourth  figure,  because  he  found  they  could  be  re- 
duced to  those  of  the  former  figures.  I  shall  now  offer 
some  examples  to  illustrate,  the  .theories  which  I  have 


EXAMPLKS    OF    SYLLOGISM.  197 

endeavored  to  explain.  The  following  is  a  syllogism  of 
the  first  figure,  and  of  the  mode  Barbara: 

All  bad  men  are  miserable ; 
All  tyrants  are  bad  men ; 
Therefore,  all  tyrants  are  miserable. 

The  major  term  is  "  miserable,"  the  minor  term  is  M  tyrants,"  and 
the  middle  term  is  "  bad  men."  The  middle  term  is  the  subject  of 
the  major  premise,  "all  bad  men  are  miserable,"  and  the  predicate 
of  the  minor  premise,  "  all  tyrants  are  bad  men."  The  syllogism  is 
therefore  of  the  first  figure,  which  requires  these  positions  of  the 
middle  term.  The  propositions  are  all  universal  affirmatives ;  con- 
sequently, the  mode  is  Barbara. 

The  next  shall  be  an  example  of  the  second  figure, 
and  of  the  mode  Cesar e. 

No  deceitful  man  merits  confidence ; 
All  honest  men  merit  confidence ; 
Therefore,  no  honest  man  is  deceitful. 

M  Deceitful,"  is  the  major  term ;  "  honest  man,"  is  the  minor  term; 
and  "merits  confidence,"  is  the  middle  term.  The  middle  term  is 
the  predicate  of  both  the  premises,  "no  deceitful  man  merits  confi- 
dence," "all  honest  men  merit  confidence,"  which  are  the  situa- 
tions of  the  middle  term  required  by  the  second  figure.  The  first 
premise  is  universal  negative,  marked  by  the  letter  <s,  "  no  deceitful 
man  merits  confidence;"  the  second  universal  affirmative  marked 
by  the  letter  a,  "all  honest  men  merit  confidence;"  the  conclusion 
universal  negative,  marked  again  by  the  letter  e,  "  no  honest  man 
is  deceitful."     These  letters  constitute  the  mode  Cesar e. 

The  subsequent  syllogism  is  of  the  third  figure,  and 
of  the  mode  Darapti.  It  is  one  of  Keckerman's  ex- 
amples : 

All  good  men  are  happy ; 

All  good  inen  hate  the  devil ; 

Therefore,  some  men  who  hate  the  devil  are  happy. 

The  major  term  is,  "  happy ;"  the  minor  term  is,  "hate  the  devil  ;v 
and  the  middle  term  is,  "  good  men."     The  middle  term  is  the  sub 


108         MODES    OF    THE    FIRST    AND    SECOND    FIGURES. 

I  ject  of  both  premises,  "all  good  men  are  happy,"  "all  good  men 
hate  the  devil,"  which  constitutes  a  syllogism  of  the  third  figure. 
The  major  premise,  "  all  good  men  are  happy,"  is  a  universal  affir- 
mative; the  minor  premise,  "all  good  men  hate  the  devil,"  is  the 
name ;  the  conclusion,  "  some  men  who  hate  the  devil  are  happy," 
is  a  particular  affirmative.  The  two  premises  are  noted  by  the  two 
a's,  the  conclusion  by  *,  and  these  letters  form  the  mode  Darapti. 

I  have  now  produced  an  example  of  a  mode  of  each 
figure.  It  would  be  tedious  to  exemplify  all  the 
modes  ;*  but  to  prevent  suspicion  of  unfair  procedure, 

[*  For  the  sake  of  gratifying  curiosity,  the  editor  subjoins  the  following 
examples  of  all  the  modes,  selected  from  a  London  work : 

The  first  fig tire  contains/bwr  moods,  or  modes,  whose  names  are  Barbara, 
Gelarent,  Darii,  and  Ferio,  of  which  the  following  are  given  as  examples: 

Bar-  Every  wicked  man  is  miserable ; 

Ba-    All  tyrants  are  wicked  men ; 

Ra.     Therefore,  all  tyrants  are  miserable. 

Ce-       They  who  neglect  their  duty  are  not  wise, 
La-      Idle  boys  neglect  their  duty  ; 
Rent.  Therefore,  idle  boys  are  not  wise. 

Da-  They  who  please  God  are  happy  ; 

Ri-    Some  poor  men  please  God ; 

I.      Therefore,  some  poor  men  are  happy 

Fe-  Disobedient  children  are  not  blessings , 

Ri-    Some  children  are  disobedient ; 

O.     Therefore,  some  children  are  not  blessings. 

There  are  four  modes  also  in  the  second  figure,  whose  names  are  Oesare, 
Oamestres,  Festino,  and  Baroco,  examples  of  which  are  here  subjoined  : 

Ce-  No  liar  is  fit  to  be  believed  ; 

Sa-  Every  good  Christian  is  fit  to  be  beUeved ; 

Re.  Therefore,  no  good  Christian  is  a  liar. 

Ca-      All  pious  men  deserve  esteem ; 

Mes-  No  robbers  deserve  esteem  ; 

Tbes.  Therefore,  no  robbers  are  pious  men. 

Fe-    No  sin  is  excusable ; 

Sti-  Some  faults  are  excusable ; 

No.  Therefore,  some  faults  are  not  sins. 

Ba-  Every  part  of  religion  is  rational ; 

Ro-  Some  doctrines  are  not  rational; 

Co.   Therefore,  some  doctrines  are  no  part  of  religion. 


MODES    OF    THE    THIRD    FIGURE.  199 

I  shall  add  a  few  instances  promiscuously,  from  the 
different  figures  and  modes,  in  order  to  illustrate  further 
the  nature  of  this  famous  instrument  of  reasoning,  and 
to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  remarks  I  have  to  offer  upon 
it.  The  following  syllogism  is  of  the  mode  Bocardo, 
which  belongs  to  the  third  figure.  The  name  shows 
that  the  first  premise,  o,  must  be  a  particular  negative  ; 
the  second  premise,  <z,  a  universal  affirmative;  and  the 
conclusion,  0,  a  particular  negative.  The  third  figure 
requires  the  middle  term  to  be  the  subject  of  both 
premises ;  all  these  requisites  are  thus  fulfilled.     • 

Some  good  men  are  not  rich ; 

All  good  men  are  happy ; 

Therefore,  some  happy  men  are  not  rich  men. 


The  modes  in  the  third  figure  are  six,  named  as  follows  :  Darapti,  Felap- 
tont  Disamis,  Datisi,  Bocardo,  Ferison,  and  these  are  examples : 

Da-    All  good  Christians  shall  be  saved; 

Rap-  All  good  Christians  have  sinned  ; 

Ti.      Therefore,  some  who  have  sinned  shall  be  saved. 

Fe-    No  hypocrites  are  pleasing  to  God  ; 
Lap-  All  hypocrites  appear  to  be  religious  ; 
Ton.  Therefore,  some  who  appear  to  be  religious  are  not 
pleasing  to  God. 

Di-    Some  men  are  honorable  ; 
Sa-    All  men  have  their  imperfections ; 
Mis.  Therefore,  some  who  have  imperfections  are  honor- 
able. 

Da-  All  virtuous  men  are  happy ; 
Ti-   Some  virtuous  men  are  beggars ; 
Si.    Therefore,  some  beggars  are  happy. 

Bo-     Some  wars  are  not  to  be  avoided ; 

Car-  All  wars  produce  bloodshed ; 

Do.     Therefore,  some  bloodshed  is  not  to  be  avoided. 

Fe-    No  afflictions  are  pleasant; 
Ki-    Some  afflictions  are  good  for  us  ; 
Son.  Therefore,  some  things  that  are  good  for  us  are  not 
pleasant.] 


200  EXAMPLES    OF   SYLLOGISM. 

The  next  example  is  of  Camestres,  a  mode  of  the  sec- 
ond figure.     It  is  another  of  Keckerman's  : 

All  men  are  animals  ; 
No  stone  is  an  animal ; 
Therefore,  no  stone  is  a  man. 

u  Animal,"  is  the  middle  term,  and  is  the  predicate  of 
both  premises,  as  required  by  the  second  figure.  The 
first  premise  is  0,  universal  affirmative ;  the  second,  e, 
universal  negative ;  the  conclusion,  0,  also  universal 
negative.     Hence  the  mode  Camcstres. 

The  mode  Darii  shall  furnish  another  example : 

Every  thing  base  should  be  avoided ; 

Some  pleasures  are  base ; 

Therefore,  some  pleasures  should  be  avoided. 

"  Avoided,"  is  the  major  term  ;  "  pleasures,"  the  minor 
term ;  "  base,"  the  middle  term.  Base,  is  the  subject 
of  the  major  premise,  and  the  predicate  of  the  minor, 
which  refers  the  syllogism  to  the  first  figure.  The  first 
premise,  marked  #,  is  universal  affirmative  ;  the  second 
premise  and  the  conclusion  are  marked  t,  *,  particular 
affirmatives  ;  hence  the  mode  Darii. 

In  each  figure  there  are  singular  syllogisms,  or  syllo- 
gisms relative  to  individuals,  which  cannot  be  reduced 
to  any  of  the  modes.  They  are  allowed,  however,  to  be 
legitimate  syllogisms,  and  they  are  constructed  on  the 
same  principle  with  the  rest.  The  only  difference  is, 
that  all  the  established  modes  refer  to  genus  and  spe- 
cies ;  these  refer  to  species  and  individual.  I  shall  pre- 
sent some  instances  from  Keeker  man : 

Every  traitor  deserves  death  ; 

Judas  was  a  traitor ; 

Therefore,  Judas  deserved  death. 

This  syllogism  is  of  the  first  figure,  where  the  middle 
term,  "  traitor,"  is  the  subject  of  the  major  premise,  and 


dr.  keid's  analysis.  201 

the  predicate  of  the  minor  premise.  The  following  is  a 
particular  example  of  the  second  figure  : 

Socrates  was  an  ugly  man ; 
Plato  was  not  an  ugly  man ; 
Therefore,  Plato  was  not  Socrates. 

The  middle  term,  "  ugly,"  is  the  predicate  of  both  pre- 
mises. The  same  logician  supplies  a  particular  example 
of  the  third  figure  : 

Judas  did  not  obtain  salvation; 

Judas  was  an  apostle; 

Therefore,  every  apostle  did  not  obtain  salvation. 

"  Judas,"  is  the  middle  term,  and  the  subject  of  both 
premises,  according  to  the  requisitions  of  the  third  figure.* 

[*  Dr.  Thomas  Reid  presents  the  following  analysis  of  the  three  syllo 
gistic  figures  explained  in  the  preceding  lecture.     He  remarks  : 

The  compass  of  the  syllogistic  system  as  an  engine  of  science,  may  bo 
discerned  by  a  compendious  and  general  view  of  the  conclusion  drawn,  and 
the  argument  used  to  prove  it,  in  each  of  the  three  figures. 

In  the  first  figure,  the  conclusion  affirms  or  denies  something  of  a  cer- 
tain species  or  individual ;  and  the  argument  to  prove  this  conclusion  is, 
that  the  same  thing  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  genus  to 
which  that  species  or  individual  belongs. 

In  the  second  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  that  some  species  or  individual 
does  not  belong  to  such  a  genus ;  and  the  argument  is,  that  some  attribute 
common  to  the  whole  genus  does  not  belong  to  that  species  or  individual. 

In  the  third  figure,  the  conclusion  is,  that  such  an  attribute  belongs  to 
part  of  a  grenus  ;  and  the  argument  is,  that  the  attribute  in  question  belongs 
to  a  species  or  individual  which  is  part  of  that  genus. 

I  apprehend  that,  in  this  short  view,  every  conclusion  that  falls  within 
the  compass  of  the  three  figures,  as  well  as  the  means  of  proof,  is  compre- 
hended. The  rules  of  all  the  figures  might  be  easily  deduced  from  it ;  and 
it  appears  that  there  is  only  one  principle  of  reasoning  in  all  the  three ;  so 
that  it  is  not  strange  that  a  syllogism  of  one  figure  should  be  reduced  to  one 
of  another  figure. 

The  general  principle  in  which  the  whole  terminates,  and  of  which  every 
categorical  syllogism  is  only  a  particular  application,  is  this,  that  what  is 
affirmed  or  denied  of  the  whole  genus,  may  be  affirmed  or  denied  of  every  species 
and  individual  belonging  to  it.  This  is  a  principle  of  undoubted  certainty 
indeed,  but  of  no  great  depth.  Aristotle  and  all  the  logicians  assume  it  as 
an  axiom  or  first  principle  from  which  the  syllogistic  system  takes  its  depart- 
ure ;  and  after  a  tedious  voyage,  and  great  expense  of  , demonstrations,  it 
lands  at  last  in  this  principle  as  its  ultimate  conclusion.  0  euros  hominum  ! 
O  qnantut  \  e&t  in,  rebus  inane  I — Reid^s  Works,  vol.  i.  p.  108,.] 

9<» 


202  ENTHYMEME. 


LECTURE  XI. 

SYLLOGISM ITS    MERIT    AS    A    MODE    OF    REASONING. 

Besides  regular,  categorical,  or  pure  syllogisms,  there 
are  others  called  irregular,  because  they  cannot  be  re- 
duced to  the  rules  of  mode  and  figure.  I  shall  briefly 
explain  the  nature  of  these,  more  in  conformity  with 
general  practice,  than  because  they  are  of  much  im 
portance. 

Enthymeme  is  the  first  species  I  shall  mention.  It 
takes  place  when  one  of  the  propositions  which  consti- 
tute the  premises  is  omitted,*  and  the  conclusion  is 
drawn  from  the  other  premise,  as  if  the  syllogism  were 
regular  and  complete.  The  following  is  an  example. 
If  I  say,  either, 

Whatever  thinks  is  a  spiritual  substance, 
Therefore,  the  mind  of  man  is  a  spiritual  substance ; 
Or, 

The  mind  thinks, 

Therefore,  the  mind  is  a  spiritual  substance ; 

I  omit  the  minor  proposition  in  the  former  case,  and  in- 
fer the  conclusion  from  the  major.  I  omit  the  major 
proposition  in  the  latter  case,  and  infer-the  same  con- 
clusion from  the  minor.  It  is  supposed  in  both  cases 
that  the  connection  of  the  conclusion  with  either  pre- 
mise, is  so  apparent  as  to  -render  unnecessary  the  pres- 
to* Gr.  ev,  and  dvpos,  mind ;  something  understood  in  the  mind,  and  not 
e  x  pressed . — Brande. 

"  What  is  an  enthymeme?"  quoth  Cornelius.  "  Why,  an  enthymeme," 
replied  Crambe,  "  is  when  the  major  is  indeed  married  to  tr  e  minor,  but 
the  marriage  kept  secret." -*-J.rb>/th not  wnd  Pope.] 


SORITES.  203 

ence  of  the  other  premise.  The  premise  in  this  case  is 
called  the  antecedent ;  and  the  conclusion,  the  sequela, 
01  the  inference.* 

Sorites  is  another  species  of  irregular  syllogism,  and 
consists  in  conjoining  a  series  of  propositions  in  such  a 
manner,  that  the  predicate  of  the  preceding  proposition 
forms  the  subject  of  the  succeeding.  The  following  is 
an  example : 

The  mind  is  a  thinking  substance.  A  thinking  substance  is  a 
spirit.  A  spirit  has  no  extension.  "What  has  no  extension  has  no 
parts.  What  has  no  parts  is  indissoluble.  What  is  indissoluble  is 
immortal.     Therefore,  the  mind  is  immortal. 

This  species,  like  the  former,  is  only  a  train  of  syllo- 
gisms abridged,  into  which  it  may  easily  be  resolved  in 
the  following  manner : 

All  thinking  substances  are  spirits ; 
The  mind  is  a  thinking  substance ; 
Therefore,  the  mind  is  a  spirit. 

Spirits  have  no  extension ; 
The  mind  is  a  spirit ; 
Therefore,  it  has  no  extension. 

Things  having  no  extension  have  no  parts ; 
The  mind  has  no  extension  ; 
Therefore,  it  has  no  parts. 

[*  The  arguments  used  in  thinking,  speaking,  or  writing,  are  never 
drawn  out  in  strict  technical  form,  except  by  practised  logicians,  desirous 
of  exhibiting  their  art  to  those  who,  like  themselves,  are  conversant  with 
it.  A  sentence  which  contains  the  materials  of  a  syllogism,  not  technically 
expressed,  has  been  called  an  enthymeme.  Aristotle  understands  by  this 
a  syllogism  such  as  would  be  used  in  rhetoric,  where  the  full  and  orderly 
expression  of  premises  and  conclusion  would  seem  labored  and  artificial. 
And  as  the  omission  of  one  of  the  premises  is  a  common,  perhaps  the  com- 
monest, feature  of  enthymemes,  logicians  have  defined  them  as  syllogisms 
with  one  premise  suppressed.  But  we  may  also  omit  the  conclusion,  or 
invert  the  order  of  premises  and  conclusion ;  and  unless  we  extend  the 
name  enthymeme  to  these  cases,  we  put  a  considerable  restriction  upon  its 
original  meaning.  Let  the  enthymeme  then  be  defined — an  argument  in 
the  form  in  whicti  it  would  naturally  occur  in  thought  or  speech.  —  W 
Thomson.] 


204  CONDITIONAL    SYLLOGISM. 

Things  having  no  parts  are  indissoluble ; 
The  mind  has  no  parts ; 
Therefore,  the  mind  is  indissoluble. 

Things  indissoluble  are  immortal ; 
The  mind  is  indissoluble ; 
Therefore,  the  mind  is  immortal. 

Hence  it  appears,  that  all  the  intermediate  proposi- 
tions between  the  first  and  the  last  of  a  Sorites  may  be 
formed  into  separate  syllogisms ;  and  that  it  is  equiva- 
lent to  an  argument  formed  of  as  many  syllogisms  as 
the  argument  contains  intermediate  propositions.  It 
may  also  be  observed,  that  every  idea  of  the  Sorites  is 
twice  repeated,  and  that  it  might  be  further  abridged 
without  any  detriment  to  the  evidence  it  communicates. 
Had  it  stood  as  follows,  the  agreement  of  its  ideas 
would  have  been  as  clear,  and  its  evidence  as  satisfac- 
tory, as  in  any  other  form.  Mind — thinking  substance 
— spirit — without  extension — without  parts — indissolu- 
ble— immortal.* 

Irregular  syllogisms,  further,  are  either  conditional  or 
disjunctive.  The  subsequent  is  a  conditional  syllogism. 
"  If  the  air  press  down  bodies  below  it,  it  must  be  a 
heavy  body."  The  legitimacy  of  this  species  of  reason- 
ing consists  in  the  inference  following  necessarily  from 
the  premise.     It  has  scarcely  any  logical  form.    It  is  an 

[*  Three  or  more  premises  in  which  the  predicate  of  each  is  the  subject 
of  the  next,  with  a  conclusion  formed  from  the  first  subject  and  last  predi- 
cate of  the  premises,  have  been  called  a  sorites,  or  accumulating'  argument, 
from  the  Greek  word  autpdg^  a  heap.  The  name  is  not  very  appropriate  ; 
the  German  title  of  chain-argument  (kettenschluss)  expresses  better  the  na- 
ture of  the  process  in  which  the  mine)  goes  on  from  link  to  link  in  its  rea- 
soning, without  thinking  it  necessary  to  draw  out  the  conclusions  as  it 
passes.  Where  the  premises  are  all  universal  affirmative  judgments,  not 
the  least  confusion  can  arise  from  thus  postponing  till  the  end  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  results.  But  where  the  premises  are  judgments  of  different 
kinds,  the  reasoning  is  more  difficult  to  follow,  and  it  may  be  necessary  to 
draw  out  each  syllogism  separately,  in  order  to  see  whether  it  is  in  a  valid 
mood,  and,  if  otherwise,  what  is  the  fault  in  it.—  Thotnson,.] 


DISJUNCTIVE    SYLLOGISM-— DILEMMA.  205 

inference  from  a  principle,  which  inference  must  be 
admitted  if  the  principle  be  granted. 

A  disjunctive  syllogism  is  proper  and  legitimate, 
when  the  predicate  of  the  premise  admits  an  alternative, 
and  when  the  predicate  and  alternative  involve  every 
possible  case.  If  the  predicate  be  obviously  false,  the 
alternative  of  course  must  be  true.     Example  : 

The  mind  of  man  is  either  corporeal  or  spiritual : 
It  is  not  corporeal ;  therefore,  it  is  spiritual. 

If  the  predicate  and  the  alternative  do  not  exhaust 
every  case  that  can  exist,  the  conclusion  will  be  illegiti- 
mate. For  example  :  "  All  neighbors  are  either  friends 
or  enemies  ;  they  are  not  friends ;  therefore,  they  are 
enemies."  In  this  instance,  the  predicate  and  the  al- 
ternative do  not  include  every  case.  The  greatest  part 
of  neighbors  may  be  neither  friends  nor  enemies :  they 
may  be  altogether  indifferent,  and  accordingly  the  con- 
clusion is  ridiculous. 

[The  Dilemma  is  a  complex  argument,  partaking  both 
of  the  conditional  and  disjunctive.  It  is  a  syllogism 
with  a  conditional  premise,  in  which  either  the  antece- 
dent or  consequent  is  disjunctive.  It  may  prove  a  neg- 
ative or  an  affirmative  conclusion. 

The  word  Dilemma  means  "  double  proposition,"  so 
that  the  whole  argument  takes  its  name  from  the  one 
mixed  judgment  in  it.  When  this  is  more  than  double, 
as  in,  "  If  a  prisoner  is  legally  discharged,  either  the 
magistrate  must  refuse  to  commit,  or  the  grand  jury 
ignore  the  bill,  or  the  common  jury  acquit,  or  the  crown 
exercise  the  prerogative  of  pardon,"  the  argument  has 
been  called  a  Trilemma,  Tetralemma,  or  Polylemma, 
according  to  the  number  of  members  the  judgment  may 
have. — Thomson."] 
.  I  observed,  Lu  the  last  leeture,  that-lof  the  hunchied 


206  RTJLES   FOR   SYLLOGISM. 

and  ninety-two  modes  which  the  three  figures  contain, 
no  more  than  fourteen  are  conclusive.  I  shall  now  ex- 
plain the  means  by  which  these  inconclusive  modes  are 
set  aside.  Aristotle  has  been  at  great  pains  to  examine 
them  separately,  and  to  demonstrate  the  fallacy  of  the 
conclusions  they  infer;  but  later  logicians  have  con- 
tracted this  process  by  the  aid  of  a  few  rules,  which  are 
either  self-evident,  or  result  naturally  from  the  construc- 
tion of  a  syllogism.     The  first  rule  is — 

"  A  syllogism  must  consist  only  of  three  terms." 
This  rule  excludes  all  ambiguities  in  the  expression 
which  would  introduce  supernumerary  terms.  All  the 
terms  are  twice  repeated ;  and  in  every  repetition  the 
same  sense  should  be  retained.  If  the  sense  be  changed 
the  syllogism  is  viliated ;  because  the  ambiguous  word 
will  supply  as  many  terms  as  it  has  meanings.  The 
subsequent  syllogism  is,  therefore,  fallacious  and  ridic- 
ulous. 

Whatever  thinks  is  immaterial ; 

All  spirits  think ; 

Therefore,  spirit  of  wine  is  immaterial. 

The  double  meaning  of  the  word  spirit  renders  the 
conclusion  absurd.  The  syllogism  really  consists  of 
four  terms,  while  apparently  it  consists  only  of  three. 
The  second  rule  is — 

"  No  syllogism  can  consist  entirely  of  particular  or 
negative  propositions." 

Particular  propositions  cannot  infer  a  conclusion,  be- 
cause, as  I  shall  afterwards  show,  the  syllogistic  art 
hangs  on  this  principle,  "  Whatever  agrees  or  disagrees 
with  a  genus,  agrees  or  disagrees  with  every  species  of 
that  genus ;"  if,  therefore,  in  any  syllogism  no  genus  is 
found ;  if  different  parts  only,  either  of  a  genus  or  a 
species,  are  compared  together,  no  conclusion  can  re- 


RULES    FOR   SYLLOGISM.  207 

suit,  because  any  inference  from  such  premises  is  ille- 
gitimate.    Take  the  following  example : 

8ome  animals  are  beautiful ; 
Some  animals  are  not  beautiful ; 

Therefore,  some  women  are  beautiful,  and  some  women  are  not 
beautiful. 

Three  negative  propositions  cannot  compose  a  legiti- 
mate syllogism,  because  they  form  three  detached  as- 
sertions ;  and  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  any  one  of  them 
has  no  dependence  on  the  other  two.  The  subsequent 
example  will  be  an  illustration : 

No  matter  thinks ; 

No  spirit  is  matter ; 

Therefore,  no  matter  thinks,  and  no  spirit  is  matter. 

Another  rule  is — 

M  The  conclusion  must  be  particular,  if  either  of  the 
premises  be  particular ;  and  negative,  if  either  of  the 
premises  be  negative." 

This  is  what  the  logicians  mean  when  they  tell  us, 
that  "  Conclusio  sequitur  partem  debiliorem."  The 
u  pars  debilior"  is  a  negative,  or  a  particular  premise, 
compared  with  an  affirmative  or  a  universal  premise. 
This  rule  needs  little  illustration.  If  either  of  the 
premises  be  negative  or  particular,  the  conclusion  can- 
not be  general  or  affirmative,  otherwise  it  would  be 
more  extensive  than  the  premises  from  which  it  is  de- 
duced. The  superstructure  would  project  beyond  the 
foundation  ;  a  manifest  solecism  both  in  philosophy 
and  in  arts.  In  the  following  syllogism  the  conclusion 
is  negative,  because  the  major  premise  is  negative : 

No  man  is  immortal ; 

All  kings  are  men ; 

Therefore,  no  king  is  immortal. 


208  nmMb  FOR  SYLLOGISM. 

In  the  subsequent  syllogism  the  conclusion  is  partic- 
ular, because  the  minor  premise  is  particular 

All  good  men  are  happy  ; 
Some  men  are  good  ; 
Therefore,  some  men  are  happy. 

The  last  rule  is — 

"The  middle  term  must  be  taken  universally  in  one 
of  the  premises." 

When  the  middle  term  is  taken  universally,  it  refers 
to  a  genus ;  when  it  is  taken  particularly,  it  refers  to  a 
species.  Were  it  not  taken  universally  in  one  of  the 
premises,  they  would  not  include  a  genus,  and,  conse- 
quently, there  would  be  no  ratiocination  from  it  to  the 
species.  The  syllogism  would  consist  of  particular 
propositions,  and  I  have  already  shown,  that  from  such 
premises  no  legitimate  inference  can  result.  Take  the 
following  example : 

Whatever  thinks  is  immaterial ; 

The  mind  of  man  thinks ; 

Therefore,  the  mind  of  man  is  immaterial. 

The  middle  term,  "  whatever  thinks,"  is  taken  univer- 
sally, or  includes  a  genus  in  the  major  premise.  It  is 
aken  particularly,  or  refers  to  the  species,  "  mind  of 
man,"  in  the  minor  premise.  The  application  of  these 
rules  evinces  the  illegitimacy  of  the  inconclusive  modes, 
and  establishes  the  authority  of  the  fourteen  conclusive 
ones. 

I  have  now  advanced  every  view  and  explication 
which  appeared  requisite  to  unfold  the  nature  of  that 
wonderful  method  of  reasoning,  on  which  Aristotle,  the 
first  and  best  logician,  has  spent  so  much  of  his  time 
and  labor;  about  which  all  the  learned  men  of  Europe 
were  employed  for  many  ages  ;  and  from  eminence  in 
which  the  highest  literary  honors  were, derived  ;  some 


MERITS    OF    THE    SYLLOGISM.  209 

times  the  administration  of  the  most  important  civil 
offices  were  conferred.  I  proceed  to  discuss  its  merits 
as  an  engine  of  knowledge. 

That  I  may  do  it  no  injustice  in  the  course  of  the 
discussion,  it  may  be  necessary  again  to  observe,  that 
every  syllogism  must  not  be  considered  as  containing  a 
complete  argument,  or  a  train  of  reasoning,  if  the  argu- 
ment requires  more  than  one  intermediate  idea.  One 
syllogism,  on  the  contrary,  contains  only  one  step  of  a 
train  of  reasoning;  and  in  arranging  a  train  of  reason- 
ing in  the  syllogistic  form,  as  many  syllogisms  must  be 
made  as  there  are  steps  or  comparisons  in  that  train.  I 
must  also  observe,  that  by  proceeding  in  this  manner, 
any  train  of  reasoning,  in  arts,  in  science,  or  in  business, 
may  be  converted  into  syllogisms. 

These  remarks  may  be  illustrated  by  exhibiting  the  first  demon- 
stration of  the  first  book  of  Euclid  in  this  form.  It  will  be  recol- 
lected, that  the  object  of  the  proposition  is  to  prove,  that  the  tri- 
angle described  on  the  given  line  A  B,  by  means  of  the  two  circles, 
the  semi-diameter  of  each  of  which  is  the  line  A  B,  is  equilateral. 
From  the  properties  of  the  circle,  each  of  the  sides  of  the  triangle 
is  found  equal  to  the  base,  and  the  inference  is  drawn  necessarily, 
that  all  the  sides  are  equal.  This  train  of  reasoning,  expressed  bv 
syllogisms,  will  stand  as  follows  : 

All  the  semi-diameters  of  the  same  cir- 
cle are  equal ; 

The  lines  A  B,  A  C,  are  semi-diame- 
ters of  the  same  circle  ; 

Therefore,  these  lines  are  equal. 

All  the  semi-diameters  of  the  same  circle  are  equal ; 

The  lines  B  A,  B  0,  are  semi-diameters  of  the  same  circle;- 

Therefore,  these  lines  are  equal. 

Whatever  things  are  equal  to  the  same  thing,  are  equal  to  one 
another ; 

The  lines  A  C  and  B  C  are  equal  to  the  line  A  B  ; 

Therefore,  the  three  lines  A  B,  A  C,  B  0,  are  equal  to  ono  an- 
other. 


210  INUTILITY    OF   THE   SYLLOGISTIC    FORM. 

Triangles,  having  their  sides  equal,  are  called  equilateral ; 
The  triangle  ABO  has  all  its  sides  equal ; 
Therefore,  it  is  equilateral. 

Now,  the  point  to  be  investigated  is,  Whether  the 
syllogistic  method  of  exhibiting  this  demonstration,  or 
any  other  train  of  reasoning,  is  preferable  to  that  adopt- 
ed by  Euclid,  or  to  the  method  which  places  the  suc- 
cessive ideas  in  the  nearest  juxtaposition,  and  expresses 
them  in  the  fewest  and  plainest  words. 

From  the  example  I  have  given,  it  will  appear  that  the  syllogistic 
form  is  not  nearly  so  concise  as  that  of  Euclid ;  for  all  the  ideas  of 
Euclid's  demonstration  are  expressed  in  one  half  of  the  words 
which  are  requisite  to  constitute  these  four  syllogisms.  Even  Eu- 
clid's manner  of  expression  is  copious  and  full ;  and  the  evidence  of 
his  demonstration  would  not  perhaps  have  been  impaired,  had  he 
communicated  it  as  follows.  The  semi-diameters  A  B  and  A  C,  of 
the  one  circle,  are  equal ;  the  semi-diameters  of  A  B  and  B  0,  of 
the  other  circle,  are  equal  also ;  therefore,  the  triangle  is  equilateral, 
and  described  on  the  given  line. 

But,  besides  being  more  prolix,  the  syllogistic  meth- 
od adds  no  light  to  the  evidence  by  which  the  ideas  of 
the  train  of  reasoning  are  perceived,  which  light  the 
ideas  possess  not  in  their  natural  state  of  juxtaposition. 
Every  syllogism  consists  of  three  terms,  and  the  reason- 
er  must  have  discovered  the  middle  term,  and  observed 
the  agreement  of  it  with  the  extremes,  before  he  can 
form  the  terms  into  a  syllogism.  After  ihe  syllogism 
is  formed,  the  mind  acquires  no  satisfaction  from  the 
contemplation  of  it,  which  the  terms  did  not  suggest  in 
the  state  of  juxtaposition. 

Suppose  I  were  to  prove  that  Socrates  was  content 
with  his  condition,  because  he  was  a  wise  man;  I 
should  have  three  terms  of  which  a  syllogism  may  be 
formed,  and  which  in  their  natural  order  would  stand 
thus :  Socrates — a  wise  man — content  with  his  condi- 


INUTILITY    OF    THE    SYLLOGISTIC    FORM.  2 1  1 

tion.  I  affirm,  that  the  agreement  between  Socrates 
and  contentment,  is  as  obvious  and  satisfactory  in  the 
simple  juxtaposition  of  the  terms,  as  it  is  after  these 
terms  are  formed  into  the  following  syllogism  : 

All  wise  men  are  content  with  their  condition; 

Socrates  was  a  wise  man ; 

Therefore,  Socrates  was  content  with  his  condition. 

Further,  as  the  syllogistic  form  communicates  no  ad- 
ditional light,  so  neither  does  it  assist  in  discovering 
middle  terms.  The  principal  operations  of  any  investi- 
gation, are  the  invention  of  intermediate  ideas,  and  the 
comparison  of  them  with  one  another,  and  with  the  ex- 
tremes. The  invention  of  middle  terms  is  the  chief 
operation  ;  and  excellence  in  it  is  the  most  important 
qualification  any  inquirer  can  possess.  It  seems  to  de- 
pend on  natural  sagacity  and  acuteness,  fortified  and 
improved  by  exercise.  No  art  can  be  of  any  use. 
From  syllogism,  in  particular,  no  aid  can  be  derived. 
It  does  not  even  pretend  to  give  any  aid.  Its  only  ob- 
ject is  to  assist  in  the  second  operation,  the  comparison 
of  ideas;  and  we  have  seen  that  the  syllogistic  exhibi- 
tion is  not  more  perspicuous  than  the  natural  one. 

But  the  most  singular  phenomenon  of  syllogism  is, 
that  the  conclusion  is  often  a  self  evident  proposition, 
sometimes  even  trifling  and  insignificant.  The  discus- 
sion of  this  point  will  unfold  the  whole  mystery  and 
merit  of  the  method.  In  converting  a  train  of  ideas 
into  the  syllogistic  form,  there  must  be  made  as  many 
syllogisms  as  there  are  steps  or  comparisons  in  the 
train,  and  as  many  as  there  are  ideas  in  the  train,  ex- 
cept one.  Each  idea  of  the  train  beginning  writh  the 
second,  is  the  major  term  of  its  respective  syllogism; 
the  other  two  terms  of  the  same  syllogism  are,  one  a 
genus,  and  the  other  a  species  of  that  g-enus.     The  ma 


212  EXAMPLES   OF    SYLLOGISM. 

j<>r  term  is  compared  first  with  the  one,  and  then  with 
the  other,  and  must  be  found  either  to  agree  or  disagree 
with  both.  Take,  for  example,  the  train  of  reasoning 
formerly  mentioned  ; — Human  mind — thinking  sub- 
stance —  immaterial  —  indissoluble  —  immortal ;  —  and 
convert  it  into  syllogisms. 

Whatever   perceives,  judges,  and   reasons,  is  a  thinking  sub- 
stance ; 
The  human  mind  perceives,  judges,  and  reasons; 
Therefore,  the  human  1  find  is  a  thinking  substance. 

In  this  syllogism,  the  major  term,  "thinking  sub 
stance,"  and  the  second  idea  of  the  train,  is  compared 
with  the  genus,  u  whatever  perceives,  judges,  and  rea- 
sons," in  the  first  premise,  and  is  found  to  agree  with 
it.  The  same  major  term  is  compared  again  with  the 
species,  "  the  human  mind,"  in  the  conclusion,  and  is 
found  also  to  agree  with  it.  Now,  the  genus,  "  what- 
ever perceives,  judges,  and  reasons,"  the  species,  "the 
mind  of  man,"  and  u  thinking  substance,"  are  all  the 
terms  of  this  syllogism. 

Whatever  thinks  is  immaterial ; 

The  human  mind  thinks ; 

Therefore,  the  human  mind  is  immaterial. 

"Immaterial,"  the  third  idea  of  the  train,  and  the 
major  term  of  this  syllogism,  is  compared  first  with  the 
genus,  "  whatever  thinks,"  and  next  with  the  species, 
"  the  human  mind,"  and  is  found  to  agree  with  both. 

Whatever  is  immaterial  is  indissoluble; 
The  mind  of  man  is  immaterial ; 
Therefore,  the  mind  of  man  is  indissoluble. 

"Indissoluble,"  the  fourth  idea  of  the  train,  and  the 
major  term  of  this  syllogism,  is  compared  first  with  the 
genus,  "  whatever  is  immaterial,"  and  next  with  the 


EXAMPLES    OF   SYLLOGISM.  213 

species,   ';  the   mind  of  man,"  and  is  found  to  agree 
with  both.    • 

Whatever  is  indissoluble  is  immortal ; 
The  mind  of  man  is  indissoluble ; 
Therefore,  the  mind  of  man  is  immortal. 

"Immortal,"  the  last  idea  of  the  train,  and  the 
major  term  of  this  syllogism,  is  compared  first  with 
the  genus,  "  whatever  is  indissoluble,"  and  then  with 
the  species,  "  the  mind  of  man,"  and  is  found  to  agree 
with  both. 

From  these  examples  it  appears,  that  the  major  term 
of  every  syllogism  is  one  of  the  iiieas  of  the  train,  be- 
ginning with  the  second ;  that  the  minor  term  of  every 
syllogism  is  the  first  idea  of  the  train;  and  that  the 
middle  term  of  every  syllogism  is  a  genus  of  the  minor. 
The  syllogisms  I  have  formed  are  all  of  the  first  figure  ; 
but  this  circumstance  is  no  objection  against  the  re- 
marks I  have  to  make,  because  all  the  other  figures  and 
modes  proceed  on  the  same  principle,  namely,  the  com- 
parison of  the  major  term  first  with  a  genus  of  the 
minor,  and  next  with  the  minor  as  a  species;  or 
the  syllogisms  of  the  other  figures  may  be  reduced 
to  those  of  the  first  in  which  these  conditions  take 
place. 

What,  then,  is  the  mystery  of  this  mighty  syllogistic 
art,  which  has  so  long  engaged  the  attention  of  learned 
men,  and  is  still  accounted  by  many  of  that  description 
to  contain  something  meritorious,  or  to  be  an  analysis 
of  the  art  of  reasoning?  It  is  no  more  than  this, 
"  Whatever  agrees1  with  any  genus,  will  agree  with  every 
species  of  that  genus  /  or  whatever  disagrees  with  any 
genus,  will  disagree  with  every  species  of  that  genus P 
If  this  . ]be  .the .  principle  .of .  the  art,  can  we  wonder  at 
the  self-evidence  pf  all  the  .conclusions  of  all  its  svllo. 


214  THE   SYLLOGISTIC    ART    USELESS. 

gisms,  or  that  it  never  gratified  science  or  business 
with  the  discovery  of  any  useful  truth  ?* 

When  we  reflect  how  genus  and  species  are  formed, 
it  is  impossible  but  that  what  agrees  or  disagrees  with 
the  one,  must  agree  or  disagree  with  the  other.  What 
is  a  genus  ?  It  is  a  collection  of  all  the  qualities  com- 
mon to  the  species  it  includes.  What  agrees,  then, 
with  the  common  qualities  of  any  species,  must  agree 
with  the  species  itself,  as  far  as  these  qualities  extend  ; 
and  syllogism  carries  the  agreement  of  the  major  term, 
with  the  minor  and  middle  terms,  no  further  than  these 
qualities.  What  agrees  with  the  genus  must  agree 
with  the  species ;  it  is  only  an  agreement  with  the  same 
thing  in  different  situations;  the  major  term  agrees  or 
disagrees  with  perfectly  the  same  qualities,  in  the  ge- 
nus, with  which  it  agrees  or  disagrees  in  the  species. 
Hence  it  appears,  that  after  finding  the  agreement  of 
the  major  term  with  the  genus  of  the  minor  term,  the 
conclusion,  which  asserts  the  agreement  of  the  major 
term 'with  the  species,  or  the  minor  term  itself,  must 
be  self-evident.  To  arrange  things  into  species  and 
genera,  is  extremely  convenient  for  the  purposes  of 
language,  and  some  of  the  purposes  of  philosophy  ;  but 
to  pretend  to  reason  from  the  one  to  the  other,  seems  to 
be  the  quintessence  of  vanity  or  folly. 

Examine  any  demonstration  of  Euclid,  any  investiga- 
tion of  morals,  politics,  or  affairs,  and  itTwill  be  found 
that  no  man  in  earnest  reasons  from  a  genus  to  a  spe- 
cies. A  mathematical  demonstration  consists  of  the 
comparison  of  quantities'  of  the  same  species ;  figures 
are  compared  with  figures ;  angles  with  angles ;  and 
lines  with  lines.  An  inquiry  concerning  justice  or 
charity,  compares  these  virtues  with  the  principles  ol 

[*  Mill's  Logic,  p.  117,  may  here  be  consulted  with  ad-vantage.} 


AN    OBJECTION    CONSIDERED.  215 

reason,  equity,  the  laws  of  the  community,  and  the  sit- 
uations of  persons.  A  process  in  the  arts  refers  to  the 
theory  of  the  art,  and  to  the  example  of  the  most  repu- 
table and  successful  practitioners. 

It  is  of  little  consequence  to  maintain  that  the  syllo- 
gistic art  sometimes  makes  its  way  into  the  most  serious 
business,  and  that  every  indictment  for  a  crime,  for  in- 
stance, is  a  syllogism  ;  of  which  the  major  premise  con- 
tains the  description  of  the  crime,  and  its  punishment 
appointed  by  the  law;  the  minor  premise,  the  applica- 
tion of  the  law  to  the  case  of  the  criminal,  and  the 
conclusion,  an  assertion  that  the  criminal  merits  the 
punishment  appointed  by  the  law. 

That  an  indictment  stands  in  the  form  of  a  syllogism,  no  doubt 
can  exist.  The  major  term  is  the  punishment ;  the  crime  committed 
is  the  minor  term  and  the  species ;  the  description  of  the  crime  in 
the  law  is  the  middle  term  and  the  genus.  The  major  term,  or  the 
punishment,  agrees  with  the  genus,  or  the  law ;  and  it  agrees  also, 
perhaps,  with  the  minor  term  and  the  species,  or  the  crime  of  the 
prisoner.  But  there  is  not  here,  strictly  speaking,  any  reasoning. 
A  trial  is  no  more  than  a  scrutiny,  whether  a  particular  crime  is 
included  under  a  general  law,  or  whether  the  indictment  accords 
with  truth,  when  it  asserts  that  the  prisoner,  in  taking  away  the 
property  or  the  life  of  his  fellow-creature,  has  committed  the  crime 
of  theft  or  murder,  of  which  crimes  the  perpetrators  are  declared 
by  the  law  to  deserve  punishment.  There  is  no  more  reasoning  in 
this  case  than  in  every  application  of  the  principles  of  science  to  the 
particular  cases  they  include. 

The  assertion,  for  example,  that  a  particular  field  consists  of  a 
certain  number  of  acres,  is  equally  a  syllogism  with  an  indictment 
charging  a  culprit  with  the  commission  of  a  crime  punishable  by 
law.  The  number  of  acres,  suppose  ten,  is  the  major  term;  the 
length  and  breadth  of  the  field,  is  the  minor  term  and  the  species ; 
the  number  of  acres  ,of  which  all  fields  of  the  length  and  breadth  of 
the  one  under  consideration  consist,  is  the  middle  term  and  the  ge- 
nus. The  major  term,  ten  acres,  agrees  with  the  dimensions  of  all 
fields  of  the  extent  of  the  one  under  consideration ;  it  agrees  also 
with  the  dimensions  of  the  one  under  consideration  ;  and,  therefore, 
it  agrees  both  with  the  genus  and  the  species  of  the  syllogism. 


216        SYLLOGISM    AS    AN    ENGINE    OF    CONTROVERSY. 

But,  while  I  reprobate  the  syllogistic  method,  for 
being  nugatory  and  insignificant  as  an  instrument  of 
reasoning,  I  admit  its  high  merit  as  an  engine  of 
wrangling  and  controversy.  It  was  the  happiest  con- 
trivance that  could  have  been  devised  for  conducting 
those  public  disputations  and  trials  of  skill  which  for 
ages  prevailed  in  Europe,  and  in  which  the  discovery 
of  truth  was  no  part  of  the  ambition  of  the  combatants. 
The  most  ready  and  acute  framer  of  syllogisms  was  sure 
to  retire  triumphant.  The  grand  contest  was  not 
whether  the  syllogism  contained  any  useful  truth.  The 
object  of  one  party  was  to  maintain  its  legitimacy ;  of 
the  other,  to  controvert  or  deny  one  of  its  propositions. 
Wrangling  thus  became  a  science  ;  and  the  mind  of 
man,  apparently  enthusiastic  in  the  discovery  of  truth 
and  knowledge,  never  wandered  further  from  their 
paths. 

[Dr.  George  Campbell  (in  his  Philosophy  of  Khetoric, 
p.  86),  observes : 

In  the  ordinary  application  of  the  syllogistic  art  to 
matters  with  which  we  can  be  made  acquainted  only 
by  experience,  it  can  be  of  little  or  no  utility.  So  far 
from  leading  the  mind,  agreeably  to  the  design  of  all 
argument  and  investigation,  from  things  known  to  things 
unknown,  and  by  things  evident  to  things  obscure,  its 
usual  progress  is,  on  the  contrary,  from  things  less 
known  to  things  better  known,  and  by  things  obscure 
to  things  evident.  When,  in  the  way  of  induction,  the 
mind  proceeds  from  individual  instances  to  the  discov- 
ery of  such  truths  as  regard  a  species,  and  from  these, 
again,  to  such  as  comprehend  a  genus,  we  may  say, 
with  reason,  that  as  we  advance,  there  may  be  in  every 
succeeding  step,  and  commonly  is,  less  certainty  than 
in  the  preceding ;  but  in  no  instance  whatever  can  there 
be  more. 


DR.    CAMPBKLl/s    REMARKS.  217 

Now  the  customary  procedure  in  the  syllogistic  sci- 
ence, is  from  general  to  special,  and  consequently  from 
less  to  more  obvious.  In  scientific  reasoning  the  case 
is  very  different,  as  the  axioms  or  universal  truths  from 
which  the  mathematician  argues,  are  so  far  from  being 
the  slow  result  of  induction  and  experience,  that  they 
are  self-evident.  They  are  no  sooner  apprehended  than 
they  are  necessarily  assented  to. 

But  to  illustrate  the  matter  by  an  example,  take  the 
following  specimen  in  Barbara,  the  first  mode  of  the 
first  figure  : 

All  animals  feel ; 

All  horses  are  animals ; 

Therefore,  all  horses  feel. 

It  is  impossible  that  any  reasonable  man  who  really 
doubts  whether  a  horse  has  feeling,  or  is  a  mere  au- 
tomaton, should  be  convinced  by  this  argument ;  for, 
supposing  he  uses  the  names  horse  and  animal  as  stand- 
ng  in  the  same  relation  of  species  and  genus  wThich  they 
bear  in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words,  the  ar- 
gument you  employ  is,  in  effect,  but  an  affirmation  of 
the  point  which  he  denies,  couched  in  such  terms  as 
include  a  multitude  of  other  similar  affirmations,  which, 
whether  true  or  false,  are  nothing  to  the  purpose.  Thus 
all  animals  feel  is  only  a  compendious  expression  for 
all  horses  feel,  all  dogs  feel,  all  eagles  feel,  and  so 
through  the  whole  animal  creation.  I  affirm,  besides, 
that  the  procedure  here  is  from  things  less  known  to 
things  better  known.  It  is  possible  that  one  may  be- 
lieve the  conclusion  who  denies  the  major :  but  the  re- 
verse is  not  possible ;  for,  to  express  myself  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  art,  that  may  be  predicated  of  the  species 
which  is  not  predicable  of  the  genus,  but  that  can  never 
be  predicated  of  the  genus  which  is  not  predicable  of 
f.he  species.   If  one,  therefore,  were  under  such  an  error 

10 


•2 1 S      brown's  analysis  of  the  scholastic  logic. 

in  regard  to  the  brutes,  true  logic,  which  is  always  co- 
incident with  good  sense,  would  lead  our  reflections  to 
the  indications  of  perception  and  feeling  given  by  those 
animals,  and  the  remarkable  conformity  which  in  this 
respect,  and  in  respect  of  their  bodily  organs,  they  beai 
to  our  own  species.] 


CONCLUDING  CHAPTER. 


[The  retardation  of  the  progress  of  reasoning,  is  one 
circumstance  which  distinguishes  the  syllogism;  but 
the  absurdity,  which  is  implied  in  the  very  theory  of  it, 
distinguishes  it  still  more.  It  constantly  assumes,  as 
the  first  stage  of  that  reasoning  by  which  we  are  to  ar- 
rive at  a  particular  truth,  our  previous  knowledge  of 
that  particular  truth.  The  major  is  the  very  conclusion 
itself  under  another  form,  and  its  truth  is  not  more  felt 
than  that  which  it  professes  to  develop.  Thus,  to  take 
one  of  the  trifling  examples  which,  in  books  of  logic, 
are  usually  given,  with  a  most  appropriate  selection,  to 
illustrate  this  worse  than  trifling  art — when,  in  order  to 
prove  that  "  John  is  a  sinner,"  I  do  not  adduce  any  par- 
ticular sin  of  which  he  has  been  guilty,  but  draw  up 
my  accusation  more  irresistibly  by  the  major  of  a  syllo- 
gism— "  All  men  are  sinners  ;"  "  John  is  a  man  ;" 
"therefore,  John  is  a  sinner."  If  I  really  attached 
any  meaning  to  my  major  proposition,  "  all  men  are 
sinners,"  I  must  at  that  very  moment  have  felt  as  com- 
pletely that  John  was  a  sinner,  as  after  I  had  per* 
sued  him  technically  through  the  minor  and  conclusion 

The  great  error  of  the  theory  of  the  syllogism  'ion- 


BliOYVN's    ANALYSIS    OF    TMK    SCHOLASTIC    LOGIC.        219 

sisted  in  supposing  that  because  all  our  knowledge  may 
be  technically  reduced,  in  some  measure,  to  general 
maxims,  these  maxims  have  naturally  a  prior  and  par- 
amount existence  in  our  thoughts,  and  give  rise  to  those 
very  reasonings  which,  on  the  contrary,  give  rise  to 
them. 

It  is  not  on  account  of  our  previous  assent  to  the 
maxim,  "  a  whole  is  greater  than  a  part,"  that  we  be- 
lieve any  particular  whole  to  be  greater  than  any  part 
of  it ;  but  we  feel  this  truth  in  every  particular  case  by 
its  own  intuitive  evidence,  and  the  axiom  only  ex- 
presses briefly  our  various  feelings  of  this  kind  without 
giving  occasion  to  them.  The  general  axiom,  then,  is 
in  every  case  posterior  to  the  separate  feelings  of  which 
it  is  only  the  brief  expression,  or,  at  least,  without 
which,  as  prior  to  our  verbal  statement  of  the  axiom, 
the  axiom  itself  never  could  have  formed  a  part  of  our 
system  of  knowledge.  The  syllogism,  therefore,  which 
proceeds  from  the  axiom  to  the  demonstration  of  par- 
ticulars, reverses  completely  the  order  of  reasoning,  and 
begins  with  the  conclusion,  in  order  to  teach  us  how  we 
may  arrive  at  it. 

The  natural  process  of  reasoning  by  two  propositions 
instead  of  the  three  which  the  syllogism  would  force  us 
to  use,  has  been  allowed  indeed  by  logicians  to  have  a 
place  in  their  system  ;  because,  with  all  their  fondness 
for  their  own  technical  modes,  they  had  not  sufficient 
hardihood  to  deny,  that  it  is  at  least  possible  for  us  to 
reason  sometimes,  as  in  truth  we  always  reason.  Their 
only  resource,  therefore,  was  to  reduce  this  natural  pro- 
cess under  their  own  artificial  method,  and  to  give  it  a 
name  which  might  imply  the  necessity  of  this  reduc- 
tion, before  the  reasoning  itself  could  be  worthy  of  that 
honorable  title.  They  supposed,  accordingly,  the  propo- 
sition which  was  technically  wanting  to  be  understood 


ANALYSIS    OF    THE    SCHOLASTIC    LOGIC. 

in  the  mind  of  the  thinker  or  hearer,  and  termed  the 
reasoning,  therefore,  an  enthymeme.  It  was,  they  said, 
a  truncated  or  imperfect  syllogism.  They  would  have 
expressed  themselves  more  accurately  if  they  had  de- 
scribed their  own  syllogism,  as,  in  relation  to  the  nat- 
ural analytic  process  of  our  thought,  a  cumbrous  and 
overloaded  enthymeme. 

A  very  little  attention  to  the  nature  of  the  different 
propositions  of  the  syllogism,  will  be  sufficient  to  show 
that  the  same  fundamental  error  which  renders  it  use- 
less for  discovering  truth,  renders  it  equally  useless  for 
the  communication  of  it  to  others ;  and  that  as  our  in- 
ternal reasoning  is  only  a  series  of  enthymemes,  it  is 
only  by  such  a  series  of  enthymemes  as  that  by  which 
truth  unfolds  itself  to  our  own  minds,  that  it  can  be  suc- 
cessfully unfolded  to  the  minds  of  others.  In  the  at- 
tempt to  communicate  knowledge  by  the  technical  forms 
of  reasoning,  the  major  proposition,  as  already  stated, 
must  of  course  have  been  supposed  to  be  understood 
and  admitted  when  stated,  since,  if  not  admitted  by  the 
hearer  or  reader,  as  soon  as  stated,  it  would  itself  stand 
in  need  of  proof;  and  if  it  was  so  understood  and  ad- 
mitted, of  what  use  would  the  remaining  propositions 
of  the  syllogism  be,  since  they  could  communicate  no 
truth  that  was  not  communicated  and  felt  before  ? 

The  whole  question  relates  to  the  feeling  of  the  truth 
of  the  major  proposition ;  for  if  it  be  true,  and  felt  to  be 
true,  all  the  rest  is  already  allowed ;  and  yet  this  most 
important  of  all  propositions,  which,  if  the  conclusion 
be  of  a  kincl  that  demands-  proof,  must  itself  demand 
proof  still  more,  is  the  very  proposition  which  is  most 
preposterously  submitted  to  us  in  the  Jlrst  place  for  our" 
assent,  without  any  proof  whatever, — the  honor  of  a 
proof  being  reserved  only  for  a  proposition  which,  if  the 
major  require  no  proof,  must  be  itself  too  clear  t<5  stand 


brown's  analysis  <>f  the  scholastic  logic.      221 

in  need  of  it.  Hence,  the  syllogism  cannot  fail  to  train 
the  mind  which  receives  instructions  in  this  way,  to  twc 
of  the  most  dangerous,  practical  errors, — the  errors  ot 
admitting  without  proof  only  what  requires  proof,  and 
of  doubting,  that  is  to  say,  of  requiring  proof,  only  of 
what  is  evident. 

The  triumph  of  the  syllogistic  art,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed, however,  is. not  as  an  art  of  acquiring  or  commu- 
nicating truth,  but  as  an  art  of  disputation, — as  the 
great  art  of  proving  any  thing  by  any  thing,  quidlibet 
'per  quodlibet  jprobandi.  And,  if  it  be  a  merit  to  dis- 
pute long  and  equally  well  on  subjects  known  and 
unknown ;  to  vanquish  an  opponent  by  being  in  the 
wrong,  and  sometimes  too  by  being  in  the  right,  but 
without  the  slightest  regard  either  to  the  right  or  wrong, 
and  merely  as  these  accidental  circumstances  may  have 
corresponded  with  certain  skilful  uses  of  terms  without 
a  meaning. — this  merit  the  logicians  of  the  schools  un- 
questionably might  claim. 

One  of  the  most  hurtful  consequences  of  this  system, 
was  the  ready  disguise  of  venerable  ratiocination  which 
it  afforded  for  any  absurdity.  However  futile  an  ex- 
planation might  be,  it  was  still  possible  to  advance  it  in 
all  the  customary  solemnities  of  mood  and  figure ;  and 
it  was  very  natural,  therefore,  for  those  who  had  heard 
what  they  had  been  accustomed  to  regard  as  reasoning, 
to  believe  that  in  hearing  *  reasoning  they  had  heard  a 
reason. 

As  another  very  hurtful  consequence  of  this  technical 
system,  I  may  remark  that  the  constant  necessity  ot 
having  recourse  <to  some  syllogistic  form  of  argument, 
and  of  using  these  forms  in  cases  in  which  the  opinions, 
involved  in  the  syllogism,  were  at  least  as  clear  before 
the  syllogism  as  after  it,  rendered  argument  and  belief. 
by  a  sort  of  indissoluble  association,  almost  synonymous 


222  MILL   ON    SYLLOGISM. 

terms.  If  we  had  still  to  prove  John  to  be  fallible  after 
having  proved,  or  at  least  obtained  assent  to  the  propo- 
sition that  all  n.en  are  fallible,  it  was  not  easy  to  dis- 
cover any  truth  so  self-evident  as  not  to  stand  at  least 
equally  in  need  of  demonstration.  Hence  the  constant 
tendency  in  the  scholastic  ages  to  prove  what  did  not 
stand  in  need  of  proof.  Every  thing  was  to  be  devion- 
strated,  and  every  thing  was  demonstrated ;  though  it 
must  be  confessed  that  the  only  effect  of  the  demonstra- 
tion frequently  was  to  render  obscure — at  least  as  ob- 
scure as  any  thing  self-evident  could  be  rendered— 
what,  but  for  the  demonstration,  could  not  have  ad- 
mitted of  the  slightest  doubt. 

Akin  to  this  tendency  of  proving  every  thing — even 
self-evident  propositions — by  some  syllogistic  form,  was 
the  tendency  which  the  mind  acquired  to  apply  many 
varieties  of  technical  phraseology  to  the  same  proposi- 
tion, so  as  to  make  many  propositions  of  one,  as  if  every 
repetition  of  it,  in  another  form  of  language,  were  the 
enunciation  of  another  truth.  It  is  impossible  to  take 
up  a  volume  of  any  of  the  old  logicians,  and  to  read  a 
single  page  of  it,  without  discovering  innumerable  ex- 
amples of  the  influence  of  which  I  speak. 

OF  THE  FUNCTIONS  AND  LOGICAL  VALUE  OF  THE 
SYLLOGISM. 

[Extracted  from  Mill's  Logic,  pp.  122-137.] 

We  have  now  to  inquire  whether  the  syllogistic  pro- 
cess, that  of  reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars,  is, 
or  is  not,  a  process  of  inference  /  a  progress  from  the 
known  to  the  unknown ;  a  means  of  coming  to  a 
knowledge  of  something  which  we  did  not  know  be- 
fore. 

Logicians  universally  allow  that  a  syllogism  is  vicious 
if  there  be  any  thing  more  in  the  conclusion  than  was 
assumed  in  the  premises.     But  this  is,  in  fa^t,  to  say 


LOGICAL    VALUE    OF    THE    SYLLOGISM.  223 

that  nothing  ever  was,  or  can  be,  proved  by  syllogism 
which  was  not  known,  or  assumed  to  be  known,  before. 
Is  ratiocination,  then,  not  a  process  of  inference  ?  And 
is  the  syllogism,  to  which  the  word  reasoning  has  so 
often  been  represented  to  be  exclusively  appropriate, 
not  really  entitled  to  be  called  reasoning  at  all?  This 
seems  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  doctrine,  admit- 
ted by  all  writers  on  the  subject,  that  a  syllogism  can 
prove  no  more  than  is  involved  in  the  premises.  Yet 
the  acknowledgment  so  explicitly  made,  has  not  pre- 
vented one  set  of  writers  from  continuing  to  represent 
the  syllogism  as  the  correct  analysis  of  what  the  mind 
actually  performs  in  discovering  and  proving  the  larger 
half  of  the  truths,  whether  of  science  or  of  daily  life, 
which  we  believe :  while  those  who  have  avoided  this 
inconsistency,  and  followed  out  the  general  theorem 
respecting  the  logical  value  of  the  syllogism  to  its  legiti- 
mate corollary,  have  been  led  to  impute  uselessness 
and  frivolity  to  the  syllogistic  theory  itself,  on  the 
ground  of  the  petitio  principii  which  they  allege  to  be 
inherent  in  every  syllogism.  As  I  believe  both  of  these 
opinions  to  be  fundamentally  erroneous,  I  must  request 
attention  to  certain  considerations,  without  which  any 
just  appreciation  of  the  true  character  of  the  syllogism, 
and  the  functions  it  performs  in  philosophy,  appears  to 
me  impossible ;  but  which  seem  to  have  been  either 
overlooked,  or  insufficiently  adverted  to,  both  by  the 
defenders  of  the  syllogistic  theory  and  by  its  assail- 
ants. 

It  must  be  granted  that  in  every  syllogism,  consider- 
ed as  an  argument  to  prove  the  conclusion,  there  is  a 
petitio  principii.     When  we  say, 

All  men  are  mortal ; 
Socrates  is  a  man ; 
Therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal ; 


224  LOGICAL    VALUE    OF    THE    SYLLOGISM. 

it  is  unanswerably  urged  by  the  adversaries  of  the  syl- 
logistic theory,  that  the  proposition,  "  Socrates  is  mor- 
tal," is  presupposed  in  the  more  general  assumption, 
"  All  men  are  mortal :"  that  we  cannot  be  assured  of 
the  mortality  of  all  men,  unless  we  were  previously 
certain  of  the  mortality  of  every  individual  man  :  that 
if  it  be  still  doubtful  whether  Socrates,  or  any  other 
individual  you  choose  to  name,  be  mortal  or  not,  the 
same  degree  of  uncertainty  must  hang  over  the  asser- 
tion, "  All  men  are  mortal :"  that  the  general  principle, 
instead  of  being  given  as  evidence  of  the  particular 
case,  cannot  itself  be  taken  for  true,  without  exception, 
until  every  shadow  of  doubt  which  could  affect  any 
case  comprised  with  it,  is  dispelled  by  evidence  from 
some  other  quarter;  and  then  what  remains  for  the 
syllogism  to  prove  ?  that,  in  short,  no  reasoning  from 
generals  to  particulars  can,  as  such,  prove  any  thing ; 
since  from  a  general  principle  you  cannot  infer  any 
particulars  but  those  which  the  principle  itself  assumes 
as  foreknown. 

This  doctrine  is  irrefragable ;  and  if  logicians,  though 
unable  to  dispute  it,  have  usually  exhibited  a  strong  dis- 
position to  explain  it  away,  this  was  not  because  they 
could  discover  any  flaw  in  the  argument  itself,  but  be- 
cause the  contrary  opinion  seemed  to  rest  upon  argu- 
ments equally  indisputable.  In  the  syllogism  last  re- 
ferred to,  for  example,  or  in  any  of  those  which  we 
previously  constructed,  is  it  not  evident  that  the  con- 
clusion may,  to  the  person  to  whom  the  syllogism  is 
presented,  be  actually  and  hona  fide  a  new  truth  \  Is  it 
not  matter  of  daily  experience  that  truths  previously 
undreamed  of,  facts  which  have  not  been,  and  cannot 
be,  directly  observed,  are  arrived  at  by  way  of  general 
reasoning  ? 

We  believe  that  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal.     We  do 


SYLLOGISM    NOT    A    PROCESS    OF    INFERENCE.  225 

not  know  this  by  direct  observation,  since  he  is  not  yet 
dead.  If  we  were  asked  how,  this  being  the  case,  we 
know  the  Duke  to  be  mortal,  we  should  probably  an- 
swer, Because  all  men  are  so.  Here,  therefore,  we  ar- 
rive at  the  knowledge  of  a  truth  not  (as  yet)  suscepti- 
ble of  observation,  by  a  reasoning  which  admits  of  be- 
ing exhibited  in  the  following  syllogism  : 

All  men  are  mortal ; 

The  Duke  of  W.  is  a  man ; 

Therefore,  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal. 

And  since  a  large  portion  of  our  knowledge  is  thus  ac- 
quired, logicians  have  persisted  in  representing  the 
syllogism  as  a  process  of  inference  or  proof;  although 
none  of  them  have  cleared  up  the  difficulty  which 
arises  from  the  inconsistency  between  that  assertion 
and  the  principle,  that  if  there  be  any  thing  in  the  con- 
clusion which  was  not  already  asserted  in  the  premises, 
the  argument  is  vicious.  For  it  is  impossible  to  attach 
any  serious  scientific  value  to  such  a  mere  salvo,  as  the 
distinction  drawn  (by  Whately  and  others)  between  be- 
ing involved  by  implication  in  the  premises,  and  being 
directly  asserted  in  them. 

From  this  difficulty  there  appears  to  be  but  one 
issue.  The  proposition  that  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal, 
is  evidently  an  inference ;  it  is  got  at  as  a  conclusion 
from  something  else  ;  but  do  we  in  reality  conclude  it 
from  the  proposition,  "All  men  are  mortal?"  I  an- 
swer, No. 

The  error  committed,  is  that  of  overlooking  the  dis- 
tinction between  the  two  parts  of  the  process  of  philoso- 
phizing, the  inferring  part  and  the  registering  part ; 
and  ascribing  to  the  latter  the  functions  of  the  former. 

Assuming  that  the  proposition,  "  The  Duke  of  W.  is 
mortal,"  is  immediately  an  inference  from  the  proposi- 
tion, "  All  men  are  mortal,"  whence  do  we  derive  our 

10<' 


2-6  „     GENERALIZATION. 

knowledge  of  that  general  truth  ?  No  supernatural  aid 
being  supposed,  the  answer  must  be,  by  observation. 
Now  all  which  man  can  observe  are  individual  cases. 
From  these  all  general,  truths  must  be  drawn,  and  into 
these  they  may  again  be  resolved ;  for  a  general  truth 
is  but  an  aggregate  of  particular  truths ;  a  comprehen- 
sive expression,  by  which  an  indefinite  number  of  indi- 
vidual facts  are  affirmed  or  denied  at  once. 

But  a  general  proposition  is  not  merely  a  compen- 
dious form  for  recording  and  preserving  in  the  memory 
a  number  of  particular  facts,  all  of  which  have  beeii 
observed.  Generalization  is  not  a  process  of  mere 
reasoning  *  it  is  also  a  process  of  inference.  From  in- 
stances which  we  have  observed,  we  feel  warranted  in 
concluding,  that  what  we  found  true  in  those  instances, 
holds  in  all  similar  ones,  past,  present,  and  future,  how- 
ever numerous  they  may  be.  We  then,  by  that  valua- 
ble contrivance  of  language  which  enables  us  to  speak 
of  many  as  if  they  were  one,  record  all  that  we  have 
observed,  together  with  all  that  we  infer  from  our  ob- 
servations, in  one  concise  expression ;  and  have  thus 
only  one  proposition,  instead  of  an  endless  number,  to 
remember  or  to  communicate.  The  results  of  many 
observations  and  inferences,  and  instructions  for  mak- 
ing innumerable  inferences  in  unforeseen  cases,  are  com- 
pressed into  one  short  sentence. 

When,  therefore,  we  conclude  from  the  death  of 
John  and  Thomas,  and  every  other  person  we  ever 
heard  of  in  whose  case  the  experiment  had  been  fairly 
tried,  that  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal  like  the  rest,  we 
may  indeed  pass  through  the  generalization,  "  All  men 
are  mortal,"  as  an  intermediate  stage ;  but  it  is  not  in 
the  latter  half  of  the  process,  the  descent  from  "  all 
men"  to  the  Duke  of  W.  that  the  inference  resides. 
The  inference  is  finished  when  we  have  asserted  that  all 


REASONING    FROM   PARTICULARS   TO    GENERALS.     227 

men  are  mortal.  What  remains  to  be  performed  after- 
wards is  merely  deciphering  our  own  notes. 

Archbishop  Whatelv  has  contended  that  syllogism, 
or  reasoning  from  generals  to  particulars,  is  not,  agree- 
ably to  the  vulgar  idea,  a  particular  mode  of  reasoning, 
but  the  philosophical  analysis  of  the  mode  in  which  all 
men  reason,  and  must  do  so  if  they  reason  at  all.  With 
the  deference  due  to  so  high  an  authority,  I  cannot  help 
thinking  that  the  vulgar  notion  is,  in  the  present  case, 
the  more  correct.  If,  from  an  experience  of  John, 
Thomas,  &c,  who  once  were  living,  but  are  now  dead, 
we  are  entitled  to  conclude  that  all  human  beings  are 
mortal,  we  might  surely,  without  any  logical  inconse- 
quence, have  concluded  at  once  from  those  instances 
that  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal.  The  mortality  of  John, 
Thomas,  and  company  is,  after  all,  the  whole  evidence 
we  have  for  the  mortality  of  the  Duke  of  W.  Not  one 
iota  is  added  to  the  proof  of  interpolating  a  general 
proposition.  Since  the  individual  cases  are  all  the  evi- 
dence we  can  possess,  evidence  which  no  logical  form 
into  which  we  choose  to  throw  it  can  make  greater  than 
it  is ;  and  since  that  evidence  is  either  sufficient  in  it- 
self, or,  if  insufficient  for  one  purpose,  cannot  be  sufficient 
for  the  other ;  I  am  unable  to  see  why  we  should  be 
forbidden  to  take  the  shortest  cut  from  these  sufficient 
premises  to  the  conclusion,  and  constrained  to  travel 
the  "  high  priori  road"  by  the  arbitrary  fiat  of  logi- 
cians. 

Not  only  may  we  reason  from  particulars  to  gen- 
erals, but  we  perpetually  do  so  reason.  All  our  earliest 
inferences  are  of  this  nature.  From  the  first  dawn  of 
intelligence  we  draw  inferences,  but  years  elapse  before 
we  learn  the  use  of  general  language.  The  child  who, 
having  burned  his  fingers,  avoids  to  thrust  them  again 
itito  the  fire,  has  reasoned  or  inferred,  though  he  has 


228        iNFEIlLNCE,    iliOM    PARTICULARS    TO    PARTICULARS. 

never  thought  of  the  general  maxim,  "  Fire  burns.'' 
He  knows  from  memory  that  he  has  been  burnt,  and 
on  this  evidence  believes,  when  he  sees  a  candle,  that 
if  he  puts  his  finger  into  the  flame  of  it  he  will  be 
burnt  again.  He  believes  this  in  every  case  wThich 
happens  to  arise,  but  without  looking,  in  each  instance, 
beyond  the  present  case.  He  is  not  generalizing;  he 
is  inferring  a  particular  from  particulars. 

I  believe  that,  in  point  of  fact,  when  drawing  infer- 
ences from  our  personal  experience,  and  not  from  max- 
ims handed  down  to  us  by  books  or  tradition,  we  much 
oftener  conclude  from  particulars  to  particulars  direct- 
ly, than  through  the  intermediate  agency  of  any  gen- 
eral proposition.  We  are  constantly  reasoning  from 
ourselves  to  other  people,  or  from  one  person  to  an- 
other, without  giving  ourselves  the  trouble  to  erect  our 
observations  into  o-eneral  maxims  of  human  or  external 
nature.  When  we  conclude  that  some  person  will,  on 
some  given  occasion,  feel  or  act  so  and  so,  we  some- 
times judge  from  an  enlarged  consideration  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  men  in  general,  or  men  of  some  particu- 
lar character,  are  accustomed  to  feel  and  act ;  but 
much  oftener  from  having  known  the  feelings  and 
conduct  of  the  same  man  in  some  previous  instance, 
or  from  considering  how  we  should  feel  or  act  our- 
selves. 

From  the  considerations  now  adduced,  the  following 
conclusions  seem  to  be  established.  All  inference  is 
from  particulars  to  particulars.  General  propositions 
are  merely  registers  of  such,  inferences  already  made, 
and  short  formulm  for  making  more.  The  major 
premise  of  a  syllogism,  consequent^  is  a  formula  of 
this  description  :  and  the  conclusion  is  not  an  inference 
drawn  from  the  formula,  but  an  inference  drawn  accord- 
ing to  the  formula  :    the  real  logical  antecedent,  or 


WHEN    THE    GENERALITIES    ARE    GIVEN.  229 

premises,  being  the  particular  facts  from  which  the 
general  proposition  was  collected  by  induction. 

This  view  of  the  functions  of  the  syllogism  is  con- 
firmed by  the  consideration  of  precisely  those  cases 
which  might  be  expected  to  be  least  favorable  to  it, 
namely,  those  in  which  ratiocination  is  independent  of 
any  previous  induction.  We  have  already  observed 
that  the  syllogism,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  our  reasun- 
ing,  is  only  the  latter  half  of  the  process  of  travelling 
from  premises  to  a  conclusion.  There  are,  however, 
some  peculiar  cases  in  which  it  is  the  whole  process. 
Particulars  alone  are  capable  of  being  subjected  to  ob- 
servation, and  all  knowledge  which  is  derived  from 
observation,  begins  therefore,  of  necessity,  in  particu- 
lars ;  but  our  knowledge  may,  in  cases  of  a  certain  de- 
scription, he  conceived  as  coming  to  us  from  other  sources 
than  observation.  It  may  present  itself  as  coming/W^ra 
revelation;  and  the  knowledge,  thus  supernaturally 
communicated,  may  be  conceived  to  comprise  not  only 
particular  facts,  but  general  propositions,  such  as  occur 
so  abundantly  in  the  writings  of  Solomon  and  in  the 
apostolic  epistles.  Or  the  generalization  may  not  be, 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  an  assertion  at  all,  but  a  com- 
mand :  a  law,  not  in  the  philosophical,  but  in  the  moral 
and  political  sense  of  the  term :  an  expression  of  the 
desire  of  a  superior,  that  we,  or  any  number  of  other 
persons,  shall  conform  our  conduct  to  certain  general 
instructions. 

In  both  these  cases  the  generalities  are  given  to  us, 
and  the  particulars  are  elicited  from  them  by  a  process 
which  correctly  resolves  itself  into  a  series  of  syllogisms. 
The  real  nature,  however,  of  the  supposed  deductive 
process,  is  evident  enough.  It  is  a  search  for  truth, 
no  doubt,  but  through  the  medium  of  an  inquiry  iatc 
the  meaning  of  a  form  of  words.     The  only  point  to  be 


230  PROCESS    OF    INTERPRETATION. 

determined  is,  whether  the  authority  which  declared  the 
general  proposition,  intended  to  include  this  case  in  it ; 
and  whether  the  legislator  intended  his  command  to 
apply  to  the  present  case  among  others,  or  not.  This  is 
a  question,  as  the  Germans  express  it,  of  hermeneutics ; 
it  relates  to  the  meaning  of  a  certain  form  of  discourse. 
The  operation  is  not  a  process  of  inference,  hut  of  in- 
terpretation. 

In  this  last  phrase  we  have  obtained  an  expression 
which  appears  to  me  to  characterize,  more  aptly  than 
any  other,  the  functions  of  the  syllogism,  in  all  cases. 
When  the  premises  are  given  by  authority,  the  function, 
of  reasoning  is  to  ascertain  the  testimony  of  a  witness, 
or  the  will  of  a  legislator,  by  interpreting  the  signs  in 
which  the  one  has  intimated  his  assertion,  and  the  other 
his  command. 

In  like  manner,  when  the  premises  are  derived  from 
observation,  the  function  of  reasoning  is  to  ascertain 
what  we  (or  our  predecessors)  formerly  thought  might 
be  inferred  from  the  observed  facts,  and  to  do  this  by 
interpreting  a  memorandum  of  ours  or  of  theirs.  The 
memorandum  reminds  us,  that  from  evidence  more  or 
less  carefully  weighed,  it  formerly  appeared  that  a  cer- 
tain attribute  might  be  inferred  wherever  we  perceive 
a  certain  mark.  The  proposition,  "  All  men  are  mor- 
tal" (for  instance),  shows  that  we  have  had  experience 
from  which  we  thought  it  followed  thatfthe  attributes 
connoted  by  the  term  "  man,"  are  a  mark  of  mortality. 
But  when  we  conclude  that  the  Duke  of  W.  is  mortal, 
we  do  not  infer  this  from  the  memorandum,  but  from 
the  former  experience.  All  that  we  infer  from  the 
memorandum  is  our  own  previous  belief  (or  that  of 
those  who  transmitted  to  us  the  proposition)  concerning 
the  inferences  which  that  former  experience  would 
warrant.    T  -  ■'"" 


ONE    ZRE    OF    THE    STLLOGTSTIC    FORM.  231 

In  the  above  observations  it  has,  I  think,  been  clearly 
shown,  that,  although  there  is  always  a  process  of  rea- 
8  ning  or  inference  where  a  syllogism  is  used,  the  syllo- 
gism is  not  a  correct  analysis  of  that  process  of  reasoning 
or  inference;  which  is,  on  the  contrary  (when  r.ot  a 
mere  inference  from  testimony),  an  inference  from  par- 
t'culars  to  particulars ;  authorized  by  a  previous  infer- 
ence from  particulars  to  generals,  and  substantially  the 
same  with  it;  of  the  nature,  therefore,  of  induction. 
But  while  these  conclusions  appear  to  me  undeniable,  I 
must  yet  enter  a  protest,  as  strong  as  that  of  Archbishop 
Whately  himself,  against  the  doctrine  that  the  syllogis- 
tic art  is  useless  for  the  purposes  of  reasoning.  The 
reasoning  lies  in  the  act  of  generalization,  not  in  inter- 
preting the  record  of  that  act ;  but  the  syllogistic  form 
is  an  indispensable  collateral  security  for  the  correctness 
of  the  generalization  itself. 

It  has  already  been  seen,  that  if  we  have  a  collection 
of  particulars  sufficient  for  grounding  an  induction,  we 
need  not  frame  a  general  proposition :  we  may  reason 
at  once  from  those  particulars  to  other  particulars. 
But  it  is  to  be  remarked  withal,  that  whenever,  from  a 
set  of  particular  cases,  we  can  legitimately  draw  any 
inference,  we  may  legitimately  make  our  inference  a 
general  one.  If,  from  observation  and  experiment,  we 
can  conclude  to  one  new  case,  so  we  may  to  an  indefi- 
nite number.  If  that  which  has  held  true  in  our  past 
experience  will  therefore  hold  in  time  to  come,  it  will 
hold  not  merely  in  some  individual  case,  but  in  all 
cases  of  a  given  description.  Every  induction,  there- 
fore, which  suffices  to  prove  one  fact,  proves  an  indefi- 
nite multitude  of  facts;  the  experience  which  justifies 
a  single  prediction,  must  be  such  as  will  suffice  to  bear 
out  a  general  theorem. 
■  Tkis  throwmg  ofihewlioie  body  of  possible  infer 


232  SECURITY    FOR  -  JUST    INF  FRRNCFS. 

enccs  from  a  given  set  of  particulars  into  one.  general 
expression,  operates  as  a  security  for  their  being  just 
inferences  in  more  ways  than  one.  First,  a  process  of 
thought  which  leads  to  a  comprehensive  generality  is 
felt  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  one  which  termi- 
nates upon  an  insulated  fact,  and  the  mind  is,  there- 
fore, led  to  weigh  more  carefully  the  sufficiency  of  the 
experience  appealed  to,  for  supporting  the  inference 
grounded  upon  it.  Secondly,  if,  instead  of  concluding- 
straight  to  the  particular  case,  we  place  before  our- 
selves an  entire  class  of  facts,  the  whole  contents  of  a 
general  proposition,  every  tittle  of  which  is  legitimate- 
ly inferrible  from  our  premises,  if  that  one  particular 
conclusion  is  so  ;  there  is  then  a  considerable  likeli- 
hood that  if  the  premises  are  insufficient,  and  the  gen- 
eral inference  therefore  groundless,  it  will  comprise 
within  it  some  fact  or  facts  the  reverse  of  which  we 
already  know  to  be  true ;  and  we  shall  thus  discover 
the  error  in  our  generalization,  by  what  the  schoolmen 
term  a  reductio  ad  impossibile. 

Thus,  if  during  the  reign  of  Marcus  Aurelius,  a  sub- 
ject of  the  Roman  empire,  under  the  bias  naturally 
given  to  the  imagination  and  expectations  by  the  lives 
and  characters  of  the  Antonines,  had  been  disposed  to 
conclude  that  Commodus  would  be  a  just  ruler ;  sup- 
posing him  to  stop  there,  he  might  only  have  been  de- 
ceived by  sad  experience.  But  if  he  reflected  that 
this  conclusion  could  not  be  justifiable  unless  from  the 
same  evidence,  he  was  also  warranted  in  concluding 
some  general  proposition,  as,  for  instance,  that  all  Ro- 
man emperors  are  just  rulers:  he  would  immediately 
have  thought  of  Nero,  Domitian,  and  other  instances, 
which,  showing  the  falsity  of  the  general  conclusion, 
and  therefore  the  insufficiency  of  the  premises,  would 
have  warned  him  that  those  premises  could  not  prove, 


PARALLEL    AND    ANALOGOUS    CASES.  233 

in  the  instance  of  Commodns,  what  they  were  inade- 
quate to  prove  in  any  collection  of  cases  in  which  his 
was  included. 

The  advantage,  in  judging  whether  any  controverted 
inference  is  legitimate,  of  referring  to  a  parallel  case, 
is  universally  acknowledged  :  but,  by  ascending  to  the 
general  proposition,  we  bring  under  our  view  not  one 
parallel  case  only,  but  all  possible  parallel  cases  at 
once;  all  cases  to  which  the  same  set  of 'evidentiary 
considerations  are  applicable. 

When,  therefore,  we  argue  from  a  number  of  known 
cases  to  another  case  supposed  to  be  analogous,  it  is 
always  possible,  and  generally  advantageous,  to  divert 
our  argument  into  the  circuitous  channel  of  an  indue- 
tion  from  those  known  cases  to  a  general  proposition, 
and  a  subsequent  application  of  the  general  proposition 
to  the  unknown  case. 

The  value,  therefore,  of  the  syllogistic  form,  and  of 
the  rules  for  using  it  correctly,  does  not  consist  in 
their  being  the  form  and  the  rules  according  to  which 
our  reasonings  are  necessarily  or  even  usually  made  ; 
but  in  their  furnishing  us  with  a  mode  in  which  those 
reasonings  may  always  be  represented,  and  which  is 
admirably  calculated,  if  they  are  inconclusive,  to  bring 
their  inconclusiveness  to  light.  An  induction  from 
particulars  to  generals,  followed  by  a  syllogistic  pro- 
cess from  those  generals  to  other  particulars,  is  a  form 
in  which  we  may  always  state  our  reasonings,  if  we 
please.  It  is  not  a  form  in  which  we  must  reason,  but 
it  is  a  form  in  which  we  may  reason,  and  into  which  it 
is  indispensable  to  throw  our  reasoning,  when  there  is 
any  doubt  of  its  validity ;  though,  when  the  case  is  fa- 
miliar, and  little  complicated,  and  there  is  no  suspicion 
of  error,  we  may,  and  do,  reason  at  once  from  the 
known  particular  cases  to  unknown  ones. 


234  INDUCTION    AND    DEDUCTION. 

These  are  the  uses  of  the  syllogism,  as  a  mode  of 
verifying  any  given  argument.  Its  ulterior  uses,  as  re- 
spects the  general  course  of  our  intellectual  operations, 
hardly  require  illustration,  being,  in  fact,  the  acknowl- 
edged uses  of  general  language.  They  amount  sub- 
stantially to  this,  that  the  inductions  may  be  made  once 
for  all ;  a  single  careful  interrogation  of  experience 
may  suffice,  and  the  result  may  be  registered  in  the 
form  of  a  general  proposition  which  is  committed  to 
memory  or  to  writing,  and  from  which  afterwards  we 
have  only  to  syllogize.  Though  not  necessary  to  rea- 
soning, general  propositions  are  necessary  to  any  con- 
siderable progress  in  reasoning.  It  is  therefore  natural 
and  indispensable  to  separate  the  process  of  investiga- 
tion into  two  parts,  and  obtain  general  formulae  for  de- 
termining what  inferences  may  be  drawn,  before  the 
occasion  arises  for  drawing  the  inferences.  The  work 
of  drawing  them  is  then  that  of  applying  the  formulae  ; 
and  the  rules  of  the  syllogism  are  a  system  of  securi- 
ties for  the  correctness  of  the  application. 

Although,  therefore,  all  processes  of  thought  in  which 
the  ultimate  premises  are  particulars,  whether  we  con- 
clude from  particulars  to  a  general  formula,  or  from 
particulars  to  other  particulars  according  to  that  for- 
mula, are  equally  induction  /  yet  this  name  more  pe- 
culiarly belongs  to  the  process  of  establishing  the  gen- 
eral proposition,  and  the  remaining  operation,  which  is 
substantially  that  of  interpreting  the  general  proposi- 
tion, usually  bears  the  name  of  deduction.  Every  pro- 
cess by  which  any  thing  is  inferred  respecting  an  unob- 
served case,  consists  of  an  induction  followed  "by  a  de- 
duction ;  and  although  the  process  need  not  necessarily 
be  carried  on  in  this  form,  yet  it  is  always  susceptible 
of  the  form,  and  must  be  thrown  into  it  when  assurance 
of  scientific  accuracy  is  needed  and  desired. 


INDUCTION   AND   DEDUCTION.  235 


INDUCTION   AND   DEDUCTION. 
[From  Thomson's  Laws  of  Thoughts.] 

Induction  is  usually  defined  to  be  the  process  of 
drawing  a  general  law  from  a  sufficient  number  of  par- 
ticular cases.  Deduction  is  the  converse  process  of 
proving  that  some  property  belongs  to  a  particular 
case,  from  the  consideration  that  it  comes  under  a  gen- 
eral law.  More  concisely,  induction  is  the  process  of 
discovering  laws  from  facts,  and  causes  from  effects  ; 
and  deduction  that  of  deriving  facts  from  laws,  and 
effects  from  their  causes.  For  example,  that  all  bodies 
tend  to  fall  toward  the  earth  is  a  truth  which  has  been 
obtained  by  considering  a  number  of  bodies  where  that 
tendency  has  been  displayed  by  induction ;  if  from 
this  general  principle  we  argue  that  the  stone  we  throw 
from  our  hands  will  show  the  same  tendency,  we  de- 
duce. If  it  were  always  possible  duly  to  examine  all 
the  cases  to  which  a  law  applies,  and  to  see  by  intu- 
ition the  significant  and  important  parts  of  each,  the 
process  of  induction  would  be  simple  enough  ;  but  a 
complete  inspection  of  all  the  cases  is  very  seldom  pos- 
sible. Even  the  laws  on  whose  invariable  operation 
the  strongest  reliance  is  placed,  must  have  been  laid 
down  upon  the  evidence  of  a  number  of  cases  very 
limited  when  compared  with  the  whole  ;  that  men 
must  all  die,  and  that  heavy  bodies  tend  to  fall  toward 
the  earth,  are  statements  which  no  one  can  boast  of 
having  verified  by  enumeration.  The  perfect  certainty 
with  which  they  are  believed,  rests  upon  far  less  than 
the  millionth  part  of  the  cases  that  might  be  brought 
to  bear  witness  about  them.     Nor,  again,  are  the  signif 


"23 f)  INDUCTION    AND    DEDUCTIOx*. 

leant  and  essential  circumstances  easy  to  observe,  m 
the  few  cases  that  lie  within  the  reach.  Either  they 
escape  notice  altogether,  as  did  the  fact  of  the  earth's 
revolution  in  the  early  days  of  astronomy  ;  or  they  are 
so  entangled  or  overlaid  with  a  mass  of  other  facts, 
t;af  their  importance  does  not  at  first  appear,  like  the 
fic/ion  of  cold  in  the  production  of  dew,  before  Dr. 
Wells7  observations.  It  appears,  then,  that  the  pure 
inductive  syllogism,  that  argument  by  which  a  law  is 
laid  down  as  the  exact  sum  of  all  the  single  cases,  will 
not  suffice  for  scientific  research.     §  115. 

While  pure  lo^ic*  only  treats  of  arguments  that  are 
certain  and  irrefutable,  the  most  important  duty  of  ap- 
plied logic  is  to  determine  under  what  conditions  im- 
perfect arguments,  such  as  the  example,  the  imperfect 
induction,  the  deduction  from  a  proposition  that  is 
not  truly  universal,  and  some  of  the  rhetorical  enthy- 
memes,  can  be  fairly  employed ;  and  to  show  that  though 
these  weaker  forms  are  so  many  deviations  from  a  per- 
fect demonstrative  argument,  they  are  so  far  from 
superseding  the  perfect  forms,  that  in  reality  each  of 
them  appeals  to  and  attests  the  cogency  of  some  per- 
fect form,  to  which  it  strives,  as  it  were,  to  conform 
itself. 

Every  one  is  perfectly  certain  of  the  truth  of  the 
proposition,  that  men  grow  infirm  and  die ;  of  which  we 
have  been  convinced  partly  by  our  own  experience  of 
men,  and  partly  by  the  experience  of  others,  delivered 
to  us  from,  all  quarters,  in  the  sober  pages  of  the  mor- 
alist, as  well  as  in  the  reckless  lyrics  of  the  reveller. 
Nor  does  our  conviction  of  this  truth  permit  itself  to 

*  Pure  logic  is  defined  to  be  the  science  of  the  necessary  laws  of  thought  in  tiieir 
own  nature,  applied  logic,  the  science  of  the  necessary  laws  of  thought  as  em, 

plstyccl  in  attaining  truth, 


INDUCTION    AND    DEDUCTION.  237 

be  disturbed  by  the  consideration,  which  is  likewise 
undeniable,  that  the  whole  aggregate  of  this  experi- 
ence does  not  in  itself  warrant  any  statement  having 
all  mankind  for  its  subject ;  that  even  supposing  the 
decadence  and  death  of  every  man  in  times  past  had 
been  obscured,  which  is  utterly  inconceivable,  at  any 
rate  there  are  many  now  living  upon  whom  the  com- 
mon doom  has  not  passed,  and  whose  cases,  therefore, 
cannot  enter  into  the  sum  of  our  experience.  In  a 
word,  we  have  concluded  from  an  experience  that 
many  men  have  become  infirm  and  died,  the  much 
wider  truth  that  all  men  do  so ;  and  this  is  unwarrant- 
able in  the  given  case,  and  we  are  right  in  rejecting 
upon  the  faith  of  it  an  assertion,  unless  supported  by 
evidence  that  transcends  experience,  that  one  man  has 
not  died,  such  as  we  have  in  the  fable  of  the  Wander- 
ing Jew,  or  a  proposal  to  obviate  death  in  future,  such 
as  was  involved  in  the  search  of  the  alchemist  for  an 
elixir  of  life. 

But  that  this  mode  of  argument,  from  a  particular 
to  a  universal,  from  some  to  all,  is  not  valid  in  itself, 
is  evident  from  applying  it  to  another  case,  in  which 
it  is  absurdly  false :  "  some  men  are  tall,  therefore  all 
men  are  tall ;"  and  the  only  form  perfectly  indisput- 
able in  itself  would  be,  "  the  men  whom  we  have  ob- 
served, have  all  died,  and  these  men  are  all  men,  that 
is,  the  only  men,  therefore  all  men  die,"  which,  from 
the  nature  of  this  case,  cannot  be  employed.  But  ap- 
plied logic  first  shows  that  this  perfect  argument  is  the 
measure  of  the  validity  of  the  other;  that  our  conclu- 
sion is  only  true,  if  we  can  say,  not,  indeed-,  "these 
men  are  all  men,"  which  is  impossible,  but  the  equally 
general  proposition,  "  these  men  are  (as  good  as)  all 
mqn,"  thus  conforming  really  to  the  perfectly  conclu- 


238  COMPLETE   AND   INCOMPLETE   INDUCTION. 

sive  argument;  and  next,  here  and  under  what  cir- 
cumstances we  can  conform  the  incomplete  to  the  com- 
plete enumeration,  how  some  can  ever  be  said  to  be  as 
good  as  all  for  purposes  of  argumentation.     §  5. 


COMPLETE    AND   INCOMPLETE    INDUCTION. 

The  question  demands  an  answer — on  what  principle 
are  incomplete  inductions,  L  e.,  examinations  of  facts 
that  stop  short  of  complete  enumeration,  sufficient  to 
establish  general  laws  ?  The  answer  will  contain  the 
most  interesting  and  important  of  the  principles  of 
logic.  All  our  experience  teaches  us  that  in  the  uni- 
verse, the  "  cosmos,"  whose  very  name  means  order, 
regularity  and  uniformity  prevail,  and  caprice  and  un- 
certainty are  excluded.  While  it  is  conceivable  that 
any  one  of  the  natural  laws  in  which  we  place  most 
confidence  might  be  reversed,  while  it  is  certain  that 
many  of  them  have  been  miraculously  suspended  for 
purposes  proportion  ably  great  and  important,  our  pre- 
sent belief  in  their  permanence  is  almost  unlimited. 
The  thought  that  there  might  be  no  more  daylight,  if 
our  planet  ceased  to  revolve  while  one  side  of  it  was 
averted  from  the  sun — that  a  draught  from  the  spring 
would  to-day  destroy  the  life  which  it  recruited  yes- 
terday— that  a  stone  thrown  from  the  hand  would  re- 
main suspended  in  mid-air,  instead  of  falling,  never 
enters  our  minds,  except,  perhaps,  as  an  amusing 
fancy ;  yet  each  of  these,  things  is  formally  possible. 
Our  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  natural  laws  is 
embodied  in  the  canon,  that  "  under  the  same  circum- 
stances and  with  the  same  substances,  the  same  effects 
always  result  from  the  same  causes." 

This  great  inductive  principle  is  itself  proved  by  in- 


COMPLETE   AND    INCOMPLETE   INDUCTION.  239 

Auction,  and  partakes  of  the  same  formal  defect  that 
may  be  charged  against  other  inductive  results,  viz., 
that  its  terms  are  wider  than  our  experience  can  war- 
rant. Many  groups  of  facts,  connected  as  causes  and 
effects,  have  not  been  examined ;  and  in  them  it  is  con- 
ceivable, at  least,  that  there  may  be  capricious  causes 
producing  opposite  effects  at  different  times.  If  this 
were  otherwise — if  the  canon  were  the  result  of  a  sim- 
ple enumeration  of  all  possible  cases — its  present  value 
as  a  rule  would  disappear,  since  it  is  to  unknown  and 
unexamined  cases  that  we  chiefly  wish  to  apply  it. 
We  draw  a  universal  canon  from  an  experience  less 
than  universal,  and  then  employ  it  to  justify  us  in 
drawing  other  universal  truths  from  other  particular 
experiences. 

The  difficulty,  however,  in  applying  this  canon  is  to 
discover  the  existence  of  a  law  of  nature  in  any  set  of 
facts,  and  how  far  the  interference  of  other  laws  per- 
mits it  to  operate.  And  here  the  relation  between  de- 
duction and  induction,  between  synthesis  and  analysis, 
is  of  great  service.  These  pairs  of  terms  correspond 
exactly,  as  names  for  the  same  two  processes ;  but  in- 
duction and  deduction  give  prominence  to  the  law, 
analysis  and  synthesis  to  the  fact.  Thus  we  call  the 
law  of  gravitation  an  inductive  law,  and  speak  of  de- 
ductions from  it,  thinking  more,  in  both  cases,  of  the 
universal  than  of  the  particular  cases  it  referred  to. 
But  we  analyze  a  fact  or  a  substance,  and  make  a  syn- 
thesis (aplaci?ig  together  of  elements)  to  reproduce  the 
fact  or  substancef  Using  the  two  former  names,  the 
universal,  the  law,  the  world  of  conceptions,  the  ab- 
stract is  made  prominent ;  using  the  two  latter,  we  give 
prominence  to  the  single  case,  the  phenomenon,  the 
world  of  the  senses,  the  concrete.     The  supposed  gen- 


240  COMPLETE   AND    INCOMPLETE   INDUCTION. 

era!  principle  may  be  tried  by  applying  it  to  a  new 
particular  case ;  the  analysis  of  a  fact  into  its  elements 
may  be  tested  by  putting  the  elements  together  anew, 
and  seeing  if  the  fact  is  reproduced  ;  the  correctness 
of  the  observations  may  be  confirmed  by  careful  ex- 
periment. And  such  attempts  offer  a  two-fold  advan- 
tage. If,  on  applying  some  general  principle  of  which 
we  are  still  uncertain  to  a  new  particular  case,  we  find 
that  it  helps  to  explain  the  particular,  this  is  one  fruit 
of  the  process ;  and  another  is,  that  our  confidence  in 
the  general  principle  is  materially  strengthened.  Law 
explains  fact ;  fact  confirms  law.  And  after  this  alter- 
nate ascent  and  descent  has  been  a  few  times  put  for- 
ward, our  belief  in  the  correctness  of  its  results  is  quite 
complete. 

A  correct  induction  fnrnishes  the  premise  for  a  sound 
deduction,  and  a  doubtful  induction  must  be  verified 
by  deductions  from  it.  The  law  that  the  planets  are 
retained  in  their  orbits  by  an  attractive  force  that  varies 
inversely  as  the  square  of  their  distance  from  the  sun, 
has  been  worked  out  to  its  theoretical  results,  and  these 
have  been  compared,  synthetically,  with  the  known 
facts.  Theory  was  found  not  to  correspond  in  all  re- 
spects, and  thus  it  became  necessary  to  revise  the 
analysis,  and  discover  the  residual  causes  that  produced 
the  variations,  which  astronomers  have  succeeded  in 
doing. 

By  a  mutual  co-operation,  then,  of  these  two  pro- 
cesses, the  physical  sciences  are  advanced.  If  no 
attempts  were  made  to  draw  a  conclusion,  and  see 
what*  use  could  be  made  of  it  till  grounds  formally 
complete  were  before  us,  conclusions  would  never  be 
drawn.  The  certainties  by  which  the  chemist,  the  as- 
tronomer, the  geologist  conducts  his  operations  with 


SYLLOGISM    BOTH    DEDUCTIVE    AND    INDUCTIVE.       241 

composure  and  success,  were  once  bare  possibilities, 
which,  after  being  handed  back  and  forward  between 
induction  and  deduction,  turned  out  to  be  truths. 


THE    SYLLOGISM    BOTH    DEDUCTIVE    AND    INDUCTIVE. 

It  is  a  great  misfortune  for  logic  that  the  syllogism 
has  been  regarded  as  an  instrument  for  deduction  only. 
An  error  of  Aristotle's,  for  the  correction  of  which  his 
many-sided  mind  has  itself  supplied  hints,  has  been 
tenaciously  preserved  ;  and  according  to  it,  four  modes 
of  syllogism,  in  which  we  start  from  a  general  law  as 
our  main  premise,  have  been  regarded  as  the  only  per- 
fect forms  ;  and  opinions  have  been  pronounced  upon 
the  whole  syllogistic  system  from  these  four  specimens. 
We  need  not  wonder,  then,  that  modes  only  adapted 
for  teaching  truth  have  been  pronounced  useless  for 
discovering  it ;  that  when  deductive  arguments  are  se- 
lec:ed,  it  should  be  easy  to  prove  that  they  will  not  do 
the  work  of  inductive.  But  it  is  wonderful  that  so  few 
should  have  perceived  how  absurd  were  the  attempts 
to  turn  the  so-called  imperfect  modes  into  perfect  ones. 

The  difficulty  in  answering  the  question,  how  does 
logic  aid  by  the  syllogism  in  adding  to  our  stock  of 
knowledge  ?  has  been  caused  principally  by  studying 
only  the  complete  forms  of  the  syllogism  ;  whereas,  in 
discoveries  it  is  necessary  to  accept  defective  forms, 
only  suspending  our  adoption  of  them  until  they  arc 
fortified  by  other  evidence.  The  fact  that  such  sus- 
pense is  necessarf,  proves  that  the  forms  are  imperfect; 
the  fact  that  we  have  attained  new  truths  from  evi- 
dence formally  insufficient  to  establish  them  by  itself, 
proves  their  usefulness. 

1) 


242  THE   SOCRATIC   METHOD   OF   REASONING. 


THE  SOCRATIC  METHOD  OF  REASONING. 

[We  subjoin,  as  worthy  of  a  place  in  a  work  on  logic,  the  fol- 
lowing account  (from  a  London  publication)  of  the  method  of  rea- 
soning practised  by  the  great  Athenian  sage.  For  additional  illus- 
trations or  examples  of  this  most  effective  and  lucid  method  of 
reasoning,  the  reader  may  refer  to  "  Xenophon's  Memorabilia  of 
Socrates."] 

This  method  of  disputation  derives  its  name  from 
Socrates,  by  whom  it  was  practised,  and  by  other  phi- 
losophers in  his  time,  long  before  Aristotle  invented  the 
forms  of  syllogism  in  mode  and  figure,  formerly  used 
in  scholastic  disputation. 

A  dispute  in  the  Socratic  manner  is  carried  on  by 
way  of  question  and  answer,  representing  the  form  of 
a  dialogue  or  common  conversation,  wherein  the  per- 
son who  instructs  seems  to  be  the  inquirer,  and  seeks 
information  from  him  who  is  instructed. 

If  the  person  with  whom  we  argue  makes  use  of  ob- 
scure or  ambiguous  words,  we  must  ask  him  to  explain 
his  meaning;  for  it  often  happens  that  men  have  ac- 
customed themselves  to  some  words  or  phrases  which 
they  do  not  perfectly  understand ;  and  then  by  a  few 
modest  questions  they  will  much  better  discern  their 
ignorance  than  by  a  direct  opposition,  which  often 
raises  the  passions  and  shuts  the  door  against  convic- 
tion. When  we  have  gone  thus  far,  if  the  person  be  a 
sincere  lover  of  truth,  he  will  presently  acknowledge 
that  he  did  not  sufficiently  understand  the  matter  >  and 
then  the  dispute  is  at  an  end.  But  if  he  is  obstinate, 
and  will  obtrude  his  words  upon  us  without  defining 
them,  we  ought  to  proceed  no  further  till  he  has  satis- 
lied  us  what  he  means.  We  must  press  him  with  little 
questions,  as  if  we  were  dull  of  apprehension  and  wonld 


THE    SOCRATIC    METHOD    OF    REASONING.  243 

be  glad  to  understand  him  better.  But  if  we  can  by 
no  means  prevail  with  him  to  speak  plainly,  it  is  time 
to  put  an  end  to  the  dispute,  since  it  is  evident  he 
knows  not  what  he  would  be  at,  or  has  a  mind  only  to 
wrangle. 

If  at  last  we  bring  him  to  declare  his  meaning  clear- 
ly, we  then  proceed  to  ask  him  questions  upon  the  sev- 
eral parts  of  the  doctrine  he  advances  and  their  conse- 
quences, not  as  objecting  against  them,  but  for  the  sake 
of  better  information.  From  these  questions,  if  pro- 
posed with  dexterity,  it  will  easily  appear  whether  the 
doctrine  be  absurd  or  not ;  and  to  make  the  matter  still 
clearer,  it  will  be  proper  to  use  examples  and  simili- 
tudes. But  if  this  be  not  sufficient  to  show  the  falsity 
of  the  opinion,  we  must  inquire  of  the  person  on  what 
arguments  or  proofs  he  grounds  it,  and  then  pursue  the 
same  conduct  as  we  did  in  the  first  part  of  the  dispute. 
Thus  the  learner  will  be  led  into  the  knowledge  of 
truth  as  it  were  by  his  own  invention,  and  being  drawn 
by  a  series  of  pertinent  questions  to  discern  his  own 
mistakes,  he  will  more  easily  be  induced  to  relinquish 
them,  as  he  seems  to  have  discovered  them  himself. 

AN    EXAMPLE    OF    THIS    METHOD    OF    DISPUTATION. 

Suppose  M.  would  lead  K.  into  the  belief  of  a  future 
state  of  rewards  and  punishments,  it  might  be  done  in 
the  following  easy  manner  of  reasoning. 

M.  Did  God  make  the  world  ? 

]V.  Certainly  he  did. 

M.  Does  God  govern  the  world  ? 

N~.  As  he  made  it,  'tis  reasonable  to  suppose  he  gov 
erns  it. 

M.  Is  not  God  a  good  and  righteous  governor  ? 

JV".  Doubtless  he  is. 


244  THE   SOCRATIC   METHOD   OF   REASONING. 

M.  What  is  the  true  idea  of  a  good  and  righteom 
governor \ 

N.  That  he  punishes  the  wicked,  and  rewards  the 
good. 

M.  But  are  the  wicked  always  punished  in  this  life  ? 

N.  No,  every  one's  observation  tells  him  the  con- 
trary ;  for  the  worst  of  men  are  often  advanced  to  rich- 
es and  honor,  and  have  all  the  external  comforts  that 
the  world  affords. 

M.  Are  the  good  always  rewarded  in  this  life  ? 

iT.  No,  certainly ;  for  poverty,  persecution,  and  va- 
rious kinds  of  affliction,  are  often  the  lot  of  the  most 
virtuous  men. 

M.  How  then  does  it  appear  that  God  is  good  and 
righteous  f 

JV.  I  confess  there  is  but  little  appearance  of  it  in  the 
present  state  of  tilings. 

M.  Will  there  not  be  a  time  when  the  scene  oi 
things  will  be  changed,  and  God  will  make  his  good- 
ness and  righteousness  in  the  government  of  mankind 
appear  ? 

JV.  Undoubtedly  such  a  time  will  come. 

M.  But  if  this  be  not  done  before  death,  how  can  it 
be  done  at  all  ?  v 

N.  In  no  other  way  that  I  can  think  of,  but  by  sup- 
posing man  to  have  some  existence  after  this  life. 

M.  Then  you  are  convinced  that  there  must  be  a 
state  of  rewards  and  punishments  beyond  the  grave? 

N.  Yes,  I  am  thoroughly  persuaded  of  it ;  since  the 
goodness  and  righteousness  of  God,  as  governor  of  the 
world,  cannot  be  made  to  appear  without  it. 

This  method  of  reasoning,  though  it  has  been  long 
neglected,  is  certainly  a  natural  and  pleasing  manner  of 
instruction,  and  is  much  more  agreeable  to  that  candor 
and  sincerity  which  every  honest  man  ought  to  propose. 


ARRANGEMENT    OF    A    SCIENCE.  245 

than  the  art  of  wrangling  which  for  several  ages  pre- 
vailed in  the  schools,  and  tended  to  overspread  the 
minds  of  youth  with  darkness  and  uncertainty,  and  to 
retard  or  mislead  them  in  their  inquiries  after  truth. 


ARRANGEMENT  OF  A   SCIENCE. 
[From  Thomson's  Laws  of  Thought.] 

Subordinate  Parts  of  a  Science. 

Judgments  that  relate  to  speculation  only,  are  called 
theoretical;  those  which  refer  to  practice  are  practical. 
Judgments  that  require  or  admit  of  proof,  are  called 
demonstrable ;  those  which  are  manifest  from  the  very 
terms,  are  indemonstrable.  Thus  much  being  premised, 
we  can  define  certain  subordinate  parts  of  a  science. 

An  Axiom  is  an  indemonstrable,  theoretical  judgment.  A  Pos- 
tulate is  an  indemonstrable,  theoretical  judgment.  A  Theorem  is  a 
demonstrable,  theoretical  judgment.  A  Problem  is  a  demonstra- 
ble, practical  judgment.  A  Thesis  is  a  judgment  proposed  for  dis- 
cussion and  proof  (but  with  Aristotle  it  sometimes  means  an  axiom 
of  some  special  science  or  disputation).  An  Hypothesis  is  a  judg- 
ment provisionally  accepted  as  an  explanation  of  some  group  of 
facts,  and  is  liable  to  be  discarded  if  it  is  found  inconsistent  with 
them.  A  judgment  which  follows  immediately  from  aaother,  is 
sometimes  called  a  Corollary  or  Consectary.  One  which  does  not 
properly  belong  to  the  science  in  which  it  appears,  but  is  taken 
from  another,  is  called  a  Lemma.  One  which  illustrates  the  science 
where  it  appears,  but  is  not  an  integral  part  of  it,  is  a  Scholion. 

A  Division  of  the  Sciences. 

A  division  of  the  sciences  tends  to  separate  different 
districts  of  knowledge,  with  the  conceptions  that  belong 
to  them,  from  one  another.  It  is  desirable  to  attempt 
such  a  division,  as  the  conclusion  of  a  treatise  on  Logic ; 
if  for  no  other  reason,  in  order  that  we  may  know  to 
how  many  subjects  we  may  have  to  direct  our  rules. 

11 


246 


A    DIVISION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 


A  science  is  a  systematic  arrangement  of  all  the  laws 
which  belong  to  any  one  subject.  The  three  great  fields 
of  human  research  are, — the  Divine  Nature,  the  nature 
of  the  human  mind,  and  the  nature  of  the  universe  ; 
and  corresponding  to  them  are  three  principal  groups 
of  sciences — the  Theological,  the  Psychological,  and  the 
Cosmical  or  Natural. 


Theological  Sciences. 


f  Biblical 
Theology.   «{  Systematical. 


i 


Mental 
Sciences. 


Mathemat- 
ical 

Sciences. 


Physical 
Sciences. 


Natural 
Sciences. 


Historical. 


Biblical  Criticism. 
Exposition — Exegesis. 
Dogmatic  Theology. 
Pastoral  Theology. 
Church  History. 
History  of  Doctrines. 


Mental  Sciences. 


Reason. 


Choice  and 
fection. 


Af- 


T  Logic,  or  the  Science  of  the  forms 

of  Thought. 
\  Metaphysic,  which  examines  the 

ground   of    all    knowledge   of 

f  Morality,  founded  on  the  concep- 
tion of  Right. 
1  ^Esthetic,  founded  on  the  concep- 
ts     tion  of  Beauty. 


Cosmical  Sciences. 


Pure  Mathemat- 
ics. 

Physico  Mathe- 
matics. 

Physics  proper. 

Geology. 

PhytologicaL 

Zoological. 


(  Arithmetic. 
/  Geometry, 
j  Mechanics. 
}  Astronomy. 

General  Physics. 

Technology,  or  Physics   applied 
to  Arts  and  Manufactures. 
{,  Descriptive  Geology. 
\  Mining,  or  "  Oryctotechny." 

j  Botany. 

\  Agriculture. 

C  Zoology  proper 

<  Zootechny,  knowledge  of  the  use 

(      of  animals  to  man. 


A    DIVISION    OF    THE    SCIENCES. 


247 


Medical 
Sciences. 


Political 

Sciences. 


Patholo- 
gical 
Science. 


Physico  Medical. 

I  Medical  Science 
[      proper. 

Legislation. 
Government. 

Of  the  Earth.        ) 

Of   the   Human 
Race. 


J  Medical  Physics. 

I  Hygiene. 

(  Pathology. 

(  Practical  Medicine. 

(  Political  Economy. 

<  History  of  Laws  and  Constitu- 

(      tions. 

Administration  of  Law. 

Police  and  Defence. 

Historical  Geology. 

Distribution  of  Plants  and  Ani- 
mals. 
\  Glossology,  or  Science  of  affinity 
J       of  Languages. 
j  Ethnography,  or  Science  of  affin- 
[      ity  of  Races. 


1KB   K9B. 


OF 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


THE    NATIONAL    READERS. 


No.  I. 
No.  2. 
No.  3. 
No.  4. 
No.  5. 
No.  6. 


By  PAEKEB   and  WATSON. 

--  National  Primer    .     .    . 

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The  Independent  First  (^&ry)  Reader 
The  Independent  Second  Reader 
The  Independent  Third  Reader 
The  Independent  Fourth  Reader 
The  Independent  Fifth  Reader  . 
The  Independent  Sixth  Reader  . 


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The  Independent  Youth's  Speller  (Script)  168    "  12° 

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Watson's  Graphic  Speller 128    "  16° 

Superior  in  mechanical  execution,  comprehensive,  progressive,  practical,  and  interesting. 
The  Introduction  gives  briefly  the  needful  instruction  and  exercises  in  the  elements  of 
spelling,  pronunciation,  words,  and  lines  and  figures.  The  Exercises  in  Drawing  are 
not  surpassed  by  any  school  manual  or  set  of  cards,  and  the  Writing  Exercises  are  as 
numerous  and  as  progressive  as  those  of  any  series  of  writing-books.  The  Vocabulary 
contains  about  6,000  of  the  most  useful  and  desirable  English  words,  strictly  classified 
with  regard  to  form,  length,  sound,  and  topic.  Their  meaning  and  use  is  learned 
from  the  Language  Lessons  and  the  Dictation,  Reviews,  and  their  correct  pronunciation 
is  given  everyvjhere.  The  Appendix  contains  Rules  in  Spelling,  Capital  Letters,  Punctu- 
ation Marks,  and  Abbreviations. 

6 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES  OF  STANDARD  SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


ORTHOGRAPHY. 

Smith's  Series. 

Smith's  Series  supplies  a  Speller  for  every  class  in  graded  schools,  and  comprises 
the  most  complete  and  excellent  treatise  on  English  Orthography  and  its  companior 
branches  extant. 

1.  Smith's  Little  Speller. 

First  round  in  the  ladder  of  learning. 

2.  Smith's  Juvenile  Definer. 

Lessons  composed  of  familiar  words  grouped  with  reference  to  similar  signifies 
tion  or  use,  and  correctly  spelled,  accented,  and  defined. 

3.  Smith's  Grammar-School  Speller. 

Familiar  words,  grouped  witli  reference  to  the  sameness  of  sound  of  syllables  dif 
ferently  spelled.  Also  definitions,  complete  rules  for  spelling  and  formation  of  deriva- 
tives, and  exercises  in  false  orthography. 

4.  Smith's  Speller  and  Definer's  Manual. 

A  complete  School  Dictionary,  containing  14,000  wor<*',  with  various  other  useful 
matter  in  the  way  of  rules  and  exercises. 

5.  Smith's  Etymology  —  Small  and  Complete  Editions. 

The  first  and  only  Etymology  to  recognize  the  Anglo-Saxon  our  mother  tongue; 
containing  also  full  lists  of  derivatives  from  the  Latin,  Greek,  Gaelic,  Swedish,  Norman, 
&c,  &c.  ;  being,  in  fact,  a  complete  etymology  of  the  language  for  schools. 

Northend's  Dictation  Exercises. 

Embracing  valuable  information  on  a  thousand  topics,  communicated  in  such  a 
manner  as  at  once  to  relieve  the  exercise  of  spelling  of  its  usual  tedium,  and  combine 
it  with  instruction  of  a  general  character  calculated  to  profit  and  amuse. 

Phillip's  Independent  Writing  Speller*- 

1.    Primary.  2.    Intermediate.  3.    Advanced. 

Unquestionably  the  best  results  can  be  attained  in  writing  spelling  exercises.  This 
series  combines  with  written  exercise  a  thorough  and  practical  instruction  in  penman, 
ship.  Copies  in  capitals  and  small  letters  are  set  on  every  page.  Spaces  for  twenty 
words  and  definitions  and  errors  are  given  in  each  lesson.  In  the  advanced  book  there 
is  additional  space  for  sentences.     In  practical  life  we  spell  only  when  we  write. 

Brown's  Pencil  Tablet  for  Written  Spelling. 

The  cheapest  prepared  pad  of  ruled  blanks,  with  stiff  board  back,  sufficient  foi 
64  lessons  of  25  words. 

Pooler's  Test  Speller. 

The  best  collection  of  "  hard  words  "  yet  made.  The  more  uncommon  ones  are  fully 
defined,  and  the  whole  are  arranged  alphabetically  for  convenient  reference.  The  book 
is  designed  for  Teachers'  Institutes  and  "  Spelling  Schools,"  and  is  prepared  by  an 
experienced  and  well-known  conductor  of  Institutes. 

Wright's  Analytical  Orthography. 

This  standard  work  is  popular,  because  it  teaches  the  elementary  sounds  in  a 
plain  and  philosophical  manner,  and  presents  orthography  and  orthoepy  in  an  easy, 
uniform  system  of  analysis  or  parsing. 

10 


THE  NATIONAL  SERIES  OF  STANDARD  SCH00L-B00K8. 


ORTHOGRAPHY  —  Continued. 

Barber's  Complete  Writing  Speller. 

"The  Student's  Own  Hand-Book  of  Ortnography,  Definitions,  and  Sentences,  con. 
sisting  of  Written  Exercises  in  the  Proper  Spelling,  Meaning,  and  Use  of  Words." 
(Published  1873.)  This  differs  from  Sherwood's  and  other  writing  spellers  in  its  moi* 
comprehensive  character.  Its  blanks  are  adapted  to  writing  whole  sentences  instead 
of  detached  words,  with  the  proper  divisions  for  numbering,  corrections,  &c.  Such 
aids  as  this,  like  Watson's  Child's  Speller  and  Phillip's  Writing  Speller,  find  their 
raison  d'etre  in  the  postulate  that  the  art  of  correct  spelling  is  dependent  upon  written, 
and  not  upon  spoken  language,  for  its  utility,  if  not  for  its  very  existence.  Hence 
the  indirectness  of  purely  oral  instruction. 


ETYMOLOGY. 

Smith's  Complete  Etymology. 
Smith's  Condensed  Etymology. 

Containing  the  Anglo-Saxon,  French,  Dutch,  German,  Welsh,  Danish,  Gothic,  Swedish, 
Gaelic,  Italian,  Latin,  and  Greek  roots,  and  the  English  words  derived  therefrom 
accurately  spelled,  accented,  and  defined. 


From  Hon.  Jno.  G.  McMvnn,  late  State 

Superintendent  of  Wisconsin. 

"  I  wish  every  teacher  in  the  country 
had  a  copy  of  this  work." 

From    Ppof.  C.  H.  Verrill,   Pa.    State 

Normal  School. 

"The  Etymology  (Smith's)  which  we 
procured  of  you  we  like  much.  It  is  the 
best  work  for  the  class-room  we  have 
seen." 


From  Prin.  Wm.  F.  Phelps,  Minn.  State 
Normal. 

"The  book  is  superb — just  what  is 
needed  in  the  department  of  etymology 
and  spelling." 

From  Hon.  Edward  Ballard,  Supt.  oj 
Common  Schools,  State  of  Maine. 

"  The  author  has  furnished  a  manual  o/ 
singular  utility  for  its  purpose." 


DICTIONARY. 

Williams's  Dictionary  of  Synonyms  ; 

Or,  Topical  Lexicon.  This  work  is  a  School  Dictionary,  an  Etymology,  a  compilation 
of  Synonyms,  and  a  manual  of  General  Information.  It  differs  from  the  ordinary  lexicon 
in  being  arranged  by  topics,  instead  of  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  thus  realizing  the 
apparent  paradox  of  a  "  Readable  Dictionary."    An  unusually  valuable  school-book. 

Kwong's  Dictionary  of  English  Phrases. 

With  Illustrative  Sentences,  collections  of  English  and  Chinese  Proverbs,  transla- 
tions of  Latin  and  French  Phrases,  historical  sketch  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  a  chrono- 
logical list  or  the  Chinese  Dynasties,  brief  biographical  sketches  of  Confucius  and 
of  Jesus,  ana  complete  index.  By  Kwong  Ki  Chiu,  late  Member  of  the  Chinese  Edu- 
cational Mission  in  the  United  States,  and  formerly  principal  teacher  of  English  in  the 
Government  tichool  at  Shanghai,  China     900  pages.     8vo.     Cloth. 

From  the  Hartford  Courant :  "  The  volume  is  one  of  the  most  curious  and  interest- 
ing of  linguistic  works." 

From  the  rfew  York  Nation  :  "  It  will  amaze  the  sand-lot  gentry  to  be  informed  that 
this  remarkable  work  will  supplement  our  English  dictionaries  even  for  native  American*  " 

11 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


ENGLISH   GRAMMAR. 


SILL'S  SYSTEM. 
Practical  Lessons  in  English. 

A  brief  course  in  Grammar  and  Composition.  By  J.  M.  B.  Sill.  This  beautiful 
book,  by  a  distinguished  and  experienced  teacher,  at  once  adopted  for  exclusive  use 
in  the  State  of  Oregon  and  the  city  of  Detroit,  simply  releases  English  Grammar 
from  bondage  to  Latin  and  Greek  formulas.  Our  language  is  worthy  of  being  taught 
as  a  distinct  and  independent  science.  It  is  almost  destitute  of  inflections  and  yet 
capable  of  being  systematized,  and  its  study  may  certainly  be  simplified  if  treated  by 
itself  and  for  itself  alone.  Superintendent  Sill* has  cut  the  Gordian  knot  and  leads 
the  van  of  a  new  school  of  grammarians. 


CLARK'S    SYSTEM. 
Clark's  Easy  Lessons  in  Language 

Contains  illustrated  object-lessons  of  the  most  attractive  character,  and  is  couched 
in  language  freed  as  much  as  possible  from  the  dry  technicalities  of  the  science. 

Clark's  Brief  English  Grammar. 

Part  Lis  adapted  to  youngest  learners,  and  the  whole  forms  a  complete  "  brief 
course  "  in  one  volume,  adequate  to  the  wants  of  the  common  school.  There  is  no- 
where published  a  superior  text-book  for  learning  thj  English  tongue  than  this. 

Clark's  Normal  Grammar. 

Designed  to  occupy  the  same  grade  as  the  author's  veteran  "  Practical "  Grammar, 
though  the  latter  is  still  furnished  upon  order.  The  Normal  is  an  entirely  new  treatise. 
It  is  a  full  exposition  of  the  system  as  described  below,  with  all  the  most  recent  im- 
provements. Some  of  its  peculiarities  are, — a  happy  blending  of  Syntheses  with 
Analyses;  thorough  criticisms  of  common  errors  inthe  use  of  our  language;  and 
important  improvements  in  the  syntax  of  sentences  and  of  phrases. 

Clark's  Key  to  the  Diagrams. 

Clark's  Analysis  of  the  English  Language. 

Clark's  Grammatical  Chart. 

The  theory  and  practice  of  teaching  grammar  in  American  schools  is  meeting  with  a 
thorough  revolution  from  the  use  of  this  system.  While  the.  old  methods  offer  profi- 
ciency to  the  pupil  only  after  much  weary  plodding  and  dull  memorizing,  this  affords 
from  the  inception  the  advantage  of  practical  Object  Teaching,  addressing  the  eye  by 
means  of  illustrative  figures  ;  furnishes  association  to  the  memory,  its  most  powerful 
aid,  and  diverts  the  pupil  by  taxing  his  ingenuity.  Teachers  who  are  using  Clark's 
Grammar  uniformly  testify  that  they  and  their  pupils  find  it  the  most  interesting  study 
of  the  school  course. 

Like  all  great  and  radical  improvements,  the  system  naturally  met  at  first  with  much 
unreasonable  opposition.  It  has  not  only  outlived  the  greater  part  of  this  opposition, 
but  finds  many  of  its  warmest  admirers  among  those  who  could  not  at  first  tolerate  so 
radical  an  innovation.  All  it  wants  is  an  impartial  trial  to  convince  the  most  scep- 
tical of  its  merit  No  one  who  has  fairly  and  intelligently  tested  it  in  the  school-room 
has  ever  been  known  to  go  back  to  the  old  method.  A  great  success  is  already 
established,  and  it  is  easy  to  prophesy  that  the  day  is  not  far  distant  when  it  will  be 
the  only  system  of  teaching  English  Grammar.'  As  the  System  is  copyrighted,  no  othei 
text-books  can  appropriate  this  obvious  and  great  improvement. 


Welch's  Analysis  of  the  English  Sentence. 

Remarkable  for  its  new  and  simple  classification,  its  method  of  treating  connective* 
its  explanations  of  the  idioms  and  constructive  laws  of  the  language,  &c. 

13 


THE  NATIONAL    SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


GEOGRAPHY. 

MONTEITH'S  SYSTEM. 

TWO-BOOK  SERIES.      INDEPENDENT  COURSE. 

[Monteith's  Elementary  Geography. 

'Monteith's  Comprehensive  Geography  (103  maps>. 

S3P""  These  volumes  are  not  revisions  of  old  works,  not  an  addition  to  any  series, 
but  are  entirely  new  productions,  —  each  by  itself  complete,  independent,  comprehen- 
sive, yet  simple,  brief,  cheap,  and  popular;  or,  taken  together,  the  most  admirable 
"  scries  "  ever  ottered  /or  a  common-school  course.  They  present  the  following  features, 
skilfully  interwoven,  the  studeut  learning  all  about  one  country  at  a  time.  Always 
revised  to  date  of  printing. 

LOCAL  GEOGRAPHY.  —  Or,  the  Use  of  Maps.  Important  features  of  the  maps 
are  the  coloring  of  States  as  objects,  and  the  ingenious  system  for  laying  down  a  much 
larger  number  of  names  for  reference  than  are  lound  on  any  other  maps  of  same  size, 
and  without  crowding. 

PHYSICAL  GEOGRAPHY.  — Or,  the  Natural  Features  of  the  Earth;  illus- 
trated by  the  original  and  striking  relief  maps,  being  bird's-eye  views  or  photographic 
pictures  of  the  earth's  surface. 

DESCRIPTIVE  GEOGRAPHY.  — Including  the  Physical;  with  some  account 
Of  Governments  and  Races,  Animals,  &c. 

HISTORICAL  GEOGRAPHY.— Or,  a  brief  summary  of  the  salient  points  of 
history,  explaining  the  present  distribution  of  nations,  origin  of  geographical 
names,  &c. 

MATHEMATICAL  GEOGRAPHY.  — Including  Astronomical,  which  describes 
the  Earth's  position  and  character  among  planets  ;  also  the  Zones,  Parallels,  &c. 

COMPARATIVE  GEOGRAPHY. —Or,  a  system  of  analogy,  connecting  new 
lessons  with  the  previous  ones.  Comparative  sizes  and  latitudes  are  shown  on  the 
margin  of  each  map,  and  all  countries  are  measured  in  the  "  frame  of  Kansas." 

TOPICAL  GEOGRAPHY.  — Consisting  of  questions  for  review,  and  testing 
the  student's  general  and  specific  knowledge  of  the  subject,  with  suggestions  for 
geographical  compositions. 

ANCIENT  GEOGRAPHY.  —  A  section  devoted  to  this  subject,  with  maps,  will 
be  appreciated  by  teachers.  It  is  seldom  taught  in  our  common  schools,  because  it 
has  heretofore  required  the  purchase  of  a  separate  book. 

GRAPHIC  GEOGRAPHY,  or  Map-Drawing  by  Allen's  "Unit  of  Measure- 
nent"  system  (now  almost  universally  recognized  as  without  a  rival),  is  introduced 
throughout  the  lessons,  and  not  as  an  appendix. 

CONSTRUCTIVE  GEOGRAPHY.  —  Or,  Globe-Making.  With  each  book  a  set 
of  map  segments  is  furnished,  with  which  each  student  may  make  his  own  globe  by 
iollowing  the  directions  given. 

RAILROAD  GEOGRAPHY.  —  With  a  grand  commercial  map  of  the  United 
States,  illustrating  steamer  and  railroad  routes  of  travel  in  the  United  States,  submarine 
telegraph  lines,  &c.     Also  a  "  Practical  Tour  in  Europe.'* 


MONTEITH     AND     McNALLY'S     SYSTEM. 

THREE  AND  FIVE  BOOKS.     NATIONAL  COURSE. 

Monteith's  First  Lessons  in  Geography. 
Monteith's  New;Manual  of  Geography. 
McNally's  System  of  Geography. 

The  new  edition  of  McNally's  Geography  is  now  ready,  rewntten  throughout  by 
James  Monteith  and  S.  C  Frost.  In  its  new  dress,  printed  from  new  type,  and  illus- 
trated with  100  new  engravings,  it  is  the  latest,  most  attractive,  as  well  as  the  most 
thoroughly  practical  book  on  geography  extant. 

15 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES  OF  STANDARD  SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


BARNES'S   NEW  GEOGRAPHY. 
Barnes's  Elementary  Geography.  Sm.  4to.  Cloth.  96  pp. 
Barnes's  Complete  Geography.     Quarto.      Cloth.     140 
pages.    320  maps  and  illustrations. 

The  object  in  view,  while  making  this  series  of  books,  was  not  so  much  cheapness  U 
'perfection,  which  is  after  all  the  truest  economy. 

They  give  all  the  instruction  in  geography  which  it  is  necessary  to  teach  From  an 
artistic  point  of  view  they  are  marvellously  beautiful  books,  and  furnish  the  rising  gem 
aration  with  instruments  of  education  far  in  advance  of  anything  hitherto  produced 

The  Elementary  Geography  is  based  upon  the  principle  of  teaching  by  observa- 
tion, and  is  adapted  to  primary  grades. 

The  Complete  Geography  is  adapted  to  the  intermediate  and  higher  grades.  It 
contains  physical,  descriptive,  commercial,  and  industrial  descriptions  of  the  earth's 
surface. 


From  the  Neiu  England  Journal  of 
Education. 

"  These  two  books  form  a  series  of  un- 
equalled beauty  and  perfection  in  the  style 
and  artistic  execution  of  the  numerous 
illustrations,  maps,  and  also  in  the  typo- 
graphical work.  It  is  like  looking  through 
a  portfolio  of  art  sketches  to  examine  and 
note  the  variety,  beauty,  and  appropriate- 
ness of  the  illustrations  of  these  two 
books.  We  fail  to  find  one  illustration 
that  does  not  teach  its  proper  lesson  in  its 
connection  with  the  descriptive  text  of 
the  books.  Too  high  praise  can  hardly  be 
given  to  these  geographies  in  the  depart- 
ment of  design  and  execution  of  the  maps 
and  illustrations.  Fortunate  is  the  edu- 
cational author  who  has  such  artistic 
talent  at  his  command,  and  special  credit 
is  due  to  the  art  department  of  the  pub- 
lishers of  these  books.  But  we  are  aware 
that  perfection  in  the  mere  mechanical 
preparation  of  books  is  not  the  highest 
test  of  their  merit  and  practical  usefulness 
as  school  text-books. 

"  Turning  to  examine  the  methods  of 
instruction  adopted  in  this  series  of  geog- 
raphy, we  find  a  recognition,  not  only  of 
the  best  pedagogical  principles  of  teaching, 
but  an  application  of  the  correct  laws  of 
culture  in  methods  that  give  these  books 
their  true  position  in  the  front  rank  of 
practical  school  books.  In  the  elementary 
book  Mr.  Monieith  leads  the  young  learner 
to  look  at  things  around  him  and  learn  of 
them,  to  observe,  examine,  discover,  in- 
quire. Beginning  at  the  school  grounds 
the  pupils  are  led  to  study  for  themselves 
their  own  town,  city,  county,  state,  coun- 
try, continent,  and  the  world.  The  ad- 
mirably graded  lessons  are  presented  in  a 
natural,  easy,  conversational  style,  calcu- 
lated to  develop  the  reasoning  powers,  as 
well  as  to  stimulate  the  individual  efforts 
of  pupils  to  help  themselves.  We  espe- 
cially commend  to  the  attention  of  teach- 
ers of  primary  schools  the  foot-notes,  the 


writing  exercises  with  language  lessons, 
teaching  by  means  of  journeys  and 
voyages,  etc.,  which  are  found' in  the 
Elementary  Book. 

"  In  the  Complete  Book  we  find  the  ac- 
complished author  has  continued  the  ob- 
servational and  deductive  methods,  begin- 
ning with  facts,  which  are  used  wisely  as 
stepping-stones  to  advanced  knowledge. 
The  physical  features  are  attractively 
presented  in  their  relation  to  the  industries 
of  the  world.  The  illuminated  pictures 
of  the  hemispheres,  showing  the  earth  as 
in  a  painting  or  on  a  relief  globe  ;  the  races 
of  men  in  colors,  showing  features,  com- 
plexions, costumes,  etc.  ;  the  trans-conti- 
nental views,  —  panoramas  of  the  conti- 
nents from  ocean  to  ocean,  —  teaching,  at 
a  glance,  the  physical  features ;  and  the 
admirable  maps,  with  the  names  of 
principal  places  engraved  in  boldfaced 
letters ;  comparative  area,  comparative 
latitude  and  extent,  comparative  tempera- 
ture, comparative  time  of  day  throughout 
the  world,  is  shown  by  means  of  c,lock 
dials,  —  also  the  standard  time  ;  elevations 
of  surface  are  shown  by  sectional  views 
under  the  maps  and  the  small  physical 
charts,  showing  the  products,  seaports, 
highlands,  lowlands,  etc.,  of  the  earth. 
These  are  teatures  of  the  Complete  Book 
worthy  of  special  mention  and  commen- 
dation. The  language  lessons  and  written 
exercises  furnish  valuable  and  interesting 
topical  reviews.  _ 

"  In  examining  these  books,  it  seems  tc 
us  that  both  author  and  publishers  have 
vied  with  each  other  to  make  this  two- 
book  series  of  geography  as  near  perfect  as 
a  study  of  correct  principles  and  methods 
of  teaching,  the  use  of  artistic  skill  in  illus- 
trations and  maps,  the  style  and  arrange- 
ment of  type,  and  good  paper  and  tasteful 
binding  could  secure.  The  books  are  a 
credit  to  American  skill  and  taste.  Wf 
commend  them  to  school  officers  and 
teachers  for  examination  and  use." 


IV 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD  SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


MATHEMATICS. 


DAYIES'S   COMPLETE   SERIES- 

ARITHMETIC. 

Davies'  Primary  Arithmetic. 

Davies'  Intellectual  Arithmetic. 

Davies'  Elements  of  Written  Arithmetic. 

Davies'  Practical  Arithmetic. 

Davies'  University  Arithmetic. 

TWO-BOOK    SERIES. 

First  Book  in  Arithmetic,   Primary  and  Mental. 
Complete  Arithmetic. 

ALGEBRA. 

Davies'   New  Elementary  Algebra. 
Davies'   University  Algebra. 
Davies'   New  Bourdon's  Algebra. 

GEOMETRY. 
Davies'  Elementary  Geometry  and  Trigonometry. 
Davies'   Legendre's  Geometry. 
Davies'   Analytical  Geometry   and  Calculus. 
Davies'   Descriptive  Geometry. 
Davies'   New  Calculus. 

MENSURATION. 
Davies'  Practical  Mathematics  and  Mensuration, 
Davies'  Elements  of   Surveying.      $ 
Davies'   Shades,   Shadows,  and  Perspective. 

MATHEMATICAL   SCIENCE. 

Davies'   Grammar  of  Arithmetic. 

Davies'   Outlines,  of   Mathematical  Science. 

Davies'   Nature  and  Utility  of   Mathematics. 

Davies'    Metric   System. 

Davies  &  Peck's  Dictionary  of  Mathematics. 

20 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES  OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 

DAVIES'   SERIES  —  Continued. 

THE    NEW    SURVEYING. 

Van  Amringe's  Davies'  Surveying. 

By  Charles  Davies,  LL.D.,  author  of  a  Full  Course  of  Mathematics.  Revised  by  J 
Howard  Van  Ainringe,  A.M.,  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Mathematics  iu  Columbia  College 
5*56  pages.     8vo.    Full  sheep. 

Davies'  Surveying  originally  appeared  as  a  text-book  for  the  use  of  the  United  State* 
Military  Academy  at  West  Foint.  It  proved  acceptable  to  a  much  wider  field,  and 
underwent  changes  and  improvements,  until  the  author's  iinal  revision,  and  has  remained 
the  standard  work  on  the  subject  for  many  years. 

In  the  present  edition,  1883,  while  the  admirable  features  which  have  hitherto  com- 
mended the  work  so  highly  to  institutions  of  learning  and  to  practical  surveyors  havs 
been  retained,  some  of  the  topics  have  been  abridged  in  treatment,  and  some  enlarged. 
Others  have  been  added,  and  the  whole  has  been  arranged  in  the  order  of  progressive 
development.  A  change  which  must  prove  particularly  acceptable  is  the  transformation 
of  the  article  on  mining-surveying  into  a  complete  treatise,  in  which  the  location  of 
claims  on  the  surface,  the  latest  and  best  methods  of  underground  traversing,  &c,  the 
calculation  of  ore-reserves,  and  all  that  pertains  to  the  work  of  the  mining-surveyor, 
are  fully  explained  and  illustrated  by  practical  examples.  Immediately  on  the  publica- 
tion of  this  edition  it  was  loudly  welcomed  in  all  quarters.  A  letter  received  as  we 
write,  from  Prof.  R.  C.  Carpenter,  of  the  Michigan  State  Agricultural  College,  says : 
"  I  am  delighted  with  it.  I  do  not  know  of  a  more  complete  work  on  the  subject,  and 
I  am  pleased  to  state  that  it  is  filled  with  examples  of  the  best  methods  of  modern 
practice.  We  shall  introduce  it  as  a  text-book  in  the  college  course. "  This  is  a  fair 
specimen  of  the  general  reception. 

Van  Nostra  ad's  Eclectic  Engineering  Maga- 
zine says :  — 
"  We  find  in  this  new  work  all  that  can 
be  asked  for  in  a  text-book.  If  there  is  a 
better  work  than  this  on  Surveying,  either 
for  students  or  surveyors,  our  attention 
has  not  been  called  to  it." 


Mathematical    Almanac    and     Annual 


"  Davies  is  a  deservedly  popular  author, 
and  his  mathematical  works  are  text- 
books in  many  of  the  leading  schools  and 
colleges." 


THE   NEW    LEGENDRE. 

Van   Amringe's    Davies'    Legendre. 

Elements  of  Geometry  and  Trigonometry.  By  Charles  Davies,  LL.D.  Revised  (1885J 
by  Frof.  J.  H.  Van  Aiming*,  of  Columbia  College.     New  pages.     8vo.     Full  leather. 

The  present  edition  of  the  Legendre  is  the  result  of  a  careful  re-examination  of  the 
work,  into  which  have  been  incorporated  such  emendations  in  the  way  of  greater  clear- 
ness of  expression  or  of  proof  as  could  be  made  without  altering  it  in  form  or  substance. 
Practical  exercises  are  placed  at  the  end  of  the  several  books,  and  comprise  additional 
theorems,  problems,  and  numerical  exercises  upon  the  principles  of  the  Book  or  Books 
preceding.  They  will  be  found  of  great  service  in  accustoming  students,  early  in  and 
throughout  their  course,  to  make  for  themselves  practical  application  of  geometric 
principles,  and  constitute,  in  addition,  a  large  and  excellent  body  of  review  and  test 
questions  for  the  convenience  of  teachers.  The  Trigonometry  and  mensuration  have 
been  carefully  revised  throughout  ;  the  deduction  of  principles  and  rules  has  been  sim- 
plified ;  the  discussion  of  the  several  cases  which  arise  in  the  solution  of  triangles, 
plane  and  spherical,  has  been  made  more  full  and  clear  ;  and  the  whole  has,  in  definition, 
demonstration,  illustration,  &c,  been  made  tp  conform  to  the  latest  and  best  methods. 

It  is  believed  that  in  clearness  and  precision  of  definition,  in  general  simplicity  and 
rigor  of  demonstration,  In  the  judicious  arrangement  of  practical  exercises,  in  orderly 
and  logical  development  of  the  subject,  and  in  compactness  of  form,  Davies'  Legendre 
is  superior  to  any  work  of  its  grade  for  the  general  training  of  the  logical  powers  ol 
pupils,  and  for  their  instruction  in  the  great  body  of  elementary  geometric  truth. 

The  work  has  been  printed  from  entirely  new  plates,  and  no  care  has  been  spared  to 
?r.dke  it  a  model  of  typographical  excellence. 

21 


THE   NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 

■  -  t 

DAVIES'S   NATIONAL   COURSE 
OF   MATHEMATICS- 

ITS    RECORD. 

In  claiming  for  this  series  the  first  place  among  American  text-books,  of  whatever 
class,  the  publishers  appeal  to  the  magnificent  record  which  its  volumes  have  earned 
during  the  thirty-five  years  of  Dr.  Charles  Davies's  mathematical  labors.  The  unremit- 
ting exertions  of  a  life-time  have  placed  the  modern  series  on  the  same  proud  eminence 
among  competitors  that  each  of  its  predecessors  had  successively  enjoyed  in  a  course  of 
constantly  improved  editions,  now  rounded  to  their  perfect  fruition,  —  for  it  seems 
almost  that  this  science  is  susceptible  of  no  further  demonstration. 

During  the  period  alluded  to,  many  authors  and  editors  in  this  department  hpve 
started  into  public  notice,  and,  by  borrowing  ideas  aud  processes  original  with  Dr.  Davie?, 
have  enjoyed  a  brief  popularity,  but  are  now  almost  unknown.  Many  of  the  series  of 
to-day,  built  upon  a  similar  basis,  and  described  as  "modern  books,"  are  destined  to  a 
similar  fate ;  while  the  most  far-seeing  eye  will  find  It  difficult  to  fix  the  time,  on  the 
basis  of  any  data  afforded  by  their  past  history,  when  these  books  will  cease  to  increase 
and  prosper,  and  fix  a  still  firmer  hold  on  the  affection  of  every  educated  American. 

One  cause  of  this  unparalleled  popularity  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  enterprise  of  the 
author  did  not  cease  with  the  original  completion  of  his  books.  Always  a  practical 
teacher,  he  has  incorporated  in  his  text-books  from  time  to  time  the  advantages  of  every 
improvement  in  methods  of  teaching,  and  every  advance  in  science.  During  ail  the 
years  in  which  he  has  been  laboring  he  constantly  submitted  his  own  theories  and  those 
©f  others  to  the  practical  test  of  the  class-room,  approving,  rejecting,  or  modifying 
them  as  the  experience  thus  obtained  might  suggest.  In  this  way  he  has  been  able 
to  produce  an  almost  perfect  series  of  class-books,  in  which  every  department  of 
mathematics  has  received  minute  and  exhaustive  attention. 

Upon  the  death  of  Dr.  Davies,  which  took  place  in  1876,  his  work  was  immediately 
taken  up  by  his  former  pupil  and  mathematical  associate  of  many  year?,  Prof.  W.  G. 
Peck,  L.L.D.,  of  Columbia  College.  By  him,  with  Prof.  J.  H.  Van  Amringe,  of  Columbia 
College,  the  original  series  is  kept  carefully  revised  and  up  to  the  times. 


Davies's  System  is  the  acknowledged  National  Standard  for  the  Unitbd 
States,  for  the  following  reasons  :  — 

1st  It  is  the  basis  of  instruction  in  the  great  national  schools  at  West  Point  and 
Annapolis. 

2d.    It  has  received  the  quasi  indorsement  of  the  National  Congress. 

3d.     It  is  exclusively  used  in  the  public  schools  of  the  National  Capital. 

4th.  The  officials  of  the  Government  use  it  as  authority  in  all  cases  involving  mathe- 
matical questions. 

5th.  Our  great  soldiers  and  sailors  commanding  the  national  armies  and  navies  were 
educated  in  this  system.  So  have  been  a  majority  of  eminent  scientists  in  this  country 
All  these  refer  to  "  Davies  "  as  authority. 

6th.  A  larger  number  of  American  citizens  have  received  their  education  from  this 
than  from  any  other  series. 

7th.  The  series  has  a  larger  circulation  throughout  the  whole  country  than  any  other, 
being  extensively  used  in  every  State  in  the  Union. 

22 


THE  NATIONAL    SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOxjL-BOOKS. 
DAVIES     AND     PECK'S     ARITHMETICS. 

OPTIONAL  OR  CONSECUTIVE. 

The  best  thoughts  of  these  two  illustrious  mathematicians  are  combined  in  the 
following  beautiful  works,  which  are  the  natural  successors  of  Davies's  Arithmetic* 
sumptuously  printed,  and  bound  in  crimson,  green,  and  gold:  — 

Davies  and  Peck's  Brief  Arithmetic. 

Also  called  the  "  Elementary  Arithmetic. "  It  is  the  shortest  presentation  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  is  adequate  for  all  grades  in  common  schools,  being  a  thorough  introduction  to 
practical  life,  except  for  the  specialist. 

At  lirst  the  authors  play  with  the  little  learner  for  a  few  lessons,  by  object-teaching 
and  kindred  allurements  ;  but  he  soon  begins  to  realize  that  study  is  earnest,  as  he 
becomes  familiar  with  the  simpler  operations,  and  is  delighted  to  find  himself  master  of 
important  results. 

The  second  part  reviews  the  Fundamental  Operations  on  a  scale  proportioned  to 
the  enlarged  intelligence  of  the  learner.  It  establishes  the  General  Principles  and 
Properties  of  Numbers,  and  then  proceeds  to  Fractions.  Currency  and  the  Metric 
System  are  fully  treated  in  connection  with  Decimals.  Compound  Numbers  and  Re- 
duction follow,  and  finally  Percentage  with  all  its  varied  applications. 

An  Index  of  words  and  principles  concludes  the  book,  lor  which  every  scholar  and 
most  teachers  will  be  grateful.  How  much  time  has  been  spent  in  searching  for  a  half- 
forgotten  definition  or  principle  in  a  former  lesson  ! 

Davies  and  Peck's  Complete  Arithmetic. 

This  work  certainly  deserves  its  name  in  the  best  sense.  Though  complete,  it  is  not, 
like  most  others  which  bear  the  same  title,  cumbersome.  These  authors  excel  in  clear, 
lucid  demonstrations,  teaching  the  science  pure  and  simple,  yet  not  ignoring  convenient 
methods  and  practical  applications. 

For  turning  out  a  thorough  business  man  no  other  work  is  so  well  adapted.  He  will 
have  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  science  as  a  whole,  and  a  working  acquaintance 
with  details  which  must  serve  him  well  in  al1  emergencies.  Distinguishing  features  of 
the  book  are  the  logical  progression  of  the  subjects  and  the  great  variety  of  practical 
problems,  not  puzzles,  which  are  beneath  the  dignity  of  educational  science.  A  clear- 
minded  critic  has  said  o;  Dr.  Peck's  work  that  it  is  free  from  that  juggling  with 
numbers  which  some  authors  falsely  call  "  Analysis."  A  series  of  Tables  for  converting 
ordinary  weights  aud  measures  into  the  Metric  System  appear  in  the  later  editions. 


PECK'S    ARITHMETICS. 
Peck's  First  Lessons  in  Numbers. 

This  book  begins  with  pictorial  illustrations,  and  unfolds  gradually  the  science  of 
numbers.  It  noticeably  simplifies  the  subject  by  developing  the  principles  of  addition 
and  subtraction  simultaneously  ;  as  it  does,  also,  those  of  multiplication  and  division. 

Peck's  Manual  of  Arithmetic. 

This  book  is  designed  especially  lor  those  who  seek  sufficient  instruction  to  carry 
them  successfully  through  practical  life,  but  have  not  time  for  extended  study. 

Peck's  Complete  Arithmetic. 

This  completes  the  series  but  is  a  much  briefer  book  than  most  of  the  complete 
arithmetics,  and  is  recommended  not  only  for  what  it  contains,  but  also  for  what  is 
omitted. 

It  may  be  said  of  Dr.  Peck's  books  more  truly  than  of  any  other  series  published,  that 
they  are  clear  and  simple  in  definition  and  rule,  and  that  superfluous  matter  of  every 
kind  has  been  faithfully  eliminated,  thus^nagnifying  the  working  value  of  the  book 
and  saving  unnecessary  expense  of  time  and  labor. 

23 


THE  NATIONAL    SERIES   OF   STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


BARNES'S   NEW  MATHEMATICS. 

In  this  series  Joseph  Ficklin,  Ph.  D.,  Professor  of  Mathematics  and  Astronomy 
in  the  University  of  Missouri,  lias  combined  all  the  best  and  latest  results  of  practical 
aud  experimental  teaching  of  arithmetic  with  the  assistance  of  many  distinguished] 
oiathematical  authors.  * 


Barnes's  Elementary  Arithmetic. 
Barnes's  National  Arithmetic. 

These  two  works  constitute  a  complete  arithmetical  course  in  tvjo  boohs. 

They  meet  the  demand  for  text-books  that  will  help  students  to  acquire  the  greatest 
amount  of  useful  and  practical  kuowledge  of  Arithmetic  by  the  smallest  expenditure  of 
time,  labor,  and  money.  Nearly  every  topic  in  Written  Arithmetic  is  introduced,  and  its 
principles  illustrated,  by  exercises  in  Oral  Arithmetic.  The  free  use  of  Equations  ;  the 
concise  method  of  combining  and  treating  Properties  of  Numbers;  the  treatment  of 
Multiplication  and  Division  of  Fractions  in  two  cases,  and  then  reduced  to  one;  Can- 
cellation by  the  use  of  the  vertical  line,  especially  in  Fractions,  Interest,  and  Proportion  ; 
the  brief,  simple,  and  greatly  superior  method  of  working  Partial  Payments  by  the 
"Time  Table  "  and  Cancellation;  the  substitution  of  formulas  to  l  threat  extent  n>r 
rules  ;  the  full  and  practical  treatment  of  the  Metric  System,  &c,  indicate  their  com- 
pleteness. A  variety  of  methods  and  processes  for  the  sume  topic,  which  deprive  the 
pupil  of  the  great  benefit  of  doing  a  part  of  the  thinking  and  labor  for  himself,  have 
been  discarded.  The  statement  of  principles,  definitionsj  rules,  &c,  is  brief  and  simple. 
The  illustrations  and  methods  are  explicit,  direct,  and  practical.  The  great  number 
«nd  variety  of  Examples  embody  the  actual  business  of  the  day.  The  very  large 
amount  of  matter  condensed  in  so  small  a  compass  has  been  accomplished  by  econo- 
mizing every  line  of  space,  by  rejecting  superfluous  matter  and  obsolete  terms,  and  by 
avoiding  the  repetition  of  analyses,  explanations,  and  operations  in  the  advanced  topics 
which  have  been  used  in  the  more  elementary  parts  of  these  books. 

AUXILIARIES. 

For  use  in  district  schools,  and  for  supplying  a  text-book  in  advanced  work  for 
classes  having  finished  the  course  as  given  in  the  ordinary  Practical  Arithmetics,  the 
National  Arithmetic  has  been  divided  and  bound  separately,  as  follows  :  — 

Barnes's  Practical  Arithmetic. 

Barnes's  Advanced  Arithmetic. 

In  many  schools  there  are  classes  that  for  various  reasons  never  reach  beyond 
Percentage.  It  is  just  such  cases  where  Barnes's  Practical  Arithmetic  will  answer  a 
good  purpose,  at  a  price  to  the  pupil  much  less  than  to  buy  the  complete  book.  On  the 
other  hand,  classes  having  finished  the  ordinary  Practical  Arithmetic  can  proceed 
with  the  higher  course  by  using  Barnes's  Advanced  Arithmetic. 

For  primary  schools  requiring  simply  a  table  book,  and  the  earliest  rudiments 
forcibly  presented  through  object-teaching  and  copious  illustrations,  we  have 
prepared 

Barnes's  First  Lessons  in  Arithmetic, 
which  begins  with  the  most  elementary  notions  of  numbers,  and  proceeds,  by  simpl* 
ileps,  to  develop  all  the  fundamental  principles  of  Arithmetic. 


Barnes's  Elements  of  Algebra. 

This  work,  as  its  title  indicates,  is  elementary  in  its  character  and  suitable  for  us* 
1)  in  such  public  schools  as  gWe  instruction  in  the  Elements  of  Algebra  :  (2)  in  institu- 
tions of  learning  whose  courses  of  study  do  not  include  Higher  Algebra  ;  (3)  in  school* 
whose  object  is  to  prepare  students  for  entrance  into  our  colleges  and  universities, 
ibis  book  will  also  meet  the  wants  of  students  of  Physics  who  require  some  knowledge  erf 

24 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


Algebra.  The  student's  progress  in  Algebra  depends  very  largely  upon  the  proper  treat- 
ment of  the  four  Fundamental  Operations.  The  terms  Addition,  Subtraction,  Multiplication, 
and  Division  in  Algebra  have  a  wider  meaning  than  in  Arithmetic,  and  these  operations 
have  been  so  defined  as  to  include  their  arithmetical  meaning  ;  so  that  the  beginner 
is  sinrply  called  upon  to  enlarge  his  views  of  those  fundamental  operations.  Much 
attention  has  been  given  to  the  explanation  of  the  negative  sign,  iu  order  to  remove  the 
well-known  difficulties  in  the  use  and  interpretation  of  that  sign.  Special  attention  is 
bere  called  to  "  A  Short  Method  of  Removing  Symbols  of  Aggregation,"  Art.  76.  On 
account  of  their  importance,  the  subjects  of  Factoring,  Qrentrtt  Common  Dirisor,  and 
Least  Common  Multifile  have  been  treated  at  greater  length  than  is  usual  in  elementary 
works.  In  the  treatment  of  Fractions,  a  method  is  used  which  is  quite  simple,  and, 
it  tl/e  same  time,  more  general  than  that  usually  employed.  In  connection  with  Rudienl 
Quantities  the  roots  are  expressed  by  fractional  exponents,  for  the  principles  and  rules 
applicable  to  integral  exponents  may  then  be  used  without  modification.  The  Equation 
is  made  the  chief  subject  of  thought  in  this  work.  It  is  defined  near  the  beginning, 
and  used  extensively  in  every  chapter.  In  addition  to  this,  four  chapters  are  devoted 
exclusively  to  the  subject  of  Equations.  All  Proportions  are  equations,  and  in  their 
treatment  as  such  all  the  difficulty  commonly  connected  with  the  subject  of  Proportion 
disappears.  The  diapter  on  Logarithms  will  doubtless  be  acceptable  to  many  teachers 
who  do  not  require  the  student  to  master  Higher  Algebra  before  entering  upon  the 
study  of  Trigonometry. 


HIGHER     MATHEMATICS. 
Peck's  Manual  of  Algebra. 

Bringing  the  methods  of  Bourdon  within  the  range  of  the  Academic  Course. 

Peck's  Manual  of  Geometry. 

By  a  method  purely  practical,  and  unembarrassed  by  the  details  which  rather  confuse 
than  simplify  science. 

Peck's  Practical  Calculus. 
Peck's  Analytical  Geometry. 
Peck's  Elementary  Mechanics. 
Peck's  Mechanics,  with  Calculus. 

The  briefest  treatises  on  these  subjects  now  published.  Adopted  by  the  great  Univer- 
sities :  Yale,  Harvard,  Columbia,  Princeton,  Cornell,  &c. 

Macnie's  Algebraical  Equations. 

Serving  as  a  complement  to  the  more  advanced  treatises  on  Algebra,  giving  special 
attention  to  the  analysis  and  solution  of  equations  with  numerical  coefficients. 

Church's  Elements  of  Calculus. 

Church's  Analytical  Geometry. 

Church's  Descriptive  Geometry.     With  plates.     Z  vols. 

These  volumes  constitute  the  "West  Point  Course  "in  their  several  departments 
Prof.  Church  was  long  the  eminent  professor  of  mathematics  at  West  Point  Military 
Academy,  and  his  works  are  standard  in  all  the  leading  colleges. 

Courtenay's  Elements  of  Calculus. 

A  standard  work  of  the  very  highest  grade,  preseating  the  most  elaborate  attainable 
survey  of  the  subject 

Hackley's  Trigonometry. 

With  applications  to  Navigation  and  Surveying,  Nautical  and  Practical  Geometry, 
and  Geodesy. 

25 


THL    NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


BARNES'S   ONE-TERM    HISTORY 
SERIES. 


United 


A    Brief     History- 
States. 

This  is  probably  the  most  original  school-book  pub- 
lished for  many  years,  in  any  department, 
claims  are  the  following  :  — 

i.  Brevity.  —  The  text  is  complete  for  grammar  school 
or  intermediate  classes,  in  290  12mo  pages,  large  type. 
It  may  readily  be  completed,  if  desired,  in  one  term  oi 
study. 

2.  Comprehensiveness.  —  Though  so  brief,  this  book 
contains  the  pith  of  all  the  wearying  contents  of  the  larger 
manuals,  and  a  great  deal  more  than  the  memory  usually 
retains  from  the  latter. 

3.  Interest  has  been  a  prime  consideration.  Small 
books  have  heretofore  been  bare,  full  of  dry  statistics,  unattractive.  This  one  is 
charmingly  written,  replete  with  anecdote,  and  brilliant  with  illustration. 

4.  Proportion  of  Events.  —  It  is  remarkable  for  the  discrimination  with  which 
the  different  portions  of  our  history  are  presented  according  to  their  importance.  Thus 
the  older  works,  being  already  large  books  when  the  Civil  War  took  place,  give  it  less 
space  than  that  accorded  to  the  Revolution. 

5.  Arrangement.  —  In  six  epochs,  entitled  respectively,  Discovery  and  Settlement, 
the  Colonics,  the  Revolution,  Growth  of  States,  the  Civil  War,  and  Current  Events. 

6.  Catch  "Words.  —  Each  paragraph  is  preceded  by  its  leading  thought  in  promi- 
nent type,  standing  in  the  student's  mind  for  the  whole  paragraph. 

7.  Key  Notes.  —  Analogous  with  this  is  the  idea  of  grouping  battles,  &c,  about 
some  central  event,  which  relieves  the  sameness  so  common  in  such  descriptions,  and 
renders  each  distinct  by  some  striking  peculiarity  of  its  own. 

8.  Foot-Notes.  —  These  are  crowded  with  interesting  matter  that  is  not  strictly  a 
part  of  history  proper.  They  may  be  learned  or  not,  at  pleasure.  They  are  certain 
in  any  event  to  be  read. 

9.  Biographies  of  all  the  leading  characters  are  given  in  full  in  foot-notes. 

10.  Maps.  —  Elegant  and  distinct  maps  from  engravings  on  copper-plate,  and  beauti- 
fully *olored,  precede  each  epoch,  and  contain  all  the  places  named. 

11.  Questions  are  at  the  back  of  the  book,  to  compel  a  more  independent  use  of  the 
text.  Both  text  and  questions  are  so  worded  that  the  pupil  must  give  intelligent 
answers  w  his  own  words.     "  Yes  "  and  "  No  "  will  not  do. 


27 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES  OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


Primary  History  ot  the  United  States. 

Beautifully  illustrated.    A  fitting 


For  Intermediate  Classes.     12mo.    225  pages 
introduction  to  Barnes's  Historical  ISeries. 
From,  Prof.  C.  W.  Richards,  High 

School,  Oswego,  N  Y. 
"  I  think  it  an  admirable  book  " 


From  D.  Beach,   jf  Gibbons  &  BmcIi,  20 
West  59th  Street,  N.Y.  City. 
"The   little   History  is  to  me  a  very 
attractive  book.'1 


From  Prof. 


C.  D 

ville, 


Larkins, 
N.Y. 


Fayette- 


"  It  is  the  only  Primary  History  that  I 
ever  saw  that  I  liked." 

From  Prot.  L.  R.  Hopkins,  Weedsport, 
N.Y. 
"  I  think  Barnes's  Primary  History  by 
far  the  best  I  ever  saw." 

From  Prof.  Richard  H.  Lewis,  Kingston 
(  ollege,  N.  C. 
"  The  subject  matter  is  very  good,  and 
shows  remarkable  condensing  power  in 
the  author." 

From  Prof.  Edward  Smith,  Supt.  of 
Sclwols,  Syracuse,  N.  Y. 

"It  is  a  very  interesting  and  pretty 
book.  I  should  like  it  very  much  for 
supplementary  reading.'' 

From  General  Horatio  C.  King, 
Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 

"I  am  especially  pleased  with  the  new 
Primary  History,  which  is  remarkably 
concise  and  interesting  and  free,  from 
partisan  bias." 

From  Prof   S.  G.  Harris,  Dryden,  N.  Y. 

"  Having  a  few  days'  vacation  I  found 
time  to  carefully  examine  the  Primary 
History  you  sent  me  and  am  highly  de- 
lighted with  it.  It  will  satisfy  a  long- 
felt  want." 

From  the  Neiv  Enoland  Jour- 
nal of  Education. 

"The  book  is  printed  in 
the  best  type,  ot.  the  finest 
paper,  and  is  illustrated  in 
the  most  superb,  even  sump- 
tuous manner.  Any  child 
who  studies  this  exceptional- 
ly beautiful  little  book  will 
unavoidably  have  a  higher 
regard  for  his  country  on 
account  of  the  superior  and 
charming  character  of  the 
keok." 


28* 


From  Mr.  H.  H.  Smith,  Prest.  Board  ef 

Education,  Vineyard  Haven,  Mass. 
M  I  should  think  you  would  feel  proud 
of  the  work. " 

FromDn.  Eugene  Bouton,  Albany,  N.Y. 

"  I  must  congratulate  every  one  on  the 
publication  of  this  beautiful  History.1' 

From  Prof.  H.  C.  Talmadge,  Wood- 
bury, Ct. 

"It  is  the  book  that  I  have  been  look- 
ing for  quite  a  long  time." 

From  Prof.  L.  C.  Foster.  Supt.  of 

Schools,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
"  It  is  indeed  a  very  beautiful  book, 
and  it  seems  to  me  well  adapted  for  use 
in  the  lower  grammar  grades." 

From  Prof.  F.  H.  Hall,  Sinclairville, 
N.  Y. 

"This  History  is  the  best  thing  of  the 
kind  I  have  ever  seen  How  it  could  be 
improved  I  do  not  see." 

From  Prof.  J.   C    Crttikshank,  Supt.  oj 
Education,  Passaic  Co. ,  N.J. 
"  It  is  the  book  needed,  and  will  fill  the 
gap  of  early  historical  instruction  in  the 
schools." 

From  Prof.  S.  R  Morse,  Supt.  of  Educa- 
tion, Atlantic  Co. ,  N.J. 
"  I  have  examined   Barnes's    Primary 
History  of  the  United  States  and  find  it 
just  what  we  have  wanted  in  our  schools. " 

FromB..  E.  Perkins,  School  Commissioner, 
Livingston  Co.,  N.Y. 
"  I  *hink  it  the  be<t  Primary  United 
States  History  that  I  ever  examined,  and 
will  recommend  it  to  my  teachers." 

From  The  Indiana  School 
^^^  -    Journal. 

11  This  book,  comprised  in 
225  pages,  is  what  its  title 
indicates,  primary  in  matter 
and  manner  of  treatment,  and 
not  simply  an  abbreviation 
of  a  large  book.  By  not  at- 
tempting everything  there  is 
space  for  a  fuller  discussion 
of  the  more  important  points. 
The  author  has  clearly  dis- 
criminated between  simplicity 
of  style  and  simple  thought." 


u  » 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES  OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


#1  'I 


A  Brief  History  of  An- 
cient Peoples. 


With  an  account  of  their  monuments, 
literature,  and  manners.  340  pages 
12mo.     Profusely  illustrated. 

In  this  work  the  political  history, 
which  occupies  nearly,  if  not  all, 
the  ordinary  school  text,  is  condensed 
to  the  salient  and  essential  facts,  in 
order  to  give  room  for  a  clear  outline 
of  the  literature,  religion,  architecture, 
character,  habits,  &c,  of  each  nation. 
Surely  it  is  as  important  to  knowsome- 
tking  about  Plato  as  all  about  Csesar, 
and  to  learn  how  the  ancients  wrote 
their  books  as  how  they  fought  their 
battles. 

The  chapters  on  Manners  and  Cus- 
toms  and  the  Scenes  in  Real  Life  repre- 
sent the  people  of  history  as  men  and 
women  subject  to  the  same  wants,  hopes 
and  fears  as  ourselves,  and  so  bring  the  distant  past  near  to  us.  The  Scenes,  which  are 
intended  only  for  reading,  are  the  result  of  a  careful  study  of  the  unequalled  collections  of 
monuments  in  the  London  and  Berlin  Museums,  of  the  ruins  in  Rome  and  Pompeii,  and 
of  the  latest  authorities  on  the  domestic  life  of  ancient  peoples.  Though  intentionally 
written  hi  a  semi-romantic  style,  they  are  accurate  pictures  of  what  might  have  occurred, 
and  some  of  them  are  simple  transcriptions  of  the  details  sculptured  in  Assyrian 
alabaster  or  painted  on  Egyptian  wall's. 

29 


THE  NATIONAL   SERIES   OF  STANDARD   SCHOOL-BOOKS. 


HISTORY  —  Continued. 

The  extracts  made  from  the  sacred  books  of  the  East  are  not  specimens  of  their  style 
and  teachings,  but  only  gems  selected  often  from  a  mass  of  matter,  much  of  which  would 
be  absurd,  meaningless,  and  even  revolting.  It  has  not  seemed  best  to  cumber  a  book 
like  this  with  selections  conveying  no  moral  lesson. 

The  numerous  cross-references,  the  abundant  dates  in  parenthesis,  the  pronunciation 
of  the  names  in  the  Index,  the  choice  reading  references  at  the  close  of  each  general 
subject,  and  the  novel  Historical  Recreations  in  the  Appendix,  will  be  of  service  to 
teacher  and  pupil  alike. 

Though  designed  primarily  for  a  text-book,  a  large  class  of  persons  —  general  readers, 
who  desire  to  know  something  about  the  progress  of  historic  criticism  and  die  recent 
discoveries  made  among  the  resurrected  monuments  of  the  East,  but  have  no  leisure  to 
read  the  ponderous  volumes  of  Brugsch,  Layard,  Grote,  Momrusen,  and  Ihne  —  will  find 
this  volume  just  what  they  need. 


From,  Homer  B.    Sprague,  Heal  Master 
Girls'  High  School,  West  Newton  St. ,  Bos- 
ton, Mass. 
**  I  beg  to  recommend  in  strong  terms 

the    adoption    of   Barnes's   'History    of 


Ancient  Peoples'  as  a  text-book.  It  is 
about  as  nearly  perfect  as  could  be 
hoped  for.  The  adoption  would  give 
great  relish  to  the  study  of  Ancient 
History." 


HE  Brief  History  of  France. 


By  the  author  of  the  "  Brnf  United  States," 
with  all  the  attractive  features  of  that  popu- 
lar work  (which  see)  and  new  ones  of  its  own. 
It  is   believed  that  the  History  of  France 
has    never    before   been    presented    in    such 
,     brief  compass,  and  this   is  effected  without 
*(\>lr^    $^8^\*TOf       ~^1M^ sa('riHcino  one  particle  of  interest.    The  book 

reads  like  a  romance,  and,  while  drawing  the 
student  by  an  irresistible  fascination  to  his 
task,  impresses  the  great  outlines  indelibly  upon  the  memory. 


Of    tn. 

UWVfiftS 


ex 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 

R^-tfW, 

nAT         it   IftCTI 

OCT    7  ftl 

9Ju!'62JR 

KEC'D  LD 

JUN  2  5  1962 

- 

• 

LD  21-100m-6,'56                                 TT   . Gen.eral  Library 
( B931 1  slO ) 476                                                    B^kile^    °fma 

«M 


YB  23098 


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